Complaint Requesting Fast Track Processing of Exelon Corporation (prompt capacity auction from the 2030/31 Delivery Year)
Topics in the text: Reliability and curtailment · Filing procedure · Connecting load and generation
What the document says
PDF p. 8
Exelon asks FERC to replace the three-year forward auction with a prompt auction.
direct PJM to establish a just and reasonable “prompt” auction schedule, to run two months before a given Delivery Year, starting with the 2030/2031 Delivery Year and continuing PDF p. 8
PDF p. 5
Exelon wants an order by January 31, 2027 and a January 1, 2027 refund date.
Exelon respectfully requests that the Commission establish a refund effective date of January 1, 2027, and permit Fast Track processing under Rule 206(h) to facilitate a Commission order by no later than January 31, 2027 PDF p. 5
PDF p. 5
Exelon says its remedy would not touch the December 2026 auction or any backstop procurement.
nothing in this complaint is intended to apply to, or otherwise disrupt the implementation of, the 2029/2030 Delivery Year BRA, which is scheduled to run in December 2026, nor any Reliability Backstop Procurement PDF p. 5
PDF p. 21
Exelon says data center growth makes the three-year load forecast structurally uncertain.
this is not a modeling failure; it reflects a structural shift in forecast uncertainty driven almost entirely by the nature and size of data center load growth in PDF p. 21
PDF p. 19
Exelon says data center growth makes the three-year load forecast structurally uncertain.
are nonetheless bound by RPM’s requirement to predict reality years into the future PDF p. 19
PDF p. 22
Exelon says over-forecast large load raises capacity costs for all customers.
the three-year RPM forward period and assumptions about large load growth, principally from data centers, are likely to overstate the peak load forecast that PJM uses to determine the Reliability Requirement PDF p. 22
PDF p. 22
Exelon says over-forecast large load raises capacity costs for all customers.
if a portion of the large loads included in the load forecast used in the BRA do not materialize, capacity costs will increase for all customers. PDF p. 22
PDF p. 24
Exelon puts a normal 1% to 2% forecast error at $6 to $12 billion.
This translates to approximately $6 to $12 billion in change in total capacity costs to customers resulting from a historically “normal” level of load forecast error PDF p. 24
PDF p. 6
Exelon says this moves the 2030/31 auction from May 2027 to about March 2030.
it will functionally push out the date of the BRA for the 2030/31 Delivery Year, currently scheduled for May 2027, to approximately March 2030 PDF p. 6
PDF p. 7
Exelon notes recent auctions cleared at the price cap yet fell short of the reserve target.
the 2027/2028 and 2028/2029 Delivery Year BRAs clearing at the temporary Commission-approved price cap and simultaneously falling thousands of MWs short of PJM’s target Installed Reserve Margin. PDF p. 7
PDF p. 12
Exelon says new capacity cannot be built within three years, undercutting the 2006 rationale.
The risk balancing analysis the Commission relied on in 2006 to accept the load forecast inaccuracies inherent in RPM’s multi-year forward period has fundamentally collapsed in 2026. PDF p. 12
PDF p. 25
Exelon says new capacity cannot be built within three years, undercutting the 2006 rationale.
approximately 24 GW of planned generation with fully executed interconnection agreements have terminated their agreements before reaching commercial operation, including 13.5 GW of natural gas capacity. PDF p. 25
PDF p. 12
Exelon says ISO-NE, NYISO and MISO already run prompt auctions, so PJM would align.
Action by the Commission in this proceeding will align PJM’s capacity auction schedule with all other Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators PDF p. 12
PDF p. 13
Exelon says a prompt auction improves ELCC data and the price signal for retirements.
A prompt auction will significantly enhance the quality of data used in PJM’s ELCC capacity accreditation PDF p. 13
PDF p. 52
Exelon says a prompt auction improves ELCC data and the price signal for retirements.
it increases the economic efficiency of resource exit from the market. PDF p. 52
PDF p. 9
Exelon concedes the complaint fixes one defect, not the whole capacity market.
the targeted surgery requested in this complaint will not heal all that ails RPM. PDF p. 9
PDF p. 7
Exelon cites FERC's September 30 finding that RPM has not kept pace with large load.
“[w]e think it clear that PJM’s ordinary instrument for procuring sufficient capacity to meet PJM’s reliability requirement, the RPM, has failed to keep pace with the unprecedented influx of large load into PDF p. 7
Responses and related views
No section-specific public response is linked for this document.
Source sections
Printed headings where available; page ranges otherwise. Excerpts below are selected from the text by keyword.
Opening text
opening text
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION Exelon Corporation, ) ) Complainant ) ) v. ) Docket No.Read this passage
Table of Contents
printed heading
Table of Contents -i- I.Read this passage
A. The Current Three-Year Forward Period of RPM is No Longer Just and
printed heading
The current three-year forward period undermines the accuracy of other BRA planning parameters, including the assumed resource mix in each Locational Deliverability Area used to calculate CETO/CETL values, leading to unjust and unreasonable results. .. 44Read this passage
B. The Commission Should Adopt a Prompt Auction Schedule as the Just and
printed heading · Topic match: Reliability and curtailment
B.Read this passage
C. Whether the matters are pending in any other FERC proceeding or other
printed heading · Topic match: Reliability and curtailment
FERC, 96 F.4th 390 (3d Cir. 2024). 3 market signals.9 Second, it will functionally push out the date of the BRA for the 2030/31 Delivery Year, currently scheduled for May 2027, to approximately March 2030, thereby preventing Exelon’s customers, and PJM customers at large, from being exposed to the…Read this passage
I. INTRODUCTION
PDF bookmark
I.Read this passage
INTRODUCTION
printed heading · Topic match: Reliability and curtailment
The Board recognized that the market’s current price volatility—while economically rational—is placing unsustainable stress on the governmental compact that allows the market to function, and that the foundational assumptions of the Reliability Pricing Model design must be reexamined in a…Read this passage
II. PARTIES AND COMMUNICATIONS
PDF bookmark
II.Read this passage
A. Complainant Exelon
PDF bookmark
Complainant Exelon Exelon is one of the nation’s largest utility holding companies, providing transmission and distribution service to nearly 11 million customers in the PJM Region through its regulated subsidiaries Atlantic City Electric Company (“ACE”), Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (“BGE”),…Read this passage
B. Respondent PJM
PDF bookmark
Respondent PJM PJM is the nation’s largest RTO, coordinating the movement of wholesale electricity in all or parts of 13 states and the District of Columbia.22 As an RTO, PJM is responsible for the reliability of the high-voltage transmission system serving 68 million people in all or parts of…Read this passage
C. Communications
PDF bookmark
K&L Gates LLP Washington, D.C. 20068 1601 K Street, NW (667) 313-0421 Washington, DC 20006 jordan.kwok@exeloncorp.com (202) 778-9000 thomas.devita@klgates.com Alejandro Bautista kimberly.frank@klgates.com Assistant General Counsel stuart.robbins@klgates.com Exelon Corporation 2301 Market Street…Read this passage
III. Background
PDF bookmark
III.Read this passage
BACKGROUND
printed heading
BACKGROUND The concept of a multi-year forward period for RPM first emerged in PJM’s August 2005 Initial RPM Proposal,24 and was designed to address one of several core deficiencies with PJM’s then-existing capacity construct—namely that, as PJM explained, the construct did “not look far enough…Read this passage
IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT
PDF bookmark
IV.Read this passage
A. The Current Three-Year Forward Period of RPM is No Longer Just and Reasonable.
PDF bookmark
The Current Three-Year Forward Period of RPM is No Longer Just and Reasonable.Read this passage
i. The risk balancing analysis the Commission relied on in 2006 to accept the load forecast inaccuracies inherent in RPM’s multi-year forward period has fundamentally collapsed in 2026.
PDF bookmark
It is worth noting that the three-year forward period of RPM is functionally a “three year + one year” estimate and commitment by customers. 37 Id., at P 71 (emphasis added). 38 See Tariff, Definitions R-S (“Reference Resource” shall mean a combustion turbine generating station, configured with a…Read this passage
a. Evidence that PJM Load Forecast Inaccuracies Have Increased Since 2006.
PDF bookmark · Topic match: Reliability and curtailment
Nicholson explains, the three-year RPM forward period and assumptions about large load growth, principally from data centers, are likely to overstate the peak load forecast that PJM uses to determine the Reliability Requirement and the amount of capacity that PJM must procure in the BRA.44 This can…Read this passage
b. Evidence that Capacity Resources cannot be constructed in the PJM Region within the current three-year cycle.
PDF bookmark · Topic match: Connecting load and generation
Evidence that Capacity Resources cannot be constructed in the PJM Region within the current three-year cycle.Read this passage
ii. The prospective assumptions in 2006 regarding the ability of RPM’s multi-year forward period to incentivize LSE bilateral contracting and risk hedging have been disproven over the course of 20 years.
PDF bookmark
Nicholson, a New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (“NJBPU”) examination of the PJM capacity market explained that federal legal restrictions limit the types of bilateral contracting the state of New Jersey can engage in to procure capacity bilaterally on a long-term basis outside of the RPM.75 The…Read this passage
iii. The current three-year forward period inhibits efficient resource exit and Deactivation, as it requires generation owners to invest in the absence of reasonable predictability in future operational capability and environmental policy.
PDF bookmark
Under PJM’s Capacity Performance construct, cleared Capacity Resources with RPM commitments are required to be available to operate throughout the Delivery Year, pursuant to RPM’s must-offer requirements.Read this passage
a. Operational Uncertainties
PDF bookmark · Topic match: Credit and exit
In PJM, this fact can be seen in the scale of identified project investment for units 33 that are required to continue operations via Reliability Must-Run (“RMR”) arrangements with the RTO.Read this passage
b. Environmental Policy Uncertainties
PDF bookmark
Nicholson explains, under PJM’s Capacity Performance construct, this uncertainty is reflected in a resource’s CPQR component of a capacity sell offer, meaning that the three-year forward period directly inflates the risk premium that owners of resources near the end of their economic life must…Read this passage
iv. PJM’s current capacity accreditation methodology (ELCC) bears no resemblance to the eFORd model considered by the Commission in 2006, and the three-year forward period forces PJM to integrate speculative assumptions into its ELCC modeling.
PDF bookmark
Nicholson, the process by which PJM implements the ELCC model involves an extraordinary amount of data and analysis.97 Specifically, ELCC class accreditations are derived from sophisticated probabilistic modeling that estimates each resource class’s reliability contribution across a wide range of…Read this passage
v. The current three-year forward period undermines the accuracy of other BRA planning parameters, including the assumed resource mix in each Locational Deliverability Area used to calculate CETO/CETL values, leading to unjust and unreasonable results.
PDF bookmark
The current three-year forward period undermines the accuracy of other BRA planning parameters, including the assumed resource mix in each Locational Deliverability Area used to calculate CETO/CETL values, leading to unjust and unreasonable results.Read this passage
B. The Commission Should Adopt a Prompt Auction Schedule as the Just and Reasonable Replacement Rate.
PDF bookmark
In the event that the Commission finds the three-year forward period of RPM to be unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential under FPA section 206, Exelon proposes the Commission direct PJM to adopt as a replacement rate a “prompt” BRA schedule, to run two months before a given…Read this passage
i. A prompt auction will significantly improve the accuracy of key BRA auction parameters, resulting in capacity prices that better reflect actual supply and demand fundamentals and system conditions in the Delivery Year.
PDF bookmark · Topic match: Filing procedure
A prompt auction will significantly improve the accuracy of key BRA auction parameters, resulting in capacity prices that better reflect actual supply and demand fundamentals and system conditions in the Delivery Year.Read this passage
ii. A prompt auction will significantly enhance the quality of information and the accuracy of the price signal used in generator Deactivation decisions.
PDF bookmark · Topic match: Reliability and curtailment
By definition, a prompt auction schedule narrows the window across which resource owners must attempt to forecast future operational, environmental, regulatory, and market conditions when deciding whether and how to bid into a BRA and commit their Capacity Resources for a Delivery Year.Read this passage
iii. A prompt auction schedule will significantly enhance the quality of data used in PJM’s ELCC capacity accreditation, thereby better aligning both price and payments with resource contributions to resource adequacy.
PDF bookmark · Topic match: Reliability and curtailment
A prompt auction schedule will significantly enhance the quality of data used in PJM’s ELCC capacity accreditation, thereby better aligning both price and payments with resource contributions to resource adequacy.Read this passage
iv. A prompt auction will significantly reduce the risks to new resources seeking to enter the market by creating more certainty regarding their expected availability for the Delivery Year.
PDF bookmark
A prompt auction will significantly reduce the risks to new resources seeking to enter the market by creating more certainty regarding their expected availability for the Delivery Year.Read this passage
V. REFUND Effective date
PDF bookmark
REFUND EFFECTIVE DATE As discussed above, Exelon respectfully requests that the Commission establish a refund effective date of January 1, 2027, and permit Fast Track processing under Rule 206(h) to facilitate a Commission order by no later than January 31, 2027—currently the last day before the…Read this passage
VI. Rule 206 REQUIREMENTS
PDF bookmark
RULE 206 REQUIREMENTS To the extent not already provided above, Exelon provides the following additional information required by Rule 206 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure.130 Exelon respectfully requests waiver of any part of the Commission’s regulations necessary to process this…Read this passage
A. Good faith estimate of financial impact or harm (Rule 206(b)(4))
PDF bookmark
Good faith estimate of financial impact or harm (Rule 206(b)(4)) The complaint sets forth in detail above the financial impact and harm to PJM Market Participants caused by the three-year forward period of RPM.Read this passage
B. Practical, operational, or nonfinancial impacts (Rule 206(b)(5))
PDF bookmark
Practical, operational, or nonfinancial impacts (Rule 206(b)(5)) The practical, operational, and nonfinancial impacts of the RPM’s three-year forward period are described at length in the sections above.Read this passage
C. Whether the matters are pending in any other FERC proceeding or other forum (Rule 206(b)(6))
PDF bookmark
Whether the matters are pending in any other FERC proceeding or other forum (Rule 206(b)(6)) The issue of whether the three-year forward period of RPM has become unjust and unreasonable under FPA section 206, as presented in this complaint, is not to Exelon’s knowledge pending in any other existing…Read this passage
D. Specific relief or remedy requested (Rule 206(b)(7))
PDF bookmark
Specific relief or remedy requested (Rule 206(b)(7)) The complaint sets forth in detail the specific relief requested.Read this passage
E. Documents supporting the complaint (Rule 206(b)(8))
PDF bookmark
Documents supporting the complaint (Rule 206(b)(8)) This filing consists of the following: • This Transmittal Letter; • Affidavit of Dr.Read this passage
F. Use of alternative dispute resolution (Rule 206(b)(9))
PDF bookmark
Only the Commission has the legal authority to provide the statutory remedy that the complaint requests.Read this passage
G. Notice (Rule 206(b)(10))
PDF bookmark
Notice (Rule 206(b)(10)) Exelon has appended a form of notice of this filing for publication in the Federal Register, in accordance with the specifications in section 385.203(d) of the Commission’s rules.Read this passage
H. Request for Fast Track Processing (Rule 206(b)(11))
PDF bookmark
Request for Fast Track Processing (Rule 206(b)(11)) As described above, Exelon respectfully requests that the Commission permit Fast Track processing under Rule 206(h) to facilitate a Commission order by no later than January 56 31, 2027—currently the last day before the posting of the planning…Read this passage
VII. SERVICE AND NOTICE
PDF bookmark
SERVICE AND NOTICE In accordance with Rule 206(c), Exelon has served a copy of this complaint upon PJM, as Respondent, simultaneously with the filing of the complaint.Read this passage
VIII. Conclusion
PDF bookmark
DeVita Director, Federal Regulatory Affairs Kimberly B.Read this passage
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
printed heading
Lynch Associate General Counsel PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. 2750 Monroe Blvd.Read this passage