{"document":{"slug":"filing-20260717-5258","title":"The Maryland Office of People's Counsel, et al. submit Request for Rehearing of the 06/18/2026 Order","issued":"2026-07-17","accession":"20260717-5258","docket":"EL26-67-001","group":"PJM filings","filer":"Maryland Office of People's CounselOHIO CONSUMERS' COUNSELDELAWARE DIVISION OF THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE ,OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL ,","kind":"request","file":"sources/originals/20260717-5258_01.pdf","url":"https://elibrary.ferc.gov/eLibrary/filelist?accession_Number=20260717-5258","sha256":"55abd0949a9d4b51e70ee8db437454dd4cbeadf4a241c682aaa83db71dad88e6","pages":30,"tokens":8051,"emptyPages":[]},"pages":[{"page":1,"startToken":0,"endToken":244,"text":"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nBEFORE THE \nFEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \n \n \nPJM Interconnection, LLC \nAEP Appalachian Transmission \nCompany, Inc., et al. \n \n \n) \n)   Docket No. EL26-67 \n) \n) \n) \n \nRequest for Rehearing and Clarification of the  \nJoint Consumer Advocates  \n \nThe Maryland Office of People’s Counsel (“MPC”), the Ohio Consumers’ \nCounsel (“OCC”), the Delaware Division of the Public Advocate (“DPA”), and the \nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General (“IOAG”) (collectively, the Joint Consumer \nAdvocates or “JCAs”) respectfully request rehearing and clarification of certain \ndeterminations in Section III.B, “Cost Shifting Risk Among Transmission Customers,” of \nthe Commission’s Order Instituting Proceeding under Section 206 of the Federal Power \nAct (the “Order”).1 The Order recognizes that the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff \n(the “PJM Tariff”) spreads the costs of Network Upgrades driven by large-load \ninterconnections to transmission customers that “neither caused the need for nor benefit \ncommensurately from” those upgrades in violation of the Federal Power Act (“FPA”).2 \nWe agree with and enthusiastically support the Order’s transparency directives because \n \n1 PJM Interconnection, et al., 195 FERC ¶ 61,211 (2026) (“Order”). MPC filed its motion to intervene in \nthis proceeding on July 1, 2026. The OCC filed its motion to intervene on July 9, 2026. The DPA filed its \nmotion to intervene on July 8, 2026. The IOAG filed its motion to intervene in the proceeding on July 7, \n2026. See (doc-less) Motions to Intervene of MPC, OCC, DPA, and IOAG, respectively, in Docket No. \nEL26-67. \n2 Order at PP 79, 81."},{"page":2,"startToken":244,"endToken":501,"text":"2 \n \nthey should expose these cost shifts to state regulators and consumers. But the cost shifts \nidentified by the Order do not originate at the retail level, and the responsibility to cure \nthem cannot lie with state regulators. They are imposed by the PJM Tariff, which only \nthis Commission may reform. \nJust and reasonable rates, whether at wholesale or retail, must protect customers \nfrom bearing costs they did not cause and from which they do not benefit. The Order \nfinds that the PJM Tariff fails to meet that standard. It is arbitrary and capricious and \ncontrary to the FPA for the Commission to conclude that the PJM Tariff is inconsistent \nwith the cost causation and beneficiary principles but then fail to remedy the elements of \nthe tariff that violate those principles. We respectfully request rehearing on the \nCommission’s finding that it “must act to address the risk of cost shifting among \ntransmission customers” but not actual cost shifts among transmission customers that are \nguaranteed by the PJM Tariff.3 \nWe agree with the Commission that, if implemented properly, “additional cost \ntransparency measures . . . will give state public utility commissions . . . the information \nnecessary to allow them to understand which transmission costs are caused by which \ntransmission customers . . . .”4 But identifying a transmission cost alone and mapping it \nto its cause is not self-implementing authority to reallocate a charge set by the PJM \nTariff. The Order’s further finding that transparency will allow state regulators to “sub-\n \n3 Id. at P 68 (emphasis added).  \n4 Id. at P 70 (emphasis added)."},{"page":3,"startToken":501,"endToken":772,"text":"3 \n \nallocate these costs to the appropriate retail customers . . . as they see fit . . .”5 assumes \nflexibility under the PJM Tariff and the FPA.6 The PJM Tariff fixes the charges each \ntransmission customer pays, and a state cannot move costs from one transmission \ncustomer to another. The cost shifts identified by the Order occur between transmission \ncustomers, including those transmission customers whose assets straddle state lines, \nbeyond the jurisdiction of a state commission. The Commission’s finding is arbitrary and \ncapricious because it does not consider how the PJM Tariff confines states to incomplete \nprotection and exposes even those limited measures to legal challenges that transmission \nowners and customers have raised and continue to press today. \nWe also agree with the Commission that cost recovery agreements are necessary \nto ensure that Eligible Customers serving large loads timely pay “the costs incurred to \nprovide them with the requested transmission service, including the costs of any needed \nNetwork Upgrades . . . .”7 But the Order describes two different measures of that cost \nresponsibility without choosing between them. The Order preliminarily finds that a cost \nrecovery agreement should be keyed to the level of transmission service the Eligible \nCustomer requests on behalf of the large load while also finding that the Eligible \nCustomer, “as opposed to other transmission customers” must be ultimately responsible \nfor the costs of any needed Network Upgrades.8 Those two measures diverge whenever \nthe Network Upgrade costs exceed the Network Integration Transmission Service \n \n5 Id. \n6 See id. at P 26 (outlining how PJM Transmission Owners bill Eligible Customers for transmission \nservice). \n7 Id. at P 81. \n8 Id. at PP 80–83."},{"page":4,"startToken":772,"endToken":1038,"text":"4 \n \n(“NITS”) charges attributable to the large load, which they will do, routinely and \nsignificantly. We therefore respectfully request that the Commission clarify the standard \nit will apply to cost recovery agreements filed in response to the Order: An agreement is \njust and reasonable only if it requires the Eligible Customer to pay the full cost of the \nNetwork Upgrades needed to accommodate the large load. \nWe also respectfully request clarification that transmission owners must promptly \ncredit revenue received under cost recovery agreements to the other transmission \ncustomers in the same PJM Transmission Zone. Collection from the Eligible Customer \nserving the large load and protection of other transmission customers are two separate \nproblems, and a cost-recovery agreement addresses only the first. Crediting revenues \nagainst the revenue requirement does not return the shifted costs to the customers who \nbore them.9 A credit must be immediate to ensure that it flows to transmission customers \nwho paid the higher rate when the Network Upgrade entered the revenue requirement. \nBecause the Order’s stated objective is to ensure that Eligible Customers, “as opposed to \nother transmission customers,”10 are ultimately responsible for Network Upgrade costs, \nwe respectfully request that the Commission clarify that transmission owners must \nimmediately credit cost-recovery agreement revenue to other transmission customers. \nA request for rehearing and clarification is appropriate now. Although much of the \nOrder is expressly preliminary, we are concerned that it also may be construed to contain \n \n9 Id. at P 84 (stating that the Commission expects that payments will be “appropriately credited toward \ntransmission owners' transmission revenue requirements . . .”). \n10 Id. at P 80."},{"page":5,"startToken":1038,"endToken":1284,"text":"5 \n \nfinal determinations about jurisdiction and a definitive statement about the scope of the \nCommission’s duty to address the risk of cost shifting among transmission customers.11 \nAssuming they are final, these determinations would “fix[] some legal relationship as a \nconsummation of the administrative process” and are proper subjects of rehearing.12 We \nseek rehearing only of those determinations that could be read as final. Waiting would \ncreate risk without corresponding benefit. Challenges raised later in this proceeding, \nfollowing a Commission order on filings by PJM and the transmission owners, could be \ndismissed as collateral attacks on the Order, jeopardizing our ability to press these \narguments on appeal. \nOur clarification requests, which do not depend on the finality of any \ndetermination, ask the Commission to resolve ambiguities in the manner we request as \nsoon as possible. Delay imposes costs on the very customers that this proceeding seeks to \nprotect. Each Network Upgrade added to a transmission owner’s revenue requirement \nwhile these questions remain open embeds another cost shift, and every cost-recovery \nagreement negotiated against an unsettled standard invites the disputes the Commission \ncould resolve today. \n \n \n11 The Commission’s final jurisdictional findings are at PP 45, 47, 68, and 70. Findings about the \nCommission’s duty to mitigate only risks of cost shifts are in P 68. \n12 MISO, et al., 188 FERC ¶ 61,211 at P 12 (2024) (citing Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Consumer \nProd. Safety Comm’n, 324 F.3d 726, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2003))."},{"page":6,"startToken":1284,"endToken":1542,"text":"6 \n \nI.  \nStatement of Issues and Specifications of Error \nPursuant to Rule 713(c) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, we \nrequest rehearing on the following: \n1. To the extent the Order’s determination of the scope of the Commission’s duty \nunder the FPA constitutes a final determination, the Commission erred by \nrecognizing a duty to address the risk of cost shifting among transmission \ncustomers while failing to remedy the actual cost shifts the PJM Tariff \nguarantees, and by failing to explain why its duty does not extend to those \nactual cost shifts. It is arbitrary and capricious and contrary to the FPA for the \nCommission to find that transmission customers “neither caused the need for \nnor benefit commensurately from” Network Upgrades for large loads but fail \nto order a remedy to the PJM Tariff that prevents those unjust and \nunreasonable cost shifts. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. \nof United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 \n(1983) (agency must “examine the relevant data and articulate a . . . rational \nconnection between the facts found and the choice made”); Ill. Commerce \nComm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 476–77 (7th Cir. 2009) (summarizing cost \ncausation and beneficiary pays principles). \n2. To the extent the Order’s findings regarding state authority over retail cost \nallocation constitute final determinations, the Commission erred by finding that \ntransparency will enable state regulators to sub-allocate Network Upgrade \ncosts to retail customers “as they see fit,” without considering that the PJM"},{"page":7,"startToken":1542,"endToken":1781,"text":"7 \n \nTariff fixes the charges each transmission customer must pay. Order at P 70. \nThe Commission likewise erred in concluding that its approach “respect[s] the \ncooperative federalism approach established under the FPA,” because it could \nassign to states a redistribution of FERC-set charges or could invite states to \napprove transmission rates that conflict with the PJM Tariff. Id. While a state \nutility commission may allocate charges paid by a particular Eligible Customer \namong retail ratepayers, states may be limited in whether and how they may re-\nallocate transmission charges among transmission customers. In this context, it \nis arbitrary and capricious and contrary to the FPA for the Commission to \nconclude that “state regulators can use [] information” about Network Upgrade \ncosts “to protect residential and small commercial customers by incorporating \nthose costs into the retail rates as they see fit given their authority to set rates \nfor different classes of retail customers.” Order at P 70. See 5 U.S.C. § \n706(2)(A); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm \nMut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (agency must “examine the \nrelevant data and articulate a . . . rational connection between the facts found \nand the choice made”); Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. \nMoore, et al., 487 U.S. 354, 371 (1988) (“States may not alter FERC-ordered \nallocations . . . by substituting their own determinations of what would be just \nand fair.”)."},{"page":8,"startToken":1781,"endToken":2005,"text":"8 \n \nTo the extent the Commission concludes that either determination is preliminary \nrather than final, we reserve the right to raise these issues in response to compliance \nfilings and at subsequent stages of this and related proceedings. \nWe further request clarification of the following: \n3. We respectfully request that the Commission clarify the standard it will apply \nto assess cost-recovery agreements. We urge the Commission to adopt a \nstraightforward test: agreements that do not protect transmission customers \nfrom cost shifts due to Network Upgrades for large loads are unjust and \nunreasonable. Just and reasonable cost-recovery agreements will “ensure that \nEligible Customers . . . are ultimately responsible for . . . the costs of any \nneeded Network Upgrades.” Order at PP 70, 80.  \n4. We respectfully request that the Commission clarify that transmission owners \nmust immediately credit revenue received under cost-recovery agreements to \nthe transmission customers in the PJM Transmission Zone. Credits against the \ntransmission owner’s revenue requirement in a later year flow to whichever \ncustomers are in the Zone at that time and in that year’s peak-load shares, not \nto the customers who bore the cost shift when the Network Upgrade entered \nthe revenue requirement. To achieve the Commission’s stated objective of \nensuring that Eligible Customers, “as opposed to other transmission \ncustomers,” are ultimately responsible for Network Upgrade costs, the \nCommission should confirm that transmission owners must immediately credit"},{"page":9,"startToken":2005,"endToken":2283,"text":"9 \n \nall revenue collected under cost-recovery agreements to transmission \ncustomers. Order at PP 80, 84. \nII. \nIllustration: The PJM transmission tariff spreads Network Upgrade \ncosts to all transmission customers in the relevant PJM transmission \nzone. \n \nBecause our requests for rehearing are about the PJM Tariff, we illustrate how the \ntariff operates with a hypothetical about Network Upgrade costs. Our hypothetical \napplication of the PJM Tariff illustrates its mechanics in raising transmission charges for \nexisting transmission customers due to Network Upgrades needed to accommodate a new \nlarge load locating in their PJM Transmission Zone. The outcome, contrary to the Order’s \nintent, is a cost shift to customers other than the large load causing the Network Upgrade.  \nOur hypothetical emphasizes that the total amount paid by each Eligible Customer \nfor transmission service is fixed by the PJM Tariff.13 The costs of Network Upgrades a \ntransmission owner identifies as needed to accommodate load additions are added to the \ntransmission owner’s revenue requirement. The PJM Tariff spreads these costs across all \ntransmission customers in the relevant transmission zone, including across state lines for \nmultijurisdictional zones and to municipal and cooperative utilities located within the \nzone.14  \n \n13 See Order at PP 25–26.  \n14 Id.; see also Supplemental Comment of FirstEnergy Service Company, Docket No. RM26-4 (Jun. 5, \n2026) (“Under the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s current rules, when a utility constructs new \nhigh-voltage transmission lines and substations to connect a single new data center, the cost of that \ninfrastructure is spread across all customers in the surrounding region. Ordinary families and small \nbusinesses see their electric bills rise to support facilities that were built to serve the new data center \nfacilities.”)."},{"page":10,"startToken":2283,"endToken":2620,"text":"10 \n \nImportantly, our hypothetical below assumes for simplicity purposes that large-\nload Network Upgrades are designated by the transmission owners as Supplemental \nProjects under the PJM Tariff. Although outside the scope of our hypothetical, we \nhighlight the Commission’s understanding that Network Upgrades for large loads that are \nplanned through PJM’s Regional Transmission Expansion Plan as baseline projects are \nregionally cost-allocated pursuant to Schedule 12 of the PJM Tariff, which spreads their \ncosts throughout PJM to transmission customers who neither benefit from nor caused \nthose upgrades.15 In such situations, the cost-shifting that occurs under our hypothetical \nincreases significantly, as the hybrid cost allocation methodology for regional high-\nvoltage baseline projects allocates 50 percent of these costs across the full PJM footprint \non a load-ratio basis and the other 50 percent using its power-flow based DFAX \nmethodology.16  \nOur hypothetical PJM Transmission Zone has an annual zonal transmission \nrevenue requirement of $300 million per year. It has three Eligible Customers:17   \n1. DistributionCo is the transmission-owning utility serving provider-of-last-\nresort load in a retail-choice state with a coincident peak of 1,500 MW.  \n \n15 See Order at P 72 (noting that Network Upgrades for large loads may contribute to regional \ntransmission needs that are addressed through the regional plan and regionally cost allocated); id. at PP \n79, 81 (stating that transmission customers “neither caused the need for nor benefit commensurately \nfrom” Network Upgrades for large loads). \n16 MPC has pending before the Commission a complaint challenging PJM’s hybrid cost allocation \nmethodology, as impacted by large loads, for regional baseline projects, including the $22 billion in costs \nfor the last three RTEP windows. Md. Off. of People’s Couns. v. PJM Interconnection, LLC, Docket No. \nEL26-63-000.   \n17 Note that the PJM Tariff uses the term Network Customer. To stay consistent with the Order, we use \nthe term Eligible Customer. The Commission appears to treat them as equivalent. See Order at P 26 (“The \ndemand charges for NITS, which are charged to the relevant Network Customer (i.e., the Eligible \nCustomer) . . .”)."},{"page":11,"startToken":2620,"endToken":2932,"text":"11 \n \n2. RetailCo is a competitive retailer with a coincident peak of 1,000 MW.  \n3. Muni is a municipal utility with a coincident peak of 500 MW. \nThe NITS rate is computed by dividing the revenue requirement by the peak load \nof 3,000 MW (1,500 + 1,000 + 500), yielding $100,000 per MW-year.18 While these \nfigures are illustrative and fictitious, they are roughly in line with actual PJM annual \nzonal transmission revenue requirements and NITS rates.19  \nThe Hypothetical PJM Transmission Zone: \n \nNITS Rate \nPeak Demand \nNITS Charges \nDisCo \n$100,000 / MW-yr \n×   1,500 MW \n=   $150 M \nRetailCo \n$100,000 / MW-yr \n×   1,000 MW \n=   $100 M \nMuni \n$100,000 / MW-yr \n×   500 MW \n=   $50 M \nNext, we compute that the NITS rate increases by 5 percent for all three \ntransmission customers when a 200 MW large load takes service.  \nA new 200 MW large load will purchase energy from RetailCo. This new large \nload will increase RetailCo’s peak demand by 200 MW. The transmission owner \nidentifies Network Upgrades of Supplemental Projects needed to accommodate the new \n200 MW large load. Using utility industry estimates about costs of Network Upgrade \n \n18 See Order at P 26 (summarizing the methodology for computing the NITS rate and NITS charges for an \nEligible Customer). \n19 In 2025, eight out of the 20 PJM Transmission Zones had annual zonal revenue requirements between \n$200 and $500 million. NITS rates in these Zones were lower than our $100,000 per MW-year \nhypothetical rate, although two Zones in this range had NITS rates above $80,000 per MW-year. Three \nother Zones, each of which has an annual revenue requirement exceeding $800 million, charge NITS rates \nhigher than $100,000 per MW-year. The highest rate in the region exceeds $180,000. See PJM, Annual \nTransmission Revenue Requirements (ATRR) and Network Integration Transmission Service (NITS) \nRates (Jun. 1, 2025)."},{"page":12,"startToken":2932,"endToken":3414,"text":"12 \n \ncosts in PJM, we assume that Network Upgrades cost $232 million for the 200 MW \nload.20 The transmission owner designates these Network Upgrades as Supplemental \nProjects under the PJM Tariff.21  \nConsistent with current practice in PJM, the transmission owner adds the $232 \nmillion in Network Upgrade costs to its revenue requirement.22 To convert the $232 \nmillion in total capital costs to an annual revenue requirement, we adopt utility industry \nestimates of weighted-average cost of capital, O&M, and depreciation that were filed in \nDocket No. RM26-4.23 That yields a first-year revenue requirement of approximately \n$32.5 million.24 We add $3.2 million as an income tax allowance.25 The $232 million in \nNetwork Upgrade costs therefore adds $35.7 million to the annual revenue requirement in \n \n20 See Supplemental Comments of WIRES to the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Docket No. \nRM26-4 (Mar. 30, 2026). At page 15, the whitepaper by Concentric Energy Advisors “assume[s] a large \nload’s network upgrade cost contribution of approximately $1.16 million per MW,” which “is derived by \ndividing approximately $23.3 billion of network upgrades identified on the PJM website as supporting \nlarge load interconnections by an estimated 20 GW of projected large load additions from 2025 to 2030.” \nThe report notes that Network Upgrade costs for an individual large load are generally not publicly \navailable. Id.  \n21 The whitepaper cited in the preceding note (the source of the $232 million figure) includes in its \nNetwork Upgrade cost estimate both regionally cost-allocated projects and Supplemental Projects \nassigned to a single PJM Transmission Zone. Id. at 22, n.21. For simplicity, we assume that all Network \nUpgrade costs are Supplemental Projects and therefore assigned to a single PJM Transmission Zone. \n22 Order at P 79 (“When a transmission owner constructs Network Upgrades to accommodate an Eligible \nCustomer’s request for transmission service on behalf of a large load, those transmission costs will be \nincluded in the transmission owner’s transmission revenue requirement.”); see also supra n. 14. \n23 Supplemental Comments of WIRES to the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Docket No. \nRM26-4 (Mar. 30, 2026) at 22 (using 8% as the weighted-average cost of capital (WACC), 20-year \nstraight-line depreciation, and 1% of initial capital costs for annual O&M spending).   \n24 The calculations are as follows: \n• \n$232 M × 8% WACC = $18.6 M \n• \n$232 M / 20 year straight-line depreciation = $11.6 M \n• \n$232 M × 1% O&M = $2.3 M \n25 We assume a 50-50 debt-equity split. A 50-50 structure with 10.5% ROE and 5.5% cost of debt blends \nto 8% WACC (0.5 × 10.5 + 0.5 × 5.5 = 8.0%). The equity return = 50% × $232M × 10.5% = $12.2M. \nTo compute the tax allowance, we assume a 21% federal income tax rate (t) multiply the equity return by \n[t ÷ (1 − t)], yielding a $3.2 M tax allowance."},{"page":13,"startToken":3414,"endToken":3640,"text":"13 \n \nthe first year. For simplicity, we round up to $36 million. We compute the new annual \nzonal revenue requirement and NITS rate, as follows.26 \nNew Annual Zonal Revenue Requirement = \n$300 M (initial revenue requirement) + $36 M (Network Upgrades) = $336 M \nNew Zonal Peak Load = \n3,000 MW (initial peak load) + 200 MW (new large load) = 3,200 MW \nNew NITS Rate = \n$336 M / 3,200 MW = $105,000 per MW-Year. \nThe Hypothetical PJM Transmission Zone after adding a 200 MW Large Load: \n \nNITS Rate \nPeak Demand \nNITS Charges \n∆ \nDisCo \n$105,000 / MW-yr \n×   1,500 MW \n=  $157.5 M \n+$7.5 M \nRetailCo \n$105,000 / MW-yr \n×   1,200 MW \n=  $126 M \n+$26 M \nMuni \n$105,000 / MW-yr \n×   500 MW \n=  $52.5 M \n+$2.5 M \n \nBecause RetailCo’s peak demand increases by 200 MW, it sees the largest \nincrease in transmission charges. The remaining $10 million in annual revenue \nrequirement increase is distributed between DisCo and Muni. Assuming the large load \npays the NITS rate, it would be charged $21 million ($105,000 per MW-yr × 200 MW) \nby RetailCo. Other customers of RetailCo would be responsible for the remaining $5 \nmillion in higher charges billed to RetailCo under the PJM Tariff. Overall, 42 percent of \n \n26 See Order at P 26 (summarizing the methodology for computing the NITS rate and NITS charges for an \nEligible Customer)."},{"page":14,"startToken":3640,"endToken":3929,"text":"14 \n \nthe increase in the annual zonal revenue requirement in the first year is allocated to \nentities other than the large load ($15 million / $36 million). \nThis hypothetical presents what we believe is the likely outcome in most \nsituations. We acknowledge, however, that, theoretically, it is possible to construct an \nexample in which a new customer, which is larger than the 200-MW new customer used \nin the hypothetical but has similar or lower upgrade costs, could decrease the zonal \ntransmission rate. Such a situation is not likely because a larger customer is likely to need \nmore substantial upgrades, causing higher zonal transmission rates, consistent with the \nhypothetical above. Regardless, in any situation where the cost of the upgrades for adding \na new customer, relative to the size of that customer, results in the zonal transmission rate \ndecreasing, that potential benefit would inure only to the customers in the same zone. If \nthe upgrade is a Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (“RTEP”) baseline project and \ncosts are allocated to other zones not hosting the large load (as they are under the existing \nPJM Tariff), the revenue requirement for those non-host zones would increase, and unless \nthose non-host zones have sufficient data center load growth themselves, the higher \nrevenue requirement will increase rates for all customers in those zones. \nIII. \nRequests for Rehearing \nA. \nBy failing to remedy a transmission tariff that facilitates systemic and \npredictable cost shifts, the Commission has not met its obligation to \nensure that transmission rates are just and reasonable. \n \nThe Order fails to remedy the unjust and unreasonable PJM Tariff. As illustrated \nabove, the PJM Tariff inevitably shifts costs caused by transmission customers serving a \nlarge load to other transmission customers. The Order recognizes that these other"},{"page":15,"startToken":3929,"endToken":4285,"text":"15 \n \ntransmission customers “neither caused the need for nor benefit commensurately from” \nthose upgrades.27 The PJM Tariff is therefore unjust and unreasonable because it is \n“guaranteed to overcharge” transmission customers by “shift[ing] a grossly \ndisproportionate share of the[] costs” of Network Upgrades onto transmission customers \nwho do not benefit commensurately from and do not cause those facilities.28 It is arbitrary \nand capricious and contrary to the FPA for the Commission to conclude that it “has a \nduty to address the risk of cost shifting among transmission customers”29 while failing to \nremedy the actual cost shifts the PJM Tariff guarantees due to Network Upgrades for \nlarge loads.30 \nWe are concerned that the Commission’s conclusion about the scope of its \nobligation under the FPA is a final determination, not a preliminary finding. In Paragraph \n68 of the Order, the Commission asserts, without qualification, that it has a “duty” and a \n“responsibility” to “address the risk of cost shifting among transmission customers” in \norder to ensure just and reasonable transmission rates.31 The Commission anchors this \nduty-scope determination between uncontroversial statements of black-letter law about its \n \n27 Order at PP 79, 81. \n28 Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 756 F.3d 556, 561, 565 (7th Cir. 2014). \n29 Order at P 68 (“The Commission has a duty to address the risk of cost shifting among transmission \ncustomers that may result in unjust and unreasonable transmission rates.”); id. (“To fulfill its \nresponsibility to ensure that transmission rates are just and reasonable, the Commission must act to \naddress the risk of cost shifting among transmission customers . . ..”) \n30 Our request for rehearing targets cost shifts due to Network Upgrades designated as Supplemental \nProjects or that are included in the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan and cost allocated pursuant to \nSchedule 12. See Order at P 72 (“Network Upgrades needed to accommodate a new transmission service \nrequest or designation of new network load may be designated as local transmission facilities (i.e., \nSupplemental Projects) or contribute to regional transmission system needs and be addressed by a \nRequired Transmission Enhancement in the RTEP.”). \n31 Order at P 68 (emphasis added)."},{"page":16,"startToken":4285,"endToken":4595,"text":"16 \n \nexclusive jurisdiction over transmission rates.32 This juxtaposition could signal that the \nCommission treats its conclusion about the scope of its duty as no less settled than its \nuncontested jurisdictional authority. \nIn subsequent paragraphs, the Commission consistently frames the harm it has a \nduty to address as a risk, not a certainty.33 The Commission erred by limiting its duty to \nmitigating the risk of cost shifting without explaining why its duty does not extend to \neliminating actual cost shifts guaranteed by the PJM Tariff. As our hypothetical \nillustrates, the NITS rate increases for all transmission customers in the PJM \nTransmission Zone that host a Network Upgrade needed for a large load. Transmission \ncharges increase for all customers regardless of whether the large load that caused the \nupgrade fails to materialize, breaches its agreement, or performs as anticipated. That cost \nshift is not mitigated by transparency measures or cost-recovery agreements aimed at \nrevenue shortfalls. The Commission’s silence on why its duty to ensure just and \nreasonable transmission rates does not reach actual, guaranteed cost shifts renders the \nOrder arbitrary and capricious and inconsistent with the FPA. \nTransmission rates must reflect the costs of providing transmission service.34 \nWhile the Commission need not “allocate costs with exacting precision,”35 the \n \n32 Id. \n33 See, e.g., id. at P 77 (“may result in unjust and unreasonable rates”); at P 79 (“could result in cost \nshifting”); id. (“may lead to unjust and unreasonable increases”); id. (“If, however, the Eligible Customer \ntakes less transmission service than anticipated . . . or fails to materialize at all . . .”). \n34 See Ala. Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. FERC, 684 F.2d 20, 27–28 (D.C. Cir. 1982); K N Energy, Inc. v. \nFERC, 968 F.2d 1295, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1992). \n35 Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1361, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 2004)."},{"page":17,"startToken":4595,"endToken":4926,"text":"17 \n \nCommission’s allocation must be reasonably and adequately explained.36 The \nCommission cannot look the other way when a transmission tariff embeds cross subsidies \nfor the benefit of particular customers.37 The Order fails to explain why the Commission \nhas concluded that it “has a duty” to address certain risks of cost shifts but no obligation \nto remedy actual, inevitable, and significant cost shifts that are fixed by the PJM Tariff.38  \nThe Commission’s longstanding approval of rolled-in pricing for a transmission \nowner’s integrated local network is not relevant here. In general, all transmission \ncustomers in a particular PJM Transmission Zone pay for local Network Upgrades \nbecause they all “receive the benefits that are inherent in [ ] an integrated system.”39 In \nthe Order, the Commission distinguished Network Upgrades for large loads from other \nlocal projects, concluding that transmission customers do not cause upgrades for large \nloads and do not benefit commensurately from those upgrades and therefore should not \npay for them.40 Having found that cost allocation of Network Upgrades for large loads \nmust consider who caused and benefits from those upgrades, the Commission must find \nthat the PJM Tariff is unjust and unreasonable because it allocates those costs on a \n \n36 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1315, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Sithe/Indep. Power \nPartners, L.P. v. FERC, 285 F.3d 1, 4–5 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d \n470, 477–78; Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 756 F.3d at 565.  \n37 See Elec. Consumers Res. Council v. FERC, 747 F.2d 1511, 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding that the \nCommission did not “even attempt[] to explain” the cross-subsidies embedded in an approved rate). \n38 See Order at P 68. \n39 Otter Tail Power Co., 12 FERC ¶ 61,169, 61,420 (1980). \n40 See Order at PP 79, 81 (citing Midwest ISO Transmission Owners, 373 F.3d at1368; Ill. Commerce \nComm’n, 576 F.3d at 476)."},{"page":18,"startToken":4926,"endToken":5201,"text":"18 \n \npostage stamp basis without considering that the benefits accrue to the large loads that \ncaused those Network Upgrades.41 \nOur argument is not backwards looking and does not cherry pick a “small \nselection of transmission projects.”42 Unlike the retrospective complaint the Commission \naddressed in Kentucky Public Service Commission, our request is forward looking and \ntargets cost shifts that are hardwired into the PJM Tariff. These cost shifts are systemic, \nforeseeable, unending, and significant, and likely to grow.43 And unlike in that \nproceeding, the Commission has now itself found that non-large load transmission \ncustomers neither cause nor benefit commensurately from Network Upgrades for large \nloads. Having made that finding, the Commission cannot maintain a transmission tariff \nthat ignores it.  \n“Here we’re talking about the allocation of the huge costs of building [ ] \ntransmission lines that do not provide uniform benefits to all the [customers] in the \n[Zone] in which the lines are built.”44 The PJM Tariff is unjust and unreasonable because \nit arbitrarily spreads those costs to all transmission customers on a postage stamp basis.45 \n \n41 See Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 576 F.3d at 475–76; Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 756 F.3d at 561–65. \n42 Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. AEP, et al., 193 FERC ¶ 61,110, P 57 (2025).  \n43 See Order at P 6 (noting “unprecedented current and expected growth of large loads seeking to \ninterconnect to the transmission system”); id. at PP 8–9 (discussing large loads in PJM). \n44 Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 756 F.3d at 559. \n45 See Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 576 F.3d at 475–76; Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 756 F.3d at 561–65."},{"page":19,"startToken":5201,"endToken":5462,"text":"19 \n \nB. \nThe Commission failed to rationally connect Network Upgrade cost \ntransparency to state authority over retail cost allocation and \narbitrarily and capriciously ignored the PJM Tariff’s legal and \npractical limitations. \n  \nRather than remedying unjust and unreasonable cost shifts embedded in the PJM \nTariff, the Commission concludes that states can “sub-allocate” transmission charges to \n“appropriate retail customers” who are the cost causers and beneficiaries of the relevant \ntransmission spending.46 As just discussed, the PJM Tariff is unjust and unreasonable \nregardless of how transmission costs are allocated by states. The Commission offers no \nlimiting principle that might prevent it from ignoring transmission cost shifts entirely, \nbased on the premise that states can address any deficiency in the PJM Tariff through \nretail cost allocation.47 We respectfully request rehearing on the Commission’s \nconclusion that its remedy “respect[s] the cooperative federalism approach established \nunder the FPA.”48 \nWe also respectfully request rehearing on the Commission’s finding that \ntransparency requirements in the PJM Tariff about Network Upgrade costs will allow \nstates to “sub-allocate” transmission charges “as they see fit.”49 To the extent this reflects \na final conclusion, the Commission’s finding is arbitrary and capricious and contrary to \nthe FPA because it ignores substantial legal and practical obstacles that may prevent \nstates from protecting retail ratepayers from the costs of Network Upgrades due to large \n \n46 Order at P 70. \n47 Fed. Power Comm’n v. Texaco, 417 U.S. 380, 394 (1974) (stating that the Federal Power Commission \nmay not “simply choose not to regulate rates.”). \n48 Order at P 70. \n49 Id."},{"page":20,"startToken":5462,"endToken":5728,"text":"20 \n \nloads. Transmission owners and customers have attacked state efforts to re-allocate \ntransmission charges set by the PJM Tariff as contrary to the FPA and Commission \norders.50 If a state can overcome threshold legal objections, it can only offer retail \nratepayers partial protection. Network Upgrade costs are spread regionally, across state \nlines zonally, and to municipal and cooperative utilities. A state cannot reach beyond its \nborders to reallocate transmission charges billed to transmission customers in other states. \nWe are concerned that the Order’s relevant determinations could be construed as \nnot preliminary. In Paragraph 70, the Commission finds that a “benefit” of additional \ntransparency about Network Upgrades is that states “can use that information to protect \nresidential and small commercial customers by incorporating those costs into the retail \nrates as they see fit . . .”51 This determination builds upon Commission findings about \n“aspects of the process for integrating large loads onto the transmission system [that] fall \nsquarely within the Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction” and about state authority over \nretail cost allocation.52 Request for rehearing is appropriate now because the \nCommission’s determinations may be construed as not preliminary, and they fail to \nconsider how its orders and the PJM Tariff constrain state authority to “sub-allocate” \ntransmission charges. \nIn PJM, retail choice states have adopted two models for recovery of transmission \ncharges at retail. State efforts to sub-allocate transmission charges in a way that departs \n \n50 See, e.g., Reply Brief of Commonwealth Edison Co., Ill. Com. Comm’n Docket Nos. 25-0677, 25-0679 \n(Nov. 18, 2025) at 28-37. \n51 Order at P 70. \n52 Order at PP 45–49, 69."},{"page":21,"startToken":5728,"endToken":5936,"text":"21 \n \nfrom the PJM Tariff have been challenged under both models. It is arbitrary and \ncapricious for the Commission to conclude that states may sub-allocate charges without \nconsidering how the PJM Tariff affects retail allocation. \nUnder the first model of transmission cost recovery at retail, each retail supplier \nseparately pays the charges assessed by the PJM Tariff. Returning to our hypothetical, \nthis model requires each of the three transmission customers to pay its own NITS \ncharges.  \nThe Hypothetical PJM Transmission Zone after adding a 200 MW Large Load: \n \nNITS Rate \nPeak Demand \nNITS Charges \n∆ \nDisCo \n$105,000 / MW-yr \n×   1,500 MW \n=  $157.5 M \n+$7.5 M \nRetailCo \n$105,000 / MW-yr \n×   1,200 MW \n=  $126 M \n+$26 M \nMuni \n$105,000 / MW-yr \n×   500 MW \n=  $52.5 M \n+$2.5 M \nAssuming that a state’s utility commission has retail cost allocation authority over \neach of the three transmission customers, the state commission could sub-allocate charges \npaid by a particular transmission customer among retail ratepayers taking service from \nthat transmission customer.  \nIn an ongoing proceeding before the Illinois Commerce Commission, transmission \nowner Commonwealth Edison (an Exelon subsidiary), however, has argued that the \nIllinois Commerce Commission may not “reallocate transmission costs between ComEd \nand [competitive retailers] without effectively attacking the underlying"},{"page":22,"startToken":5936,"endToken":6259,"text":"22 \n \nFERC-jurisdictional rate design.”53 ComEd argues that “the way that transmission costs \nare allocated between transmission customers is a question subject to FERC’s exclusive \njurisdiction” and therefore cannot be modified through sub-allocation by a state.54 Under \nComEd’s legal theory, Illinois is powerless to remedy the transmission costs shifted to \nDisco and Muni by the PJM Tariff. \nComEd further argues that Illinois law prevents the Illinois regulators from sub-\nallocating transmission costs paid by a competitive supplier.55 Thus, under ComEd’s \nlegal arguments, all retail ratepayers in ComEd’s PJM Transmission Zone taking service \nfrom a competitive supplier will immediately face higher transmission costs due to \nNetwork Upgrades for large loads, and the state will be powerless to protect them. \nDelaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia are \nretail-choice jurisdictions that have adopted similar approaches to retail transmission cost \nrecovery. Other transmission owners have filed arguments that echo ComEd’s \npreemption claims.56 \n \n53 Commonwealth Edison Co., Response to the Joint Non-Governmental Organizations’ Motion for \nClarification, Docket Nos. 25-0677, 25-0679 (Apr. 24, 2026) at 6. \n54 Id. at 4. \n55 Id. at 4–5 (citing various provisions of Illinois law about ICC authority over competitive retailers). \n56 See, e.g., Joint Comments of FirstEnergy Pennsylvania Electric Co., et al., Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n \nDocket No. M-2025-3054271 (Dec. 22, 2025) at 8–9 (“the Commission is preempted from directing what \ncost-allocation method or ratemaking approach should be used for the costs of such [transmission] \nfacilities or upgrades to such facilities.”); Comments of the Energy Association of Pennsylvania (EAP), \nPa. Pub. Util. Comm’n Docket No. M-2025-3054271 (Dec. 22, 2025) at 3–4, 9 (“Transmission cost \nallocation, network upgrade determinations, and rate recovery mechanisms are governed by FERC-\napproved tariffs and established federal precedent, not through the PUC. . . . Pennsylvania EDCs and their \naffiliated transmission companies cannot implement cost allocation methodologies that conflict with \nFERC-approved tariffs and orders.”) (EAP’s members include several PJM Transmission Owners)."},{"page":23,"startToken":6259,"endToken":6556,"text":"23 \n \nUnder the second model, a transmission owner recovers transmission charges from \nall of its retail distribution ratepayers through a non-bypassable rider, including \nratepayers served by competitive suppliers. Ohio has adopted this model. In 2015, the \nPublic Utilities Commission of Ohio (“PUCO”) approved a non-bypassable rider filed by \ntransmission owner AEP that recovers transmission costs for all of its retail ratepayers, \nincluding ratepayers who are served by a competitive supplier.57 A state statute \nauthorizes PUCO to approve such a rider.58 \nThis model, too, has been attacked as inconsistent with the PJM Tariff. Shortly \nafter the PUCO approved the rider, an alliance of Ohio industrial consumers filed a \ncomplaint at this Commission arguing that PUCO’s approval is inconsistent with the PJM \nTariff and Order No. 888.59 Because AEP’s non-bypassable rider used different billing \ndeterminants than the PJM Tariff, they argued that PUCO’s order forces customers to \nobtain transmission services at rates, terms, and conditions different than those provided \nby the PJM Tariff.60 The industrial consumers claimed that because this Commission \nasserted jurisdiction over “retail transmission in interstate commerce,” PUCO may not \napprove different rates, terms, and conditions than those offered by the PJM Tariff \nwithout Commission authorization.61  \n \n57 See In re Application of Ohio Power Co., 180 Ohio St. 3d 556, 558–59 (2025) (summarizing history of \nAEP’s rider). \n58 Id. at 561 (pointing to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.05). \n59 Complaint of the Industrial Energy Users-Ohio, Docket No. EL16-10 (Nov. 15, 2015). \n60 Id. at 3.  \n61 Id. at 7 (quoting Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Nondiscriminatory \nTransmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,625 (May 10, 1996)); see also Order at \nP 45 (reiterating the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmission service)."},{"page":24,"startToken":6556,"endToken":6872,"text":"24 \n \nSix weeks after it filed the complaint, the industrial consumers moved for \nvoluntary dismissal based on an unspecified “change in circumstances.”62 The Office of \nthe Ohio Consumers’ Counsel urged the Commission to reject that request, claiming that \nthe complaint articulated a “clear potential for Ohio retail customers to either pay twice \nfor transmission services in PJM or to be denied direct access to PJM’s transmission \nsystem” and that dismissal may lead Ohio ratepayers to “pay more for transmission \nservices than the filed rate authorized under the PJM Tariff.”63 Before any other parties \nfiled substantive responses, the Commission granted the industrial consumers’ request for \nvoluntary dismissal.64 The legal questions raised by the complaint remain unresolved. \nEven if the second model for retail transmission cost allocation survives legal \nattack, the PJM Tariff prevents state regulators from sub-allocating transmission charges \n“as they see fit.”65 The Order recognizes that Network Upgrades for large loads include \nprojects that are included in PJM’s RTEP and regionally cost allocated pursuant to \nSchedule 12 of the PJM Tariff.66 Schedule 12 distributes costs of an individual project \nacross multiple PJM Transmission Zones. A state cannot reach beyond its borders to sub-\nallocate charges that the PJM Tariff assigns to transmission customers in other states.67  \n \n62 Motion to Dismiss Complaint Without Prejudice, Docket No. EL16-10 (Dec. 22, 2015). \n63 Response to Industrial Energy Users-Ohio’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint by the Office of the Ohio \nConsumers’ Counsel, Docket No. EL16-10 (Jan. 6, 2016) at 3. \n64 Industrial Energy Users-Ohio v. The Ohio Power Company and PJM, 154 FERC ¶ 61,047 (2016) \n(letter order). \n65 Order at P 70. \n66 Order at P 72. \n67 See, e.g., Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 371 (1988) (“States may not \nalter FERC-ordered allocations . . . by substituting their own determinations of what would be just and \nfair.”)."},{"page":25,"startToken":6872,"endToken":7085,"text":"25 \n \nSimilarly, a state cannot protect ratepayers from costs of Network Upgrades \ndesignated as Supplemental Projects in a PJM Transmission Zone that spans more than \none state. It appears that the following seven zones include substantial territories in at \nleast two states: American Electric Power (AEP), Allegheny Power Systems (AP), \nAmerican Transmission Systems, Inc. (ATSI), Delmarva Power & Light (DP&L), \nDominion, Duke Energy Ohio and Kentucky (DEO&K), and Potomac Electric Power \n(PEPCO). These seven multi-state Zones comprise 52 percent of PJM’s peak load.68 Two \nother Zones (EKPC and JCP&L) have small protrusions into a second state. Because \nlarge loads occupy small geographic footprints, even these modest extensions into a \nsecond state could enable significant cost shifts that a state commission would be \nincapable of remedying. Thus, across more than half of PJM, retail sub-allocation cannot \nundo cost shifts that have already occurred among transmission customers through the \nPJM Tariff. \n \nSource: PJM \n \n68 See PJM Network Service Peak Loads (NSPL) for 2026. Note that we did not include EKPC and \nJCP&L because each is nearly entirely within a single state. That said, there could be significant loads in \nthe small portion of the zone in a second state, which could exacerbate interstate cost shifts that a state \ncould not address."},{"page":26,"startToken":7085,"endToken":7336,"text":"26 \n \nIn addition, states may be unable to re-allocate charges assessed through the PJM \nTariff on municipal or cooperative utilities. For instance, the Ohio model only reaches \nretail ratepayers who take distribution service from the utility subject to PUCO’s \nrate-regulation authority. Municipal and cooperative utilities are outside that authority. \nIV. \nRequests for Clarification \nA.  \nThe Commission should clarify that a just and reasonable \ncost-recovery agreement requires the Eligible Customer to pay the full \nincremental cost of Network Upgrades needed to accommodate the \nlarge load. \n \n \nThe Order preliminarily finds that a cost-recovery agreement should be based on \nthe level of jurisdictional transmission service requested by the Eligible Customer on \nbehalf of a large load.69 The Commission also finds that such Eligible Customers should \nbe “ultimately responsible for the costs incurred to provide [them with requested] \ntransmission service, including the costs of any needed Network Upgrades.”70 These two \nmeasures will diverge when the cost of Network Upgrades exceeds the NITS charges \nattributable to the large load’s forecasted demand.  \nOur hypothetical illustrates the gap between the two approaches. A cost-recovery \nagreement that requires RetailCo to pay only the NITS rate based on the large load’s \nforecasted demand will yield $21 million in the first year ($105,000 NITS rate × 200 MW \ndemand). That falls $15 million short of the $36 million increase in the annual zonal \nrevenue requirement caused by the Network Upgrades the transmission owner identified \n \n69 Order at P 83. \n70 Order at P 80; see also PP 66, 77."},{"page":27,"startToken":7336,"endToken":7568,"text":"27 \n \nto accommodate the large load. Under such an agreement, the other transmission \ncustomers in the zone and RetailCo’s other retail customers absorb the $15 million \ndifference in the first year alone, with comparable shortfalls recurring for the life of the \nassets. \nBecause the Commission identified two approaches to cost-recovery agreements, \nwe respectfully request that the Commission clarify that just and reasonable \ncost-recovery agreements will require Eligible Customers taking service on behalf of a \nlarge load to pay the full incremental cost of Network Upgrades. Transmission customers \nwill bear the costs of any delay in clarifying the governing standard.  \n \nB.  \nThe Commission should clarify that transmission owners must \nimmediately credit revenue received under cost-recovery agreements to \nthe other transmission customers in the zone. \n \n \nCollection from the large-load cost-causer and protection of the non-causers are \ntwo separate issues, and a cost-recovery agreement only addresses the first. The \nCommission’s stated objective is to ensure that Eligible Customers serving a large load, \n“as opposed to other transmission customers . . . are ultimately responsible for . . . the \ncosts of any needed Network Upgrades.”71 A remedy that fixes only what the Eligible \nCustomer must pay, without requiring those payments to flow to the customers onto \nwhom the costs were shifted, cannot achieve that objective. \nThe Order says that the Commission “expect[s]” that payments “will be \nappropriately credited toward transmission owners’ transmission revenue requirements \n \n71 Order at P 80."},{"page":28,"startToken":7568,"endToken":7782,"text":"28 \n \nconsistent with the Commission’s cost-of-service regulations.”72 Crediting payments \nagainst the revenue requirement prevents the transmission owner from over-collecting, \nbut it does not, by itself, protect other transmission customers from cost shifts. Only \nimmediate crediting of the full incremental costs will prevent transmission customers \nfrom subsidizing the large load. Any later credit from a cost recovery agreement \npayment, by contrast, would reduce the revenue requirement, and thus the NITS rate, in \nwhatever future year the payment is received and credited, divided across the zonal peak \nload in that year, which may include different customers, different peak-demand shares, \nand a new revenue requirement that has changed due to unrelated factors.  \nWe therefore respectfully request that the Commission clarify that transmission \nowners must immediately credit all revenue received under cost-recovery agreements to \ntransmission customers in the relevant zone. Transmission customers will bear the costs \nof any delay in clarifying the governing standard. \n \nCONCLUSION \nThe Order correctly finds that the PJM Tariff shifts the costs of Network Upgrades \nfor large loads to transmission customers that neither caused nor benefit from them. We \nrespectfully request that the Commission grant rehearing and clarification, as discussed \nherein, to protect transmission customers as soon as possible from unjust and \nunreasonable cost shifts. \n[signature page follows] \n \n72 Order at P 84."},{"page":29,"startToken":7782,"endToken":7979,"text":"29 \n \nRespectfully submitted, \nMARYLAND OFFICE OF \nPEOPLE’S COUNSEL  \n \nDavid S. Lapp \nPeople’s Counsel \nWilliam F. Fields \nDeputy People’s Counsel \n/s/ Philip L. Sussler \nPhilip L. Sussler \nSenior Assistant People’s Counsel \n \n6 St. Paul Street, Suite 2102 \nBaltimore, MD 21202 \nTelephone: (410) 767-8150 \ndavids.lapp@maryland.gov \nwilliam.fields@maryland.gov \nphilip.sussler@maryland.gov \nOFFICE OF THE OHIO  \nCONSUMERS’ COUNSEL \n \nMaureen Willis \nOhio Consumers’ Counsel \n/s/ Angela O’Brien \nAngela O’Brien            \nDeputy Consumers’ Counsel \n  \n65 East State Street, Suite 700 \nColumbus, OH 43215 \nTelephone: (614) 466-9531 \nangela.obrien@occ.ohio.gov  \n \n \nDELAWARE DIVISION OF THE \nPUBLIC ADVOCATE \n \n/s/ David T. Crumplar \nDavid T. Crumplar (#5876) \nDeputy Attorney General \n820 N. French Street \nWilmington, DE 19801 \nTelephone: 302-577-8400 \nDavid.crumplar@delaware.gov  \nCounsel to the Delaware Division of the \nPublic Advocate \nOFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS \nATTORNEY GENERAL \n \nSusan L. Satter \nChief, Public Utilities Bureau  \n/s/ Kimberly B. Janas \nKimberly B. Janas \nCounsel to the Attorney General \nScott Metzger \nSenior Assistant Attorney General \nAndrew Obeso \nAssistant Attorney General \nOffice of the Attorney General \n115 South LaSalle, 25th Floor \nChicago, IL 60603 \nTelephone: (312) 636-2307 \nKimberly.Janas@ilag.gov \nScott.Metzger@ilag.gov \nSusan.Satter@ilag.gov \nAndrew.Obeso@ilag.gov"},{"page":30,"startToken":7979,"endToken":8051,"text":"30 \n \nCertificate of Service \n \nPursuant to Rules 206 and Rule 2010 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and \nProcedure, 18 C.F.R. § 385.206 and 18 C.F.R. § 2010, it is hereby certified that, on this \n17th day of July 2026, a copy of the foregoing has been served upon the Parties and \nIntervenors in this Proceeding.   \n \nRespectfully submitted, \n/s/ Philip L. Sussler \nPhilip L. Sussler       \n \n \nSenior Assistant People’s Counsel"}],"sections":[{"p":1,"at":0,"title":"Opening text","method":"opening text","endPage":6,"endAt":5,"startToken":0,"endToken":1285},{"p":6,"at":5,"title":"I. Statement of Issues and Specifications of Error","method":"printed heading","endPage":9,"endAt":107,"startToken":1285,"endToken":2020},{"p":9,"at":107,"title":"II. Illustration: The PJM transmission tariff spreads Network Upgrade","method":"printed heading","endPage":14,"endAt":1385,"startToken":2020,"endToken":3856},{"p":14,"at":1385,"title":"III. Requests for Rehearing","method":"printed heading","endPage":14,"endAt":1415,"startToken":3856,"endToken":3860},{"p":14,"at":1415,"title":"A. By failing to remedy a transmission tariff that facilitates systemic and","method":"printed heading","endPage":19,"endAt":6,"startToken":3860,"endToken":5202},{"p":19,"at":6,"title":"B. The Commission failed to rationally connect Network Upgrade cost","method":"printed heading","endPage":26,"endAt":354,"startToken":5202,"endToken":7134},{"p":26,"at":354,"title":"IV. Requests for Clarification","method":"printed heading","endPage":26,"endAt":387,"startToken":7134,"endToken":7138},{"p":26,"at":387,"title":"A. The Commission should clarify that a just and reasonable","method":"printed heading","endPage":27,"endAt":682,"startToken":7138,"endToken":7435},{"p":27,"at":682,"title":"B. The Commission should clarify that transmission owners must","method":"printed heading","endPage":28,"endAt":1089,"startToken":7435,"endToken":7719},{"p":28,"at":1089,"title":"CONCLUSION","method":"printed heading","endPage":30,"endAt":6,"startToken":7719,"endToken":7980},{"p":30,"at":6,"title":"Certificate of Service","method":"printed heading","endPage":30,"endAt":434,"startToken":7980,"endToken":8051}]}