{"document":{"slug":"filing-20260720-5172","title":"Exelon Corporation and FirstEnergy Service Company submit Request for Rehearing of the 06/18/2026 Order","issued":"2026-07-20","accession":"20260720-5172","docket":"EL26-67-001","group":"PJM filings","filer":"Exelon CorporationThe FirstEnergy Transmission Companies","kind":"request","file":"sources/originals/20260720-5172_01.pdf","url":"https://elibrary.ferc.gov/eLibrary/filelist?accession_Number=20260720-5172","sha256":"c21b865f999456b69c7eae0a4fccddc7256473b27b13933cd56f9343f79773b8","pages":33,"tokens":11932,"emptyPages":[]},"pages":[{"page":1,"startToken":0,"endToken":287,"text":"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nBEFORE THE \nFEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \n \nPJM Interconnection, L.L.C., et al.   \n)  \n \nDocket No. EL26-67-000 \n \nREQUEST FOR REHEARING OF EXELON CORPORATION AND  \nFIRSTENERGY SERVICE COMPANY \n \nPursuant to Federal Power Act (“FPA”) section 3131 and Rule 7132 of the Rules of Practice \nand Procedure of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or “Commission”), Exelon \nCorporation3 and FirstEnergy Service Company4 (together “Exelon and FirstEnergy”) request \nrehearing of the Commission’s June 18 Order Instituting Proceeding Under Section 206 of the \nFederal Power Act (“Show Cause Order”)5 insofar as the Commission found that PJM’s Open \nAccess Transmission Tariff (“PJM Tariff”) appears to be unjust and unreasonable without new \ntransmission services that would be available to “large load” customers, specifically what the \nShow Cause Order refers to as “flexible large loads.”6  The Commission’s findings that the PJM \nTariff appears to be unjust and unreasonable without these new transmission service options is \narbitrary and capricious and not based upon reasoned decision making.   \n \n1  \n16 U.S.C. § 825l(a). \n2  \nSee 18 C.F.R. § 385.713. \n3  \nExelon Corporation submits this rehearing request on behalf of its affiliates Atlantic City Electric Company, \nBaltimore Gas and Electric Company, Commonwealth Edison Company (“ComEd”), Commonwealth Edison \nCompany of Indiana, Inc., Delmarva Power & Light Company, PECO Energy Company, and Potomac Electric \nPower Company. \n4  \nFirstEnergy Service Company submits this rehearing request as agent for its affiliates American Transmission \nSystems, Incorporated, Jersey Central Power & Light Company, Mid-Atlantic Interstate Transmission LLC, \nKeystone Appalachian Transmission Company, The Potomac Edison Company, Monongahela Power Company \nand Trans-Allegheny Interstate Line Company (collectively, the “FirstEnergy Transmission Companies”). \n5  \nPJM Interconnection, L.L.C., et al., 195 FERC ¶ 61,211 (2026). \n6  \nSee id. at P 86."},{"page":2,"startToken":287,"endToken":610,"text":"2 \n \nIn the Show Cause Order, the Commission preliminarily found that PJM’s Tariff appears \nto be unjust and unreasonable because it “does not include transmission services that reflect \nEligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of flexible large loads that are willing \nand able to limit their use of the transmission system under certain conditions.”7  The Commission \nnoted that the existing transmission services in PJM consist of Network Integration Transmission \nService and firm and non-firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service.  While the Commission stated \nthat these remain just and reasonable options, the Commission directed PJM to address whether \nits Tariff remains just and reasonable without allowing Eligible Customers taking transmission \nservice on behalf of “flexible large loads” the option of taking one or more of the three new \ntransmission services that the Commission directed in its December 18, 2025 order on Co-Located \nLoad in PJM.8 \nExelon and FirstEnergy seek rehearing of these findings for the same reasons they sought \nrehearing of the December 18 Co-Located Load Order’s requirement to adopt these new \ntransmission services for Co-Located Load customers.  As with the December 18 Co-Located Load \nOrder, the purported purpose of the Commission’s findings at issue here is to improve the \navailability of service to new large load customers and ensure that service to such customers does \nnot impose unnecessary costs on existing customers.  But the creation of these new forms of \ntransmission service will not hasten or improve service and instead merely reduce transmission \ncharges for large loads at the expense of other customers.  Requiring new transmission services \nfor “flexible large loads” or other large load customers will not resolve any actual inadequacy in \n \n7  \nId. \n8  \nId. at 87 (citing PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 (2025) (“December 18 Co-Located Load \nOrder”)).  This request for rehearing refers to the proceedings addressed by the December 18 Co-Located Load \nOrder (Docket Nos. EL25-49, et al.) as the “PJM Co-Located Load Proceedings.”"},{"page":3,"startToken":610,"endToken":992,"text":"3 \n \nthe PJM Tariff and instead will provide an unreasonable and unduly preferential gift to a favored \nclass. \nI. \nStatement of Issues/Specification of Error. \nIn accordance with 18 C.F.R. § 385.713(c)(1) and (2), the Exelon and FirstEnergy provide \nthe following specification of errors and statement of issues, including citations to representative \nCommission and judicial precedent. \n1. The Burden Under FPA Section 206 Has Not Been Met: The Existing Rate Has \nNot Been Shown to Be Unjust and Unreasonable.  See 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a); Pub. \nCitizen, Inc. v. FERC, 7 F.4th 1177, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (explaining that “[t]he \nburden of proving” that a rate is unjust or unreasonable is placed on “the party that \ninitiated the proceeding”). \na. There is No Evidence In the Record That Flexible Large Loads or Any \nOther Large Loads Are Unable to Obtain Reliable, Timely, and \nReasonably Priced Service Using the Existing Network Service \nConstruct.  Therefore, the Commission Fails To Satisfy the \nRequirement Under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) That \nIts Decision Be Supported With Substantial Evidence. \ni. The APA requires the Commission to “examine the relevant \ndata and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action \nincluding a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the \nchoice made,’” and to base its decision on substantial evidence; \nbecause FERC has failed to do so, its decision is arbitrary and \ncapricious.  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. \nCo. (“State Farm”), 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (citation omitted); see \nFla. Gas Transmission Co. v. FERC (“Florida Gas”), 604 F.3d 636, \n639 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Commission ‘must be able to \ndemonstrate that it has made a reasoned decision based upon \nsubstantial evidence in the record.’”) (citation omitted); Consol. \nEdison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (explaining \nthat substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla”); see \nalso 5 U.S.C. § 706. \nii. The PJM Tariff provides two transmission service options \n(Network Integration Transmission Service and Point-to-Point \nTransmission Service) and includes provisions to explain how \nthose services work and how Network Customers will be served.  \nSee PJM Tariff at §§ 31.1, 31.2, 31.3, 31.6 and 32; see also generally \nPJM Tariff , OATT Definitions."},{"page":4,"startToken":992,"endToken":1406,"text":"4 \n \niii. To the extent that parties have argued they are unable to \ninterconnect or are experiencing delays, that is false and any \ndelay is of their own making.  See, e.g., Exelon Dec. 8, 2025 \nComments at 3-4; Complaint Requesting Fast Track Processing of \nConstellation Energy Generation, LLC, Docket No. EL25-20, at Ex. \n5 Attach 1 (providing Exelon’s Nov. 12, 2024 Letter).  FERC \narbitrarily and capriciously disregarded evidence that Network \nService under the current tariff is feasible and has been used for \nco-location arrangements.  Compare PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., \n189 FERC ¶ 61,078 (2024) and PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., \nDocket No. ER24-2172-000, Application Attach. A, Amended ISA, \nat Schedule F, Part F.4 (June 1, 2024), with Press Release, Talen \nEnergy, Talen Energy Expands Nuclear Energy Relationship with \nAmazon \n(June \n11, \n2025), \nhttps://ir.talenenergy.com/news-\nreleases/news-release-details/talen-energy-expands-nuclear-\nenergy-relationship-amazon.  See also Exelon Dec. 8, 2025 \nComments at 6. \niv. Ignoring data in the record regarding the ability of large loads \nto interconnect to the transmission system violates the APA and \nrenders FERC’s decision arbitrary and capricious.  See State \nFarm, 463 U.S. at 43. \nv. There is no evidence in the record that the cost of Network \nService adversely impacts flexible large loads or any other large \nloads.  Nor is there evidence to support that existing Network \nService imposes unnecessary upgrades on all customers.  Nor is \nthere evidence that new forms of transmission service will allow \nfor faster interconnection.  See Florida Gas, 604 F.3d at 639 \n(“[T]he Commission ‘must be able to demonstrate that it has made \na reasoned decision based upon substantial evidence in the \nrecord.’”) (citation omitted); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 305 \nU.S. at 229 (explaining that substantial evidence means “more than \na mere scintilla”); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706. \nvi. The Commission has not met its burden under FPA section 206 \nbecause it acknowledges that the existing transmission services \nremain just and reasonable options.  See June 18, 2026 Order, 195 \nFERC ¶ 61,209 at P 195 (finding Network Service charged on a \ngross demand basis to be “one just and reasonable transmission \nservice option”). \nb. The Commission Did Not Engage in Reasoned Decision Making \nBecause It Did Not Explain its Departure from FERC Precedent \nRegarding the Reasonableness of the Existing Network Service.  See \nF.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (“[T]he \nrequirement that an agency provide reasoned explanation for its action"},{"page":5,"startToken":1406,"endToken":1929,"text":"5 \n \nwould ordinarily demand that it display awareness that it is changing \nposition.  An agency may not, for example, depart from a prior policy sub \nsilentio or simply disregard rules that are still on the books.”); New England \nPower Generators Ass’n v. FERC, 881 F.3d 202, 211 (D.C. Cir. 2018) \n(“Although case-by-case adjudication sometimes results in decisions that \nseem at odds but can be distinguished on their facts, it is the agency’s \nresponsibility to provide a reasoned explanation of why those facts \nmatter.”); W. Deptford Energy, LLC v. FERC, 766 F.3d 10, 20 (D.C. Cir. \n2014) (“It is textbook administrative law that an agency must ‘provide[ ] a \nreasoned explanation for departing from precedent or treating similar \nsituations differently,’ and Commission cases are no exception.”) (citations \nomitted); Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. FERC, 879 F.3d 966, 977 (9th Cir. \n2018) (“FERC departed from this policy without acknowledgment or \nexplanation.  This departure was arbitrary and capricious.”); Sw. Airlines \nCo. v. FERC, 926 F.3d 851, 856 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“‘A full and rational \nexplanation’ becomes ‘especially important’ when, as here, an agency \nelects to ‘shift [its] policy’ or ‘depart[ ] from its typical manner of’ \nadministering a program. . . . [FERC] must at least ‘acknowledge’ its \nseemingly inconsistent precedents and either offer a reason ‘to distinguish \nthem’ or ‘explain its apparent rejection of their approach’ . . . . But however \nthe agency justifies its new position, what it may not do is ‘gloss[ ] over or \nswerve[ ] from prior precedents without discussion.’”) (most alterations in \noriginal) (citations omitted); see also 16 U.S.C. § 824d(b) (prohibiting a \npublic utility from making or granting an “undue preference or advantage” \nor from maintaining “any unreasonable difference in rates, charges, service, \nfacilities, or in any other respect, . . . as between classes of service”); \nTransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd. v. FERC, 811 F.3d 1, 12–13 (D.C. Cir. \n2015) (remanding because FERC did not adequately explain its position). \ni. The Commission has a long-standing policy of rejecting \nattempts by network transmission customers to avoid paying \ntheir load ratio share of system cost.  See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. \nPassenger Corp. v. PPL Elec. Utils. Corp., 171 FERC ¶ 61,237 at \nPP 40–41, denying clarification & addressing arguments raised on \nreh’g, 173 FERC ¶ 61,043 at PP 13–14 (2020); see Promoting \nWholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory \nTransmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded \nCosts by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888-\nA, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,048, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,274, 12,324 \n(Mar. 14, 1997), order on reh’g, Order No. 888-B, 81 FERC ¶ \n61,248 (1997), order on reh’g, Order No. 888-C, 82 FERC ¶ 61,046 \n(1998), aff’d in relevant part sub nom. Transmission Access Pol’y \nStudy Grp. v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d sub nom. \nNew York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002); see also, e.g., Fla. Mun. \nPower Auth. v. FERC, 411 F.3d 287 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Fla. Power \n& Light Co., 113 FERC ¶ 61,290 (2005), aff’d on rehearing, 116 \nFERC ¶ 61,012 (2006), aff’d on appeal sub nom. Fla. Mun. Power"},{"page":6,"startToken":1929,"endToken":2396,"text":"6 \n \nAgency v. FERC, 264 F. App’x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam); \nIdaho Power Co., 106 FERC ¶ 61,329 (2004); Ameren Servs. Co. v. \nPrairieland Energy Inc., 131 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2010); Ariz. Pub. \nServ. Co., 151 FERC ¶ 61,191 (2015); Preventing Undue \nDiscrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, Order No. \n890, 119 FERC ¶ 61,119 (“Order No. 890”), order on reh’g, Order \nNo. 890-A, 121 FERC ¶ 61,297 (2007), order on reh’g, Order No. \n890-B, 123 FERC ¶ 61,299 (2008), order on reh’g, Order No. 890-\nC, 126 FERC ¶ 61,228, order on clarification, Order No. 890-D, \n129 FERC ¶ 61,126 (2009). \nc. Flexible Large Loads and Other Large Loads Rely Upon the Entire \nEmbedded Transmission System to Serve Their Full Gross Load.  \nTherefore, FERC’s Decision is Arbitrary and Capricious Because the \nEmbedded Transmission System Costs Should Be Charged For Those \nTransmission Services.  See Decl. of David Weaver, PE, Attachment 1 to \nExelon Comments, Docket No. EL25-20 (Dec. 12, 2024); see also PJM \nInterconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. EL25-20-000, Indicated Transmission \nOwners June 3, 2025 Answer, Declaration of Danielle S. Powers, at P 29. \ni. The Commission’s failure to consider the benefits of grid \ninterconnection makes the Show Cause Order arbitrary and \ncapricious.  See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. \n2. The Burden Has Not Been Met Under FPA Section 206: FERC’s Proposed \nReplacement Rate is Not Just and Reasonable.  See 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a); \nAdvanced Energy Mgmt. All. v. FERC, 860 F.3d 656, 663 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“If the \nCommission finds that a rate is ‘unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or \npreferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate . . . and \nshall fix the same by order,’” and “[i]t is the Commission’s job—not the \npetitioner’s—to find a just and reasonable rate.”) (alterations in original) (citation \nomitted); Emera Maine v. FERC, 854 F.3d 9, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Atl. City Elec. \nCo. v. FERC, 295 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  The Show Cause Order failed to \naddress the fact that reliability is relevant to the inquiry of whether a rate is \njust and reasonable.  See Constellation Mystic Power, LLC v. FERC, 45 F.4th \n1028, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“The reasonableness of a rate is assessed in light of \nthe FPA’s goals of promoting reliable service at reasonable rates and developing \nplentiful energy supplies.”); NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 669–70 (1976) (“[T]he \nprincipal purpose of [the FPA is] to encourage the orderly development of plentiful \nsupplies of electricity . . . at reasonable prices.”). \na. Allowing Special Treatment For Flexible Large Loads Violates the \nFPA’s Requirement That There Be No Undue Preference Or \nUnreasonable Difference In Rates Between Classes of Service.  See 16 \nU.S.C. § 824d(b)."},{"page":7,"startToken":2396,"endToken":2792,"text":"7 \n \ni. To the extent that the Commission suggests that the \ntransmission provider may move forward with interconnection \nbefore studies are completed, such course of action would \njeopardize reliability and would be in tension with NERC \nreliability standards.  See, e.g., See NERC, FAC-002-4 – Facility \nInterconnection \nStudies \n(2022), https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/standards/reliability-\nstandards/fac/fac-002-4.pdf; NERC, 181 FERC ¶ 61,126 (2022) \n(approving FAC-002-4). \nii. There is no lawful basis to require tariff changes to impose new \nforms of service that give certain large load customers a reduced \nshare of embedded costs compared to all other users when they \nreceive the same benefits.  See Coal. of MISO Transmission \nCustomers v. FERC, 45 F.4th 1004, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2022). \nb. The Commission’s Emphasis on Control Technologies and Protection \nSystems Is In Tension With the Commission’s Open Access Policies and \nTherefore Is Arbitrary and Capricious.  The Commission Also Erred \nIn Failing to Account for the Fact that Protective Systems Can and \nHave Failed.  See NERC, Characteristics and Risks of Emerging Large \nLoads: Large Loads Task Force White Paper, at 13 (July 2025), \nhttps://www.nerc.com/globalassets/who-we-are/standing-\ncommittees/rstc/whitepaper-characteristics-and-risks-of-emerging-large-\nloads.pdf. \ni. The Commission erred in proposing a policy in tension with its \nopen access policies.  See Promoting Wholesale Competition \nThrough Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services \nby Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities \nand Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. \n¶ 31,048, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,274 (Mar. 14, 1997), order on reh’g, \nOrder No. 888-B, 81 FERC ¶ 61,248 (1997), order on reh’g, Order \nNo. 888-C, 82 FERC ¶ 61,046 (1998), aff’d in relevant part sub \nnom. Transmission Access Pol’y Study Grp. v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 \n(D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d sub nom. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 \n(2002). \nc. The Show Cause Order is Arbitrary and Capricious in Abandoning the \nMain Construct of Service to Load, Which is That Customers Share In \nthe Embedded Costs of the System.  See Florida Gas, 604 F.3d at 639 \n(“[T]he Commission ‘must be able to demonstrate that it has made a \nreasoned decision based upon substantial evidence in the record.’”) (citation \nomitted); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 305 U.S. at 229 (explaining that \nsubstantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla”); see also 5 U.S.C. \n§ 706."},{"page":8,"startToken":2792,"endToken":3205,"text":"8 \n \ni. FERC’s order is arbitrary and capricious in abandoning the \nmain construct of service to load, which is that customers share \nin the embedded costs of the system.  See State Farm, 463 U.S. at \n43; Coal. of MISO Transmission Customers, 45 F.4th at 1009 \n(quoting S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41, 53 (D.C. Cir. \n2014) (per curiam)). \nii. The Show Cause Order departs from traditional cost causation \nprinciples and fails to explain or justify its departure.  See, e.g., \nNat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. PPL Elec. Utils. Corp., 173 FERC ¶ \n61,043, at PP 13–14 (2020); see also Fox Television Stations, Inc., \n556 U.S. at 515 (“[T]he requirement that an agency provide \nreasoned explanation for its action would ordinarily demand that it \ndisplay awareness that it is changing position.  An agency may not, \nfor example, depart from a prior policy sub silentio or simply \ndisregard rules that are still on the books.”) (citation omitted). \niii. The Commission provides no record evidence nor a reasoned \nexplanation for why flexible large load should not be charged \nlike other load, i.e., with the upgrade cost recovered as part of \nthe transmission rates charged to all customers.  Transmission \nowners are permitted to earn a reasonable return on the \ninvestments necessary to construct, operate, and maintain \ntransmission facilities, including those network upgrades \nrequired to serve co-located load.  See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n \nv. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); Bluefield Water Works \n& Improvement Co. v. Pub. Service Comm’n of W. Va., 262 U.S. \n679 (1923). \nd. There is No Evidence that the New Services That the Commission \nProposes to Extend to Flexible Large Load Will Promote Efficiency or \nChange Siting. \ni. The Commission’s decision to require options for contract \ndemand service (“CD Service”) does not change how the study \nprocess or the regional planning process should work.  See PJM \nTariff §§  31.1-31.3, 31.6, 32. \ne. The \nCommission’s \nDisregard \nof \nReliability \nConsiderations \nUnderscores that its Proposed Replacement Rate is Not Just and \nReasonable.  See Constellation Mystic Power, LLC, 45 F.4th at 1035 (“The \nreasonableness of a rate is assessed in light of the FPA’s goals of promoting \nreliable service at reasonable rates and developing plentiful energy \nsupplies.”); NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. at 669–70 (“[T]he principal purpose \nof [the FPA is] to encourage the orderly development of plentiful supplies \nof electricity . . . at reasonable prices.”)."},{"page":9,"startToken":3205,"endToken":3675,"text":"9 \n \n3. FERC Exceeded Its Jurisdiction.  See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b). \na. FERC’s Proposed Replacement Rate Violates the Major Questions \nDoctrine.  See West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 723 (2022); Whitman \nv. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress, we have held, \ndoes not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms \nor ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in \nmouseholes.”); see also Midship Pipeline Co., v. FERC, 45 F.4th 867, 877 \n(5th Cir. 2022) (vacating part of the Commission’s order and remanding the \nremainder because “[t]he FERC’s interpretation of the NGA to give the \nagency power to determine ‘the reasonable cost’ of remediation efforts \n‘change[d] the plot line’ of its enabling legislation, and was therefore \nerroneous” and “[t]he FERC lacks such authority under the NGA, and it \nlikewise lacked authority to order an ALJ to make such a determination \nindirectly”) (quoting West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. at 723); see Atl. City \nElec. Co. v. FERC, 295 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (As a federal agency, \n“FERC is a ‘creature of statute,’ having ‘no constitutional or common law \nexistence or authority, but only those authorities conferred upon it by \nCongress. Thus, if there is no statute conferring authority, FERC has \nnone.”) (citation omitted). \n \nb. The Commission’s Proposed Approach Would Infringe on State Retail \nAuthority. \ni. The Commission’s new approach would infringe on state \njurisdiction and is distinguishable from wholesale demand \nresponse programs.  See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b); see also FERC v. \nElec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 270, 278–79 (2016); \nFERC, Energy Primer: A Handbook for Energy Market Basics, at \n41 (Jan. 17, 2024), https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/ferc-\nstaff-issues-2024-energy-primer-handbook-energy-market-basics. \nii. The Commission is unable to do indirectly what it cannot do \ndirectly.  Cf. Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 909 \nF.2d 1519, 1522 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“once want of power to do this \ndirectly were established, the existence of power to achieve the same \nend indirectly through the conditioning power might well be \ndoubted” (quoting Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 \nU.S. 137, 152 (1960) and citing Richmond Power & Light v. \nFERC, 574 F.2d 610, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (the Commission may \nnot achieve indirectly through conditioning power of Federal Power \nAct what it is otherwise prohibited from achieving directly)); Am. \nGas Ass’n v. FERC, 912 F.2d 1496, 1510 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“[T]he \nCommission may not use its § 7 conditioning power to do \nindirectly . . . things that it cannot do at all.”); see also FERC v. Elec. \nPower Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. at 288 (“The FPA ‘leaves no room \neither for direct state regulation of the prices of interstate"},{"page":10,"startToken":3675,"endToken":3992,"text":"10 \n \nwholesales’ or for regulation that ‘would indirectly achieve the same \nresult.’”) (citation omitted). \nII. \nThe Burden Under FPA Section 206 Has Not Been Met: The Existing Rate Has \nNot Been Shown To Be Unjust And Unreasonable. \n \nThe FPA requires that the rates and charges of a public utility “in connection with the \ntransmission or sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and all rules \nand regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates or charges shall be just and reasonable.”9  \n“[A]ny such rate or charge that is not just and reasonable is . . . unlawful.”10  Under FPA section \n206, the Commission may, by its own motion or upon complaint from a third party, remedy any \n“rate [or] charge” or “any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate [or] charge” \nfound to be “unjust [or] unreasonable.”11  “The burden of proving an unjust or unreasonable rate \nrests with the party that initiated the proceeding—that is, the Commission or the third-party \ncomplainant.”12  In other words, a respondent to a FPA section 206 complaint is not required to \nmake an affirmative showing that its existing rate is still just and reasonable.   \nFor the reasons below, neither FERC nor any other party have met the burden of \ndemonstrating that PJM’s current rate is unjust and unreasonable so as to require new forms of \ntransmission service for flexible large load or other large load customers.   \nA. There is No Evidence In The Record That Flexible Large Loads or Other \nLarge Loads Are Unable to Obtain Reliable, Timely, And Reasonably Priced \nService Using The Existing Network Service Construct.  Therefore, the \nCommission Fails To Satisfy The Requirement Under The APA That Its \nFindings Be Supported With Substantial Evidence. \n \n \n9  \n16 U.S.C. § 824d(a). \n10  Id. \n11  Id. § 824e(a). \n12  Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. FERC, 7 F.4th 1177, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2021)."},{"page":11,"startToken":3992,"endToken":4333,"text":"11 \n \nUnder the APA, the Commission “must examine the relevant data and articulate a \nsatisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and \nthe choice made’”13 and must base its decision on substantial evidence in the record.14  Substantial \nevidence means “more than a mere scintilla,” that is, “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind \nmight accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”15  The Commission’s findings in the Show \nCause Order regarding the need for new transmission services does not meet this standard. \nThe totality of the Commission’s reasoning for requiring that new forms of transmission \nservice be offered to flexible large loads is set forth in Paragraphs 85-87 of the Show Cause Order, \nin which the Commission simply states that there is evidence that flexible large loads can “quickly \nand verifiably adjust their consumption in response to system conditions and price signals” and \ncan “potentially defer or reduce the need for Network Upgrades, among other benefits.”16  \nFrom here, the Commission concludes that the existing PJM Tariff may be unjust and \nunreasonable because it does not offer flexible large loads the same transmission services as \nrequired by the Commission in the December 18 Co-Located Load Order.  However, as in that \nOrder, the Commission’s finding in the Show Cause Order is unsupported by evidence that the \ncurrent tariff service options are inadequate.  Under the current PJM Tariff, there are two \ntransmission service options: (1) Network Integration Transmission Service (“NITS” or “Network \n \n13  State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (citation omitted). \n14  See, e.g., Fla. Gas Transmission Co. v. FERC, 604 F.3d 636, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Commission ‘must be \nable to demonstrate that it has made a reasoned decision based upon substantial evidence in the record.’” (quoting \nPac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1315, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 2004))); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706.  \n15  Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 305 U.S. at 229. \n16  Show Cause Order at P 85."},{"page":12,"startToken":4333,"endToken":4768,"text":"12 \n \nService”);17 and (2) Point-to-Point Transmission Service.18  There is no inability to determine how \nto serve load in PJM; the PJM Tariff already has provisions explaining how Network Service works \nand how loads of Network Customers will be served.  The starting point is Section 31.1 of the PJM \nTariff, which (mirroring the Commission’s own pro forma Open Access Transmission Tariff \n(“OATT”) requires that Network Loads are to be specified in the Service Agreement.  The PJM \nTariff sets forth in Sections 31.2 and 31.3 the procedures for identifying new Network Loads that \nwill be served by the Network Customer.  If, and to the extent that, study is required of the request, \nthe requirements of that study are spelled out in Section 32 of the PJM Tariff.  And, in recognition \nof the fact that loads change after commencement of service, Section 31.6 provides the process by \nwhich to report on changing loads.  Further, there are application procedures for studying any new \nservice in Section 29 of the PJM Tariff, which require specification of all aspects of the requested \nservice, including capabilities and operating restrictions on all proposed network resources.  These \ntariff provisions have been in place for decades, and already require that service requests should \nbe assessed and analyzed based on their particular features; thus they already provide mechanisms \nfor factoring in and assessing the individualized characteristics of the proposed service.   \nThe Show Cause Order does not even begin to explain how the existing Network Service \nconstruct and existing PJM Tariff rules and precedent fail to provide a mechanism for loads of all \nsorts, including flexible large loads.  The Commission states that Eligible Customers taking \n \n17  Under the PJM Tariff, “Network Transmission Service” “mean[s] transmission service provided pursuant to the \nrates, terms and conditions set forth in Tariff, Part III, or transmission service comparable to such service that is \nprovided to a Load Serving Entity that is also a Transmission Owner.”  PJM Tariff, OATT Definitions – L – M – \nN, at 13-14.  The PJM Tariff defines “Network Integration Transmission Service” as “the transmission service \nprovided under Tariff, Part III.  There are two types of firm Network Integration Transmission Service:  Regional \nNetwork Integration Transmission Service and firm Cross-Border Network Integration Transmission Service.  \nNon-firm Network Integration Transmission Service includes Secondary Service.”  Id. at 12–13. \n18  Under the PJM Tariff, “Point-To-Point Transmission Service” “mean[s] the reservation and transmission of \ncapacity and energy on either a firm or non-firm basis from the Point(s) of Receipt to the Point(s) of Delivery \nunder Tariff, Part II.”  Id., OATT Definitions – O – P – Q, at 10."},{"page":13,"startToken":4768,"endToken":5112,"text":"13 \n \ntransmission service on behalf of Eligible Load should be allowed to “choose a transmission \nservice that aligns with their use of the transmission system and therefore aligns the charges for \nservice with the benefits received.”19  However, the Commission never addresses, much less \nexplains, how the existing NITS and Point-to-Point options provide inadequate optionality to \nEligible Customers taking service on behalf of large loads, relative to existing load customers in \nPJM.  Large load customers have been served under open access tariffs for decades and there is \nsimply no evidence offered in the order that such customers are forced to operate inefficiently on \naccount of the existing OATT transmission service offerings.  Indeed, as discussed below, the \nCommission has consistently rejected arguments that different ratemaking should be applied even \nwhere there are limits to the amount of transmission system use.20 \nThe Commission in the Show Cause Order held that NITS and Point-to-Point service \noptions remain just and reasonable.21  But nevertheless, the Commission preliminarily finds that \nflexible large load customers should be entitled to more new options.22  In short, the Commission \nasserts that the PJM Tariff may be unjust and unreasonable without these new service options, but \nprovides no evidence to support the conclusion that the existing service options fail to address the \nneeds of flexible large loads.  That is not a permissible basis to make findings or take action under \nFPA section 206.   \nB. The Commission Did Not Engage in Reasoned Decision Making Because It Did \nNot Explain its Departure from FERC Precedent or Refute that, Because the \nExisting PJM Tariff Provides Service on the Same Basis for All Customers, the \nExisting PJM Tariff Does Not Grant an Undue Preference.   \n \n19  Show Cause Order at P 86. \n20  See Fla. Power & Light Co., 113 FERC ¶ 61,290 (2005), aff’d on rehearing, 116 FERC ¶ 61,012 (2006), aff’d on \nappeal sub nom. Fla. Mun. Power Agency v. FERC, 264 F. App’x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam). \n21  Show Cause Order at P 86. \n22  June 18, 2026 Order at P 68."},{"page":14,"startToken":5112,"endToken":5466,"text":"14 \n \n \nAs an initial matter, picking and choosing customers to receive preferential rate treatment \nruns contrary to the FPA’s requirement that “[n]o public utility shall, with respect to any \ntransmission or sale subject to [FERC’s] jurisdiction . . . (1) make or grant any undue preference \nor advantage to any person or subject any person to any undue prejudice or disadvantage, or (2) \nmaintain any unreasonable difference in rates, charges, service, facilities, or in any other respect, \neither as between localities or as between classes of service.”23   \nThe Commission has a long-standing policy of rejecting attempts by network transmission \ncustomers to avoid paying their load ratio share of system cost.  As the Commission recognized in \nthe December 18 Co-Located Load Order, citing the Amtrak case, the Commission “has rejected \ncost causation arguments made by network customers that sought to lower their load ratio share \nbased on actual use of the transmission system.”24  This policy has long persisted for very good \nreason.  The “assessment of [Network Integration Transmission Service] is not based on actual use \nover a particular transmission path, but rather based on the network customer’s right to use the \nentire system” and its effects on that system.25   \nThe Amtrak case, which rejected an attempt by a network customer in PJM to pay for less \nthan its full gross load, was not an outlier, but instead reflected decades of Commission precedent, \nrejecting challenges to uniform application of the rule that Network Service would be based on the \nentire gross load of the network customer, regardless of arguments (such as those advanced by \n \n23  16 U.S.C. § 824d(b). \n24  December 18 Co-Located Load Order at P 196 & n.412 (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. PPL Elec. Utils. \nCorp, 171 FERC ¶ 61,237, at P 41 (2020), denying clarification and addressing reh’g, Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. \nv. PPL Elec. Utils. Corp., 173 FERC ¶ 61,043 (2020) (“Amtrak”); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 169 FERC ¶ \n61,041, at P 60 (2019)). \n25  Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. PPL Elec. Utils. Corp., 173 FERC ¶ 61,043, at PP 13–14 (2020)."},{"page":15,"startToken":5466,"endToken":5879,"text":"15 \n \nAmtrak) that the customer could purportedly limit use of the system.  For example, this exact issue \nwas addressed in Order No. 888-A and resulting appeals.  In Order No. 888-A, the Commission \nheld that customers cannot “split” their load at a delivery point—if some of the load takes Network \nService, all of the load must be designated for Network Service: \nThe concept of allowing a “split system” or splitting a discrete load \nis antithetical to the concept of network service.  A request for \nnetwork service is a request for the integration of a customer’s \nresources and loads.  Quite simply, a load at a discrete point of \ndelivery cannot be partially integrated—it is either fully integrated \nor not integrated.  Furthermore, such a split system creates the \npotential for a customer to “game the system” thereby evading some \nor all of its load-ratio cost responsibility for network services.26 \nThat ruling was expressly upheld on appeal by the U.S Court of Appeals for the District of \nColumbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”), which accepted the Commission’s reasoning, finding that \nobjections were “not well-taken.”27   \nThe issue was likewise addressed in a long series of cases involving Florida Municipal \nPower Agency (“FMPA”) and transmission service it was taking from Florida Power and Light.  \nAs recounted by the D.C. Circuit in 2005, years of litigation in that case involved the attempt by \nFMPA to avoid paying for Network Service based on its overall gross load, with the Commission \nconsistently rejecting all arguments by FMPA against such load splitting.28  In the 2005 decision, \nthe court remanded one argument by FMPA, which is that physical constraints on the transmission \nsystem made it physically impossible for its entire load to be served by the Florida Power and \n \n26  Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public \nUtilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888-A, 78 FERC \n¶ 61,220 (1997), order on reh’g, Order No. 888-B, 81 FERC ¶ 61,248 (1997), order on reh’g, Order No. 888-C, \n82 FERC ¶ 61,046 (1998), aff’d in relevant part sub nom. Transmission Access Pol’y Study Grp. v. FERC, 225 \nF.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d sub nom. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002). \n27  Transmission Access Pol’y Study Grp., 225 F.3d at 726. \n28  Fla. Mun. Power Auth. v. FERC, 411 F.3d 287 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (describing history of case back to 1993)."},{"page":16,"startToken":5879,"endToken":6320,"text":"16 \n \nLight system.29  On remand, the Commission found that even in the case of physical impossibility \nof serving the entire load, the gross load construct was most appropriate, rejecting arguments that \na network customer should pay for any less than its entire system load.30 \nThe Commission has consistently followed this precedent.31  For example, in Idaho Power, \nthe Commission rejected Bonneville Power Administration’s (“BPA”) attempt to remove certain \nof its load from its load ratio share.32  The Commission explained that, contrary to Order No. 888, \n“BPA’s proposal would essentially leave the behind the meter loads . . . as part of BPA’s network \nload served by Idaho Power’s transmission service, but eliminate the requirement that such loads \nbe metered, i.e., included in BPA’s load ratio share, because Idaho Power’s transmission service \nmay only be needed in rare instances.”33  Similarly, in Order No. 890,34 commenters complained \nthat assigning transmission-related costs to customers that reduce their use of the transmission \nprovider’s system to serve load is inconsistent with the Commission’s cost-causation principles. \nThe Commission rejected such arguments, stating that its existing policy already provides \n \n29  Id. at 292 (remanding because “FERC . . . failed to explain why network customers should be charged by the \ntransmission provider for network service that the provider is physically constrained from offering and, relatedly, \nwhy physical impossibility should not be recognized as an exception to the general rule against permitting partial \nload ratio pricing for network customers”). \n30  Fla. Power & Light, 113 FERC  ¶ 61,290 (2005), aff’d on rehearing, 116 FERC ¶ 61,012 (2006), aff’d on appeal, \n264 F. App’x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2008). \n31  See, e.g., Idaho Power Co., 106 FERC ¶ 61,329 (2004) (“Idaho Power”); Ameren Servs. Co. v. Prairieland Energy \nInc., 131 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2010) (finding that network customer failed to comply with the tariff by not designating \nits total load as network load); Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 151 FERC ¶ 61,191 (2015) (finding that a network customer's \nrequest to designate less than its entire load as network load violated both the transmission provider’s OATT and \nlong standing Commission policy, which require network customers to designate their entire load as network load \nto receive network service). \n32  Idaho Power, 106 FERC ¶ 61,329 at P 14. \n33  Id. \n34  Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, Order No. 890, 119 FERC ¶ 61,119 \n(“Order No. 890”), order on reh'g, Order No. 890-A, 121 FERC ¶ 61,297 (2007), order on reh'g, Order No. 890-\nB, 123 FERC ¶ 61,299 (2008), order on reh'g, Order No. 890-C, 126 FERC ¶ 61,228, order on clarification, \nOrder No. 890-D, 129 FERC ¶ 61,126 (2009)."},{"page":17,"startToken":6320,"endToken":6746,"text":"17 \n \ncustomers with the opportunity to reduce network service costs to the extent a customer is not \nrelying on the transmission system to meet its energy needs (i.e., by taking point-to-point \ntransmission service instead of network service).35 \nThe Show Cause Order’s preliminary finding that flexible large load should be entitled to \nnew transmission services based on less than their entire load departs from these decades of \nprecedent and, contrary to the APA, has failed adequately to explain such departure.36  The \nCommission’s prior determinations of the fairness of load ratio allocation (based on gross load—\neven in the case of purported physical impossibility of service to full load) of embedded costs hold \ntrue.  There is no reasoned basis for these distinctions. \nThe Declaration of Danielle S. Powers (“Powers Declaration”), submitted by the Indicated \nTransmission Owners in the PJM Co-Located Load Proceedings, explains why the assessment of \nNetwork Service is not based on actual use over specific transmission paths.37  All customers have \ndifferent usage of the grid.  Many customers’ reliance upon the grid varies during different times \nof the year and can be distinguished from other customers’ uses.  These customers may have \ndistinct load shapes or load factors, but they pay the same rate for Network Service as do high load \nfactor customers.  Such customers pay the full Network Service rate, but because Network Service \ncharges are allocated based on contribution to the system coincident peak, some customer charges \n \n35  See Order No. 890, 119 FERC ¶ 61,119. \n36  See  Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. at 515 (“the requirement that an agency provide reasoned explanation \nfor its action would ordinarily demand that it display awareness that it is changing position. An agency may not, \nfor example, depart from a prior policy sub silentio or simply disregard rules that are still on the books.”).  At \nparagraph 211 of the June 18, 2026 Order, the Commission says that the current load-splitting proposal is different \nfrom prior situations because PJM need only plan for the specified contract demand rather than the full load, but \nthis argument is not a difference from prior cases at all, such as the FPL case where there was no contention that \nFPL was redesigning its system to serve the full load of FMPA, or the Amtrak case where the entire premise of \nthe argument was that Amtrak made only rare and limited use of the system. \n37  See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. EL25-20-000, Indicated TOs June 3, 2025 Answer, Declaration of \nDanielle S. Powers at P 29."},{"page":18,"startToken":6746,"endToken":7219,"text":"18 \n \nmay be lower on average than others if their operations occur disproportionately outside of the \npeak hours.  No additional rate discount is necessary or given.  Up until now, the Commission has \nconsistently applied this approach of not carving out special rates for different customer classes \nfor good reason—every customer can attempt to make arguments why their usage should result in \na decrease of their share of the embedded costs of the transmission system.  Utilities have an \nobligation to serve load and that load needs to be able to call on service regardless of whether they \nactually utilize the system to the maximum allowable extent since weather and other factors are \nunpredictable.  Hence, actual usage does not reflect the benefit.  Entertaining such arguments \nwould frustrate the rate design that the Commission has applied across the board and that was put \nin place following Order No. 888.38 \nThe existing PJM Tariff effectuates the principle that those that benefit from the \ntransmission system should contribute on a load ratio basis to the embedded costs of the system \nand is consistent with the pro forma OATT in providing for Network Service and Point-to-Point \nService, an important component of Order No. 888.39  Under the APA, the Commission must \nexplain why circumstances have changed such that this proceeding requires departure from past \nefforts by customers to pay for less than gross load.40  The Commission made no serious attempt \n \n38  See, e.g., Recovery of Stranded Costs by Pub. Utils. and Transmitting Utils., Order No. 888, 75 FERC ¶ 61,080 \n(1996), order on reh’g, Order No. 888-A, 78 FERC ¶ 61,220, order on reh’g, Order No. 888-B, 81 FERC ¶ 61,248 \n(1997), order on reh’g, Order No. 888-C, 82 FERC ¶ 61,046 (1998), aff’d in relevant part sub nom. Transmission \nAccess Pol’y Study Grp. v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (TAPS), aff’d sub nom. New York v. FERC, 535 \nU.S. 1 (2002). \n39  See, e.g., id. \n40  See Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. at 515 (“the requirement that an agency provide reasoned explanation \nfor its action would ordinarily demand that it display awareness that it is changing position.  An agency may not, \nfor example, depart from a prior policy sub silentio or simply disregard rules that are still on the books.”); see \nalso Constellation Mystic Power, LLC 45 F.4th at 1057 (finding the Commission’s decision to be arbitrary and \ncapricious and that “the Commission’s ‘failure to provide an intelligible explanation . . . amounts to a failure to \nengage in reasoned decisionmaking’”) (citation omitted); New England Power Generators Ass’n, Inc. v. FERC, \n881 F.3d 202, 211 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“Although case-by-case adjudication sometimes results in decisions that \nseem at odds but can be distinguished on their facts, it is the agency’s responsibility to provide a reasoned \n(cont'd)"},{"page":19,"startToken":7219,"endToken":7676,"text":"19 \n \nto do so.  Nor has the Commission distinguished why other existing customers will not qualify for \ndiscounts—many of whom can argue that they impose lesser demand on the grid by some measure.  \nThat failure to provide explanation renders FERC’s finding arbitrary and capricious and violative \nof the APA.41  Ultimately, this is not reasoned decision making and will create a nightmare as other \ncustomers in PJM and beyond raise a host of similar arguments that their transmission rates should \nbe modified based on their allegedly different use of the system, which is a reason why the \nCommission never mandated this in the past.   \nC. The Loads Rely Upon The Entire Embedded Transmission System To Serve \nTheir Full Gross Load.  Therefore, FERC’s Decision is Arbitrary and \nCapricious Because The Embedded Transmission System Costs Should Be \nCharged For Those Transmission Services. \nNotwithstanding well-established Commission policy and judicial precedent to the \ncontrary, the Show Cause Order preliminarily finds that flexible large loads should be entitled to \na preferential transmission rate.  Not only is this new rate unduly discriminatory (as discussed \nherein), but it is based on a false premise that the combination of transmission system burdens and \nuser benefits of flexible loads are so insignificant as to justify the establishment of a lower, \npreferential rate.  The Commission is wrong, with respect to both the actual burdens on the system \nand the benefits to flexible large loads of being interconnected to the grid. \n \nexplanation of why those facts matter.” (citing BP Energy Co. v. FERC, 828 F.3d 959, 968 (D.C. Cir. 2016) \n(vacating finding of no undue discrimination where Commission identified differences between two natural-gas \ncompanies but failed to adequately explain why they provide a rational basis for the difference in treatment))); \nW. Deptford Energy, LLC v. FERC, 766 F.3d 10, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“It is textbook administrative law that an \nagency must ‘provide[ ] a reasoned explanation for departing from precedent or treating similar situations \ndifferently,’ . . . and Commission cases are no exception . . . .”) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). \n41  See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 879 F.3d at 977 (“FERC departed from this policy without acknowledgment \nor explanation. This departure was arbitrary and capricious.”); Sw. Airlines Co., 926 F.3d at 856 (“‘A full and \nrational explanation’ becomes ‘especially important’ when, as here, an agency elects to ‘shift [its] policy’ or \n‘depart[ ] from its typical manner of’ administering a program. . . .  [FERC] must at least ‘acknowledge’ its \nseemingly inconsistent precedents and either offer a reason ‘to distinguish them’ or ‘explain its apparent rejection \nof their approach’ . . . But however the agency justifies its new position, what it may not do is ‘gloss[ ] over or \nswerve[ ] from prior precedents without discussion.’”) (alterations in original) (citation omitted)."},{"page":20,"startToken":7676,"endToken":7989,"text":"20 \n \nAs for benefits, the Commission has recognized that co-located loads benefit from black \nstart and load following service,42 and that such service properly should be charged based on gross \nload.  Flexible large loads are likewise reliant on black start and load following. Load following \nservices are supplied from a diverse range of the interconnected generation facilities located \nthroughout the system.  These services cannot be provided without use of all the transmission \nsystem’s resources and personnel.  Moreover, because it is a universal rule that generators cannot \noperate every hour of every year and that unexpected outages can and do occur, transmission \ninterconnections provide an avenue for such loads to readily acquire back-up power when co-\nlocated generation facilities are not available.   \nIn addition, in assessing flexible large loads, the Commission fails to consider the many \nadvantages to such loads when they connect to the transmission system, regardless of whether they \nare able to limit their demand under certain circumstances.  These advantages become apparent \nwhen one compares islanded projects to similar projects that are interconnected to the transmission \ngrid.  Islanded projects require extensive back-up generation to assure reliable sources of power.  \nIt is very difficult and expensive to supply islanded generation with black start capabilities or \ninstantaneous load following.  All back-up generation on an islanded project will sit idle when not \nneeded to serve the islanded load, thereby forgoing significant revenues from selling the surplus \npower into the wholesale market.  These lost opportunity sales revenues alone could likely cover \nthe fully embedded costs of Network Service.  Ultimately, islanded generation projects are more \nrisky and therefore more difficult to finance.  Grid interconnection is valuable, which is why large \nloads, including those co-located with generation, have not proposed islanded configurations.  In \npreliminarily finding that traditional Network Service without the option of additional services is \n \n42  See December 18 Co-Located Load Order at PP 209, 219."},{"page":21,"startToken":7989,"endToken":8329,"text":"21 \n \nunjust and unreasonable for flexible large load, the Commission considered none of these benefits \nof grid interconnection to such loads.  Failure to consider the benefits of grid interconnection \nmakes this finding arbitrary and capricious and unreasoned.43 \nIII. \nThe Commission’s Suggested Replacement Rate Would Not Be Just and \nReasonable. \n \nUnder FPA section 206,44 there are two steps: only after the Commission finds a rate to be \nunjust and unreasonable, may it set a replacement rate.45  Even if the Commission has established \nthat the current PJM Tariff is unjust and unreasonable with respect to the transmission services \navailable to flexible large load, it has not demonstrated that its proposed replacement rate—\nextending the services that it directed in the PJM Co-Located Load Proceeding to flexible large \nload—is just and reasonable.  \nA. Allowing Special Treatment For Flexible Large Load Would Violate The \nFPA’s Requirement That There Be No Undue Preference Or Unreasonable \nDifference In Rates Between Classes Of Service.  \nAs explained above, FPA section 205 prohibits any public utility charging transmission \nrates from “mak[ing] or grant[ing] any undue preference or advantage to any person or subject any \nperson to any undue prejudice or disadvantage” or “maintain[ing] any unreasonable difference in \nrates, charges, service, facilities, or in any other respect, either as between localities or as between \nclasses of service.”46  Requiring extension of the new transmission services that the Commission \n \n43  See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. \n44  16 U.S.C. § 824e(a).  \n45  See id; see also Advanced Energy Mgmt. All., 860 F.3d at 663 (“If the Commission finds that a rate is ‘unjust, \nunreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable \nrate … and shall fix the same by order,’” and “[i]t is the Commission’s job—not the petitioner’s—to find a just \nand reasonable rate.”) (alterations in original) (citation omitted); Emera Maine, 854 F.3d at 21; Atl. City Elec. \nCo., 295 F.3d at 10. \n46  16 U.S.C. § 824d(b)."},{"page":22,"startToken":8329,"endToken":8655,"text":"22 \n \nhas required for Co-Located Load to flexible large load would establish rates that grant an undue \npreference or advantage to such loads, for the same reasons that Exelon and FirstEnergy explained \nin the PJM Co-Located Load Proceedings.   \nThere already exist mechanisms (such as demand response at the state and federal levels) \nto address when customers can scale back their load or otherwise reduce their withdrawals when \ncalled upon.  If flexible large loads wish to be compensated for being interruptible, then they should \nrely upon PJM’s demand response rules, or retail rules in the various states, and the Show Cause \nOrder fails to explain why those rules are inadequate here.  The point of FPA section 206 is not \nfor the Commission to declare what it thinks would be better tariff options—it is to ensure that the \ntariff on file is just and reasonable.  Similarly, the PJM Tariff already has in place provisions to \nprovide compensation to those customers that can ease transmission congestion—to the extent that \na basis for the Commission’s orders is that some uses of the system reduce grid usage thus easing \ncongestion, the mechanisms are already there.  The Commission does not consider those existing \ntariff provisions. \nWith respect to Interim NITS service, there is no basis for the Commission to require this \nnew form of service prior to the completion of necessary network upgrades and studies to ensure \nreliability of the system.  The Commission has effectively conceded it has not yet done adequate \nanalysis on this point in the PJM Co-Located Load Proceeding – ruling in Paragraphs 125 and 131 \nof the June 18, 2026 Co-Located Load Order that it is “premature” to determine the extent, if any, \nthat the new forms of service promote efficiency or impact reliability.  The Commission cannot \nhave it both ways – if it is premature to consider if the new services promote efficiency, or \nadequately protect reliability, the Commission cannot rely on purported efficiency gains, to justify"},{"page":23,"startToken":8655,"endToken":8977,"text":"23 \n \nimposition of the new services, and cannot claim to have done so in a way that is protective of \nreliability.   \nSecond, the only issue that CD Services resolve is rate levels for embedded costs allocated \nto the loads taking such services.  The form of service does not dictate what studies should be \nconducted, or what upgrades might be necessary for the system.  Whether or not a customer seeks \nCD Service, studies should consider the actual circumstances of the proposed interconnection, \nwhich will be dictated by engineering and physics, and not by the rate level charged to the \ncustomer.  The notion that CD Service impacts issues such as where a customer interconnects \ndepend on a fallacy that system studies consider rate levels rather than the details of the proposed \ninterconnection. \nInterconnecting to the grid burdens the system by adding new loads and operating \ncontingencies that must be addressed by system operators.  Grid interconnections also bring \nsignificant project benefits such as the ability to receive load following service from off-site \ngeneration.  The totality of these burdens and benefits—benefits which no doubt exceed the cost \nof Network Service based on gross load—easily justify charging flexible large loads, and indeed \nall large loads, the same rate as all other transmission customers.  To allow for preferential rate \ntreatment would allow those customers to rely upon the grid and its benefits at a price that is \nsubsidized by all other customers.  That cannot be said to be just and or reasonable.47  Such a \n \n47  See Coal. of MISO Transmission Customers, 45 F.4th at, 1009 (alterations in original) (quoting S.C. Pub. Serv. \nAuth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam)) (“The cost-causation principle requires that ‘[t]he \ncost of transmission facilities . . . be allocated to those within the transmission planning region that benefit from \nthose facilities in a manner that is at least roughly commensurate with estimated benefits.’”)."},{"page":24,"startToken":8977,"endToken":9297,"text":"24 \n \ndecision is not grounded in reasoned decision making and is not supported by substantial \nevidence.48   \nB. The Commission’s Emphasis On Control Technologies and Protection \nSystems Is In Tension With The Commission’s Open Access Policies And \nTherefore Is Arbitrary And Capricious.  The Commission Also Erred In \nMinimizing The Fact That Such Systems Can And Have Failed. \n \nAs Exelon, FirstEnergy and other Transmission Owners have explained in the PJM Co-\nLocated Load Proceeding, protective systems can provide value, but they are no panacea.  Such \nsystems do not operate instantaneously and without failure.  If a load unexpectedly draws excess \nsupply from the grid, for even a moment, the transmission system sees a rapid demand spike, which \nmay stress and harm the system.49  Moreover, as the Commission acknowledged, “PJM maintains \nthat it is always possible that any protection system in an isolated (but not islanded) Co-Location \nArrangement could mis-operate, be disabled, or degrade, and that, in the few instances where such \nschemes exist on the PJM system, PJM has observed these schemes fail, and the load has taken \ngrid service.”50  This concern is no less applicable to flexible loads that would depend on such \nsystems to ensure that their actual use does not exceed their planned use. \nAs the Commission recognizes from PJM’s comments, “if the protection system fails, the \nlarge load would instantly take significant energy from the system” and “though a few such \nconfigurations may seem tolerable, the risk increases with large quantities of such \n \n48  See Florida Gas, 604 F.3d at 639 (“[T]he Commission ‘must be able to demonstrate that it has made a reasoned \ndecision based upon substantial evidence in the record.’”) (citation omitted); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 305 \nU.S. at 229 (explaining that substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla”); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706. \n49  Id. \n50  December 18, 2025 Co-Located Load Order at P 44."},{"page":25,"startToken":9297,"endToken":9605,"text":"25 \n \nconfigurations.”51  To address this risk, the Commission “direct[s] PJM to apply a penalty rate.”52  \nAssessing penalties, however, only addresses the issue after the fact and does not remediate the \nreliability implications of faulty protective systems.   \nAs previously discussed, because the Commission has not addressed these issues in making \nits preliminary finding that flexible loads should be entitled to take the same transmission services \nthat the Commission directed in the PJM Co-Located Load Proceeding, it has not engaged in \nreasoned decision making and fails to satisfy the APA requirements. \nC. CD Service Will Not Promote Efficiency Or Change Siting. \nTo be clear, under any circumstance, project development teams for new load, whether that \nload is co-located or not, already have a strong incentive to site their facilities on the grid at a \nlocation that minimizes the need for transmission upgrades.  Project developers understand that \nadditional work can add cost, increase complexity, risk project delay, and result in lost opportunity.  \nIn addition, and as discussed above, wise siting decisions will minimize the need for system \nupgrades, which will hasten interconnection.  That benefit is real.  But it has nothing to do with \nthe proposed CD Service.  This is because the impacts to the grid are based on physics and \nengineering.  Whether the service paid for is based on net load or gross load does not change that \nplanning and siting depend on the physics and engineering of the grid.  \nThe Commission’s preliminary finding regarding the availability of CD Service does not \nchange how the study process should work.  Regardless of cost allocation, ensuring there is a \nreliable grid is essential and understanding what load amount the system needs to support is \nnecessary.  If transmission providers are forced to pretend a 500 MW load is only 50 MW, or even \n \n51  Id. P 17. \n52  Id. P 212."},{"page":26,"startToken":9605,"endToken":9904,"text":"26 \n \nthat it is zero, and pretend away the physics and engineering impacts, it will threaten reliability \nand resource adequacy and therefore cannot be said to be just and reasonable. \nWhile protective systems can be beneficial, any suggestion that regional planning needs \nare automatically reduced by the establishment of CD Service is also not supported by evidence.  \nNo loads should be taken out of the broader planning process—to do so would only threaten \nreliability of the system.  Grid operators must plan for such eventualities to ensure system \nreliability.53   \nD. The Commission’s Disregard of Reliability Considerations Underscores That \nThe Proposed Replacement Rate is Not Just and Reasonable \nThe new transmission service options that the Commission proposes to extend to flexible \nlarge load reflect the fact that the Commission overlooked important reliability concerns.  The \nCommission’s ruling in the June 18, 2026 Co-Located Load Order that the issue is premature, and \nits failure to meaningfully address reliability issues in the Show Cause Order, highlights the fact \nthat the Commission has not yet dealt with this issue.54  Protective systems, even when fully \nfunctioning, are intended to keep net load at zero or below, but as the Commission has held in the \nCo-Located Load Proceeding, it is the gross load that is being followed by resources elsewhere on \nthe grid every minute of the day, and thus using and impacting the system every minute of the \nday.55  The suggestion that protective systems that only address net load obviate reliability \nconcerns ignores physical reality.  \nThe Commission’s preliminary finding that Interim NITS should be offered to flexible load \noverlooks potential resource adequacy risks.  This service is, by definition, offered before needed \n \n53  See PJM Tariff §§ 31.1-31.3, 31.6, 32. \n54  June 18, 2026 Order at P 131. \n55  See id."},{"page":27,"startToken":9904,"endToken":10344,"text":"27 \n \ntransmission upgrades are completed and it is unclear from the Show Cause Order how it will be \ndetermined whether the load may be reliably served.  The purpose of this interim service is “more \nrapid interconnection and operation of Co-Located Loads” and the only reliability check is a \ndetermination by PJM that it can provide “some level of interim service reliably.”56  Among other \nthings, we still do not know how PJM will determine whether it can provide “some level of interim \nservice reliably” which is an issue that has been left for later development and filings.  Because \n“[t]he reasonableness of a rate is assessed in light of the FPA’s goals of promoting reliable service \nat reasonable rates and developing plentiful energy supplies,”57 and given that it is still unknown \nhow one could reasonably determine what level of service can be provided before studies are \nconducted, it cannot be said that these transmission service options are just and reasonable.58  The \nCommission has failed to seriously take into account reliability implications in its finding that \nthese new transmission services should be adopted for flexible large loads, and its decision is \ntherefore not reasoned decision making and is arbitrary and capricious. \nIV. \nFERC Exceeded Its Jurisdiction. \nA. FERC’s Proposed Replacement Rate Violates the Major Questions Doctrine. \n \n56  Id. P 200.  \n57  Constellation Mystic Power, LLC, 45 F.4th at 1035. \n58  Cf. Ameren Servs. Co. v. FERC, 880 F.3d 571, 580–81 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (finding that FERC “ma[de] no real \nattempt to holistically assess all of the various risks and benefits to the transmission owner caused by the addition \nof the upgrade facilities,” that “FERC inadequately considered [the] argument that all costs, and risks, are not \nbaked in—that, in fact, shareholders are forced to accept incremental exposure to loss with no corresponding \nbenefit” and therefore, that FERC’s “failure to meaningfully respond to it makes FERC’s decision arbitrary and \ncapricious”) (footnote omitted); Advanced Energy Mgmt. All., 860 F.3d at 664–65 (explaining the Commission’s \nrationales that “support[ed] the Commission’s finding that the energy market rules were unjust and unreasonable,” \nwhich included a rationale that “existing generator outage provisions ‘impede PJM’s ability to ensure reliability’ \nbecause they do not give PJM the authority to rescind approval for a planned outage when there is an emergency”) \n(citation omitted); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. FERC, 783 F.3d 92, 111 (2d Cir. 2015) (explaining that \nFERC, in creating the Lower Hudson Zone, considered long-term benefits that would follow accurate price \nsignals, including that it would “alleviate the risk of reliability problems in the long run”)."},{"page":28,"startToken":10344,"endToken":10798,"text":"28 \n \nThere is no basis to change the PJM Tariff under FPA section 206 when the purpose of the \nchange is to provide preferential treatment or a preferred service to a certain category of customers.  \nSuch action would violate the major questions doctrine.  If Congress wanted to give the \nCommission authority to direct its preferred transmission service to benefit certain categories of \ncustomers, it could have done so.59  It did not do so.  FERC, like all agencies, “ha[s] only those \npowers given to [it] by Congress, and ‘enabling legislation’ is generally not an ‘open book to which \nthe agency [may] add pages and change the plot line.”60  The Commission lacks authority under \nthe FPA to order a new type of transmission service with the sole purpose to benefit some \ncategories of load and to treat those favored types of load differently from other loads that have \nsimilar system impacts and usage.  Accordingly, FERC proposal to require new transmission \nservices be adopted for flexible large loads—because it favors a narrow category of customers \n(i.e., a “subset” of large loads that “are willing and able to limit their energy withdrawals from the \ntransmission system under certain conditions”) without reasoned explanation—violates the \nrequirement in the FPA that no rate by a public utility grants an undue preference or advantage or \nunreasonable difference in rates.61   \nB.  The Commission’s New Approach Infringes On State Retail Authority.   \n \n \n59  Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress, we have held, does not alter the \nfundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, \nhide elephants in mouseholes.”); see Atl. City Elec. Co., 295 F.3d at 8 (As a federal agency, “FERC is a ‘creature \nof statute,’ having ‘no constitutional or common law existence or authority, but only those authorities conferred \nupon it by Congress. Thus, if there is no statute conferring authority, FERC has none.”) (citation omitted). \n \n60  \nWest Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 723 (2022) (third alteration in original) (citation omitted); see also Midship \nPipeline Co. v. FERC, 45 F.4th 867, 877 (5th Cir. 2022) (vacating part of the Commission’s order and remanding \nthe remainder because “[t]he FERC’s interpretation of the NGA to give the agency power to determine ‘the \nreasonable cost’ of remediation efforts ‘change[d] the plot line’ of its enabling legislation, and was therefore \nerroneous” and “[t]he FERC lacks such authority under the NGA, and it likewise lacked authority to order an ALJ \nto make such a determination indirectly”) (second alteration in original) (quoting West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. \nat 723). \n61  16 U.S.C. § 824d(b)."},{"page":29,"startToken":10798,"endToken":11122,"text":"29 \n \nThe states, not the Commission, have jurisdiction to decide when and in what \ncircumstances retail load will be curtailed, and how utilities should charge and treat retail \ncustomers in those circumstances.  The Commission has jurisdiction over “the transmission of \nelectric energy in interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate \ncommerce,” and over “all facilities for such transmission or sale of electric energy.”62  Except as \notherwise provided in the FPA, the states retain jurisdiction over “any other sale of electric energy” \nand “over facilities used for the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local \ndistribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce, or over facilities \nfor the transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by the transmitter.”63   \nStates decide how the retail obligation to serve should be met.  For example, states might \nrequire the provision of backup service to retail customers who lose supply from their contracted \nsupplier, would regulate the distribution system costs associated with such service that would be \ncharged to the retail customer, and would regulate the costs and terms of the backup service.  \nRather than honoring the states’ freedom and flexibility to exercise their jurisdiction over such \nquestions, the Commission’s new rule appears to create a new federal construct that defines the \nextent and terms of service in such situations.  That is, the Commission’s new rules leave it entirely \nup to the customer to specify a contract demand service level that it will purportedly not exceed, \neven if state law mandates that the local utility provide the customer with backup service in the \nevent of an outage.  The Commission’s conclusion that the customer will not take additional \nservice lies in direct conflict with the states’ backup service mandates.  The Commission does not \nhave authority under the FPA to dictate the terms of retail service in that fashion.   \n \n62  16 U.S.C. § 824(b). \n63  Id."},{"page":30,"startToken":11122,"endToken":11467,"text":"30 \n \nUnlike wholesale demand response programs, which “allow[] any state regulatory body to \nprohibit consumers in its retail market from taking part in wholesale demand response programs,” \nthereby “not requir[ing] any “‘action[ ] that would violate State laws or regulations,’” the \nCommission’s new forms of transmission services provide no such limitation.64  As the Supreme \nCourt has explained, however, “if indirect or tangential impacts on wholesale electricity rates \nsufficed, FERC could regulate now in one industry, now in another, changing a vast array of rules \nand practices to implement its vision of reasonableness and justice,” a result that the Court could \nnot “imagine . . . was what Congress had in mind.”65  That is the problem here with FERC’s \nproposal to extend the new transmission services that it devised in the PJM Co-Located Load \nProceeding to flexible large load. \nAs the Supreme Court explained, the FPA \n“limit[s] FERC’s sale jurisdiction to that at wholesale,” reserving \nregulatory authority over retail sales (as well as intrastate wholesale \nsales) to the States.  FERC cannot take an action transgressing that \nlimit no matter how direct, or dramatic, its impact on wholesale \nrates.  Suppose, to take a far-fetched example, that the Commission \nissued a regulation compelling every consumer to buy a certain \namount of electricity on the retail market.  Such a rule would \nnecessarily determine the load purchased on the wholesale market \ntoo, and thus would alter wholesale prices.  But even given that \nineluctable consequence, the regulation would exceed FERC’s \nauthority, as defined in § 824(b), because it specifies terms of sale \nat retail—which is a job for the States alone.66 \nFERC’s CD Services similarly interfere with States’ regulation of the terms of sale at retail, \ndictating the terms and circumstances of service to end use customers who lose their contracted \nretail power supplier—an area that is directly within the States’ domain.  The Commission is \n \n64  FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 275 (2016) (third alteration in original) (citation omitted). \n65  Id. at 278. \n66  Id. at 279–80 (alteration in original) (citations omitted)."},{"page":31,"startToken":11467,"endToken":11784,"text":"31 \n \nunable to do indirectly what it cannot do directly, which is what it does when it intrudes on state \nregulatory authority over retail service in this fashion.67 \nThe Commission should leave retail service questions to the retail regulator.  The \nimposition of CD Service rates to usurp these questions exceeds the Commission’s lawful \nauthority. \nV. \nConclusion \nBecause neither the Commission nor any other complainant have satisfied their burden \nunder FPA section 206 to show that PJM’s existing Tariff is unjust and unreasonable with respect \nto flexible large load (or any other type of load) and the Commission has not engaged in reasoned \ndecision making in the Show Cause Order the Commission should grant rehearing and revoke its \npreliminary finding in the Show Cause Order that the new transmission service offerings that it \ndevised in the PJM Co-Located Load Proceeding should be extended to flexible large loads, or \nany other large loads.   \n \n \n \n \n \n \n67  Cf. Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 909 F.2d 1519, 1522 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“once want of power to do this \ndirectly were established, the existence of power to achieve the same end indirectly through the conditioning \npower might well be doubted”) (quoting Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137, 152 (1960) and \nciting Richmond Power & Light v. FERC, 574 F.2d 610, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (the Commission may not achieve \nindirectly through conditioning power of Federal Power Act what it is otherwise prohibited from achieving \ndirectly)); Am. Gas Ass’n, 912 F.2d at 1510 (“[T]he Commission may not use its § 7 conditioning power to do \nindirectly . . . things that it cannot do at all.”); see also FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. at 288 (“The \nFPA ‘leaves no room either for direct state regulation of the prices of interstate wholesales’ or for regulation that \n‘would indirectly achieve the same result.’”) (citation omitted)."},{"page":32,"startToken":11784,"endToken":11886,"text":"32 \n \nRespectfully submitted, \n \n/s/ William Sauer \nWilliam Sauer \nVice President, Federal Regulatory \nAffairs  \nExelon Corporation  \n701 Ninth St. N.W.  \nWashington, DC 20001  \nTelephone: 202-868-7499  \nEmail: william.sauer@exeloncorp.com   \n/s/ Bradley R. Perkins  \nBradley R. Perkins \nVice President and Deputy General Counsel \nExelon Corporation \nChase Building \n10 S. Dearborn, 52nd Floor \nChicago, IL 60603 \n(312)394-2632 \nTelephone: 312-394-2632 \nEmail: bradley.perkins@exeloncorp.com \n \n \nOn behalf of Exelon Corporation \n \n \n/s/ Amanda P. Parker \nAmanda P. Parker \nCorporate Counsel \nFirstEnergy Service Company \n341 White Pond Drive \nAkron, OH 44320 \n \nTelephone: (330) 384-4592 \nEmail: aparker@firstenergycorp.com  \n \n \n \nOn behalf of The FirstEnergy \nTransmission Companies"},{"page":33,"startToken":11886,"endToken":11932,"text":"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \n \nI hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing document upon each person \ndesignated on the official service list in the above captioned dockets. \n \nDated at Chicago, IL this 20th day of July, 2026. \n \n/s/ Geneva Kennedy  \nGeneva Kennedy  \nExelon Corporation"}],"sections":[{"p":1,"at":0,"title":"Opening text","method":"opening text","endPage":3,"endAt":112,"startToken":0,"endToken":628},{"p":3,"at":112,"title":"I. Statement of Issues/Specification of Error.","method":"printed heading","endPage":10,"endAt":109,"startToken":628,"endToken":3689},{"p":10,"at":109,"title":"II. The Burden Under FPA Section 206 Has Not Been Met: The Existing Rate Has","method":"printed heading","endPage":10,"endAt":1451,"startToken":3689,"endToken":3913},{"p":10,"at":1451,"title":"A. There is No Evidence In The Record That Flexible Large Loads or Other","method":"printed heading","endPage":13,"endAt":1544,"startToken":3913,"endToken":5003},{"p":13,"at":1544,"title":"B. The Commission Did Not Engage in Reasoned Decision Making Because It Did","method":"printed heading","endPage":19,"endAt":641,"startToken":5003,"endToken":7324},{"p":19,"at":641,"title":"C. The Loads Rely Upon The Entire Embedded Transmission System To Serve","method":"printed heading","endPage":21,"endAt":266,"startToken":7324,"endToken":8027},{"p":21,"at":266,"title":"III. The Commission’s Suggested Replacement Rate Would Not Be Just and","method":"printed heading","endPage":21,"endAt":865,"startToken":8027,"endToken":8122},{"p":21,"at":865,"title":"A. Allowing Special Treatment For Flexible Large Load Would Violate The","method":"printed heading","endPage":24,"endAt":111,"startToken":8122,"endToken":8994},{"p":24,"at":111,"title":"B. The Commission’s Emphasis On Control Technologies and Protection","method":"printed heading","endPage":25,"endAt":617,"startToken":8994,"endToken":9389},{"p":25,"at":617,"title":"C. CD Service Will Not Promote Efficiency Or Change Siting.","method":"printed heading","endPage":26,"endAt":576,"startToken":9389,"endToken":9695},{"p":26,"at":576,"title":"D. The Commission’s Disregard of Reliability Considerations Underscores That","method":"printed heading","endPage":27,"endAt":1261,"startToken":9695,"endToken":10106},{"p":27,"at":1261,"title":"IV. FERC Exceeded Its Jurisdiction.","method":"printed heading","endPage":27,"endAt":1299,"startToken":10106,"endToken":10111},{"p":27,"at":1299,"title":"A. FERC’s Proposed Replacement Rate Violates the Major Questions Doctrine.","method":"printed heading","endPage":28,"endAt":1397,"startToken":10111,"endToken":10572},{"p":28,"at":1397,"title":"B. The Commission’s New Approach Infringes On State Retail Authority.","method":"printed heading","endPage":31,"endAt":353,"startToken":10572,"endToken":11522},{"p":31,"at":353,"title":"V. Conclusion","method":"printed heading","endPage":31,"endAt":357,"startToken":11522,"endToken":11523},{"p":31,"at":357,"title":"Conclusion","method":"printed heading","endPage":33,"endAt":0,"startToken":11523,"endToken":11886},{"p":33,"at":0,"title":"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE","method":"printed heading","endPage":33,"endAt":296,"startToken":11886,"endToken":11932}]}