Protest of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM re PJM Interconnection, LLC's 07/31/2026 proposed Reliability Backstop Procurement filing
Read topic-matched comments in ER26-3380
Topics in the text: Reliability and curtailment · Cost allocation · Connecting load and generation
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Opening text
opening text · Topic match: Cost allocation
There is broad agreement among policy makers, regulators, and developers, captured in the Ratepayer Protection Pledge and Principles, on the need to ensure that data centers bring their own new generation and pay their own way and to prioritize the protection of reliability and affordability for…Read this passage Filed comments: Cost allocation
I. PROTEST
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I.Read this passage
A. The RBP Filing Has Not Been Shown Just and Reasonable.
PDF bookmark · Topic match: Cost allocation
Rather than directly addressing the issue of data center load, PJM’s RBP Filing proposes an extremely complex approach to this issue that unnecessarily undermines basic elements of the PJM market design.Read this passage Filed comments: Cost allocation
B. The RBP Filing Is Deficient, Unjust and Unreasonable.
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The RBP Filing Is Deficient, Unjust and Unreasonable.Read this passage
1. The PJM RBP Filing would violate fundamental elements of the PJM capacity market design.
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The PJM RBP proposal would violate these fundamental elements of the PJM capacity market design: • Must buy/must sell requirements in the capacity market • LSEs’ role in the capacity market • Locational capacity market design - 8 - • Single clearing price auction design • Market power mitigation…Read this passage
2. PJM’s RBP Filing would reverse the core must buy/must sell obligations in the capacity market and convert to must buy/option to sell at highest price.
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PJM’s RBP Filing would reverse the core must buy/must sell obligations in the capacity market and convert to must buy/option to sell at highest price.Read this passage
3. PJM’s RBP Filing would inappropriately require LSEs to bear costs and risks.
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As the capacity market evolved into the RPM design, the PJM capacity market design remains a must buy/must sell design in which all LSEs and all capacity owners must participate.13 This design prevents both buyer side and seller side market power. 13 LSEs may elect the Fixed Resource Requirement…Read this passage
4. The RBP Filing is inconsistent with the basic locational design of the PJM Capacity Market.
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The RBP Filing is inconsistent with the basic locational design of the PJM Capacity Market.Read this passage
Attachment A - Revisions to the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff and PJM Reliability
printed heading · Topic match: Cost allocation
There are clear solutions available for addressing the locational facts of PJM including requiring that the generation to serve a data center must be in the same LDA as the data center.Read this passage Filed comments: Cost allocation
5. The RBP Filing abandons single clearing price auction in favor of pay as bid.
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PJM also proposes to not use “market power screening or mitigation measures.”17 It should be unacceptable that PJM, at a time of severe supply shortage, would propose to not use the standard market power screening that is used in all PJM capacity auctions.Read this passage
6. The PJM RBP Filing fails to address market power.
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The PJM RBP Filing fails to address market power.Read this passage
7. The RBP Filing shifts ELCC risk from generators to customers. The RBP filing shifts the risks of generators failing to perform to customers.
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More generally, PJM proposes to inappropriately shift ELCC related risk from generators to customers.21 Generator performance risk is an investor risk and not a customer risk.Read this passage
Attachment A – Marked Tariff Records at Attachment DD, 18.5(e)(i).
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Attachment A – Marked Tariff Records at Attachment DD, 18.5(e)(i). 21 Shortfalls due to decreases in the ELCC ratings are not subject to RBP Shortfall Charges.Read this passage
8. The RBP Filing is inconsistent with the capacity market approach to penalties for performance.
PDF bookmark · Topic match: Credit and exit
PJM proposed Tariff, Attachment DD, section 18.6(d) states: RBP Resources with RBP UCAP MW committed through the Reliability Backstop Procurement that are unable to meet its full RBP UCAP MW commitment due to not achieving commercial operation by the first Delivery Year of the RBP commitment shall…Read this passage Filed comments: Credit and exit
1. PJM proposes to include all large loads rather than just data center load.
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PJM proposes to include all large loads rather than just data center load.Read this passage
2. The RBP Filing fails to match supply and demand for energy
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The RBP Filing fails to match supply and demand for energy The RBP Filing is inconsistent with matching the supply and demand for energy.Read this passage
3. The RBP Filing is inconsistent with the requirement to provide revenue certainty to new generation for 15 years.
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The RBP Filing is inconsistent with the requirement to provide revenue certainty to new generation for 15 years.Read this passage
4. The RBP Filing includes inconsistent definitions of the capacity that can satisfy the requirements to meet the data center load.
PDF bookmark · Topic match: Connecting load and generation
The problem is that PJM proposes to treat RBP offset capacity as equivalent to RBP supply for purposes of reducing the regional reliability requirement, even though the two have materially different contractual protections and performance obligations.Read this passage Filed comments: Connecting load and generation
5. DR as capacity to meet demand of data centers
PDF bookmark · Topic match: Reliability and curtailment
Includes transferred CIRs from a deactivated resource or a resource that has announced deactivation as of April 10, 2026 NA Uprate New ICAP, new MFO , supported by new or transferred CIRs NA New ICAP, supported by an increase in CIRs (does not specify new or transferred) New ICAP, supported by an…Read this passage Filed comments: Reliability and curtailment
6. The proposed RBP process is not consistent with the cost minimizing principles used for clearing energy and capacity markets in PJM today.
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The proposed RBP process is not consistent with the cost minimizing principles used for clearing energy and capacity markets in PJM today.Read this passage
Attachment A - Revisions to the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff and PJM Reliability
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Attachment A - Revisions to the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff and PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement at 18.5 The Reliability Backstop Procurement Process (“Attachment A – Marked Tariff Records”).) 28 Under the PJM ‘s proposed approach, sellers of RBP capacity provide PJM offer price in…Read this passage
7. PJM failed to update the maximum price calculation
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PJM failed to update the maximum price calculation PJM failed to update the calculation of energy market net revenues that is used to offset Gross CONE to calculate the Net CONE value used as the maximum price in the RBP of $555/MW-day.Read this passage
C. Rejecting the RBP Filing Would Allow the Commission to Direct and Appropriate Remedy.
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Rejecting the RBP Filing Would Allow the Commission to Direct and Appropriate Remedy.Read this passage
1. The Current Rules Are Inadequate to Address Prevailing Market Conditions.
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The Current Rules Are Inadequate to Address Prevailing Market Conditions.Read this passage
2. The Record Provides Sufficient Information for the Commission to Immediately Issue a Remedial Directive that Protects Reliability and Affordability.
PDF bookmark · Topic match: Reliability and curtailment
That allocation, reflected as it is in a filed rate, must be respected by NCUC.Read this passage Filed comments: Reliability and curtailment
II. CONCLUSION
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CONCLUSION The Market Monitor respectfully requests that the Commission afford due consideration to this pleading as the Commission resolves the issues raised in this proceeding.Read this passage
ATTACHMENT A
printed heading · Topic match: Reliability and curtailment
ATTACHMENT A Market Monitor Proposal © Monitoring Analytics 2026 | www.monitoringanalytics.com DATE: June 30, 2026, Meeting Date TO: CIFP: Reliability Backstop FROM: IMM SUBJECT: Proposed reliability backstop auction design V6 The most important criterion for evaluating proposals to address how to…Read this passage Filed comments: Reliability and curtailment
ATTACHMENT B
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ATTACHMENT B Technical Appendix - 1 -Read this passage
A. Issues with PJM’s maximum price
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A.Read this passage
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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Dated at Eagleville, Pennsylvania, this 21st day of August, 2026.Read this passage