{"document":{"slug":"filing-20260903-5199","title":"Motion to Intervene and Protest of the Data Center Coalition to PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.’s proposal to establish Interim Resource Adequacy Service and a Large Load Registry","issued":"2026-09-03","accession":"20260903-5199","docket":"ER26-3515-000","group":"PJM filings","filer":"Data Center Coalition","kind":"motion","file":"sources/originals/20260903-5199_01.pdf","url":"https://elibrary.ferc.gov/eLibrary/filelist?accession_Number=20260903-5199","sha256":"b2e7e478d0ba9e16fc7d5fe79c76e2cab402c92d63ab9425f68e6f61bcebdaae","pages":71,"tokens":15543,"emptyPages":[]},"pages":[{"page":1,"startToken":0,"endToken":282,"text":"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nBEFORE THE \nFEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \n) \nPJM Interconnection, L.L.C. \n ) \n Docket No. ER26-3515-000\n) \n \nMOTION TO INTERVENE  \nAND PROTEST OF THE DATA CENTER COALITION \n \nPursuant to Rules 211, 212, and 214 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Federal \nEnergy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or the “Commission”)1 and the Commission’s August \n13, 2026 Combined Notice of Filings #2,2 the Data Center Coalition (“DCC”) hereby moves to \nintervene and submits this protest of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.’s (“PJM”) proposal to establish \nInterim Resource Adequacy Service (“IRAS”) and a Large Load Registry.3 \nI. \nINTRODUCTION \nDCC is the membership organization for the U.S. data center industry, representing leading \ndata center owners and operators that develop, operate, and maintain data center infrastructure and \nteams across the country.  DCC members operate data centers that constitute significant loads \nwithin the PJM region and DCC has been an active stakeholder in regional efforts to ensure \nreliability, enable new generation, and discipline load forecasts.   \nDCC and its members have been at the forefront of efforts to advance reforms in PJM and \nat the state level to accommodate the growth of data centers and other large load customers within \nthe PJM region while maintaining reliability and protecting existing retail customers.  DCC agrees \n \n1 18 C.F.R. §§ 385.211, 385.212, and 385.214. \n2 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., et al., Docket No. ER26-3515-000, et al., Combined Notice of Filings #2 \n(Aug. 13, 2026). \n3 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. ER26-3515-000, Proposal of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. to \nEstablish Interim Resource Adequacy Service and a Large Load Registry to Address System Reliability (Aug. 13, \n2026) (“Filing”)."},{"page":2,"startToken":282,"endToken":576,"text":"- 2 - \nwith PJM that steps must be taken to maintain reliability, protect existing customers from \ninappropriate cost shifts, and ensure that data centers and other large load customers take \nappropriate responsibility for supporting the development of new generation and infrastructure \nnecessary to serve their demand.   \nIndeed, DCC was a leading voice in the PJM Critical Issue Fast Path (“CIFP”) processes \nthat led to PJM’s Filing in this docket.  From the outset of these processes, DCC championed \nreforms to enable data centers to bring their own generation capacity to insulate existing customers \nfrom the costs of serving demand from large load customers, as well as legally-durable pathways \nto enable states to implement interruptible retail tariffs to support grid-wide reliability and \nresilience.  Looking beyond the positions DCC took in PJM’s stakeholder process, DCC members \nhave proudly joined over 200 governors, utilities, electric cooperatives, and data center developers \nin support of the White House’s “Ratepayer Protection Pledge,”4 which, through historic levels of \nindustry investment in long-needed new capacity, is already helping to resolve many of the \nfundamental issues PJM aims to address through this proceeding. \nDCC also strongly supports state efforts to establish interruptible service tariffs that \nfacilitate the integration of new large loads while maintaining reliability and protecting existing \ncustomers.  In fact, DCC has, alongside the Virginia State Corporation Commission (“VA SCC”), \ncalled for other state regulators to develop model retail interruptible tariffs and emergency load-\nreduction programs that would allow large loads to take interruptible service, establish \nstandardized curtailment obligations and operating rules, and allow state-jurisdictional utilities to \ncurtail participating large commercial and industrial customers during system emergencies to \n \n4 Ratepayer Protection Pledge, THE WHITE HOUSE, Proclamation No. 11014, 91 Fed. Reg. 11439 (Mar. 4, \n2026), https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/03/ratepayer-protection-pledge/."},{"page":3,"startToken":576,"endToken":891,"text":"- 3 - \nprotect existing customers.5   \n \nNotwithstanding DCC’s support for bring-your-own-generation-capacity solutions and the \nother initiatives described above, DCC believes that the IRAS proposal is legally defective and \nmust be rejected.  The Federal Power Act (“FPA”) grants states—not PJM or FERC—exclusive \nauthority over the rates, terms, and conditions of retail service.  Yet, PJM asks the Commission to \ngrant it authorization to impose a new curtailment program that aims to interrupt retail service to \nlarge load customers that PJM determines have failed to comply with new bring your own new \ncapacity (“BYONC”) requirements prescribed in the PJM tariff (“Eligible New Large Loads”).  \nRather than accommodating state efforts to modify retail curtailment policies to account for the \ngrowth of large loads, IRAS instead seeks to compel states within the PJM footprint to conform \ntheir retail curtailment frameworks to PJM tariff requirements.  DCC believes that this top-down \napproach to addressing the curtailment of retail customers is inconsistent with principles of \ncooperative federalism and disregards the carefully calibrated division of authority between FERC \nand the states.   \n \nDCC acknowledges that successfully addressing the challenges of large load integration in \nthe region will require collaboration and cooperation among PJM, state regulators, large loads, \nelectric distribution companies, and other stakeholders.  But Congress’s decision to reserve to the \nstates authority over retail service means that it is the states that must take the lead in developing \nthe retail service frameworks through which new large loads are integrated into the electric system, \nincluding the rules governing the priority of customer classes, the terms for interrupting service to \nretail customers, and the requirements that customers must meet to obtain firm service.  While  \n \n5 See Exh. A; Letter to Ms. Paula Conboy and Mr. David Mills from VA SCC Chair, Kelsey Bagot and DCC \nPresident & CEO, Josh Levi (June 30, 2026), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/cifp-\nrbp/2026/20260630/20260630-written-comments---va-scc-and-data-center-coalition.pdf."},{"page":4,"startToken":891,"endToken":1227,"text":"- 4 - \nPJM has a critical role to play in ensuring that large loads are integrated into the system reliably, \nit should not seek to displace the role of the states by imposing a uniform retail curtailment policy \nacross the PJM region. \n \nThis does not mean that PJM and the Commission are powerless to take actions to protect \ncustomers from service interruptions when grid conditions are tight.  During the CIFP process, \nDCC outlined a framework for a state “opt-in framework” that would couple state-led \nimplementation of interruptible service with changes to PJM’s operational practices to ensure that \nretail curtailments are implemented in a manner that recognizes the respective roles of wholesale \nand retail regulators.6  Under that proposal, states would be responsible for establishing \ninterruptible customer classes for large load customers while PJM would continue to monitor \nsystem conditions and, when conditions warrant, would issue a signal to utilities in participating \nstates that would trigger curtailments in accordance with state-established tariffs and service \npriorities.  To provide immediate relief to customers while states work to update their retail tariffs, \nDCC also proposed that PJM update its manual load-shed procedures to establish a framework \nunder which data centers and other large loads would be contacted during emergencies and \nprovided an opportunity to voluntarily curtail prior to PJM’s implementation of broader load dump \nprocedures.   \nDCC’s proposal illustrates that there are approaches that can achieve the same reliability \noutcomes as IRAS while respecting the traditional division of responsibility between FERC and \nthe states.  But the benefits of a state-led approach are not limited to merely avoiding the significant \n \n6 See Exh. B; DCC Connect & Manage Alternative: State-Led Implementation with Immediate Residential \nCustomer Protection (June 30, 2026), available at: https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-\ngroups/committees/mc/2026/20260630-special/item-01c---data-center-coalition---cm---executive-summary.pdf.  See \nalso Exh. C; DCC, A Path to Reliable Large-Load Integration: Creating Certainty for Investment, Customers, and the \nGrid \n(June \n10, \n2026), \nhttps://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/cifp-\nrbp/2026/20260611/20260611-item-03a---data-center-coalition-presentation.pdf."},{"page":5,"startToken":1227,"endToken":1535,"text":"- 5 - \nlegal issues presented by IRAS.  Allowing states to take the lead in establishing retail curtailment \npriorities avoids one of the other major shortcomings of IRAS: there is no assurance that a PJM-\nled framework will be effective or achieve the objectives that PJM seeks.  If states are truly free to \nestablish different curtailment priorities as PJM claims, PJM cannot ensure that the customers it \nseeks to target through IRAS will be curtailed, that retail customers that comply with PJM’s \nBYONC requirements will avoid service interruptions, or that the proposal will deliver the \nreliability benefits PJM claims.  \nIRAS is also unjust, unreasonable, and unduly discriminatory on its own terms.  IRAS \nwould create a sub-class of Network Integration Transmission Service (“NITS”) customers that \nwould be defined by the characteristics of the retail customers that they serve.  NITS customers \nserving Eligible New Large Loads would be required to pay the same transmission and capacity \ncharges as other NITS customers, but would be curtailed ahead of other NITS customers and firm \npoint-to-point customers.  In fact, while NITS customers serving Eligible New Large Loads still \nwould be required to pay charges reflecting the cost of capacity committed through PJM’s capacity \nmarket, PJM proposes to curtail these customers prior to deploying Demand Resources that have \nbeen committed to provide capacity to maintain reliability and avoid interruptions to firm \ncustomers.  The result would be to force these NITS customers to bear the costs of capacity that \nwould not be available to meet their needs. \nCompounding these problems is the fact that the Filing offers no transition mechanism and \neffectively provides New Large Loads a window of less than ten months to procure new capacity \nor face curtailment—an interval that PJM’s own documented difficulties in bringing resources \nonline demonstrates is not realistic.  The result is that large loads that have spent billions of dollars"},{"page":6,"startToken":1535,"endToken":1848,"text":"- 6 - \nand entered complex commercial arrangements in reliance on PJM’s longstanding rules will \nsuddenly face the prospect of being unable to obtain the reliable service their projects depend on.   \n \nRather than implementing measures to degrade the quality of service provided to Eligible \nNew Large Loads, PJM should be pursuing reforms that eliminate barriers to the development of \nthe new generation capacity needed to maintain reliability and avoid the curtailment of retail \ncustomers.  Yet, PJM proposes to undermine the ability of the capacity market to send price signals \nfor the development of new capacity by excluding Eligible New Large Loads from the calculation \nof the Variable Resource Requirement curve (“VRR Curve”) beginning with the 2029/2030 \nDelivery Year.  Ultimately, the result will be a capacity market that produces prices and results \nthat are untethered to actual supply and demand conditions within the PJM footprint.  A capacity \nmarket that is modeled as if a large and growing increment of demand does not exist cannot send \nthe price signals needed to attract the supply that PJM says the region lacks.  \nDCC recognizes that the PJM region must adapt to this high load growth environment in \nwhich new resource entry remains frustrated and is committed to advancing durable solutions that \npreserve states’ role in integrating large loads, protect existing customers from inappropriate cost \nshifts, and provide data centers and other large loads with timely pathways to power that ultimately \nimproves reliability throughout the region.  Establishing a framework that can accomplish these \nobjectives is essential to ensuring that America’s industries of the future—data centers, \nsemiconductors, battery manufacturing, and the automotive, steel, metal, chemical, petrochemical, \nand refining industries—remain competitive in the global economy.  But PJM’s proposal to impose \na retail curtailment scheme on states that eviscerates the jurisdictional lines drawn by Congress, \nrequires customers to pay for capacity that they will not benefit from, undermines the settled"},{"page":7,"startToken":1848,"endToken":2102,"text":"- 7 - \nexpectations of New Large Loads, and may ultimately prove unworkable is not a viable path \nforward.   \nFor the foregoing reasons, DCC asks the Commission to issue an order rejecting the Filing \nand encouraging PJM to work with stakeholders to develop changes to PJM’s emergency \nprocedures that accommodate—rather than dictate—the retail curtailment priorities of individual \nstates.  Alternatively, if the Commission finds that the growth of large loads has rendered PJM’s \nexisting emergency procedures unjust and unreasonable, the Commission should initiate a Section \n206 proceeding to develop proposed revisions to these procedures that respect the jurisdictional \nboundaries established by the FPA while protecting existing retail customers from service \ndisruptions and inappropriate cost shifts.   \nIf the Commission does not reject IRAS outright, then it should direct PJM to establish a \nmeaningful transition mechanism that avoids disrupting existing contractual arrangements and \nprovides both large load customers and the states a reasonable timeline to take the steps necessary \nto adapt to the IRAS framework.  Among other things, any transition mechanism should limit the \napplication of IRAS in a manner that respects existing contracts and investment decisions, \nincluding exempting large load customers that have already entered into contracts for retail service \nthat pre-date implementation of IRAS.  Additionally, the Commission should direct PJM to delay \nimplementation of IRAS until June 1, 2028 to provide new large loads a reasonable amount of \ntime to comply with PJM’s BYONC requirements and to provide state authorities with the time \nnecessary to update their retail policies to account for the IRAS framework."},{"page":8,"startToken":2102,"endToken":2472,"text":"- 8 - \nII. \nPROTEST \nA. \nIRAS Unlawfully Intrudes On State Authority Over Retail Sales \nIn drafting the FPA, “Congress meant to draw a bright line easily ascertained, between \nstate and federal jurisdiction[.]”7  Congress granted FERC jurisdiction over wholesale sales of \nelectricity and transmission service in interstate commerce.8  At the same time, the FPA “limits \nFERC’s regulatory reach, and . . . maintains a zone of exclusive state jurisdiction”9 by reserving \nto the states jurisdiction over “any other sale of electric energy” and “over facilities used for the \ngeneration of electric energy” and “facilities used in local distribution[.]”10   \nAlthough the “wholesale and retail markets in electricity are inextricably linked,” the mere \nfact that the rates, terms, and conditions of retail service may affect wholesale markets is not a \nsufficient basis for FERC to assert jurisdiction.11  FERC cannot take an action transgressing the \nlimits prescribed by Congress “no matter how direct, or dramatic, its impact on wholesale rates.”12  \nFERC may not approve tariff provisions that directly regulate retail customers, dictate retail \nservice terms, or prescribe the curtailment priority of retail customers.13  Nor may FERC approve \ntariff provisions that “target” those matters left for the states to regulate.14  \nPJM portrays IRAS as a narrow reliability measure that merely supplements existing \nemergency procedures.  But the proposal cannot be evaluated based on labels alone.  The \n \n7 Federal Power Comm’n v. Southern California Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964).  \n8 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1).    \n9 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 266 (2015).  \n10 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1).  \n11 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 264 (2015). \n12 Id. at 280. \n13 Northern States Power Co. v. FERC, 176 F.3d 1090 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that FERC’s “attempt to \nregulate the curtailment of electrical transmission on native/retail consumers is unlawful, as it falls outside of the \nFPA’s specific grant of authority to FERC.”); Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc., 193 FERC ¶ \n61,070, at P 49 (2025) (rejecting large load tariff that “appear[s] to dictate certain terms and conditions for retail \nsales[.]”). \n14 Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373, 385 (2015)."},{"page":9,"startToken":2472,"endToken":2893,"text":"- 9 - \nCommission must examine what IRAS actually does in practice.  When PJM’s Filing and proposed \ntariff language are considered as a whole, the target of the Filing becomes clear: IRAS is an \nunprecedented program that aims to interrupt service to specific retail customers that do not \ncomply with federally-approved resource procurement requirements prescribed by the PJM tariff \nand directs state-regulated distribution utilities to implement PJM’s retail curtailment priorities.   \nPJM casts IRAS as a new wholesale service that retail customers can provide.  But IRAS \nis not a novel form of demand response; it is a framework for singling out retail customers for \nforced service interruptions during tight grid conditions based on criteria established in a FERC-\njurisdictional tariff.  Under IRAS, “end-use customer load” with a peak load of 50 MW or greater \nthat goes into service15 after PJM prescribed deadlines (i.e., New Large Loads) will be required to \nbring capacity meeting PJM’s BYONC criteria or be deemed to be subject to interruption during \nemergency conditions.  In effect, IRAS: \n• seeks to create a new interruptible retail customer class consisting of large load \ncustomers that do not meet PJM’s BYONC requirements;16 \n• authorizes PJM to issue curtailment instructions during prescribed conditions to \ncompel Electric Distributors17 to reduce the load of these customers;18  \n• directs Electric Distributors to provide compensation to Eligible New Large Loads \nwhose load is curtailed pursuant to these directives equal to 50% of the Non-\nPerformance Charge Rate set out in the PJM tariff (unless the Eligible New Large \nLoad agrees to “accept in its retail rates” a lower sum);19 and  \n \n15 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 1, n.2 (defining “New Large Load” to include end-use customer load that is \neither “a Large Load that goes into service after” the deadline prescribed by the tariff or “incremental load in-service \nafter [such deadline], that increases the existing end-use customer load at a single electrical site that, prior to such \nincremental load, did not previously meet the definition of Large Load.”). \n16 Id. at 69.  \n17 Electric Distributor is defined as a PJM member that owns or leases electric distribution facilities that are \nused to provide electric distribution service to load within the PJM region or a cooperative or joint municipal agency \nthat has a member that owns electric distribution facilities used to provide electric distribution service to load within \nthe PJM region.  PJM, Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region, Art. 1 \n(defining Electric Distributor).  \n18 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 74-75, 83-84. \n19 Id. at 102."},{"page":10,"startToken":2893,"endToken":3305,"text":"- 10 - \n• directs Electric Distributors to impose charges on other customers to fund these \ncompensation payments.20 \nPJM has failed to provide a sufficient basis for the Commission to find that IRAS does not \nregulate the terms and conditions of retail service in ways that go beyond the Commission’s \nauthority.  FERC does not have any authority to exercise jurisdiction over the quality of service \nthat retail customers receive, the terms and conditions that retail customers must meet to avoid \ninterruption during emergency conditions, or the compensation paid to retail customers whose \nservice is curtailed.  Each of these areas are matters that states have historically regulated pursuant \nto their exclusive authority over the rates, terms, and conditions of retail service.   \nThe extent to which IRAS targets matters within the jurisdiction of the states is readily \ndiscernable by even a cursory review of the subject matters addressed by state laws and tariffs \ngoverning retail service.  For instance, state laws and tariffs within the PJM region recognize the \nauthority of state public utility commissions to establish the relative priority of retail customers for \nservice,21 require state electric utilities to implement curtailments in a manner that complies with \nstate law and regulation, establish interruptible service classes,22 determine eligibility for \nparticipation in interruptible rate schedules,23 and establish credits and compensation for customers \n \n20 Id., Att. A, Proposed Att. DD-4(X). \n21 See, e.g., Va. Code § 56-250 (authorizing Virginia state corporation commission to establish plan \ngoverning curtailment of retail customers during grid emergencies and shortages); 20 VAC5-300-20 (establishing \nprocedures for Virginia utilities to take during emergencies and establishing relative priority of residential, \ncommercial, and industrial customers);  Ohio Administrative Code 4901:5-19 (recognizing right of Public Utility \nCommission of Ohio to implement measures that fulfill “electric requirements for priority use by its consumers” and \nreallocate or curtail supplies “among its consumers”).  \n22 See, e.g., PPL Electric Utilities Corp., General Tariff: Rules and Rate Schedules for Electric Service, Rate \nSchedule LP-6 (Large Load Interconnections) (providing large load customers the option to voluntarily elect \n“interruptible service . . . instead of firm service”). \n23 See, e.g., Pub. Util. Comm’n of Ohio, In the Matter of the Application of Ohio Power Company for \nAuthority to Establish a Standard Service Offer Pursuant to R.C. 4928.143, In The Form Of An Electric Security Plan, \nOpinion and Order, Case No. 23-23-EL-SSO at ¶¶ 105-109, 140-144 (Apr. 3, 2024) (approving interruptible power \ntariff for customers that meet notice requirements and establishing demand credits)."},{"page":11,"startToken":3305,"endToken":3654,"text":"- 11 - \nthat interrupt their service.24  The service classification of retail customers, the curtailment priority \nof different classes, and the consideration paid for these service interruptions are all familiar \ncomponents of state-regulated retail service and beyond the bounds of permissible FERC \nregulation.  \nPJM attempts to justify its proposal by stating that it will not curtail specific end-use \ncustomers directly, but will direct Electric Distributors25 to curtail these customers’ demand.26  But \nthe fact that PJM does not have authority to directly curtail retail customers merely reinforces that \nPJM is attempting to exercise control over matters that are outside of its purview and beyond the \nboundaries of the Commission’s jurisdiction.  And the fact that PJM is attempting to do indirectly \nwhat it cannot do directly is of no legal significance.27  The FPA leaves no room either for FERC \nto directly regulate retail sales or approve regulations that would indirectly achieve this result. \nPJM argues that IRAS is consistent with the Supreme Court’s determination in EPSA that \nOrder No. 745’s directive to regional transmission organizations (“RTO”) and independent system \noperators (“ISO”) to pay demand response resources participating in the energy market the \nlocational price for energy did not intrude on the jurisdiction of the states.28  But the reasoning that \nthe Court employed in sustaining Order No. 745 in EPSA has no application to IRAS.   \nImportantly, EPSA upheld Order No. 745 based on the Court’s determination that Order \nNo. 745 merely established a rate for wholesale transactions and was confined solely to the rules \n \n24 See, e.g., id. \n25 DCC notes that it is unclear how PJM’s proposal would work in retail choice jurisdictions where \ncompetitive retail suppliers—rather than the Electric Distributor—may be responsible for providing service to retail \ncustomers. \n26 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 86.  \n27 Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, 578 U.S. 150, 163 (2016) (“FPA leaves no room either for direct \nstate regulation of the prices of interstate wholesales or for regulation that would indirectly achieve the same result.”). \n28 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 266 (2015)."},{"page":12,"startToken":3654,"endToken":4080,"text":"- 12 - \ngoverning the wholesale markets.29  The same cannot be said of IRAS.  To the contrary, PJM’s \ntariff revisions seek to prescribe the amount paid to retail customers through their retail rates for \nservice interruptions implemented at PJM’s direction.30  And, in contrast to Order No. 745, the \neffectiveness of PJM’s proposed framework depends on electric distributors issuing directives to \ntheir retail customers to reduce demand31 and state regulatory authorities adopting retail tariffs that \nalign with the curtailment priorities set forth in the PJM tariff.32  \n \nThe Court also noted that Order No. 745 was carefully crafted to preserve the jurisdiction \nof the states by providing state regulators with the option of prohibiting retail customers from \noffering demand response into the wholesale markets33 and FERC’s “justifications for regulating \ndemand response are all about, and only about, improving the wholesale market.”34  IRAS does \nnot provide state regulators with any such opt out.  Regardless of the decisions made by individual \nstate regulators, PJM will continue to issue directives to electric distributors to curtail New Large \nLoad customers that do not comply with PJM’s BYONC requirements.  And while the \njustifications for Order No. 745 were all about the wholesale market, PJM acknowledges that IRAS \nis intended to “establish load reduction priorities for retail customers”35 and encourage “states to \n \n29 Id. at 282 (stating that “every aspect of the regulatory plan happens exclusively on the wholesale market \nand governs exclusively that market’s rules”).  \n30 Filing, Att. A, Proposed Att. DD-4(X)(a) (stating that the rate for the provision of IRAS “shall be 50% of \nthe Non-Performance Charge Rate . . . unless any Eligible New Large Load elects to (i) accept in its retail rates a sum \nless than 50% of the Non-Performance Charge Rate . . . or (ii) waive receipt in its retail rates any compensation for \nthe provision of” IRAS”) (emphasis added). \n31 Id., Transmittal Letter at 26 (“Electric Distributors must execute PJM’s load reduction directives when \nPJM issues an Interim Resource Adequacy Alert.”).  \n32 Id. at 3 (“PJM anticipates participating in efforts to develop standardized regulatory tools and model retail \ntariff structures that individual state commissions may consider as they address the integration of new loads and \notherwise decide whether and how to act in response to the evolving federal wholesale landscape, inclusive of the \nIRAS filing.”).  \n33 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 287 (“[T]he Rule allows any State regulator to prohibit \nits consumers from making demand response bids in the wholesale market.”).  \n34 Id. at 282. \n35 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 31."},{"page":13,"startToken":4080,"endToken":4442,"text":"- 13 - \nre-evaluate load reduction plans.”36  The objective of IRAS is clear: to compel state regulators to \nmodify their regulation of the retail market to conform to PJM policy.  \nAdditionally, Order No. 745 established the rate that demand response providers would be \npaid if they voluntarily elected to participate in the wholesale markets.  The wholesale demand \nresponse programs at issue in Order No. 745 did not compel retail customers to curtail their loads \ninvoluntarily or state regulators to re-evaluate their retail curtailment programs.  IRAS, in contrast, \ntargets individual retail customers that fail to comply with PJM’s BYONC requirements for \ninvoluntary curtailment and seeks to ensure that states conform their curtailment policies to align \nwith the priorities established by the PJM tariff. \nPJM attempts to avoid these jurisdictional issues by claiming that states retain discretion37 \nover how to shape their retail policies in response to IRAS and that it will be Electric Distributors \nand state regulators that determine which retail customers actually are curtailed.  PJM’s reasoning \nmisses the point.  It is the role of the states—not PJM—to establish load reduction priorities for \nretail service.  Neither PJM nor FERC should be dictating retail curtailment rules, whether directly \nor by establishing market rules intended to compel compliance.  \nUltimately, IRAS does not offer states a genuine choice.  For a state to ignore PJM’s \ndictates would be to run the risk that reliability events could result in broader service disruptions \naffecting other customers within its jurisdiction rather than a more targeted curtailment of \nindividual large load customers.  Offering states the choice between compliance and indiscriminate \ncurtailment of retail customers is well past the point at which “pressure turns into compulsion” and \n \n36 Id. at 3.   \n37 Notwithstanding PJM’s claims about the flexibility afforded to state authorities, a decision by FERC to \nassert jurisdiction over, and approve, IRAS would raise serious legal questions about what discretion states have to \ndeviate from the terms of the filed rate approved by the Commission.  See Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, \n476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986) (once FERC “sets a rate, a state may not conclude in setting retail rates that the FERC-\napproved wholesale rates are unreasonable”)."},{"page":14,"startToken":4442,"endToken":4753,"text":"- 14 - \nundermines the cooperative federalism embodied in the FPA.38 \nEven if states were given a meaningful choice, PJM’s repeated references to the discretion \nof the states as to whether to comply with IRAS highlights a fundamental flaw in PJM’s proposal. \nPJM cannot simultaneously maintain that states retain meaningful discretion over the \nimplementation of retail curtailments and assume that IRAS will operate exactly as PJM describes.  \nIf states are genuinely free to establish different curtailment priorities, PJM cannot guarantee that \nthe customers it seeks to target through IRAS will actually be curtailed or that the proposal will \nachieve its objectives.  \nNor can PJM ensure that new large load customers that comply with PJM’s BYONC \nrequirements will avoid service interruption.  For instance, an Eligible New Large Load customer \nthat procures new capacity to meet its load may still experience service disruptions during \nemergency conditions if the relevant state authorities and Electric Distributors do not adopt \ncurtailment priorities that align with the IRAS framework.  The lack of certainty that a customer \nthat complies with PJM’s BYONC requirements will avoid service interruptions will undermine \none of the primary justifications for the IRAS framework: to provide an incentive for new large \nload customers to support the development of new capacity required to meet their needs. \nPJM states that IRAS is merely an example of the “federal regime helping to effectuate \nstate decisions associated with the rates, terms, and conditions of retail service.”39  But it is quite \nthe opposite.  Rather than accommodating state decisions—as the proposal DCC advanced in the \nPJM stakeholder process would have—PJM asks the Commission to approve a tariff framework \ndesigned to ensure that retail customers are curtailed in a manner that aligns with PJM’s \n \n38 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580 (2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted). \n39 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 3."},{"page":15,"startToken":4753,"endToken":4999,"text":"- 15 - \npreferences, priorities, and requirements.  If Congress had intended to give FERC the authority to \ndetermine the retail load priorities within 13 states and the District of Columbia then it would have \nexplicitly provided FERC with this authority in the FPA.40  But it did not.  Instead, it explicitly \ndenied FERC any authority to exercise jurisdiction over the rates, terms, and conditions of retail \nservice, reserving these matters to the states.   \nPJM minimizes jurisdictional concerns by noting that the FPA’s drafters could not have \nforeseen the resource adequacy impacts of data centers and technological advancements in \nartificial intelligence.41  That may be true.  But the drafters of the FPA did foresee a different risk: \nthat federal regulation of the electric industry could encroach upon the authority long enjoyed by \nthe states.  Congress therefore drew a clear jurisdictional boundary, granting FERC authority over \nwholesale sales and interstate transmission while reserving regulation of retail service to the states.  \nImplicit in this structure is the recognition that not all problems require a federal solution.  The \nnovelty of today’s reliability challenges does not permit the Commission to disregard the \nboundaries established by Congress.       \n \n40 West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 716 (2022) (explaining that under the major questions doctrine, “courts \n‘expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast economic and political \nsignificance.’”) (quoting Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 571 U.S. 302 (2014)). \n41 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 91."},{"page":16,"startToken":4999,"endToken":5385,"text":"- 16 - \nB. \nIRAS Is Unjust, Unreasonable, Unduly Discriminatory, And Inconsistent \nWith Cost Causation Requirements \n \n1. \nCurtailing New Large Loads Before Requiring Demand Resources To \nPerform Is Unjust And Unreasonable \nThe purpose of committing capacity through the PJM Reliability Pricing Model (“RPM”) \nis to ensure that PJM has sufficient resources available to avoid the risk of supply interruptions.42  \nIn the last two PJM Base Residual Auctions (“BRA”), Demand Resources were paid over a \ncombined $1.5 billion to reduce their demand when called upon by PJM to maintain reliability.43  \nDemand Resources are compensated at this level based on “the expectation that such resources \nwill be available to provide energy and reserves when called upon” just like other Capacity \nResources.44   \nIf IRAS is approved, however, Demand Resources committed through the capacity market \nwill no longer be available to serve the needs of Eligible New Large Load customers.  Specifically, \nPJM’s proposed curtailment order following the adoption of IRAS would be as follows:  \n• PJM dispatches available generation and economic demand response;45 \n \n• PJM curtails non-firm export transactions associated with Capacity Resources;46 \n \n• PJM curtails new Non-Firm Contract Demand Service and Interim Network \nIntegrated Transmission Service;47 \n \n42 PJM, Powering Reliability Through Market Design: Addressing Rising Demand and Constrained Supply, \nand Stimulating Investment To Support Durable Reliability at 14 (May 6, 2026), https://www.pjm.com/-\n/media/DotCom/library/reports-notices/special-reports/2026/20260506-powering-reliability-through-market-\ndesign.pdf.  See also PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,209, at P 520 (2026) (“Capacity resources are \npurchased to meet the needs of transmission customers taking existing firm service, such as NITS.”). \n43 See PJM 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction Report at 2-3, 5, 12 (July 14, 2026), available at: \nhttps://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/rpm.aspx (showing 7,641 MW of Demand Response clearing at \n$333.44 MW-day for 2027/2028 Delivery Year and 7,364 MW of Demand Response clearing at $325.00 MW-day \nfor 2028/2029 Delivery Year).  \n44 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 151 FERC ¶ 61,208, at P 99 (2015).  \n45 Filing, Att. C – Aff. of Christopher Pilong on behalf of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. at ¶ 8.  See also Filing, \nTransmittal Letter at 78. \n46 Id. at ¶ 9.  See also Filing, Transmittal Letter at 78. \n47 Id. at ¶ 12.  See also Filing, Transmittal Letter at 78."},{"page":17,"startToken":5385,"endToken":5790,"text":"- 17 - \n \n• PJM curtails Eligible New Large Loads under IRAS;48 and, finally, \n \n• PJM initiates Pre-Emergency Load Management Reduction Actions, including \nmandatory reductions for Demand Response.49 \nIn short, under PJM’s proposal New Large Loads that have not satisfied the BYONC requirements \nwill be curtailed before PJM calls on Demand Resources that have been paid to reduce their load.50  \nPJM has not demonstrated that it is just and reasonable to direct the curtailment of retail \ncustomers prior to deploying Demand Resources that have been committed precisely to avoid such \nservice disruptions.  The point of Capacity Resources and Demand Resources is that they will \nprovide capacity when called upon “to avoid periods of involuntarily firm load shed or \nblackouts.”51  And the Commission has consistently found that paying resources, including \nDemand Resources, for capacity but not expecting them to perform “threaten[s] reliable operation \nof the system and forc[es] consumers to pay for capacity without receiving commensurate \nreliability benefits” ultimately resulting in unjust and unreasonable rates.52  PJM’s IRAS proposal \nreverses that relationship: PJM proposes to involuntarily curtail customers that continue paying \n \n48 Id. at ¶ 13. See also Filing, Transmittal Letter at 78.  \n49 Id. at ¶ 14; PJM Manual 13: Emergency Operations § 2 (Revision 98; effective June 24, 2026) \n(“Applicability: Any site registered in the PJM Demand Response program as a demand resource (a.k.a. DR) type that \nneeds 30, 60 or 120 minute lead time to make its reductions.  These reductions are mandatory when dispatched during \nthe product availability window.”).  \n50 The relative curtailment priority of Eligible New Large Loads and Demand Resources also raises questions \nabout the efficacy of the IRAS framework.  Under PJM’s proposal, a New Eligible Large Load would have a strong \nincentive to become a Demand Resource, receive capacity revenues, and then be dispatched under PJM’s demand \nresponse rules—after IRAS otherwise would have required it to curtail.  In effect, a New Large Load customer could \nmove from paying for capacity and being curtailed prior to the deployment of demand response to receiving capacity \nrevenues and receiving a later curtailment priority simply by changing its wholesale market status.   \n51 PJM, Powering Reliability Through Market Design: Addressing Rising Demand and Constrained Supply, \nand Stimulating Investment To Support Durable Reliability at 14 (May 6, 2026), https://www.pjm.com/-\n/media/DotCom/library/reports-notices/special-reports/2026/20260506-powering-reliability-through-market-\ndesign.pdf. \n52 ISO New England, Inc., 147 FERC ¶ 61,172, at P 23 (2014)."},{"page":18,"startToken":5790,"endToken":6076,"text":"- 18 - \ncapacity charges while leaving Demand Resources that have been committed to provide capacity \nundeployed.  \nThe only explanation PJM has provided to justify its proposal is that Demand Resources \nare curtailed as part of the Pre-Emergency Load Management Reductions when a North American \nElectric Reliability Corporation Energy Emergency Alert Level 1 (“EEA1”) is established.53  And \nbecause Pre-Emergency Load Management Reductions indicate that the “region is approaching a \ncapacity event,” PJM says that it is “[t]hus, … appropriate for PJM to direct Electric Distributors \nto reduce those New Large Loads that have failed to cover their capacity obligations before relying \non Demand Resources, through Pre-Emergency Load Management Reductions Actions, to \nmaintain reliability.”54  \nWhile it is obvious that requiring Eligible New Large Loads to curtail would be helpful to \navoid Pre-Emergency Load Management Reductions Actions, it does not follow that curtailing \nretail customers through IRAS is an appropriate mechanism to prevent Demand Response from \nbeing called upon to avoid Pre-Emergency Load Management Reductions Actions.  If PJM is \nconcerned that calling upon Demand Resources will trigger a Pre-Emergency Load Management \nReduction or EEA1 earlier than it believes is warranted, it should revise its curtailment procedures \nto allow it to require Demand Response to perform without triggering a Pre-Emergency Load \nManagement Reduction or EEA1.  Indeed, PJM has previously recognized that it needed to revise \nits definition of “Emergency Action” to avoid triggering a Performance Assessment Interval \n(“PAI”) when it called upon Demand Resources: \n[I]nclusion of load management resources, which are generally committed Demand \nResources in the capacity market, in the definition of Emergency Action is not \nrepresentative of a capacity emergency.  That is because Pre-Emergency Load \n \n53 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 79.  \n54 Id. (emphasis in original)."},{"page":19,"startToken":6076,"endToken":6447,"text":"- 19 - \nResponse Program, like all other committed Capacity Resources, should be able to \nsupport the reliability needs of the PJM Region regardless of whether there is a \ncapacity emergency.  Consequently, deployment of pre-emergency load \nmanagement reduction should not, in and of itself, trigger a PAI.55 \n \nIf PJM is similarly concerned that it cannot call upon Demand Resources before triggering a Pre-\nEmergency Load Management Reduction or EEA1, then it should revise its curtailment procedures \nso that Demand Resources can be relied upon to perform the capacity function they are paid for.  \nBut PJM should not be permitted to only rely on Demand Resources after it has issued directives \ncalling for the curtailment of retail load.  \n2. \nCurtailing Load That Pays For Demand Response Before Calling Upon \nDemand Response Is Inconsistent With Cost Causation Requirements \n \n \nThe Commission and the courts have recognized that the FPA’s “just and reasonable” \nstandard incorporates a cost causation principle.56  The cost causation principle requires that “all \napproved rates reflect to some degree the costs actually caused by the customer who must pay \nthem” and prohibits the Commission from approving a rate scheme that will result in one group of \ncustomers being required to subsidize the provision of service to a different group of customers.57  \nThe cost causation principle can be considered “a matter of making sure that burden is matched \nwith benefit.”58 \n \nDCC and its members are committed to paying for the costs associated with integrating \ndata centers into the grid, including the incremental capacity costs associated with providing them \nfirm, reliable service.  DCC is also a strong proponent of BYONC mechanisms that facilitate \n \n55 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. ER23-1996-000, Proposed Revisions to Prospectively Refine \nthe Definition of Emergency Action, Request for Shortened Comment Period and Expedited Commission Action at 8 \n(May 30, 2023).  \n56  See, e.g., City of Lincoln v. FERC, 89 F.4th 926, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2024). \n57 Constellation Mystic Power, LLC v. FERC, 45 F.4th 1028, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting Black Oak \nEnergy, LLC v. FERC, 725 F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).  \n58 BNP Paribas Energy Trading GP v. FERC, 743 F.3d 264, 268 (D.C. Cir. 2014)."},{"page":20,"startToken":6447,"endToken":6835,"text":"- 20 - \npathways to power for data centers and other large loads while adding capacity to the grid for the \nbenefit of all customers.  But it is nevertheless important that costs imposed on large loads be \nconsistent with the cost causation principle.   \nPJM’s IRAS proposal will result in Eligible New Large Load customers incurring the \nburden of paying Demand Resources for capacity for which these large loads will not receive a \ncorresponding benefit.  Under PJM’s proposal, NITS customers serving Eligible New Large Loads \nwill continue to be responsible for paying Locational Reliability Charges reflecting the costs of \ncapacity procured through the BRA, including Demand Resources—costs that ultimately will be \npassed through to Eligible New Large Load customers.59  Yet, these NITS customers and the \nEligible New Large Loads that they serve will no longer benefit from the Demand Resources \ncommitted through the capacity market, as these resources will only be called upon to perform \nafter PJM issues a directive to these customers to curtail.  Requiring NITS customers and their \nretail customers to pay the costs of capacity that only will be deployed after their service has been \ncurtailed is inconsistent with cost causation requirements.  \n \nPJM appeared to recognize as much in its stakeholder process.  Specifically, in its June 10, \n2026 presentation to stakeholders PJM stated that “[l]oads that are subject to Connect and Manage \n[now known as IRAS] are not assessed capacity charges” and that it “will adjust EDC RPM Load \nObligations to reflect UCAP associated with new Large Loads assigned Connect & Manage.”60  \nYet, PJM’s Filing in this proceeding is devoid of any tariff revisions that would result in Eligible \nNew Large Loads subject to IRAS being exempt from capacity charges.  PJM has not proposed to \n \n59 See PJM Manual 18: PJM Capacity Market § 9.2.1 (Revision 62; effective Dec. 17, 2025) (“Each LSE that \nserves load in a PJM Zone or load outside PJM using PJM resources (Non-Zone Network Load) during the Delivery \nYear is responsible for paying a Locational Reliability Charge equal to their Daily Unforced Capacity Obligation in a \nZone times the applicable Final Zonal Capacity Price for that Delivery Year.”).  \n60 PJM CIFP–RBP / Connect and Manage - Stage 3 (June 10, 2026 – Meeting Materials), Connect & Manage \nPackage Updates at 40 (June 10, 2026), available at: https://www.pjm.com/committees-and-groups/cifp-rbp."},{"page":21,"startToken":6835,"endToken":7246,"text":"- 21 - \nrevise provisions of its tariff addressing the Locational Reliability Charge61 or the determination \nof Unforced Capacity Obligations.62  Moreover, PJM’s Filing does not include any mention of \nexempting Eligible New Large Loads from a capacity charge other than its cursory statement that \n“[t]he net result” of the compensation that may be paid to Eligible New Large Loads subject to \ncurtailment “is a reduced capacity charge for Eligible New Large Loads.”63  But even if this \ncompensation was intended to offset the capacity costs Eligible New Large Loads will pay for, it \nis only a partial offset.  And, as PJM concedes, there is no guarantee that such compensation will \neven be awarded to Eligible New Large Loads.”64   \n \nThe cost causation principle “generally calls for giving the same treatment to new and \ncontinuing customers, [w]here ‘all customers cause the incurrence of the costs . . . , whether by \nadding or merely continuing their usage[.]”65  But this principle is founded upon the understanding \nthat all customers contributing to the costs will be given an equal opportunity to enjoy the \ncorresponding benefits.  It is inconsistent with cost causation to force Eligible New Large Loads \nto bear the cost of Demand Resources that will not be used to provide them with service.  And if \nEligible New Large Loads are to bear the costs of these capacity resources, then Demand \nResources committed to provide capacity should be deployed prior to interrupting service to \nEligible New Large Loads.       \n \n61 PJM, Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region § 7.2 (“[E]ach \nParty shall pay, as to the loads it serves in each Zone during a Delivery Year, a Locational Reliability Charge for each \nsuch Zone during such Delivery Year.  The Locational Reliability Charge shall equal such Party’s Daily Unforced \nCapacity Obligation in a Zone, as determined pursuant to RAA, Schedule 8, times the Final Zonal Capacity Price for \nsuch Zone, as determined pursuant to Tariff, Attachment DD.”).  \n62 PJM, Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region, Schedule 8.  \n63 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 104.  \n64 Id. at 106 (stating that “how this wholesale rate is used to compensate for IRAS and how it is used to collect \nmonies for such compensation will be left to the Electric Distributors that directed the specific load reductions to \nimplement IRAS, consistent with their state-approved program…”). \n65 BNP Paribas Energy Trading GP v. FERC, 743 F.3d 264, 268 (2014) (citations omitted)."},{"page":22,"startToken":7246,"endToken":7592,"text":"- 22 - \nTo be clear, data centers are committed to paying their fair share of the costs associated \nwith procuring sufficient capacity to maintain reliability in PJM.  Indeed, the DCC and the data \ncenter industry generally have been vocal proponents of proposals that allow data centers to bring \ntheir own capacity to mitigate the potential resource adequacy impact of large load integration.  \nBut where data centers in fact pay for capacity and that capacity is available to be called upon to \npreserve reliability, it is unjust and unreasonable for PJM to instead curtail data centers and other \nlarge loads rather than requiring paid-for capacity to perform.   \n3. \nPJM’s Proposal Will Require Customers In Zones With Large Load \nCustomers To Subsidize The Costs Of Capacity For The PJM Region   \nPJM’s IRAS proposal also presents a separate and distinct cost causation issue: customers \nlocated in electric distribution service areas where large loads are interconnecting will be required \nto subsidize the cost of capacity for the broader PJM region.  Under PJM’s proposal, Eligible New \nLarge Loads will contribute to paying a share of Locational Reliability Charges and, thus, reduce \nthe capacity costs borne by other customers across the PJM region.  PJM then proposes to offset \nthese capacity costs by requiring Electric Distributors to compensate Eligible New Large Load \ncustomers that are curtailed under IRAS.  However, the costs of funding these payments to Eligible \nNew Large Loads will not be allocated across the region.  Instead, PJM’s proposal contemplates \nthat Electric Distributors will be required to fund these payments by imposing additional charges \non the customers within their service territory.  The net result of this framework is that customers \nin service territories with large load growth effectively will be required to subsidize rate reductions \nfor customers in other portions of the PJM footprint.66   \nPJM’s proposed payment scheme for funding payments to Eligible New Large Loads \n \n66 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 101.  Indeed, PJM says that the rate paid to large loads for curtailment under \nIRAS by electric distributors is “intended to be conjoined with retail rates.” Filing, Transmittal Letter at 104."},{"page":23,"startToken":7592,"endToken":7990,"text":"- 23 - \nviolates cost causation requirements.  As the courts have recognized, the cost causation principle \nprohibits the Commission from approving a rate scheme that requires one set of customers to \nsubsidize the provision of service to others.67  In this case, the capacity-related benefits produced \nby Eligible New Large Loads would be shared across the PJM region through lower Locational \nReliability Charges, but the costs of compensating those loads for IRAS curtailments would be \nimposed on customers in the host Electric Distributor’s service territory.  The result is a mismatch \nbetween costs and benefits: customers in areas experiencing large load growth are required to fund \na regional benefit enjoyed by customers throughout PJM.  Cost causation principles do not permit \nsuch cross subsidization.  \n4. \nProviding Inferior Service At The Same Price Is Unjust, Unreasonable, \nand Contrary To Cost Causation Principles \nPJM also has not demonstrated that charging NITS customers serving Eligible New Large \nLoads the same transmission rates as other NITS customers is just, reasonable, and not unduly \ndiscriminatory or preferential.  The Commission repeatedly has recognized that the transmission \nrates imposed on customers must reflect the firmness of the service provided.68  In Order No. 888, \nthe Commission recognized that “non-firm transmission prices should reflect the interruptibility \nof the service and should promote efficient use of the transmission system[.]”69  More recently, \nthe Commission rejected the PJM Transmission Owner’s proposal to set the rate for Non-Firm \nContract Demand transmission service equal to the rate for Firm Point-to-Point Service because it \n \n67 El Paso Elec. Co. v. FERC, 76 F.4th 352, 363 (5th Cir. 2023). \n68 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,209, at P 406 (2026) (stating that “rates should vary based \non the quality of the transmission service”).  \n69 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Servs. by Pub. \nUtils.; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Pub. Utils. & Transmitting Utils., Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 \n(1996), clarified, 76 FERC ¶ 61,009 (1996), order on reh’g, Order No. 888-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,048, at \n30272 (1997), order on reh’g, Order No. 888-B, 81 FERC ¶ 61,248 (1997), order on reh’g, Order No. 888-C, 82 \nFERC ¶ 61,046 (1998), aff’d in part and remanded in part sub nom. Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. v. FERC, \n225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d sub nom. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002)."},{"page":24,"startToken":7990,"endToken":8309,"text":"- 24 - \nfound “the rates should vary based on the quality of the transmission service.”70  Under the IRAS \nproposal, NITS customers subject to interruption under IRAS would be required to pay the same \ntransmission rates as other NITS customers despite receiving inferior service.   \nPJM cannot have it both ways.  If NITS customers serving Eligible New Large Loads pay \nthe same rates as other NITS customers, then they should receive a comparable level of service \nand be curtailed at the same time as other NITS customers.  Alternatively, if PJM is going to \nsubject NITS customers serving Eligible New Large Loads to interruption ahead of other NITS \ncustomers, then the rates for these customers must reflect the lower quality of service being \nprovided.  PJM’s proposal to offer less service at the same price is unjust, unreasonable, and \ncontrary to cost causation requirements.   \n5. \nExcluding New Large Loads From The VRR Curve Will Undermine \nEfforts To Maintain Reliability \n \nAt a time when PJM needs additional capacity to meet resource adequacy needs within the \nregion, PJM’s proposal to exclude New Large Loads that do not meet BYONC requirements from \nthe VRR Curve beginning with the 2029/2030 Delivery Year is counterproductive and \nmisguided.71  The VRR Curve is intended to “produce accurate market signals that will encourage \nappropriate capacity investment and achieve an adequate level of reliability.”72  But the VRR \nCurve and the market as a whole can only send the price signals necessary to attract new \ninvestment if they accurately reflect supply-demand conditions within the PJM region.  By \nexcluding Eligible New Large Loads from consideration in the capacity market, PJM’s proposal \nwill result in a capacity market construct that will produce market prices and results that are \n \n70 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,209, at P 406 (2026). \n71 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 23.   \n72 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 167 FERC ¶ 61,029, at P 19 (2019)."},{"page":25,"startToken":8309,"endToken":8682,"text":"- 25 - \nuntethered from market fundamentals within the PJM region.  \nThe fact that excluding Eligible New Large Loads from the VRR curve will mute \ninvestment signals and undermine reliability has been acknowledged by PJM.  In the stakeholder \nprocess, PJM explained that it was important to model loads subject to IRAS in the RPM because \n“[i]ncluding Connect and Manage [now known as IRAS] in the RPM Auction continues to provide \nprice signals for new investment while providing an incentive for New Large Load to BYONC \nthrough new supply or DR/DER.”73  Indeed, there would be no way for the market to send a price \nsignal that additional supply is needed in the region if the market treats new demand as if it did not \nexist.  The PJM Board, however, modified the IRAS proposal to remove Eligible New Large Loads \nfrom the VRR Curve on the basis that “[i]ncremental new Large Loads relative to the forecast \nutilized for the 2028/2029 BRA will be excluded from the forecast used in future RPM auctions \nfor the 2029/2030 Delivery Year and beyond unless and until there are new supply resources \noffered into an RPM auction in sufficient quantity to cover the new Large Load.”74  The PJM \nBoard cannot expect new supply resources to appear if the price signals sent by the market do not \nreflect—as will be the case under PJM’s IRAS proposal—the actual load that must be served in \nthe region.  \n  \nWhile PJM’s proposal may temporarily suppress capacity prices, it will do so based on an \nutterly inaccurate view of the actual demand for capacity in PJM.  And if the RPM does not \naccurately reflect demand, it is hard to understand how PJM expects the RPM to send price signals \nthat will ensure the entry of new resources capable of meeting the region’s needs.  As the \n \n73 PJM CIFP – RBP / Connect and Manage - Stage 3 (May 27, 2026 – Meeting Materials), Connect and \nManage PJM Package at 29 (May 27, 2026), available at: https://www.pjm.com/committees-and-groups/cifp-rbp. \n74 PJM Post CIFP Workshop - Technical Overview, PJM Board - CIFP Framework for Service During \nPeriods of Insufficient Resource Adequacy - Executive Summary (July 30, 2026), available at: \nhttps://www.pjm.com/committees-and-groups/cifp-rbp."},{"page":26,"startToken":8682,"endToken":8998,"text":"- 26 - \nCommission observed, a capacity market should “provide price signals that guide the orderly entry \nand exit of capacity resources, result in the selection of the least-cost set of resources that possess \nthe attributes sought by the markets, provide price transparency, shift risk as appropriate from \ncustomers to private capital, and mitigate market power.”75  But a capacity market that does not \nsend price signals that accurately reflect market fundamentals cannot achieve these objectives.  \n6. \nPJM’s Proposal To Provide Inferior Service To NITS Customers \nServing Eligible New Large Loads Is Unduly Discriminatory \nIRAS is not merely a change to PJM’s emergency operating procedures.  IRAS degrades \none of the defining characteristics of NITS—its curtailment priority—for a subset of customers.  \nNITS customers historically have been entitled to receive “firm transmission service over the \nTransmission System for the delivery of capacity and energy from its designated Network \nResources to service its Network Loads on a basis that is comparable to each Transmission \nOwner’s use of the Transmission System to reliably service its Native Load Customers.”76  When \ncurtailments are required to maintain reliability, the transmission provider is required to curtail \nNITS customers on a non-discriminatory and pro rata basis consistent with the treatment of native \nload and firm point-to-point customers.77    \nThis will no longer be the case if IRAS is accepted.  In practical terms, IRAS creates a \nform of second-class NITS customers.  NITS customers serving Eligible New Large Loads will \ncontinue purchasing NITS and paying the same transmission and capacity charges as other firm \ncustomers.  Yet, these NITS customers and the Eligible New Large Loads that they serve will be \ndeprived of one of the principal benefits of NITS: protection from service interruptions and \n \n75 ISO New England Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, at P 21 (2018).   \n76 PJM Tariff, Part III § 28.1.  \n77 PJM Tariff, Part II § 13.6; id., Part III § 33.5."},{"page":27,"startToken":8998,"endToken":9380,"text":"- 27 - \ncurtailment on a basis comparable to other firm uses of the system.78  PJM cannot charge customers \nfor firm service while reserving the right to treat them as interruptible customers when reliability \nconditions deteriorate.   \nThe FPA prohibits public utilities from engaging in any undue discrimination or granting \nany undue preference or advantage in providing transmission service.79  Undue discrimination or \npreference occurs, as both the courts and the Commission have held, when similarly situated \ncustomers are treated differently “for no good reason.”80  To justify treating customers differently, \nthe prohibition on undue discrimination requires that the utility proposing disparate treatment \ndemonstrate that there are “specific factual differences” between the customers that justify the \nspecific rates, terms, and conditions imposed by the utility.81  \nPJM does not deny that its proposal is discriminatory.  Instead, it attempts to justify the \ndifferences in treatment by pointing to the Commission’s decision to require PJM to revise its tariff \nto create a definition for large loads and cites to general statements by the Commission that large \nloads are unique and pose specific challenges to the transmission system.82  But PJM cannot justify \nthe disparate treatment proposed in this case by making general references to the unique challenges \nposed by large load integration.  The issue is not merely whether there are some differences \nbetween the classes at issue; but whether there are differences that are “material to the inquiry at \nhand” that justify the specific differences in treatment that are being proposed.83   \n \n78 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 94 (stating that NITS customers serving Eligible New Large Load customers \nwill “be asked to reduce load prior to other NITS customers in accordance with the Interim Resource Adequacy \nService they may be asked to provide”).  \n79 16 U.S.C. § 824d(b).  \n80 Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 45 F.4th 265, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2022); State Corp. Comm’n of Kan. v. FERC, \n876 F.3d 322, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  \n81 See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind. v. FERC, 575 F.2d 1204, 1212 (7th Cir. 1978).   \n82 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 96. \n83 N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,124, at P 10 (2018).  See Basin Elec. Power Cooperative, \n188 FERC ¶ 61,132, at PP 95-96 (2024)."},{"page":28,"startToken":9380,"endToken":9725,"text":"- 28 - \nPJM has failed to meet its burden in this case.  As an initial matter, PJM’s suggestion that \nFERC has granted transmission providers carte blanche to discriminate against large load \ncustomers because of the characteristics of these customers is simply incorrect.  It is true that the \nCommission has required PJM to revise its tariff to include a definition of large load.  But the \nCommission also has sought to create new pathways for large loads to come online while \nprotecting customers and maintaining reliability, including encouraging PJM and other \ntransmission providers to revise their tariffs to create new transmission service products that better \nalign with the characteristics of large load customers, create new interim pathways for the \nintegration of large load customers and new generation capacity, and provide these customers with \ngreater flexibility to calibrate their use of the transmission system to meet their needs.84  The notion \nthat the Commission has found that large load customers inherently are less deserving of firm, \npredictable service is incorrect and unsupported by Commission precedent.  \n \nAdditionally, PJM’s justification fails to account for the fact that IRAS will result in \nElectric Distributors serving large load receiving very different treatment based on the timing of \nwhen the load is placed into service.  Under IRAS, two Electric Distributors purchasing NITS to \nserve loads of comparable size and paying the same rate will receive fundamentally different \nservices based on when their retail customers were placed into service.  For instance, an Electric \nDistributor that takes NITS to serve a 100 MW large load customer that is placed into service on \nMay 31, 2027 will not be interrupted during an emergency until PJM initiates a manual load dump \naction after all capacity resources have been exhausted.  An Electric Distributor who takes NITS \nto serve a 100 MW large load customer that is placed into service one day later, on June 1, 2027, \n \n84 See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 193 FERC ¶ 61,217, at P 2 (2025) (directing changes to the PJM \ntariff to better account for the characteristics of large load customers)."},{"page":29,"startToken":9725,"endToken":10155,"text":"- 29 - \nwill not be guaranteed this same level of service unless they demonstrate that the retail customer’s \nload is supported by new capacity complying with PJM’s BYONC requirements.  \nThe arbitrary nature of IRAS becomes especially apparent when applied to facilities with \na load ramp.  Two otherwise identical MW of the same facility could be subject to different \ncurtailment priorities solely because one increment of load came online before PJM’s cutoff date \nand the other came online after.85  Such vintage-based discrimination does not reflect any \ndifference material to reliability or resource adequacy and cannot justify the disparate treatment at \nissue here.  \n \nNor has PJM demonstrated that the timing of when load has come online is a legitimate \nbasis for discrimination.  Existing resources, like new resources, contribute to the need for \ncapacity86 and PJM has not explained why existing customers should receive preferential \ntreatment.  IRAS appears premised on the assumption that New Large Load customers solely are \nresponsible for recent supply shortfalls in the BRA.  But there are multiple factors that have \ncontributed to the supply-demand balance within the PJM region, including the retirement of \nexisting generation resources, the slow pace of new entry, and load growth within the region.87  \nPJM offers no evidence that a MW of demand imposes different resource adequacy impacts based \nsolely on when the demand first takes service.  Nor does PJM explain why new customers should \n \n85 As noted above, PJM proposes to define New Large Load as end-use customer load that is either a Large \nLoad that goes into service after June 1, 2027 or incremental load in-service after this deadline that increases the \nexisting end-use customer load at a site that did not previously meet the definition of Large Load.  Filing, Transmittal \nLetter at 1, n.2.  Although PJM’s proposed definition of New Large Load is ambiguous, DCC understands that PJM \nintends to subject any increment of load placed in service by a large load customer after the deadline to IRAS unless \nthe increment is supported by capacity meeting PJM’s BYONC requirements.  However, DCC believes that the \nCommission should require PJM to clarify the scope of its proposal and its application to customers with load ramp \nperiods that extend beyond the deadlines prescribed in the PJM tariff.  \n86 BNP Paribas Energy Trading GP v. FERC, 743 F.3d 264, 268 (D.C. Cir. 2014). \n87 See PJM, Powering Reliability Through Market Design: Addressing Rising Demand and Constrained \nSupply, and Stimulating Investment To Support Durable Reliability at 4 (May 6, 2026), https://www.pjm.com/-\n/media/DotCom/library/reports-notices/special-reports/2026/20260506-powering-reliability-through-market-\ndesign.pdf."},{"page":30,"startToken":10155,"endToken":10489,"text":"- 30 - \nbear the reliability impact of generation retirements or a broken interconnection process.  PJM’s \nproposal to afford less favorable treatment to customers merely because they are “new” is unduly \ndiscriminatory and should be rejected. \nIn short, PJM’s proposal to afford less favorable treatment to NITS customers serving \nEligible New Large Loads is unduly discriminatory and preferential.  NITS customers serving \nEligible New Large Loads are similarly situated to other NITS customers: they have reserved firm \ntransmission to allow them to meet their supply obligations, pay the same transmission rates as \nother NITS customers, and will pay the costs of capacity that has been committed through the \nRPM to maintain reliability.  Yet, IRAS will result in NITS customers serving Eligible New Large \nLoads being afforded less favorable treatment than other NITS customers.  And PJM’s vague \nreferences to the unique characteristics of large customers are insufficient to justify the arbitrary \ndifferences in treatment under the IRAS proposal.   \nC. \nIRAS Fails To Account For Existing Contractual Arrangements And Reliance \nInterests \nAlthough PJM is permitted to make filings under FPA Section 205 to change its market \nrules, in evaluating these changes FERC must be cognizant that existing market rules “may have \n‘engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account’”88 and “‘assess whether \nthere were reliance interests’ in the prior rule, determine whether those interests ‘[are] significant,’ \nand weigh them ‘against competing policy concerns.’”89   \nPJM’s proposal to curtail a subset of retail customers that do not bring their own capacity \nrepresents a fundamental shift in how PJM’s markets have functioned for the duration of its \nexistence.  For decades new loads in the PJM region were permitted to interconnect and obtain \n \n88 Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 212 (2016). \n89 Solar Energy Indus. Ass’n. v. FERC, 80 F.4th 956, 980 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (quoting DHS v. Regents of Univ. \nof Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1914 (2020)); Capital Power Corp. v. FERC, 156 F.4th 644, 653 (D.C. Cir. 2025)."},{"page":31,"startToken":10489,"endToken":10843,"text":"- 31 - \nservice based on the same rates, terms, and conditions that were afforded to all other customers.  \nService to load in PJM was not conditioned on such load bringing its own new capacity.  PJM’s \nIRAS proposal drastically alters the ability of certain loads to obtain reliable service in PJM by \nlimiting New Large Loads to receiving an inferior service until they procure their own new \ncapacity.  PJM proposes these significant structural changes without any transition mechanism or \neven acknowledging the potential impact on customers’ investment decisions.   \nPJM’s proposal will undermine the settled expectations of New Large Loads that have \nmade investment decisions and entered into contracts based on their ability to receive firm service \nconsistent with long-standing market rules and retail requirements.  As the Commission has \nacknowledged, Large Loads have entered into binding contractual obligations and made \nsignificant investments in reliance on the ability to obtain reliable service within the PJM region \nbased on its longstanding rules.90  These arrangements include entering into energy supply and \ntransmission service agreements, executing leases with data center tenants, obtaining real property \ninterests, posting security for the construction of line extensions and other physical infrastructure, \nand entering into financing agreements necessary for the construction of their facilities.  PJM’s \nproposal will undermine the economic assumptions underpinning these arrangements by forcing \nNew Large Loads to accept less reliable service—which may not align with the contractual \ncommitments made to their tenants—or incurring significant new costs to ensure that they receive \nthe same level of firm service that historically has been available.  \n \n90 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,211, at P 5 (2026) (“We recognize that large loads, including \ndata centers, are actively working with transmission owners and other relevant entities to interconnect to, and to take \nservice from, the transmission system. We appreciate that different large loads are currently at different stages of that \nprocess. We also understand that large loads and Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of large \nloads are negotiating, entering into, and/or have executed various agreements related to interconnecting to the \ntransmission system and/or the provision of transmission service.”)."},{"page":32,"startToken":10843,"endToken":11188,"text":"- 32 - \nThe disruption from IRAS will not be limited only to New Large Loads that first place their \nfacilities into service after June 1, 2027 (or subsequent deadlines established by PJM).  IRAS also \nappears to extend to incremental load placed in service by an existing customer after this date.  In \npractice, this means that IRAS will extend to data center customers that have placed their existing \nfacilities into operation but that have load ramp schedules that extend beyond June 1, 2027.  If \nIRAS is approved, these customers will now face the prospect that a portion of their loads will be \ndeemed interruptible unless they comply with PJM’s BYONC requirements.   \nIn some cases, it simply will be too late for large load customers to revisit their investment \ndecisions or rewrite contracts that were entered into years prior.  Even if a data center has some \nflexibility to renegotiate existing leases with their tenants, it would have to attempt to renegotiate \nthese arrangements without certainty regarding how IRAS will be implemented, how relevant state \nauthorities plan to address IRAS, or when the data center will be able to guarantee firm service for \nits tenants.  The significant uncertainty that would be created by approval of IRAS has the potential \nto create new obstacles to the completion of data center projects that have been under development \nfor years.  \nMoreover, IRAS establishes what is effectively a less than 10-month window for New \nLarge Loads to obtain their own new capacity to avoid curtailment.  As the Commission is well \naware91 and as PJM’s own documented struggles with bringing new resources online \n \n91 See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 190 FERC ¶ 61,084 (2025) (Comm’r Rosner and Phillips, \nconcurring at P 2) (“PJM’s legacy interconnection process is overwhelmed by the volume of requests to connect new \ngeneration and storage, causing the typical wait time in PJM’s queue to exceed five years.   While long overdue, PJM’s \ntransition away from a legacy serial process includes the unfortunate feature of pausing study of all new \ninterconnection requests while PJM implements its new, faster process.”)."},{"page":33,"startToken":11188,"endToken":11620,"text":"- 33 - \ndemonstrate,92 this timeline does not provide a realistic opportunity for New Large Loads to meet \nthe BYONC requirements and avoid curtailment.  The result will be a significant disruption to \nnearly all large load projects with a post-June 1, 2027 in-service date that is likely to threaten the \nviability of many projects that are essential for maintaining the nation’s competitive edge in the \nglobal economy.   \nPJM’s implementation timeline for IRAS and failure to include a transition mechanism is \neven more alarming given that many of the regulatory structures PJM acknowledges that states \nmust adopt to give effect to IRAS have yet to even be proposed.93  While certain state commissions \nlike the VA SCC may have commenced efforts to establish a regulatory scheme that is consistent \nwith IRAS,94 such efforts have not been mirrored by most of the PJM state commissions.  As a \nresult, New Large Loads will be forced to scramble to comply with an entirely new service \nparadigm in PJM while the rules necessary for implementing IRAS in their relevant states are still \nbeing developed.  Undermining the settled expectations of large load customers will alone present \na significant challenge to the ability of large load customers to move forward with their projects, \n \n92 PJM, Powering Reliability Through Market Design: Addressing Rising Demand and Constrained Supply, \nand Stimulating Investment To Support Durable Reliability at 4 (May 6, 2026), https://www.pjm.com/-\n/media/DotCom/library/reports-notices/special-reports/2026/20260506-powering-reliability-through-market-\ndesign.pdf.  (“Construction timelines have doubled. A decade ago, the market’s three-year forward procurement \nhorizon was calibrated to the development timeline of the market’s reference technology.  Today, a new natural gas \nturbine plant – the reference technology for the capacity market – requires at least four years under optimistic \nassumptions from financial investment decision to commercial operation, due to supply chain constraints on major \nequipment (gas turbines, step-up transformers), extended permitting and interconnection timelines, and larger project \nscale.”).  \n93 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 86-87 (“PJM will not direct specific LSEs and/or specific customers of LSEs—\nincluding specific Large Loads—to reduce their load and/or switch to on-site backup resources.  Those decisions \nwould be worked out through revised state retail tariffs.”) (emphasis in original).  \n94 Id. at 88 (citing Letter of Chair of Virginia State Corporation Commission, Kelsey Bagot and President \nand CEO of Data Center Coalition, Josh Levi to Ms. Paula Conboy, Chair of PJM Board of Managers, and Mr. David \nMills, President and CEO of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. at 2 (June 30, 2026), https://www.pjm.com/-\n/media/DotCom/committees-groups/cifp-rbp/2026/20260630/20260630-written-comments---va-scc-and-data-center-\ncoalition.pdf)."},{"page":34,"startToken":11620,"endToken":11932,"text":"- 34 - \nbut disrupting their settled expectations and making them plan for a service paradigm in which the \nrules are still being developed presents a challenge of a different magnitude.  \nPJM’s proposal to subject a subset of retail load to mandatory curtailments represents a \nstark departure from the historic paradigm in which customers were able to obtain reliable service \non the same rates, terms, and conditions as all other customers.  While DCC supports BYONC \nrequirements, such requirements must be implemented on a timeframe that provides large loads a \nreasonable opportunity to comply.  The fact that PJM has proposed this departure from its prior \nrules without including a transition mechanism as part of its proposal or even considering the \nreasonable reliance interests of large loads further warrants rejection of the Filing by the \nCommission.   \nD. \nThe Commission Should Reject IRAS Or Impose A Meaningful Transition \nMechanism \nDCC urges the Commission to issue an order rejecting IRAS while encouraging PJM to \npursue alternative pathways that better align with the jurisdictional divide established by the FPA.  \nAs noted above, DCC believes that the objectives underlying IRAS can be achieved by allowing \nstates to take the lead in establishing interruptible retail service schedules while PJM modifies its \noperational practices to accommodate the choices of states within its footprint.  For that reason, \nDCC believes that any order in this proceeding rejecting IRAS should encourage PJM to work \nwith states to pursue a framework that respects the authority reserved to the states under the FPA \nwhile protecting residential customers from service disruptions during emergency conditions.   \nAlternatively, if the Commission determines based on the record in this proceeding that \nPJM’s emergency procedures must be reformed immediately, then it should initiate a Section 206 \nproceeding to determine how PJM’s emergency procedures can be modified to mitigate reliability \nrisks without encroaching on state jurisdiction over the rates, terms, and conditions of retail"},{"page":35,"startToken":11932,"endToken":12231,"text":"- 35 - \nservice.  While DCC believes that any effort to modify the curtailment priority of retail customers \nmust be led by the states, a Section 206 proceeding would provide the Commission and other \nparties opportunities to further explore what changes can be made to the wholesale market to \nfurther mitigate reliability risks.   \nFinally, even if the Commission is inclined to approve IRAS, it should direct PJM to \nmodify its proposal to establish a meaningful transition mechanism that avoids disrupting existing \ncontractual arrangements and investment decisions, and provides large load customers and the \nstates a reasonable implementation timeline.  Among other things, any transition mechanism \nshould limit the application of IRAS in a manner that respects existing contracts and investment \ndecisions (e.g., exempting large load customers that already have entered into contracts for retail \nservice prior to the implementation date of IRAS).  The Commission also should direct PJM to \ndelay implementation of IRAS until June 1, 2028 to provide new large loads a reasonable amount \nof time to procure new capacity before they are subject to IRAS and to provide state authorities \nsufficient time to modify their retail policies as necessary to account for the IRAS framework.    \nIII. \nMOTION TO INTERVENE  \nDCC respectfully moves to intervene in this proceeding. DCC is the membership \norganization for the U.S. data center industry, representing leading data center owners and \noperators that develop, operate, and maintain data center infrastructure and teams across the \ncountry.95  DCC members operate data centers that constitute significant loads within the PJM \n \n95 The DCC is a membership organization of leading data center owners and operators.  Public testimony and \nwritten comments submitted by DCC do not necessarily reflect the views of each individual DCC member.  A list of \ncurrent DCC members is accessible at https://www.datacentercoalition.org/members."},{"page":36,"startToken":12231,"endToken":12412,"text":"- 36 - \nregion and DCC has been an active stakeholder in regional efforts to ensure reliability, enable new \ngeneration, and discipline load forecasts.  \nDCC’s member companies provide the essential digital infrastructure that underpins the \nmodern economy and supports critical public services, including cloud computing, artificial \nintelligence, emergency response systems, and public safety operations.  From 2017 to 2023, the \ndata center industry contributed $3.5 trillion to U.S. GDP.  As the industry unlocks unprecedented \neconomic opportunities across the country and in the PJM region, supporting affordability is a \nfoundational priority for DCC members and the communities they serve.  DCC advocates for grid \nreforms that minimize unnecessary cost burdens, align with cost causation principles, facilitate \nresponsible load growth, support the development of new generation, and enhance grid resilience \nsystem-wide without imposing undue costs on existing ratepayers.   \nFor the above reasons, DCC has a substantial interest in the outcome of this proceeding \nthat cannot be represented adequately by any other participant to this proceeding.  DCC’s \nintervention is in the public interest and its motion for leave to intervene in this proceeding should \nbe granted."},{"page":37,"startToken":12412,"endToken":12634,"text":"- 37 - \nIV. \nCORRESPONDENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS \nDCC requests that the following names be placed on the official service list for this \nproceeding by the Commission and that all correspondence and communications with respect to \nthis proceeding be addressed to the following:96 \nMorgan A. Sipple \nDirector, Energy Policy – FERC and RTOs \nDATA CENTER COALITION \n1250 H Street, NW \nWashington, DC  20005 \nmorgan@datacentercoalition.org  \n \n \nStephen J. Hug \nBen N. Reiter \nAKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP \n2001 K Street, N.W. \nWashington, D.C.  20006 \nTel: (202) 887-4000 \nshug@akingump.com  \nbreiter@akingump.com \n \nV. \nCONCLUSION \nFor the reasons set out above, DCC respectfully requests that the Commission issue an \norder consistent with this protest.  \n \nRespectfully submitted, \n \n \n \n/s/ Stephen J. Hug \nMorgan A. Sipple \nDirector, Energy Policy – FERC and RTOs \nDATA CENTER COALITION \n1250 H Street, NW \nWashington, DC  20005 \nmorgan@datacentercoalition.org  \n \nData Center Coalition \nStephen J. Hug \nBen N. Reiter \nAKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP \n2001 K Street, N.W. \nWashington, D.C.  20006 \nTel: (202) 887-4000 \nshug@akingump.com \nbreiter@akingump.com \n \n \n \n \n \nDated: September 3, 2026 \n \n \nCounsel for the Data Center Coalition \n \n96 DCC respectfully requests waiver of Rule 203(b)(3) of the Commission’s regulations, 18 C.F.R. § \n385.203(b)(3), in order to permit designation of more than two persons for service in this proceeding."},{"page":38,"startToken":12634,"endToken":12657,"text":"Exhibit A \nLetter to Ms. Paula Conboy and Mr. David Mills \nfrom VA SCC Chair, Kelsey Bagot and DCC \nPresident & CEO, Josh Levi"},{"page":39,"startToken":12657,"endToken":13081,"text":"Confidential\nJune 30, 2026 \n  \nMs. Paula Conboy, Chair, PJM Board of Managers \nMr. David Mills, PJM President and CEO \nPJM Interconnection, L.L.C. \n2750 Monroe Boulevard \nAudubon, Pennsylvania 19403 \n  \nDear Ms. Conboy and Mr. Mills: \nThe Virginia State Corporation Commission (VA SCC), along with its fellow PJM state utility \ncommissions, is mandated to ensure reliable electric service, just and reasonable retail rates, and to protect \nresidential and traditional industrial customers from undue cost shifts as the electric system continues to \nevolve. The growth of large electric loads presents both significant opportunities for economic \ndevelopment and important challenges for maintaining affordability and reliability across the PJM region. \nThe Data Center Coalition (DCC) is the national membership association for the data center industry, \nrepresenting leading data center owners and operators who maintain data center infrastructure across the \ncountry and globe, as well as companies that lease large amounts of data center capacity.1  DCC \nrepresents many of the companies driving investment in the PJM region and seeks to ensure that its \nmembers have timely, efficient, and predictable pathways to secure the power necessary for their \noperations. DCC members are fully committed to bearing the costs associated with serving their load to \nensure existing customers are protected from any undue cost shifts. \nTogether, the VA SCC and DCC recognize that the mandate of state utility commissions and serving \nemerging large loads are not mutually exclusive. Rather, achieving them will require proactive \ncollaboration among states, industry, and PJM to develop standardized regulatory tools and model retail \ntariff structures that individual state commissions may consider as they address the integration of new \nlarge electric loads. By working collaboratively now, we believe it is possible to facilitate continued \neconomic investment while preserving reliability and protecting existing customers from inappropriate \ncost shifts. Because many of the tools necessary to achieve these objectives fall within state jurisdiction, \nthe VA SCC and DCC are launching a collaborative effort to develop model retail tariff structures and \nregulatory frameworks for consideration by interested state commissions. \nState-Level Interruptible Tariffs and Load Reduction Priorities \nThe VA SCC and DCC will convene a joint working group with other interested states to develop model \nstate regulatory frameworks that enable states to better integrate large loads while maintaining reliability \n \n1 The Data Center Coalition is a membership organization of leading data center owners and operators. \nPublic testimony, written comments and letters submitted by DCC do not necessarily reflect the views of \neach individual DCC member. A list of current DCC members is accessible at \nhttps://www.datacentercoalition.org/members."},{"page":40,"startToken":13081,"endToken":13444,"text":"Confidential\nand protecting existing customers. The initiative will focus on two complementary, but distinct, \nworkstreams. \n1. Model State Interruptible Tariffs \nThe parties will develop model retail interruptible tariff structures that state commissions may consider \nadopting to facilitate the integration of new large electric loads while maintaining reliability and \nprotecting existing customers. These model tariffs would: \n● Establish standardized retail tariff provisions under which large customers may receive \ninterruptible service, whether through voluntary election or pursuant to state regulatory \nrequirements; \n● Define the operational expectations, customer obligations, and utility responsibilities associated \nwith interruptible service; \n● Establish the retail mechanisms through which interruptible customers would respond to requests \nfor curtailment consistent with applicable state tariffs and regional reliability procedures; and \n● Provide model tariff language for consideration by interested state commissions while fully \npreserving each state's independent regulatory authority. \n \nThe intended completion date for this work is no later than February 1, 2027. \n2. Emergency Load Reduction \nThe VA SCC, DCC, and other interested states will jointly develop model state tariffs establishing \nemergency load reduction programs designed to protect residential customers during the most severe \nreliability emergencies while preserving reliable system operations. These model tariffs would: \n● Establish retail mechanisms authorizing utilities to curtail designated large commercial and \nindustrial customers, or require the use of available on-site backup generation, once PJM has \nexhausted all other available reliability resources, including demand response, but before \nimplementation of broad manual load shed; \n● Define the operational expectations, customer obligations, and utility implementation procedures \nassociated with those programs; and \n● Provide model tariff language for consideration by state utility commissions while preserving \neach state's independent regulatory authority. \n \nBy targeting reductions from large commercial and industrial customers before implementing widespread \nfeeder-level outages, this approach can significantly reduce the likelihood that residential customers are \ninterrupted during the most severe reliability emergencies. It is particularly beneficial for jurisdictions \nwith little or no large-load development, where residential customers could otherwise be subject to \nmanual load shed even though targeted reductions of large loads—or deployment of available on-site \nbackup generation—in other parts of the PJM region would have been sufficient to address the reliability \nneed. \nThe intended completion date for this work is no later than February 1, 2027."},{"page":41,"startToken":13444,"endToken":13712,"text":"Confidential\nReliability Backstop Cost Allocation \nThe VA SCC, DCC, and other interested states will also collaborate to develop model state tariff \nprovisions addressing the retail allocation of costs associated with PJM's Reliability Backstop \nProcurement. \nThe objective is to develop transparent retail mechanisms that appropriately assign reliability backstop \ncosts to the large load customers whose demand contributes to the need for those procurements, while \nprotecting existing residential and traditional industrial customers from inappropriate cost shifts. \nThe intended completion date for this work is no later than January 1, 2028. \nMoving Forward \nThis collaborative effort reflects our shared commitment to finding practical, durable solutions that \nbalance reliability, affordability, economic development, and regulatory certainty. \nTogether, the VA SCC and DCC recognize that these objectives are complementary. Achieving them will \nrequire proactive collaboration among states, industry, utilities, and PJM to develop standardized \nregulatory tools and model retail tariff structures that state utility commissions may consider as they \naddress the integration of new large electric loads. We also recognize that meeting the region's growing \nelectricity demand will require significant investment in new generation and other energy resources. DCC \nmembers are committed to pursuing those investments, and both the VA SCC and DCC recognize that \nclear, predictable regulatory frameworks are essential to supporting the investment in new generation and \nenergy resources needed to reliably serve the region's growing demand while protecting existing \ncustomers. \nWe appreciate PJM's continued leadership on these matters and look forward to working collaboratively \nwith PJM, the states, and all stakeholders as these efforts move forward.  \n \nSincerely, \nKelsey Bagot \nChair, Virginia State Corporation Commission \n  \nJosh Levi \nPresident & CEO  \nData Center Coalition"},{"page":42,"startToken":13712,"endToken":13725,"text":"Exhibit B \nDCC Connect & Manage Alternative: State-Led \nImplementation with Immediate Residential \nCustomer Protection"},{"page":43,"startToken":13725,"endToken":13983,"text":"DCC Connect & Manage Alternative:  \nState-Led Implementation with Immediate Residential \nCustomer Protection \nThe Data Center Coalition supports PJM’s objective of ensuring that new large loads \ncontribute to maintaining system reliability and that sufficient capacity is developed to \nsupport continued economic growth. We agree that reliability must be maintained and that \nnew capacity should accompany significant new load additions. At the same time, \nimplementation frameworks must provide clear customer treatment, align obligations with \nbenefits, and protect existing customers. \nDCC’s proposal is founded on the principle that large-load integration requires \ncoordination among PJM, states, electric distribution companies (EDCs), and customers. \nDurable solutions must recognize the respective roles of wholesale and retail regulators \nwhile providing certainty regarding reliability obligations, customer protections, and \ncurtailment treatment. \nState Opt-In Framework \nDCC proposes a State Opt-In model that allows states and EDCs to establish interruptible \nservice classifications and customer treatment rules while PJM continues to administer \nwholesale reliability requirements. Under this approach: \n• States establish interruptible customer classes and associated tariff provisions for large-\nload customers. \n• PJM monitors system conditions and, when reliability conditions warrant, issues a \nwholesale reliability signal for interruption of interruptible load. \n• The PJM signal activates the applicable state interruptible tariff. \n• The EDC implements curtailments in accordance with state-established customer \nclassifications, priorities, and protections. \n• PJM maintains responsibility for bulk-system reliability, while states retain authority over \nretail customer classifications and curtailment treatment. \n• This approach achieves the desired reliability outcome while preserving the traditional \ndivision of state and federal responsibilities and avoiding the jurisdictional concerns \nassociated with PJM directly imposing mandatory curtailment obligations on retail \ncustomers."},{"page":44,"startToken":13983,"endToken":14310,"text":"• The framework also preserves incentives for customers to support the development of \nnew capacity resources. \nThe proposal acknowledges a practical reality: regardless of the wholesale framework \nadopted, states and EDCs ultimately determine how customers are treated during \nemergency conditions. By explicitly incorporating state implementation into the \nframework, the proposal creates a more transparent and durable path for integrating large-\nload growth while maintaining reliability. \nThe state-led approach is also necessary to avoid significant jurisdictional concerns. Any \nframework that requires PJM to impose mandatory curtailment obligations based on the \ncharacteristics of specific retail customers risks blurring the longstanding division between \nwholesale and retail regulation. By relying on states and EDCs to establish customer \nclassifications, interruptible service arrangements, and curtailment priorities, the proposal \npreserves the traditional regulatory compact while allowing PJM to maintain reliability \nthrough wholesale market signals. \n \nImmediate Reliability Action to Protect Residential Customers \nWhile states develop long-term large-load tariffs and customer classifications, PJM, states, \nand EDCs should take immediate action to strengthen emergency load-shed procedures \nand better protect residential customers. \nDCC proposes a phased manual load-shed approach under which large commercial and \nindustrial customers are contacted and provided an opportunity to curtail load before \nresidential customers are interrupted during emergency reliability events. States and zones \nwithout significant large-load customers available for curtailment would not be expected \nto participate in the initial phase. Instead, the first phase would focus on areas where large \ncommercial and industrial load reductions can be achieved. Residential customers and \ncritical services would remain a last-resort option after practical large-customer \ncurtailment opportunities within the affected area have been exhausted. \nThis recommendation is significant because it can be implemented immediately and does \nnot require states to first complete lengthy tariff, rulemaking, or customer-classification \nproceedings. It provides a practical bridge between today’s reliability challenges and the \nlonger-term frameworks currently under development across the PJM region. \nThe approach offers several benefits: \n• Provides immediate protection for residential customers. \n• Reduces the likelihood that residential and critical-service customers are interrupted."},{"page":45,"startToken":14310,"endToken":14431,"text":"• Preserves state authority over retail customer classifications and curtailment priorities. \n• Improves reliability outcomes during emergency conditions using existing operational \ntools and processes. \n• Creates time for states, EDCs, customers, and PJM to develop durable long-term \nsolutions without delaying meaningful residential customer protections. \nConclusion \nDCC’s proposal advances PJM’s reliability objectives while providing a practical \nimplementation pathway that aligns responsibilities among PJM, states, EDCs, and \ncustomers. The State Opt-In framework recognizes the realities of retail implementation, \npreserves incentives for new capacity development, and provides greater clarity regarding \ncustomer obligations and protections. Combined with immediate actions to better protect \nresidential customers during reliability emergencies, the proposal offers both a near-term \nand long-term path for maintaining reliability while supporting continued economic growth \nthroughout the PJM region."},{"page":46,"startToken":14431,"endToken":14448,"text":"Exhibit C \nDCC – A Path to Reliable Large-Load \nIntegration: Creating Certainty for Investment, \nCustomers, and the Grid"},{"page":47,"startToken":14448,"endToken":14465,"text":"June 10, 2026\nA Path to Reliable Large-Load Integration\nCreating Certainty for Investment, Customers, and the Grid"},{"page":48,"startToken":14465,"endToken":14484,"text":"New Load Should Fund New Capacity\nIndustry practice has already shifted toward customer-funded capacity to \nprotect existing ratepayers.\n2"},{"page":49,"startToken":14484,"endToken":14523,"text":"Predictable Pathway to Firm Service\nLarge load needs regulatory certainty to confidently invest in new capacity. \nKey Takeaway: \nData Centers are \ncommitted to invest in \nnew capacity once the \npath to firm service \nwithout paying twice is \nassured. \n3"},{"page":50,"startToken":14523,"endToken":14567,"text":"PJM Cannot Provide the Needed Answers\nPJM lacks the authority to answer critical questions that customers need \nbefore investing billions to bring new supply to PJM.\nKey Takeaway: PJM’s proposal depends on customer action \nthat PJM lacks authority to define, enforce, or guarantee.\n4"},{"page":51,"startToken":14567,"endToken":14588,"text":"Large-load integration requires new \ncapacity and customer accountability. \nLasting solutions require states and PJM \nto each perform their proper role.\n5"},{"page":52,"startToken":14588,"endToken":14591,"text":"Connect & Manage: \nChallenges"},{"page":53,"startToken":14591,"endToken":14642,"text":"Jurisdiction: Core Issue\nC&M relies on retail customer characteristics to determine wholesale \nobligations creating a jurisdictional vulnerability. \nCurtailment obligations depend on retail customer \ncharacteristics. \nLarge-load size and interconnection date/ load ramp \ndrives outcomes\nRetail customer attributes become wholesale triggers\nAppears targeted at retail transactions\nRaises Federal Power Act concerns\n7"},{"page":54,"startToken":14642,"endToken":14687,"text":"C&M Is Not Really About Load Growth\nExample\nSCENARIO A\nSCENARIO B\nNew Load\n200 MW\n100 MW\nCustomer Type\nMany small loads\nOne large load\nC&M Obligation\nNo\nYes\n \nThe outcome depends on customer type – \n \n \nnot the amount of load growth\n8"},{"page":55,"startToken":14687,"endToken":14738,"text":"Undue Discrimination Risk\nThe proposal is not truly prospective – loads face different treatment based on \nramp duration, not when they were put in service or contract terms. \nThe difference is based on ramp timing. Proposed rules do not permit or \ncontemplate evaluating contracts in place. Cost causation rationale is weak.\n9"},{"page":56,"startToken":14738,"endToken":14759,"text":"Arbitrary Outcomes Created by Vintage\nCutoff dates create arbitrary results that are not based on load magnitude or \nsystem impact. \n10"},{"page":57,"startToken":14759,"endToken":14825,"text":"Protection is Not Assured\nThe Claimed Benefit of BYONC Is Outside PJM’s Control\nProtection Must Be Real\n• PJM cannot dictate retail curtailment decisions \n• States and EDCs determine actual load-shed priorities \n• Meeting PJM requirements may not guarantee protection \n• Customers may still face curtailment despite meeting PJM’s \nBYONC requirements \n• Benefits and obligations may not align\nCustomers need certainty regarding the benefit they receive for \nbringing new capacity.\n11"},{"page":58,"startToken":14825,"endToken":14902,"text":"What Service Is Being Purchased?\n• C&M load remains subject to interruption \n• Customers continue paying for firm transmission (NITS) \n• The proposal does not clearly establish what reliability rights \naccompany C&M treatment\n• Undue discrimination relative to DR and disruption of DR contracts\n• Benefits and obligations may not align\n• Customers need certainty regarding the service they are purchasing\nService Classification Mismatch\nIf customers are subject to interruption, the associated service rights \nand classifications should be clearly defined.\n12"},{"page":59,"startToken":14902,"endToken":14956,"text":"• States may require locational or “in state” resources\n• States may impose policy priorities on the resource \ntype, e.g., threshold % for  clean resources\n• States may impose additional conditions on workforce \nor other requirements\n• Pennsylvania illustrates this trend\n• BYONC to PJM ≠ BYONC to State\nState Policy Preferences Will Differ\nRetail implementation will remain state-specific\n13"},{"page":60,"startToken":14956,"endToken":14984,"text":"Operational, Policy, and Litigation Risks\nDefining new load, implementing across states and EDCs, and allocating costs create \nsignificant operational, policy and legal risks without assured customer benefit\n14"},{"page":61,"startToken":14984,"endToken":15046,"text":"So Where Does This Leave Us? \nWe Agree on the Objective\n• Reliability must be maintained\n• New capacity should accompany new large load \nThe Missing Piece\n• States, EDCs, and PJM lack a coordinated framework for customer \ncurtailment and protection\nThe Path Forward\n✓ Respect and coordinate with state jurisdiction\n✓ Create clear customer treatment rules\n✓ Align obligations with benefits\n✓ Preserve incentives for new capacity\n15"},{"page":62,"startToken":15046,"endToken":15054,"text":"A Better Path Forward: State Opt-In Model\n16"},{"page":63,"startToken":15054,"endToken":15086,"text":"Immediate Reliability Action\nManual Load Dump: Curtail Large C&I Before Residential Load\nWhile states develop interruptible-load tariffs and customer classifications, States, EDCs, \nand PJM should immediately improve emergency load-shed procedures. \n17"},{"page":64,"startToken":15086,"endToken":15187,"text":"• Large-load integration requires action from PJM, states, EDCs, and \ncustomers\n• Initial feedback on the opt-in framework focused on what happens if \nstates do not act - that risk exists under any C&M framework\n• PJM cannot establish retail curtailment rules through assumption\n• State implementation is a dependency whether acknowledged or not\n• PJM's proposal assumes states will take actions that the tariff itself \ncannot require\n• Our proposal explicitly recognizes the respective roles of PJM and the \nstates.\nState Action is Necessary and Unavoidable\nRestoring the Regulatory Compact\nIgnoring the need for state action does not eliminate the \ndependency, it only obscures it.\n18"},{"page":65,"startToken":15187,"endToken":15190,"text":"Reliability Backstop \nMechanism"},{"page":66,"startToken":15190,"endToken":15273,"text":"We Support a Limited, Targeted Backstop\n• Bilateral procurement remains the preferred path for securing new \ncapacity\n• DCC supported PJM's proposal for an extended bilateral procurement \nwindow before any backstop procurement\n• We recognize PJM's need to move forward on a September timeline \nWe Will Not Oppose a September Backstop Auction\n• The backstop should supplement – not replace – bilateral \nprocurement \nThe Backstop Must Remain Limited\n• Procurement should be limited to demonstrated capacity shortfall \nthat will not be addressed through bilateral arrangements. \nReliability Backstop: DCC Position\n20"},{"page":67,"startToken":15273,"endToken":15334,"text":"Procure Only for Load That Will Not Bilateral\n• Backstop MWs should be limited to demonstrated reliability shortfalls\n• Capacity should not be procured for customers actively pursuing \nbilateral solutions – particularly for load on the 2030+ timeframe\n• Avoid duplicative procurement for the same future load\n• The objective is to fill remaining gaps, not substitute for \nprivate contracting\nProcurement: Limited to Residual Needs\n21"},{"page":68,"startToken":15334,"endToken":15396,"text":"Cost Responsibility Established Up Front \nTransparency and Accountability Matter\n• Cost responsibility should be determined before procurement \ncommitments are made\n• Customers expected to fund procurement should be identified \nwhenever feasible\n• States and EDCs should provide notice before acting on behalf \nof specific customers\n• Broad socialization should not replace targeted cost \nresponsibility\nCapacity procurement and cost allocation should be determined together\n—not sequentially.\n22"},{"page":69,"startToken":15396,"endToken":15485,"text":"Meaningful Market Power Mitigation\nMean + 2 Standard Deviations is Not a Market Power Screen\n• The benchmark is calculated from market offers\n• Market offers may already reflect concentrated supply conditions\n• Excluding statistical outliers does not establish that remaining offers are \ncompetitive\n• The benchmark may continue to embed market power\n• Consumer protections should be grounded in resource economics\n• Consider a cap based on Net CONE (require support for costs > Net CONE)\nMitigation Should Not Depend on Potentially Exercised Market Power\nA statistical filter is not a substitute for economic mitigation\n23"},{"page":70,"startToken":15485,"endToken":15492,"text":"Pamela Quinlan\nPrincipal, GQS \nPQuinlan@GQSenergy.com"},{"page":71,"startToken":15492,"endToken":15543,"text":"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI hereby certify that I have this day served a copy of the foregoing document on the persons \ndesignated on the official service list compiled by the Secretary in this proceeding. \n \nDated at Washington, D.C., this 3rd day of September 2026. \n/s/ Stephen J. Hug \n \n \n \nStephen Hug"}],"sections":[{"p":1,"at":0,"title":"Opening text","method":"opening text","endPage":1,"endAt":651,"startToken":0,"endToken":100},{"p":1,"at":651,"title":"I. INTRODUCTION","method":"printed heading","endPage":1,"endAt":655,"startToken":100,"endToken":101},{"p":1,"at":655,"title":"INTRODUCTION","method":"printed heading","endPage":8,"endAt":7,"startToken":101,"endToken":2103},{"p":8,"at":7,"title":"II. PROTEST","method":"printed heading","endPage":8,"endAt":21,"startToken":2103,"endToken":2105},{"p":8,"at":21,"title":"A. IRAS Unlawfully Intrudes On State Authority Over Retail Sales","method":"printed heading","endPage":16,"endAt":8,"startToken":2105,"endToken":5000},{"p":16,"at":8,"title":"B. IRAS Is Unjust, Unreasonable, Unduly Discriminatory, And Inconsistent","method":"printed heading","endPage":30,"endAt":1059,"startToken":5000,"endToken":10309},{"p":30,"at":1059,"title":"C. IRAS Fails To Account For Existing Contractual Arrangements And Reliance","method":"printed heading","endPage":34,"endAt":869,"startToken":10309,"endToken":11752},{"p":34,"at":869,"title":"D. The Commission Should Reject IRAS Or Impose A Meaningful Transition","method":"printed heading","endPage":35,"endAt":1293,"startToken":11752,"endToken":12127},{"p":35,"at":1293,"title":"III. MOTION TO INTERVENE","method":"printed heading","endPage":37,"endAt":8,"startToken":12127,"endToken":12413},{"p":37,"at":8,"title":"IV. CORRESPONDENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS","method":"printed heading","endPage":37,"endAt":617,"startToken":12413,"endToken":12505},{"p":37,"at":617,"title":"V. CONCLUSION","method":"printed heading","endPage":37,"endAt":621,"startToken":12505,"endToken":12506},{"p":37,"at":621,"title":"CONCLUSION","method":"printed heading","endPage":45,"endAt":359,"startToken":12506,"endToken":14351},{"p":45,"at":359,"title":"Conclusion","method":"printed heading","endPage":71,"endAt":0,"startToken":14351,"endToken":15492},{"p":71,"at":0,"title":"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE","method":"printed heading","endPage":71,"endAt":304,"startToken":15492,"endToken":15543}]}