{"document":{"slug":"filing-20260903-5212","title":"Protest and Comments of Joint Consumer Advocates on the 08/13/2026 filing by PJM Interconnection, L.L.C","issued":"2026-09-03","accession":"20260903-5212","docket":"ER26-3515-000","group":"PJM filings","filer":"Delaware Division of the Public AdvocateDistrict of Columbia Office of People's CounselIllinois Citizens Utility Board ,Maryland Office of People's Counsel ,New Jersey Division of Rate Counsel ,Office of the Illinois Attorney General ,","kind":"comments","file":"sources/originals/20260903-5212_01.pdf","url":"https://elibrary.ferc.gov/eLibrary/filelist?accession_Number=20260903-5212","sha256":"cb8f02622e1a1fc6f86c837d433d3f8d003d400a3bb07edaa6607a8ce750d6f9","pages":41,"tokens":13118,"emptyPages":[]},"pages":[{"page":1,"startToken":0,"endToken":276,"text":"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nBEFORE THE \nFEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \nPJM Interconnection, L.L.C. \nDocket No. ER26-3515-000 \n \nPROTEST AND COMMENTS OF JOINT CONSUMER ADVOCATES  \nPursuant to Rule 211 of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC or \nCommission) Rules of Practice and Procedure,1 the Delaware Division of the Public \nAdvocate, District of Columbia Office of People’s Counsel, Illinois Citizens Utility Board, \nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General, Maryland Office of the People’s Counsel, and New \nJersey Division of Rate Counsel (together, Joint Consumer Advocates or JCA)2 submit this \nprotest of and comments on the August 13, 2026, filing by PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. \n(PJM) proposing to establish an Interim Resource Adequacy Service (IRAS) and a Large \nLoad Registry.3 While JCA appreciate PJM’s efforts in developing and presenting IRAS, \nand acknowledge that it is a better outcome than potential alternatives, the proposal falls \nshort of the just and reasonable standard.  \nFor the reasons stated below, the Commission should find PJM’s proposal unjust \nand unreasonable, and direct PJM to file an amended version of IRAS. PJM has consented \nto the Commission’s modification or severing of this proposal to the extent “consistent with \nPJM’s overarching objectives in this filing.”4 To the extent this consent is insufficient to \n \n1 18 C.F.R. § 385.211. \n2 Each of the Joint Consumer Advocates has separately and timely moved for leave to intervene in this \nproceeding. \n3 Proposal of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. to Establish Interim Resource Adequacy Service and a Large Load \nRegistry to Address System Reliability (Aug. 13, 2026), eLibrary No. 20260813-5118 (IRAS Filing). \n4 IRAS Filing, Transmittal Letter at 9 (IRAS Transmittal Letter)."},{"page":2,"startToken":276,"endToken":548,"text":"- 2 - \nimplement the changes sought here, the Commission should exercise its Federal Power Act \n(FPA) section 2065 authority to require that PJM implement the identified modifications. \nWe note that the Commission’s June 2026 Show Cause Order6 found PJM’s Open Access \nTransmission Tariff (Tariff) “appears to be unjust, unreasonable, or unduly discriminatory \nor preferential,” in part because of its treatment of large load customers.7 \nThe Commission should reject PJM’s treatment of IRAS as a compensable resource \nadequacy service, and instead direct PJM to modify the proposal to provide that new large \nloads that do not self-supply must take non-firm transmission service. The Commission \nshould also direct PJM to revise the proposal and modify the new large load self-supply \nprovisions (Bring Your Own New Capacity (BYONC)) such that only resources that have \nnot previously cleared a prior Base Residual Auction (BRA) are eligible. In addition, the \nCommission should direct modification of the proposal to require its review and validation \nof data supplied for the Large Load Registry, and to expand access to the information in \nthe Registry such that the JCA can review the data. Finally, Commission acceptance of the \nrevised IRAS proposal should be coordinated with the disposition—and rejection—of the \nseparate Reliability Backstop Procurement (RBP) proceeding pending in Docket \nNo. ER26-3380.8  \n \n5 16 U.S.C. § 824e. \n6 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,211 (2026) (June 2026 Show Cause Order). \n7 Id. P 3. \n8 PJM, Reliability Backstop Procurement to Address Resource Adequacy Concerns Stemming from New \nLoad Adjustments, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. ER26-3380 (July 31, 2026), eLibrary \nNo. 20260731-5214 (PJM RBP Filing)."},{"page":3,"startToken":548,"endToken":917,"text":"- 3 - \nSUMMARY \nThe instant proposal and PJM’s separate RBP initiative address the same reliability \nproblem: unprecedented growth in new large loads—chiefly, data centers—that has \noutpaced new generation and transmission development and produced consecutive years \nof capacity shortfalls in PJM’s BRAs.9 RBP seeks to cover the immediate shortfall, though \ndoes so by means that are unjust and unreasonable in myriad ways.10 IRAS also seeks to \npreserve regional reliability in the face of an unprecedented resource adequacy challenge. \nThe mechanism facilitates the interconnection of new large loads but requires (or should \nrequire) that they make a choice: either bring new capacity sufficient to meet their needs \nor (assuming appropriate state action) face curtailment when circumstances necessitate \nload reductions.  \nJoint Consumer Advocates recognize and appreciate that PJM’s IRAS proposal \nseeks to navigate a difficult course, and we support the general thrust of the proposal. If \nimplemented correctly, the approach could go far toward maintaining reliability without \neither stopping the interconnection of non-capacity backed new large loads or socializing \nthe reliability consequences of non-capacity backed large-load growth. We submit that \nneither of those options was likely to gain regulatory traction or, even more importantly, to \nbe consistent with PJM’s obligation to ensure resource adequacy.11 IRAS rightly strikes a \n \n9 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 14, 21. \n10 Protest, Motion to Reject, and Alternative Request for the Imposition of Conditions of Joint  \nConsumer Advocates, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. ER26-3380 (Aug. 21, 2026), eLibrary  \nNo. 20260821-5183 (JCA RBP Protest). \n11 Pursuant to Order No. 2000, PJM serves as the North American Electric Reliability Coordinator (NERC) \nregional security coordinator and is responsible for “directing actions to maintain [system] reliability, \nincluding firm load shedding.” Reg’l Transmission Orgs., Order No. 2000, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285, FERC Stats. \n& Regs. at 31,089 (1999), order on reh’g, Order No. 2000-A, 90 FERC ¶ 61,201 (2000), appeal dismissed \nfor want of standing sub nom., Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 272 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See also PJM \nManual 03 § 1.1 (“PJM is the Reliability Coordinator for the PJM [regional transmission operator (RTO)] \nand is responsible for all regional Reliability coordination as defined in the NERC and Regional Standards"},{"page":4,"startToken":917,"endToken":1274,"text":"- 4 - \ndifferent course, requiring new large loads either to balance their load additions with supply \nadditions or to accept curtailment risk. But the IRAS proposal that PJM filed departs from \nwhat it discussed with stakeholders and falls short of being just and reasonable in important \nrespects. In short, and as reviewed in the first part of this pleading, PJM’s basic concept is \nlargely sound and potentially beneficial. But, as explained in the second part of the \npleading, PJM’s proposed implementation is flawed. \nThe flaws include that PJM’s proposal fails to capture all the new large load that \nshould be a curtailable IRAS resource. PJM exempts new large loads from IRAS to the \nextent that they bring their own new capacity but fails to ensure that the “new” capacity in \nfact adds to the system’s existing capacity. As explained below, PJM’s proposal would \nallow a new large load to decrease its IRAS service (and curtailment risk) by procuring \ncapacity that already has cleared in previous BRAs. This would increase the amount of \nload on the system without either increasing system supply or making the new load an \nIRAS resource subject to curtailment. That is an unjust and unreasonable loophole.  \nSecond, PJM’s proposal to compensate IRAS resources when they are curtailed has \nnot been shown to be just and reasonable. The compensation proposal departs from the \n“connect and manage” proposal it promoted during the stakeholder process, under which \nnon-capacity backed new large loads would be required to take non-firm transmission \nservice akin to the approaches adopted and approved in the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) \nand Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT).12 “Connect and manage” was \n \nand applicable PJM Operating Manuals.”). “[T]he role of a security coordinator is central to maintaining grid \nreliability and non-discriminatory access.” Order No. 2000, FERC Stats & Regs. at 31,090 (citation modified) \n(quoting Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, 84 FERC ¶ 61,231 at 62,158, order on reconsideration, \n85 FERC ¶ 61,250, order on reh’g, 85 FERC ¶ 61,372 (1998)). \n12 PJM, Powering Reliability Through Market Design at 37 (May 6, 2026), https://www.pjm.com/-\n/media/DotCom/library/reports-notices/special-reports/2026/20260506-powering-reliability-through-"},{"page":5,"startToken":1274,"endToken":1615,"text":"- 5 - \npresented as a demand-side solution that would not impose resource adequacy costs on \nother customers. But in making its filing initiating this proceeding, PJM has presented \nIRAS as a supply-side measure akin to demand response.13 Thus, PJM proposes that new \nlarge loads that are curtailed pursuant to IRAS should be entitled to compensation, but \nleaves to the states resolution of the question of who ultimately must fund that \ncompensation—which leaves open the possibility that non-large load customers may yet \nend up paying resource adequacy costs to the new large data center loads that are driving \nPJM’s reliability concerns.  \nThat is an unnecessary risk. PJM could have avoided it, while enabling new large \nload growth and preserving reliability, by having new large loads without incremental \ncapacity come on as non-firm customers, without any right to compensation if they are \ncurtailed. Instead, by declaring that new large loads will be taking firm transmission \nservice14 and will be paid for whatever load curtailments are ordered as a form of \ninvoluntary demand response,15 PJM needlessly creates a cost that depends on state action \nto allocate correctly. It is an unnecessary, and unjust and unreasonable, regulatory two-step. \nMoreover, as designed, the proposal does not incent new large loads to procure new \nself-supply but instead incents them to engage in a cost-benefit analysis as to whether it is \nin their economic self-interest to instead continue as a non-capacity backed load subject to \n \nmarket-design.pdf (comparing PJM proposed connect and manage approach to ERCOT and SPP use of non-\nfirm transmission service to interconnect and serve non-capacity backed new large loads) (White Paper). \n13 PJM, CIFP Framework for Service During Periods of Insufficient Resource Adequacy – PJM Proposal at \n5 (July 31, 2026), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/about-pjm/who-we-are/public-\ndisclosures/2026/20260727-cifp-framework-for-service-during-periods-of-insufficient-resource-adequacy-\nexecutive-summary.pdf (discussing IRAS credits). See also IRAS Transmittal Letter at 101-04. \n14 “Load reduction under Interim Resource Adequacy Service appropriately treats New Large Loads as \n[network integration transmission service] customers.” IRAS Transmittal Letter at 100. \n15 Id. at 104-06."},{"page":6,"startToken":1615,"endToken":1998,"text":"- 6 - \ncompensation for curtailment. PJM provides no cost analysis to justify its unnecessary \ntreatment of non-capacity backed loads as firm transmission customers eligible (depending \nupon state action) for compensation from other ratepayers. And PJM’s proposal violates \nthe minimum standards for formula rates because it is not possible to ascertain what \ncustomers will be responsible for paying curtailment charges. Fundamentally, non-capacity \nbacked new large loads cannot come on to the system unless they are subject to curtailment \nand should be treated as such, i.e., non-firm transmission customers. \nImportantly, IRAS itself does not guarantee that any required curtailments will \nnecessarily fall on large loads. PJM proposes to issue curtailment directives to Electric \nDistribution Companies (EDCs) in the amount of their IRAS load but leaves specific load \ncurtailments to the state and/or Retail Electric Regulatory Rate Authority (RERRA).16 And \nthere are questions about the extent to which the data included in the Large Load Registry, \nwhich is the data engine for the IRAS mechanism, are being properly vetted, supported, \nand made available to regulatory authorities, including ratepayer advocates. Finally, IRAS \ndoes not purport to address other, significant issues, including the increased transmission \nor energy costs that result from new large loads, which should also be their cost \nresponsibility.17 \n \n16 Id. at 83-86. One of the problems posed by IRAS is that PJM is unable to dictate which specific loads will \nbe curtailed in the event they are necessary. Curtailment decisions will be made by the relevant state/RERRA. \nIn other words, IRAS allows new large data centers without BYONC to come onto the grid, but in so doing \nmay subject to curtailment customers who are not responsible for the reliability problem IRAS aims to solve. \nId. “[A]n Interim Resource Adequacy Service Action will not be specific as to which New Large Loads \nwould need to be reduced.” Id. at 83 (emphasis in original). \n17 According to the Independent Market Monitor’s August 19, 2026, Market Monitor Report comparing \nJanuary to July 2025 to January to July 2026, energy costs within PJM increased by 46%, capacity costs \nincreased by 138%, and transmission costs increased by 6.3%. Monitoring Analytics, Market Monitor \nReport at 27 (Aug. 19, 2026), \nwww.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/presentations/2026/IMM_MC_Market_Monitor_Report_20260819.\npdf?_sp=674592ab-00d2-413a-9d56-caac654c2c84.1788266063005."},{"page":7,"startToken":1998,"endToken":2317,"text":"- 7 - \nIn short, when considered in context and against alternatives, IRAS is a flawed step \nforward. The Commission can and should take steps to modify the proposal. FERC should \nexercise its FPA sections 205 and/or 206 authority and find IRAS unjust and unreasonable \nas a compensatory resource adequacy measure. PJM should instead be directed to resubmit \nIRAS as requiring non-capacity backed new large loads to take non-firm transmission \nservice. Indeed, PJM’s tariff already contains non-firm transmission services that appear \nconsistent with the proposed curtailment priority to be accorded IRAS.18 Finally, \nacceptance of an amended IRAS proposal as urged here renders PJM’s proposed RBP \nduplicative and unnecessary. The Commission should couple acceptance of an amended \nIRAS proposal with the rejection of the RBP.  \nPROTEST AND COMMENTS \nI. \nIF PROPERLY IMPLEMENTED, IRAS COULD INSULATE \nRATEPAYERS FROM THE CAPACITY COSTS OF SERVING \nPROJECTED NEW LARGE LOADS BY REMOVING THOSE \nLOADS FROM THE BRA. \nThe White House’s Ratepayer Protection Pledge states in part that:19 \nCompanies will build, bring, or buy the new generation \nresources and electricity needed to satisfy their new energy \ndemands, paying the full cost of those resources whether by \nbuilding, or buying from, new or otherwise additive power \nplants. Where possible, these companies will also add more \ncapacity that serves the broader public by increasing supply. \n \n18 IRAS Filing, Attach. C, Affidavit of Christopher Pilong on Behalf of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. ¶ 12 \n& n. 10 (Pilong Aff.). \n19 \nPress \nRelease, \nThe \nWhite \nHouse, \nRatepayer \nProtection \nPledge \n(Mar. \n4, \n2026), \nhttps://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/03/ratepayer-protection-pledge/. PJM reports that on July 23, \n2026, over 282 utilities, cooperatives, data centers, and 23 governors [had] joined the Ratepayer Protection \nPledge, including 38 data centers. The signatories included many of the large hyperscaler/data center \ndevelopers in the generative artificial intelligence (GAI) industry including Amazon, Google, Meta, \nMicrosoft, OpenAI and Oracle. IRAS Transmittal Letter at 4 n.10."},{"page":8,"startToken":2317,"endToken":2637,"text":"- 8 - \nPJM identifies two aspects of IRAS that it asserts accord with this Pledge. “First, PJM is \nproposing revisions to the [Reliability Assurance Agreement (RAA)] to clarify a Load \nServing Entity’s (“LSE”) obligation to bring new capacity [BYONC] in an amount that \nequals or exceeds its New Large Loads’ peak load or be subject to load reduction requests \nduring Emergencies prior to Pre-Emergency Load Management Response.”20 Second, \n“PJM is proposing to exclude from the [Variable Resource Requirement (VRR)] Curve \nNew Large Loads, to the extent they do not have arrangements with sufficient BYONC, \nbeginning with the 2029/2030 Delivery Year.”21 \nWe focus here on the most beneficial ratepayer aspect of IRAS as currently \nproposed: PJM’s intent to exclude non-capacity backed new large loads from the VRR \ncurve. Beyond the Ratepayer Protection Pledge, PJM’s effort to insulate ratepayers from \nthe capacity costs associated with serving projected new large loads is grounded in the \ngeneral recognition that data center development and forecasts of data center load are \ndriving increases in PJM capacity costs. The Independent Market Monitor has determined \nthat “[t]he increase in costs to other PJM customers in the 2027/2028 BRA as a result of \ndata center demand was $6,497,653,512. The total increase in costs to other PJM customers \nas a result of data center load in the last three BRAs was $23,100,955,341.”22 PJM likewise \nunderstands what is driving the recent BRA auction shortfalls, observing that it “hosts the \nlargest concentration of data center load in the world.”23 Of the 32 gigawatts (GW) in \n \n20 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 3-4. \n21 Id. at 23-24. \n22 Monitoring Analytics, Analysis of the 2027/2028 RPM Base Residual Auction: Part A at 3 (Jan. 5, 2026), \nhttps://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2026/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20272028_RPM_Base\n_Residual_Auction_Part_A_20260105.pdf. \n23 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 13."},{"page":9,"startToken":2637,"endToken":2909,"text":"- 9 - \nprojected load growth between 2024 and 2030 “30 GW . . .  is projected to be from data \ncenters.”24 Each megawatt (MW) of new large load that comes into service without \naccompanying new generation capacity consumes a portion of the resource adequacy \nmargin that would otherwise stand between normal system operations and an emergency. \nA new large load that adds to peak demand without contributing commensurate new \ncapacity exacerbates PJM’s current and projected capacity shortfall and increases the risk \nthat PJM will be forced to shed load to maintain system reliability.25 As that shortfall \nincreases, the risk of load-shedding increases correspondingly. Left unaddressed, continued \nlarge load growth would progressively erode the reliability margin on which existing \ncustomers rely. \nThe stress on PJM’s capacity market is driven by the unique phenomenon of new \nlarge data center load—real and projected—that is unlike the diffuse, organic load growth \ntypical of the U.S. electric industry since its inception. The Commission recognizes that \nlarge loads are “a separate category of load” and has directed every RTO/Independent \nSystem Operator (ISO), including PJM, to define “large load” in their respective tariffs— \nbecause, among other considerations, their integration “poses specific challenges to \ntransmission system operation given their size, operational behavior, and unique potential \nto impact the transmission system.”26 \nThe ability of new large loads to self-supply capacity or default to IRAS is a \nsafeguard to protect ratepayers from excessive capacity costs driven by a small class of \ncustomers. The key to this safeguard is the accompanying removal of IRAS load from the \n \n24 Id. \n25 Id. \n26 June 2026 Show Cause Order PP 50, 58."},{"page":10,"startToken":2909,"endToken":3233,"text":"- 10 - \nVRR curve beginning with the 2029/2030 Delivery Year. This mechanism will protect \nratepayers from bearing capacity costs that should rightfully be borne by new large loads \nor otherwise bearing excessive and unnecessary capacity costs associated with phantom \nload projections. PJM explains the “core logic” of its proposal:27 \nLarge new loads that seek to interconnect to the system \nwithout bringing commensurate new generation capacity \nare, in a meaningful sense, free-riding on the reliability \nprovided by the existing fleet. If the system is short and load \nmust be shed, there is a defensible argument that these loads \n– which imposed incremental demand on a strained system \nwithout yet being able to contribute commensurate supply – \nshould be curtailed before legacy load that has been served \nby and paid into the shared reliability pool. \nInterconnecting large load customers that cause the need for network upgrades or system \nstress are “differently situated” from customers whose presence on the system causes no \nsuch burdens. As such, it is fair and permissible to ask a large load customer to bear “the \nsystem-reliability burdens that flow from its decision” to operate ahead of the infrastructure \nneeded to support it.28 Existing load has long supported the PJM resource adequacy \nframework—through reserve-margin planning, capacity-market procurement, and the \nreliability-coordination function PJM has performed for decades. The present shortfall does \nnot arise from any change in that existing load’s behavior; it arises from rapid incremental \ndemand growth that is materially different in scale and timing from anything the framework \nhas previously accommodated.29 Removing from the BRA the loads that caused the \n \n27 White Paper at 37 (addressing connect and manage predecessor proposal to IRAS). \n28 Tenaska Clear Creek Wind, LLC v. Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 183 FERC ¶ 61,043, P 24 (2023) (Tenaska). \nAlthough Tenaska was decided in the context of an interconnecting generator, the same reasoning applies \nwith respect to new large loads. \n29 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 21, 99."},{"page":11,"startToken":3233,"endToken":3552,"text":"- 11 - \nincremental need —rather than including them and spreading the cost consequences among \nother customers —honors that existing bargain. \nIRAS likewise seeks to address the problem of uncertain large load projections that \nare currently plaguing the BRA. If the projected large loads materialize, then PJM will have \na resource adequacy tool to address them. If they fail to materialize, IRAS is unused but \navailable as necessary. In either circumstance, removing these large load projections from \nthe BRA demand curve insulates ratepayers from bearing the capacity costs that would \notherwise be associated with meeting these large load projections (though, as discussed \nmore fully below, unless corrected, ratepayers could be required to bear the cost of any \ncurtailment that does occur). \nThe problem of speculative large load forecasts is real. For example, the data center \nat issue in the Commonwealth Edison transmission security agreement cancellation \nlitigation has a “maximum planned load of 1,800 MW.”30 Thus, whether this single data \ncenter project goes forward has resource adequacy implications exceeding the capacity of \na new nuclear power generating unit.31 PJM concedes that “[u]ncertainty [in current large \nload projections] rises significantly after 2030” but apparently believes that the large \namount of data centers currently under construction will achieve commercial operation.32 \nPerhaps, though the facts on the ground are evolving. In May, a “JP Morgan analysis found \n \n30 Protest of Powerhouse Hillwood Holding LLC and Request for Confidential Treatment at 6, \nCommonwealth Edison Co., Docket No. ER26-3257 (Aug 14, 2026), eLibrary No. 20260814-5241. \n31 Units 3 and 4 of Georgia Power’s Vogtle nuclear plant have a combined rating of 2,234 MWs. Nuclear \nPlant Vogtle, Georgia Power, https://www.georgiapower.com/about/energy/plants/plant-vogtle.html (last \nvisited Sep. 2, 2026).   \n32 PJM, Shaping a Powerful Change: PJM Five-Year Strategy at 5 (Aug. 2026), https://www.pjm.com/-\n/media/DotCom/library/reports-notices/special-reports/2026/20260819-shaping-a-powerful-change-pjm-\nfive-year-strategy.pdf (Five Year Strategy)."},{"page":12,"startToken":3552,"endToken":3972,"text":"- 12 - \nthat more than 60% of data-center capacity planned for completion in 2027 isn’t yet under \nconstruction, and another 7% is delayed.”33 Even more recently, Exelon Corporation \nannounced a 7-GW reduction (to 11 GW) in its “high probability” data center load within \nPJM following a review that resulted in culling out speculative projects.34 In short, PJM’s \nassociated RBP and connect and manage/IRAS proposals have been developed against a \nbackdrop of ever-diminishing large load forecasts. On April 17 of this year, PJM identified \nan anticipated RBP procurement target of 14.8 GW.35 In a little over three months, that \nforecast has fallen by more than half, to 6.8 GW, a rate of decline of 2.3 GW per month.36 \nConcerns about the financial sustainability of forecasted investment in AI \ninfrastructure add to the uncertainty. The June 2026 Annual Report of the Bank for \nInternational Settlements warns that the Artificial Intelligence (AI) “capex [capital \nexpenditure] boom [could transform] into a protracted investment bust”37 and like prior \ninvestment booms could “induc[e] economy-wide recession[].”38 \nIn the near term, the ongoing AI investment boom raises \nquestions about the sustainability of the current economic \nexpansion. The five largest hyperscalers are set to spend over \na trillion US dollars on AI-related capital expenditure from \n \n33 Katherine Blunt, America’s Data-Center Build-Out Is Falling Way Behind Schedule, Wall Street Journal \n(June \n3, \n2026), \nhttps://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/americas-data-center-build-out-is-falling-way-behind-\nschedule-e408a9a8?mod=hp_lead_pos1. \n34 Ethan Howland, Exelon ‘High Probability’ Data Center Load Falls 40%, Utility Dive (July 31, 2026) \nhttps://www.utilitydive.com/news/exelon-data-center-load-new-jersey-battery-earnings/826686/. \n35 PJM Staff, Reliability Backstop Procurement Design: Reliability Backstop CIFP at 11 (Apr. 16-17, 2026), \nhttps://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/cifp-rbp/2026/20260416/20260416-item-05---\npjm-reliability-backstop-procurement-design---pjm-presentation.pdf. \n36 PJM RBP Filing, Attach. C, Affidavit of Danielle Croop ¶ 4. \n37 Bank for International Settlements, Annual Economic Report at 22 (June 2026), \nhttps://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2026e.pdf (BIS Report). The Bank for International Settlements is one of \nthe most prestigious financial institutions in the world. Its “mission is to support central banks’ pursuit of \nmonetary and financial stability through international cooperation, and to act as a bank for central banks.” \nBIS, About the BIS (last visited Sep. 3, 2026), https://www.bis.org/about/index.htm.   \n38 BIS Report at 22-23. See also id. at Graph 11(b) showing potential trillions of dollars in revenue shortfall \nneeded to support capex and debt service in an AI industry downside scenario."},{"page":13,"startToken":3972,"endToken":4374,"text":"- 13 - \n2025 through 2026. These commitments are outpacing \nearnings and the free cash flow of these firms, leading some \nto issue debt to raise additional financing . . . . This \ninvestment race may be partly driven by the perception that \nonly a small number of players with superior technology will \nultimately dominate the market shares. . . . As competitive \npressure drives capex higher, the net economic surplus – the \ntotal payoff less investment costs – declines for the sector as \na whole and could turn negative in adverse scenarios . . . . \nDisappointment in returns could trigger a sudden pullback in \nfinancing and turn the capex boom into a protracted \ninvestment bust, with potential knock-on effects on financial \nconditions. \nSome see “a basic math problem” at the heart of the generative AI industry:39 \nThere is a fundamental mismatch between the trillions being \ninvested in the infrastructure to develop AI and the \nbillions people and companies are spending to use AI. \nSpecifically, J.P. Morgan Chase analysts anticipate $5 \ntrillion of spending on AI infrastructure between now and \n2030. This year alone, four tech companies—Amazon, \nAlphabet, Meta and Microsoft— have plans to invest $670 \nbillion on AI infrastructure. When measured as a percentage \nof U.S. GDP, this is more than the Apollo space program, the \nU.S. interstate highway system, railroads, and every other \nmajor capital expenditure in U.S. history except the \nLouisiana Purchase, according to the Wall Street Journal. \nYet OpenAI and Anthropic have annualized revenues of \nabout $25 billion and $19 billion, respectively. Unless AI \nrevenues grow by orders of magnitude soon, there’s a Grand \nCanyon-sized gap that will be hard to cross. \nThe Commission’s “first and foremost duty” under the FPA is to “protect consumers \nfrom unjust and unreasonable rates.”40 Here, that means that FERC must act to protect \nratepayers against the risk of “a protracted [AI] investment bust,” including the risk of the \n \n39 Ganesh Sitaraman and Asad Ramzanali, We Must Prepare for an AI Bubble Now, TIME (Mar. 26, 2026); \nhttps://time.com/article/2026/03/26/we-must-prepare-for-an-ai-bubble-now/.   \n40 Morgan Stanley Cap. Grp. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., 554 U.S. 527, 551 (2008). See also \nAtl. Ref. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 360 U.S. 378, 388 (1959) (The FPA’s sister Act, the Natural Gas \nAct, was “framed as to afford consumers a complete, permanent and effective bond of protection from \nexcessive rates and charges.”)."},{"page":14,"startToken":4374,"endToken":4729,"text":"- 14 - \ncosts of capacity procured but ultimately unneeded to serve failing or abandoned AI data \ncenter projects. Removing projected new large loads from the BRA going forward, as PJM \nproposes, is essential to safeguarding ratepayer interests. \nII. \nIRAS SHOULD HELP EASE THE DEMAND PRESSURES \nPLAGUING THE BRA. \nIn planning and administering the regional transmission system, PJM seeks “to \nmeet the demands for firm transmission service, and to support competition, in the PJM \nRegion.”41 The misalignment of supply and demand driven by projected new large loads \nis an impediment to competition. In a supply-constrained market, new entry cannot perform \nits function of disciplining the market power of incumbent resources:42 \n[C]ontinuing to simply accept the interconnection of large \ndata center loads that cannot be served reliably because there \nis not adequate dispatchable capacity, is not a reasonable \npath forward and is not an efficient or competitive market \nsolution and is not a solution of any kind. That path leads to \ncontinued shortfalls, increased reliability issues, continued \nmaximum prices, and continued calls to abandon markets.43 \nThe answer is not to throw out the BRA baby with the new large load bathwater. \n“[C]urrent data center issues [should not be] a pretext for redefining fundamental elements \nof the PJM market design.”44 PJM’s IRAS proposal offers an (albeit flawed) market-based \nsolution for new large loads that seek to connect to the grid while providing a pathway for \n \n41 PJM Operating Agreement, Sched. 6 § 1.1. \n42 The forward-looking BRA was the product of a settlement with “design features [intended to] discourage \nthe exercise of market power and market manipulation generally. Specific mitigation rules and increased \ncompetition from new entry are the most important design elements in this regard.” PJM Interconnection \nL.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61,331, P 6 (2006), reh’g granted in part, 119 FERC ¶ 61,318, reh’g denied, 121 FERC \n¶ 61,173 (2007), pet. for review denied sub nom., Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. FERC, 324 Fed. Appx. 1 \n(2009). \n43 Monitoring Analytics, L.L.C., State of the Market Report for PJM Q1 2026 at 4 (May 14, 2026). \n44 Id."},{"page":15,"startToken":4729,"endToken":5043,"text":"- 15 - \nthe BRA to return to a more competitive balance of supply and demand. As discussed \nabove, a central—and essential—IRAS element is that, beginning with the 2029/2030 \nDelivery Year, PJM will exclude from the BRA VRR demand curve the megawatts of New \nLarge Loads that have not entered into BYONC arrangements, or do not have Allocated \nRBP Unforced Capacity (UCAP) MW, over and above the megawatts of New Large Loads \nthat were included in the load forecast for the 2028/2029 Delivery Year.45 \nThe competitive market effect follows directly from these mechanics: by removing \nuncommitted New Large Load MW from the demand curve, and by incentivizing BYONC \narrangements that add real, new, and dispatchable capacity to the system, IRAS addresses \ndirectly the demand-side driver of the last two BRA shortfalls rather than only adding \nsupply-side procurement on top of an unconstrained and speculative demand baseline.46 \nOver time, as uncommitted New Large Load MW is either converted to firm, capacity-\nbacked load through BYONC or excluded from the demand curve altogether, the BRA \nshould be expected to reflect a less distorted balance of supply and demand—reducing the \nfrequency and severity of future shortfalls of the kind that gave rise to both the RBP and \nIRAS proceedings, and moderating the upward trajectory of capacity prices. \nThe numbers bear this out. PJM projects only 2 gigawatts of non-data center load \ngrowth between 2024 and 2030.47 On the supply side, PJM notes that there was “a net \nincrease of 1,294.4 MW Installed Capacity (“ICAP”) of supply between the 2027/2028 and \n2028/2029 [BRA].”48 PJM also observes that its Reliability Resource Initiative resulted in \n \n45 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 109. \n46 Id. at 55-58, 109-18 (Parts II.C.3 and II.F). \n47 Id. at 13 (quoting June 2026 Show Cause Order P 8 & n.24). \n48 Id."},{"page":16,"startToken":5043,"endToken":5356,"text":"- 16 - \nthe “selecti[on of] 51 projects that can come online quickly and provide more than 9,300 \nMW of reliable capacity.”49 And PJM states in its RBP filing that “[t]he supply-side \nresponse to the [Charles Rivers Associates Request for Information] was also significant, \nwith 397 potential projects by 87 entities and approximately 136 gigawatt in total potential \ncapacity,” interested in entering into bilateral arrangements to serve new large load.50 \nIndeed, there is evidence that PJM is significantly underestimating the amount of \nEffective Load Carrying Capability (ELCC) already available to serve current load and \nnew load going forward. As explained by a litigant in the RBP proceeding:51 \nIn December 2025, Energy and Environmental Economics, \nInc. (“E3”) delivered to PJM a report titled PJM ELCC / RRS \nModel Evaluation. E3 states that it “was retained by PJM to \nindependently assess PJM’s Effective Load Carrying \nCapability / Reserve Requirement Study [RRS] Model . . . \nfor alignment with industry best practices in loss-of-load-\nprobability . . . modeling,” and notes that “[t]he outputs of \nthe ELCC/RRS model are used directly in PJM’s capacity \nmarket.”    \nE3 determined that if PJM “[u]se[d] more temporal granularity to model capability and \ndeliverability of unlimited resources,” this would reflect “[a]pproximately ~8 GW of \nadditional unlimited resource capability in the winter months.”52 PJM performed its own \nsensitivity analysis and53  \nquantified \nthe \nwinter \ncapability \nquestion \ndirectly. \nComparing summer and winter ICAP for unlimited \n \n49 Id. at 19. \n50 PJM RBP Filing, Transmittal Letter at 18 (RBP Transmittal Letter). See also Charles River Associates, \nPJM \nReliability \nBackstop \nRFI \nSummary \n(May \n27, \n2026), \nhttps://www.pjm.com/-\n/media/DotCom/committees-groups/cifp-rbp/2026/20260527/20260527-informational-only---reliability-\nbackstop-rfi-summary---charles-river-associates.pdf. \n51 Motion to Intervene and Protest of Nicholas Max Neal and David Neal, Delaware Standard Offer Service \nRatepayers ¶ 22, Docket No. ER26-3380 (Aug. 20, 2026), eLibrary No. 20260820-5015. \n52 Id. ¶ 24. \n53 Id. ¶ 30."},{"page":17,"startToken":5356,"endToken":5686,"text":"- 17 - \nresources across nuclear, coal, gas combined cycle, gas \ncombustion turbine, diesel, steam and other thermal classes, \nPJM's table shows 163,149 MW of summer ICAP against \n171,710 MW of winter ICAP — a difference of 8,561 MW. \nE3’s and PJM’s findings are consistent with (a subset of) the recommendation advanced by \nsome of the JCA (in a separate proceeding) that PJM “use winter ratings for combustion \nresources,” which the JCA witness estimated would result in some additional 5,439 MWs \nof available UCAP MWs not reflected in the 2025/2026 BRA.54 PJM’s failure to implement \nthese accreditation changes has not been explained, and its inaction is particularly \nnoteworthy given the need to restore competitive balance in the BRA and accurately reflect \nthe amount of available capacity. \nAs the foregoing shows, there is good reason to believe that PJM’s proposal to \nremove new large loads from the VRR curve for the 2029/2030 BRA could begin to restore \nthe competitive balance of supply and demand in the auction and there is every reason to \ndo so. \nIII. \nWHILE POTENTIALLY BENEFICIAL, IRAS AS PROPOSED IS \nFLAWED.  \nPJM’s principal means of addressing resource adequacy concerns is the BRA. “The \nobjective of [the BRA is] to procure the least-cost, competitively-priced combination of \nresources necessary to meet the region’s reliability objectives.”55 In proposing IRAS, PJM \nseeks to respond to the evident concern that the BRA supply-side mechanism is no longer \nadequate to ensure resource adequacy given projected new data center load. The problem \nfacing PJM is that new supply is unable to keep pace with these load projections, which \n \n54 Complaint of Joint Consumer Advocates and Request for Fast Track Processing, Attach. A, Declaration of \nMarc D. Montalvo, ¶¶ 20-21, Docket No. EL25-76 (Apr. 14, 2025), eLibrary No. 20250414-5190. \n55 N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74, 101 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., \n137 FERC ¶ 61,145, P 90 (2011) (subsequent history omitted))."},{"page":18,"startToken":5686,"endToken":6045,"text":"- 18 - \nare driven primarily by (uncertain) forecasts of new data centers. According to PJM affiant \nPilong:56 \nNew Large Loads are developing more quickly than \ngeneration and transmission can be built. As a result, this \nmay impact the ability for PJM to maintain a reliable system \nand continue to meet the demand for existing customers and \nmaintain reserve requirements during times of peak demand \nand/or significant generator outages. Therefore, a new \noperational tool is needed to ensure the current level of \nreliability for our customers is maintained. \nThe White Paper explains that “[t]oday, due to compounding frictions in siting, \npermitting, supply chains and interconnection, it can take two or three times as long to \nbuild a gas resource as it does to build a hyperscale data center.”57 Other resources, such \nas renewables combined with battery storage, may not face the same supply-chain \ndifficulties as gas combustion turbine generators, but nevertheless face permitting, \nfinancing and other project—including regulatory—hurdles.58 “[T]he addition of new \nsupply has not kept pace with rapid large load demand growth, thus giving rise to the \nsignificant tightening of the capacity market in recent years and subsequent resource \nadequacy shortfalls.”59 \n Given the uncertainties of new generation supply-side capabilities to meet regional \nresource adequacy needs, PJM here proposes IRAS as a demand response solution, aimed \n \n56 Pilong Aff. ¶ 19. \n57 White Paper at 18. \n58 See, e.g., Comments of the Solar Energy Industries Association at 9-12, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., \nDocket No. ER26-3380 (Aug. 21, 2026), eLibrary No. 20260821-5105 (identifying barriers to entry resulting \nfrom PJM rules governing surplus interconnection service). \n59 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 13. See also id. at 21 (highlighting “the ‘unprecedented surge in data center \nload’ at a faster pace than new supply can come online, and the ‘speed of connecting these large loads creates \na fundamental misalignment between demand and supply cycles,’ resulting in ‘resource adequacy in the PJM \nservice area [being] under significant stress.’” (quoting PJM, 2027/2028 Base Residual Auction Reserve \nTarget Shortfall Report at 1-4 (Feb. 9, 2026), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-\nauction-info/2027-2028/2027-2028-bra-reserve-target-shortfall-report.pdf))."},{"page":19,"startToken":6045,"endToken":6378,"text":"- 19 - \nat ensuring resource adequacy while requiring the data center loads that are causing the \nproblem either to bring sufficient capacity to address their contribution to the concern or \nface the possibility of curtailment should a system problem arise. Under the proposal, PJM \nwill calculate the amount of IRAS it needs to procure each year based on BRA shortfalls,60 \nidentify amounts of available IRAS from the Large Load Registry based upon new large \nloads that have not procured BYONC,61 and when needed direct EDCs with IRAS loads to \nimplement necessary curtailments consistent with state/RERRA regulation.62 IRAS is an \ninterim resource adequacy measure. Under PJM’s proposal, New Large Loads eligible for \nIRAS procurement will terminate after three consecutive Delivery Years when the BRA \nclears with sufficient capacity to obviate the need for IRAS. If the BRA thereafter clears \nshort, however, subsequent New Large Loads will become eligible for IRAS.63 \nAs proposed, IRAS is a potentially beneficial—but flawed— means to ensure \nresource adequacy and manage the reliability problem posed by new large data center \nloads.64 Rather than treating non-capacity-backed load as involuntary, compensated \ndemand response, IRAS should return to its connect and manage roots and require non-\ncapacity backed new large loads to take non-firm transmission service. Making this change \nshould not require a major sea-change or novel tariff development, as PJM already has a \n \n60 IRAS Filing, Attach. A, Attach. DD-4 §§ IV(b)-(c) (Attach. DD-4). \n61 Id.  \n62 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 79 (“[I]t is appropriate for PJM to direct Electric Distributors to reduce those \nNew Large Loads that have failed to cover their capacity obligations . . . .”). \n63 Id. at 77. See also id. at 79, fig. 1; Pilong Aff. ¶¶ 35-47. \n64 As discussed below, to the extent IRAS is called upon, this will impose unnecessary costs on ratepayers, \ncompared to a requirement that new large loads that do not BYONC will be served by non-firm transmission \nservice akin to PJM’s original connect and manage proposal."},{"page":20,"startToken":6378,"endToken":6760,"text":"- 20 - \nCommission-approved menu of non-firm service options and a set of curtailment priorities \nwith respect to co-located loads.65 \nSimilar actions have been taken elsewhere. Texas has successfully used a “connect \nand manage” non-firm transmission service approach to manage large amounts of new data \ncenter load for over a year.66 In a similar vein, the Commission has approved SPP’s \nimplementation of  “a new type of non-firm transmission service called Conditional High \nImpact Large Load Service (CHILLS)” to serve new high impact large loads such as large \ndata centers.67 The Commission found that CHILLS is “narrowly tailored to reflect the \ninterim nature of CHILLS and the unique characteristics of the CHILLs that transmission \ncustomers will serve.”68 The Commission has explained that CHILLS allows transmission \ncustomers serving new large loads (such as data centers) “to reliably receive transfers of \nenergy [subject to curtailment and interruption] until sufficient designated resources and/or \nnetwork upgrades are in place to support long-term firm transmission service.”69  \nAlong the same lines, the academic literature likewise supports the conclusion that \nflexible transmission service is a feasible means of expediting the connection of new large \ndata center load to the grid while protecting ratepayers. In 2025, Norris et al. estimated that \n \n65 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,209, P 551 (2026); see also Pilong Aff. ¶ 12. \n66 An Act Relating to the Planning for, Interconnection and Operation of, and Costs Related to Providing \nService for Certain Electrical Loads and to the Generation of Electric Power by a Water Supply or Sewer \nService Corporation, S.B. 6, 89th Tex. Leg. (enacted June 20, 2025). Although the Governor of Texas has \nimposed a moratorium on new large load interconnections and ERCOT is performing a new large load \ninterconnection audit, connect and manage is operative in ERCOT as a resource adequacy measure with \nrespect to the substantial amount of data center load already on the system. Robert Walton, ERCOT aims to \ncomplete Texas governor’s data center audit by December, Utility Dive (Aug. 21, 2026), \nhttps://www.utilitydive.com/news/ercot-texas-puc-data-center-audit/828472/. \n67 Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,196, P 1 (2026) (SPP CHILLS Order). \n68 Id. P 85. \n69 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 4 (alteration in original) (quoting June 2026 Show Cause Order P 17)."},{"page":21,"startToken":6760,"endToken":7126,"text":"- 21 - \nPJM could serve an additional 18 GW of load using interruptible service at “0.5% annual \ncurtailment” of their maximum uptime without adding new generation.70 Other \ncommentators have noted the ability of data centers to self-supply or operate with flexible \nservice:71 \nLarge loads can deliver on flexibility commitments by \nmoderating their energy consumption and by meeting \nelectricity needs through nearby resources that provide \npower without relying on the transmission system. Data \ncenters—which comprise the largest share of expected \ngrowth in large loads, and which are typically conceived of \nas \ninflexible \nloads—can \nmodulate \ncompute-related \nconsumption by scaling down computing power for tasks \nthat are less performance-sensitive (including some AI \ntraining tasks), postponing tasks that are less time-sensitive, \nor shifting tasks that are less location-sensitive to other sites. \nData centers may also be able to reduce consumption in \ncertain circumstances by modulating cooling system \nconsumption. \nThe trade press is rife with reports that one of the core bottlenecks delaying the \nconstruction and commercial operation of new data centers is access to electrical power: \n“Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, and Microsoft remain on track to deploy more than $650 billion \nin 2026 on AI infrastructure, with some projects now expected to wait up to five years for \nutility power interconnection.”72 Although PJM’s focus in proposing IRAS is to ensure \n \n70 Tyler H. Norris et al., Rethinking Load Growth Assessing the Potential for Integration of Large Flexible \nLoads in US Power Systems at 2, Nicholas Institute for Energy, Environment & Sustainability at Duke \nUniversity (Feb. 2025), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/publications/rethinking-load-growth. \n71 Sam Walsh et al., Leveraging Large Load Flexibility to Facilitate Access to Power While Protecting \nCustomers: Considerations for State Regulators at 6, Nicholas Institute for Energy, Environment & \nSustainability at Duke University (Mar. 2026) (footnote omitted) (citing Williams et al., Power-Flexible AI \nFactories: A UK-First Demonstration of Grid-Responsive AI Infrastructure, National Grid (March 2026), \nhttps://ngpartners.cdn.prismic.io/ngpartners/aabLtVxvIZEnjRNr_v11_emerald-ai_march2026.pdf), \nhttps://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/publications/leveraging-large-load-flexibility-facilitate-access-power-\nwhile-protecting-customers. \n72 Nadia Dubois, Half of U.S. AI Data Centers Delayed or Canceled: Inside the 7 GW Capacity Crisis \nReshaping a $650B Buildout, Tech Insider (Apr. 17, 2026), https://tech-insider.org/us-ai-data-center-delays-\ncancellations-7gw-capacity-crisis-2026/."},{"page":22,"startToken":7126,"endToken":7435,"text":"- 22 - \nresource adequacy,73 IRAS could also help to unlock currently untapped electrical service \nwithin PJM for new data centers by means of flexible service. \nAlthough PJM has proposed IRAS as a new interim resource adequacy product,74 \nit is functionally akin to the interim non-firm CHILLS transmission service used to serve \nlarge data center load in SPP and the connect and manage non-firm transmission service \nused for that purpose in ERCOT—albeit with the unjust and unreasonable possibility of \nratepayers potentially having to compensate New Large Loads when they are curtailed. \nThe solution to these concerns is for FERC to direct PJM to refile IRAS as non-firm \ntransmission service. \nIV. \nTHE COMMISSION SHOULD EXERCISE EITHER ITS FPA \nSECTION 205 OR SECTION 206 AUTHORITY TO DIRECT PJM \nTO MAKE IRAS A NON-FIRM TRANSMISSION SERVICE. \nWhile IRAS offers the promise of significant customer benefits, it also suffers from \na serious flaw. PJM proposes it as a compensable resource adequacy measure. “PJM is \nproposing a rate for IRAS that is equal to 50% of the Non-Performance Charge Rate.”75 \n“Electric Distributors bear the responsibility to implement the compensation scheme for \nNew Large Loads that provide the IRAS load reduction service,”76 and PJM envisions a \ncollaborative state/federal arrangement where new large loads receive payment for their \n \n73 See IRAS Transmittal Letter at 90 (“[T]he reforms in this filing address issues that the FPA’s drafters \nwould have certainly considered science fiction—the resource adequacy impacts of New Large Loads, \nincluding data centers, driven primarily by exponential technological advancements in artificial \nintelligence.”). \n74 “IRAS is a supplemental capacity product through which Eligible New Large Loads may be directed by \nthe Electric Distributor to reduce their load in response to an Interim Resource Adequacy Service Action \ncalled by PJM.” Id. at 74. \n75 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 102. \n76 Id. at 101."},{"page":23,"startToken":7435,"endToken":7754,"text":"- 23 - \nservice interruption.77 PJM’s proposal to compensate new large loads for interruptible \nservice is contrary to precedent, a departure from the Ratepayer Protection Pledge, and a \npotential windfall to new large loads who must take interruptible service to mitigate the \nreliability risks posed by their connection to the grid that are not met through BYONC. \nAs  described above, PJM’s current service offerings include some new forms of \nnon-firm transmission.78 Similarly, the Commission, in the SPP CHILLS Order, approved \nthe applicant’s implementation of “a new type of non-firm transmission service called \n[CHILLS].”79 This new non-firm service enables transmission customers serving new large \nloads (such as data centers) “to reliably receive transfers of energy [subject to curtailment \nand interruption] until sufficient designated resources and/or network upgrades are in place \nto support long-term firm transmission service.”80 PJM nowhere in its filing addresses why \nit has proposed IRAS as a compensable resource adequacy measure, as opposed to non-\nfirm transmission service akin to the service arrangement the Commission approved in the \nSPP CHILLS Order. \nAt its core, PJM’s compensable IRAS service defeats the goal of the rate design. \nPJM portrays IRAS as providing new large loads a choice between bringing their own new \ncapacity or taking interruptible IRAS. But unlike the arrangement in the SPP CHILLS \nOrder, which “incentivize[s] transmission customers . . . to obtain the designated resources \nand/or complete the network upgrades needed to procure long-term firm transmission \n \n77 “The IRAS rate is compensation for a wholesale load reduction service, but the entities to be paid the rate \nand the loads to be charged to support such compensation must be determined at the state level consistent \nwith the Electric Distributor’s state-approved load reduction plans and other state-approved programs, rates, \nand rules.” Id. at 104.  \n78 See supra note 69.  \n79 SPP CHILLS Order P 1. \n80 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 4 (quoting June 2026 Show Cause Order)."},{"page":24,"startToken":7754,"endToken":8054,"text":"- 24 - \nservice,”81 new large loads will receive firm transmission service regardless of whether \nthey bring their own new capacity. “Load reduction under [IRAS] appropriately treats New \nLarge Loads as [network integration transmission service ] customers.”82 What this means \nis that new large loads are presented with the cost-benefit choice of either providing \ncompensable interim resource adequacy service or offering some other form of qualifying \nnew resource. Unlike the CHILLS service in SPP, by offering the potential of curtailment \ncompensation, IRAS does not necessarily incent new large loads in PJM to obtain new self-\nsupply resources to avoid possible curtailments. \nPJM’s claims aside, IRAS is not consistent with the Ratepayer Protection Pledge. \nAs proposed, IRAS will serve to insulate ratepayers from the increased capacity costs \nassociated with: (i) simply connecting more and more new large data center load to the grid \nfaster than resources can be built to serve it; or (ii) including speculative new data center \nload forecasts in the VRR demand curve. Nevertheless, it is fundamentally contrary to the \nRatepayer Protection Pledge for PJM to include the possibility that other customers will be \nobliged to pay new large loads for taking the interruptible service that is a prerequisite to \nthose loads connecting to the grid without unduly impairing system reliability. \nPJM seeks to justify IRAS as “similar to the Pre-Emergency Load Response \nProgram.”83 But that comparison rests upon a fact that PJM’s filing fails to clarify. Load \nparticipating in the Pre-Emergency Load Response Program has paid and is paying its \nratable share of BRA capacity costs and is making the choice of foregoing the benefits of \nthe firm service it paid for by providing demand response in Pre-Emergency Load \n \n81 June 2026 Show Cause Order P 17. \n82 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 100. \n83 Id. at 103."},{"page":25,"startToken":8054,"endToken":8362,"text":"- 25 - \nResponse conditions. Beginning with the proposed implementation of IRAS in the \n2027/2028 Delivery Year, PJM intends to treat non-capacity backed new large loads as \ntaking network transmission service. What this should mean is that these new large load \ncustomers will pay their ratable share of BRA capacity costs. But PJM’s filing fails to \nexplain whether this is so, leaving the possibility that that service to new large loads is \nbeing treated simultaneously as both capacity backed and non-capacity backed. Beginning \nwith the 2029/2030 Delivery Year, new large loads will be excluded from the VRR demand \ncurve. \nBut even if PJM proposes to allocate BRA capacity costs to new large loads, they \nare only being allowed to come on to the system by means of taking interruptible service, \nbecause PJM has determined that for them to do otherwise jeopardizes system reliability. \nAs far as we can tell, PJM is both declaring that non-capacity backed new large loads are \ntaking firm network transmission service but also involuntarily providing a type of \ncompensable demand response. The Commission analyzes compliance with the cost \ncausation principle “by comparing the costs assessed against a party to the burdens imposed \nor benefits drawn by that party.”84 Here, it is the new large loads that are the causal basis \nfor IRAS. And as regards the benefits of IRAS, “FERC is not authorized to approve a \npricing scheme that requires a group of [customers] to pay for [services] from which its \nmembers derive no benefits, or benefits that are trivial in relation to the costs sought to be \nshifted to its members.”85 Other customers are not benefiting from new large loads taking \n \n84 Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1361, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 2004). \n85 Ill. Com. Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 2009)."},{"page":26,"startToken":8362,"endToken":8713,"text":"- 26 - \ninterruptible service because that is the minimum safeguard necessary for these new large \nloads to interconnect with the PJM grid. \nAlthough PJM has made no effort to calculate the potential adverse cost impact if \nIRAS compensation obligations are visited on other customers, there is reason to believe \nthat the cost of that obligation could be substantial. FERC approved a 50% reduction on \nthe Non-Performance Charge Rate for purposes of the Pre-Emergency Load Response \nProgram penalty rate “‘to appropriately reflect that such events may be twice as common’ \nas [Performance Assessment Interval (PAI)] events.”86 The Commission, market \nparticipants, and stakeholders recognize that PAI Non-Performance Charge penalties can \nbe substantial. Due to generator non-performance during Winter Storm Elliot, PJM initially \nassessed $1.8 billion in PAI penalties, an amount reduced in settlement to $1.25 billion.87 \nWhile currently unknown, PJM’s projections indicate that it is possible that the amount of \nnew large load eligible for IRAS could be substantial, and as much as several thousand \nmegawatts.88 Other customers should not bear any costs—let alone millions of dollars—as \nan accommodation to new large loads. The just and reasonable approach is to require new \nlarge loads that do not bring their own new capacity to take non-firm transmission service, \nconsistent with service offerings within PJM and the Commission’s decision in the SPP \nCHILLS Order. \n \n86 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,253 P 14 (2026). \n87 PJM, Winter Storm Elliott Performance Assessment Interval Settlement Agreement  Frequently Asked \nQuestions For Public Use at 3 (Dec. 20, 2023), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/markets-ops/winter-\nstorm-elliott/ferc-settlement-faq.pdf. “About 45,950 MW, or 23.2% of PJM’s generating fleet, was \nunexpectedly offline on Dec. 24, mainly because of plant equipment that didn’t operate and fuel supply \nproblems . . . .” Ethan Howland, PJM generators face up to $2B in penalties for failing to run during \nDecember’s Winter Storm Elliott, Utility Dive (Jan. 12, 2023) https://www.utilitydive.com/news/pjm-\ngenerators-penalties-power-winter-storm-elliott/640242/. \n88 From 2024 to 2030, PJM projects 30 GW of additional data center load. IRAS Transmittal Letter at 13."},{"page":27,"startToken":8713,"endToken":9007,"text":"- 27 - \nThe alternative is to prohibit new large loads from coming on to the system \naltogether unless they BYONC or the BRA secures sufficient resources to serve them. \nThere is no principle of utility law that requires service to customers that jeopardizes utility \noperations, let alone system reliability. PJM is no stranger to service moratoriums and \nsought and obtained approval of a multi-year suspension of its interconnection process.89 \nAlthough uncommon, moratoriums denying the provision of service to new customers to \npreserve system reliability are a feature of the utility landscape. For example, in 1971, local \nregulators authorized Washington Gas to suspend the provision of service to new customers \ndue to the unavailability of natural gas, a service restriction that lasted almost six years.90 \nOf particular relevance here, Texas, which has adopted a connect and manage non-firm \ntransmission approach to accommodate new large loads, has suspended data center \ninterconnection requests in response to the Governor of Texas’s request for a moratorium \ndue to the threat posed to ERCOT reliability. The Governor’s letter explains:91 \nThe Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) is \ncurrently considering approximately 474 gigawatts of \nrequests to connect to the Texas grid. That is more than five \ntimes Texas’ record peak electricity demand for ERCOT. \nApproximately 90 percent of the new power requests are \ndata centers. That unprecedented load growth could \nendanger the reliability and stability of the Texas electric \ngrid. \n   \n \n89 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 181 FERC ¶ 61,162 (2022). \n90 Washington Gas, Growing With Washington, Part III at 44 (2012),  https://cdn.prod.website-\nfiles.com/68c82ad46f5fe4c05f17bdf0/68f264a6a9f3949565d0c8d1_growing_with_washington_part-\n2_ch_3.pdf.  \n91 Letter from Governor Greg Abbott to Mr. Thomas Gleeson, Chairman, Public Utilities Commission of \nTexas at 1 (Aug. 3, 2026)."},{"page":28,"startToken":9007,"endToken":9288,"text":"- 28 - \nPJM also seeks to defend its “IRAS framework [as] strik[ing] a straightforward \nbargain.”92 PJM makes clear that part of this so-called bargain is that “[t]hese Eligible New \nLarge Load customers will be compensated under the IRAS framework to the extent that \nthey reduce load pursuant to IRAS and do not waive compensation.”93 But a bargain \nimplies that there are parties on both sides of a dispute agreeing to a package of \ngives-and-takes. There is no such bargain here. IRAS is not the product of a settlement. It \ndid not receive stakeholder approval. Indeed, PJM first proposed compensation for IRAS \nafter the June 30, 2026, conclusion of the stakeholder process. The “bargain” was first \nannounced  as part of the Board’s July 27, 2026 decision, and explained in a July 31, 2026 \npresentation.94  \nIn addition, PJM seeks to defend its compensation proposal because it “provides \nElectrical Distributors and states flexibility in the applicable IRAS rate for its territory, and \naffords the New Large Load the ability to waive compensation.”95 That is not an adequate \nsafeguard for PJM ratepayers. While new large loads could waive compensation, it is not \nin their economic interests to do so. This means that cost responsibility for PJM’s IRAS \nproposal is neither fixed nor predictable. The inability of PJM ratepayers to know whether \nthey will be subject to IRAS compensation charges falls well short of the “irreducible \nminimum of detail needed for a valid formula rate.”96 \n \n92 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 94. \n93 Id.  \n94 See supra note 8. \n95 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 102. \n96 Pub. Utils. Of Cal. v. FERC, 254 F.2d 250, 255 (D.C. Cir. 2001)."},{"page":29,"startToken":9288,"endToken":9617,"text":"- 29 - \nThe Commission should adhere to the approach adopted in the SPP CHILLS Order  \nand act in a manner consistent with the Ratepayer Protection Pledge. Specifically, FERC \nshould find IRAS to be unjust and unreasonable, and, as explained at the outset, direct \nPJM—whether pursuant to sections 205 or 206—to refile its IRAS proposal not as a \ncompensable resource adequacy service but instead as a requirement that new large loads \nthat do not self-supply must take non-firm transmission service. \nV. \nPJM’S PROPOSAL IS FLAWED BECAUSE IT IMPROPERLY \nTREATS AS “NEW” CAPACITY THAT PREVIOUSLY CLEARED \nA BASE RESIDUAL AUCTION. \nIRAS is intended to enable PJM to address auction shortfalls and ensure system \nreliability.97 Because new large loads are driving BRA shortfalls, PJM proposes through \nIRAS to require these loads either to bring their own new capacity or be subject to \ncurtailment (depending upon state load shed protocols). But PJM’s eligibility criteria defeat \nthat objective by allowing new large loads to satisfy their BYONC and avoid curtailment \nwith capacity that has already cleared in the BRA.98 Such capacity should not be considered \nthe additional or “new” capacity PJM needs to redress the recent series of auction shortfalls. \nPJM knows this. PJM’s treatment of capacity that has previously cleared an auction \nas “new” for IRAS purposes cannot be reconciled with its treatment of “new” capacity for \nthe proposed RBP. Both initiatives are intended to redress the recent series of BRA \nshortfalls. PJM explains in its RBP filing that “[t]he RBP is focused on procuring new \ncapacity. Thus, to be eligible to be offered into the RBP, a resource must: (1) never have \n \n97 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 6. \n98 Attach. DD-4 § VI(a)(i) (“Capacity Resources that cleared an RPM Auction for the first time in the Base \nResidual Auction for the 2027/2028, 2028/2029, and 2029/2030 Delivery Years may qualify as BYONC to \nthe extent the underlying resource meets the criteria in subsection (b) below.”)."},{"page":30,"startToken":9617,"endToken":9936,"text":"- 30 - \nbeen committed to provide capacity; [and] (2) not have been the subject of a notice of intent \nto participate in an RPM Auction prior to and including the 2028/2029 Delivery Year, but \nif so, must have offered and not cleared any RPM Auction.”99 \nBut the outcome under IRAS is different. As explained in the filing’s Transmittal \nLetter, “[g]iven that PJM is currently short of capacity and looking to reestablish a healthy \ncapacity reserve margin, . . . any capacity added to the system starting with the 2027/2028 \nBRA will qualify as new—subject to the gating criteria.”100 This explanation makes no \nsense: the shortfall in the 2027/2028 BRA is one of the reasons PJM is proposing IRAS.101 \nPJM suggests that its proposal accommodates purported reliance interests. “Given that \nNew Large Loads are included in the RPM Auctions through the 2028/2029 Delivery Year \nand eligible BYONC that previously cleared an RPM Auction through the 2028/2029 \nDelivery Year was not on notice of this limitation, any eligible BYONC that is offered in \nRPM Auctions through the 2028/2029 Delivery Year can be procured by New Large Loads \nto avoid IRAS.”102 The seller’s purported reliance interest is irrelevant: the seller’s bid has \nbeen selected and the seller has a must offer obligation going forward. But the benefit of \nthis arrangement goes to new large loads—on whose part PJM posits no reliance. Most \nimportantly, PJM nowhere addresses the reliability consequences of this loophole, which \ninclude the procurement of a smaller amount of IRAS against an unreduced shortfall. \nA simple example should flesh out the problems in treating capacity that has cleared \nan auction as “new” capacity. Assume that prior to the start of the 2028/2029 Delivery \n \n99 RBP Transmittal Letter at 51 (original emphasis) (footnote omitted). \n100 IRAS Filing Transmittal Letter at 52. \n101 Id. at 6. \n102 Id. at 115 n.302."},{"page":31,"startToken":9936,"endToken":10285,"text":"- 31 - \nYear, new large loads had acquired 6.8 gigawatts of otherwise BYONC-eligible capacity \nthat had cleared in the 2027/2028 BRA. The 2028/2029 BRA auction fell short of PJM’s \nreliability requirement by 6.8 gigawatts.103 Pursuant to PJM’s IRAS protocol, PJM would \nlook to the Large Load Registry to identify 6.8 GWs of new large load eligible for IRAS \nin the 2028/2029 Delivery Year. But PJM would not find any. The new large loads who \npurchased the 6.8 GWs of previously cleared capacity would not be listed in the Registry \nas eligible for IRAS because they had brought their own “new” capacity.104 The auction \nshortfall would still exist, but PJM would not have an amount of curtailable IRAS to \naddress its reliability needs in the 2028/2029 Delivery Year. This result holds true for any \namount of capacity that new large loads procure that had cleared the 2027/2028 BRA.  \nFor IRAS to meet its intended purpose, the BYONC eligibility criteria must be \nrevised and limited to capacity that, as with the RBP, has not cleared a prior BRA auction. \nVI. \nTHE COMMISSION SHOULD CONDITION ACCEPTANCE \nUPON REVISIONS TO THE LARGE LOAD REGISTRY.  \nAs stated in proposed Attachment DD-4 to the Tariff, PJM shall maintain a Large \nLoad Registry, which “shall inform which New Large Loads are eligible to be called on to \nprovide Interim Resource Adequacy Service.”105 PJM acknowledges that the successful \nimplementation of IRAS is premised upon the inclusion of accurate data in the proposed \nRegistry, explaining:106  \nThe information provided in the Large Load Registry will \nform the foundation for an accurate, complete, and reliable \n \n103 RBP Transmittal Letter at 7. \n104 In a Delivery Year where IRAS applies, the MW subject to IRAS that PJM will allocate to an Electric \nDistributor zone/area will be limited to the MW quantity of New Large Loads in that zone/area without \narrangements for BYONC or RBP UCAP MW allocated to them.” IRAS Transmittal Letter at 40. \n105 Attach. DD-4 § I(c). \n106 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 43-44 (footnote omitted)."},{"page":32,"startToken":10285,"endToken":10651,"text":"- 32 - \ndatabase that will inform, inter alia, decisions about the MW \nquantity of New Large Loads that is available to provide \nIRAS in a Delivery Year.  \nPJM is aware that false or misleading statements about, for \nexample, Peak Load Contributions could give rise to \ninaccurate baselines on which PJM would rely in the course \nof determining Eligible New Large Load Amounts, i.e., the \nMW value of load that an Eligible New Large Load in a \ngiven zone/area may be required to be made available for \nIRAS. \nThe proposed Tariff language creating the Registry includes details on the various \ntypes of information to be provided to PJM. But the obligation to submit the information \nfalls on the EDCs rather than the large loads themselves. The duty to populate the Registry \nfalls on “[e]ach Party,” which must “submit, or cause to be submitted,” the required \ninformation “related to each Large Load served by the Party.”107 Electric Distributors, in \nturn, are required to provide “any information or data the Electric Distributor believes \nappropriate to facilitate an accurate Large Load Registry.”108 The new large load itself—\nthe entity that presumably possesses firsthand knowledge of its peak, ramp, in-service \ntiming, \nbackup \ngeneration, \nand \ncoverage—apparently \nbears \nno \naffirmative, \ntariff-expressed obligation either to submit data or to substantiate them. \nGiven the importance of the information provided for inclusion in the registry, PJM \nstates in its Transmittal Letter that it “will review the information provided and coordinate \nwith the applicable Transmission Owner and Electric Distributor to check the validity of \nthe information provided, request additional information if needed, and consult with the \n \n107 IRAS Filing, Attach. A, Sched. 11 § B.1(a) (“Each Party shall submit, or cause to be submitted, to the \nOffice of the Interconnection the following information . . . related to each Large Load served by the Party”). \nThe obligation thus runs to the Party serving the load (the LSE), not to the Large Load; no provision of the \nproposed Tariff imposes a submission or substantiation duty on the New Large Load itself. \n108Attach. DD-4 § III(b) (Electric Distributor to provide “any information or data the Electric Distributor \nbelieves appropriate to facilitate an accurate Large Load Registry”)."},{"page":33,"startToken":10651,"endToken":10926,"text":"- 33 - \nLarge Load.”109 Unfortunately, this level of commitment is not matched by the proposed \nTariff language. The proposed revisions to Tariff Schedule 11 phrase PJM’s obligation to \nassess the validity of the data received to create the Registry in permissive terms, stating \nthat PJM, “may review information and coordinate with the applicable Transmission \nOwner and Electric Distributor as needed, regarding the validity of the information \nprovided, including through requesting additional information as the Office of the \nInterconnection deems necessary,” and “also may consult with the Large Load.”110 \nGiven that the Registry is essential to the success of IRAS, PJM should be required \nto review and validate the information provided to populate it. The Commission should \ncondition any approval on PJM modifying the Tariff language to make mandatory PJM’s \nobligation to vet and verify data provided in connection with the establishment of the \nRegistry. \nSeparate from the vetting issues, PJM’s Registry proposal includes two \nunreasonable restrictions on access to Registry data: (1) State Consumer Advocates111 are \nmissing from the list of entities that can access the Registry; and (2) even those entities that \ncan do so are subject to onerous and perhaps insurmountable confidentiality restrictions. \nThese limitations are unreasonable, particularly given the important role that states are \nanticipated to play in IRAS implementation. \nPJM’s proposal specifies the entities that “may” access the Large Load Registry \nand the conditions under which they may do so.112 Access to the Registry is confined to \n \n109 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 43 (emphasis added). \n110 IRAS Filing, Attach. A, Sched. 11 § B.1(c) (emphasis added). \n111 See id. § B.1(d). \n112 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 28."},{"page":34,"startToken":10926,"endToken":11235,"text":"- 34 - \n“Authorized Commissions, Transmission Owners, Electric Distributors, Load Serving \nEntities, the Market Monitoring Unit, and FERC.”113 “Authorized Commission” is defined \nin the PJM Operating Agreement:114 \n“Authorized Commission” shall mean (i) a State public \nutility commission that regulates the distribution or supply \nof electricity to retail customers and is legally charged with \nmonitoring the operation of wholesale or retail markets \nserving retail suppliers or customers within its State or (ii) \nan association or organization comprised exclusively of \nState public utility commissions described in the \nimmediately preceding clause (i) [presumably, the \nOrganization of PJM States, Inc. (OPSI)]. \nPJM’s RAA includes a separate Tariff definition for “State Consumer Advocate,” \ndefined as “a legislatively created office from any State, all or any part of the territory of \nwhich is within the PJM Region, and the District of Columbia established, inter alia, for \nthe purpose of representing the interests of energy consumers before the utility regulatory \ncommissions of such states and the District of Columbia and the FERC.”115 State \nConsumer Advocates are PJM voting members. The JCA are all State Consumer \nAdvocates, required by state statute to represent the interest of retail customers.  \nPJM should be directed to modify the definitions such that State Consumer \nAdvocates have access to the Registry. The information available in the Registry will play \na central role in their advocacy efforts. The offices need these data to seek and support \nIRAS curtailment protocols that ensure that new large loads are curtailed before other retail \nload. Similarly, these advocates will need access to this data to challenge any proposal that \n \n113 IRAS Filing, Attach. A., Sched. 11 § B.1(d). \n114 PJM Operating Agreement, Definitions A-B. \n115 PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement, art. 1, Definitions. This definition of State Consumer Advocate \ntracks the definition of State Consumer Advocate in the Operating Agreement. See PJM Operating \nAgreement, Definitions S-T."},{"page":35,"startToken":11235,"endToken":11521,"text":"- 35 - \nother retail customers fund demand response payments to the new large loads that must \ntake curtailable service in order to come on the system. \nThe Registry’s proposed confidentiality provisions pose another unreasonable \nobstacle—both to State Consumer Advocates seeking to carry out their regulatory \nmissions, and to state commissions seeking to exercise their oversight function. All entities \nmust comply with “appropriate data protection safeguards required by Operating \nAgreement, section 18.17.”116  Specifically, to “the extent such documents, data, or other \ninformation provided to” PJM “has been designated as confidential by a Party, Electric \nDistributor, or other entity supplying the information,” then PJM “shall maintain the \nconfidentiality of the information provided under this RAA, Schedule 11, section B \nconsistent with its obligations under Operating Agreement, section 18.17.”117 Put another \nway, if a Party118 to the RAA, Electric Distributor, or any un-identified “entity” (such as a \nnew large load) that is “supplying information” to PJM, decides that any such information \nheaded for the Large Load Registry is confidential, then that entity may request that their \ninformation be included in the Registry, and it will thereafter be subject to the “appropriate” \ndata protection safeguards set forth in Section 18.17. \nMost significant to the Large Load Registry, Section 18.17.4 governs the disclosure \nof confidential information to Authorized Commissions (i.e., the PJM state commissions \nand OPSI). Under Section 18.17, an Authorized Commission may only request access to \nconfidential information after successfully completing a certification process with FERC \n \n116 IRAS Filing, Attach. A, Sched. 11 § B.1(d). \n117 Id. \n118 “Party” is defined as “an entity bound by the terms of the Operating Agreement.” See PJM Reliability \nAssurance Agreement, art. 1, Definitions."},{"page":36,"startToken":11521,"endToken":11912,"text":"- 36 - \nthat will, at a minimum, take over three months to complete, if successful at all.119  As \nreported by PJM on its website, only six of the 14 state commissions in the PJM footprint \nhave completed the FERC certification process and have the opportunity to post their list \nof “authorized persons” who may receive confidential information successfully requested \nby the Authorized Commission.120  It does not appear that OPSI has completed the required \nFERC certification, though it is included in the definition of Authorized Commission. \nFor the remaining eight state Authorized Commissions (and OPSI),121 there is no \nguarantee of obtaining FERC certification. Timing considerations alone counsel that most \nAuthorized Commissions will not obtain certification before the IRAS proposed effective \ndate. And even if an Authorized Commission has been FERC-certified, it must still engage \nin a PJM process to request confidential information. The Authorized Commission must \nspecify the confidential information it is requesting and provide “a general description of \nthe purpose” of the Authorized Commission in making the request.122 Both PJM and an \n“affected” PJM Member may object to the release of the confidential information.123 Such \nobjections are to be resolved first with a conference, but absent resolution may lead to the \n \n119 PJM Operating Agreement § 18.17.4(a)(i). Section 18.17.4(a)(i) specifies that “[e]ach party shall bear its \nown costs in connection with such a FERC protest proceeding.” It is unclear what other party would pay the \ncosts of a party’s protest. \n120 PJM, State Commissions, Authorized Persons Schedule, https://www.pjm.com/committees-and-\ngroups/state-commissions (last visited Sep. 3, 2026). According to the posting of authorized person lists, it \nappears that the six state commissions that have obtained FERC certification are Indiana, Maryland, New \nJersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Illinois, Delaware, Michigan, Tennessee, Kentucky, North \nCarolina, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia are not on the list. \n121 While it appears that OPSI has not attempted the certification process at FERC, OPSI may take on an \nenhanced role in governance at PJM. See, e.g., Post-Technical Conference Joint Comments of the \nOrganization of PJM States, Inc. and PJM Governors’ Collaborative, PJM Governance & Stakeholder \nReforms, Docket No. AD26-7 (Aug. 21, 2026), eLibrary No. 20260821-5102. \n122 PJM Operating Agreement § 18.17.4(c)(i). \n123 Id. § 18.17.4(c)(iii)."},{"page":37,"startToken":11912,"endToken":12217,"text":"- 37 - \nfiling of a FERC complaint.124  While how and when such complaints would be resolved \nis unclear, what is clear is that absent resolution, state commissions may never see the \ninformation, let alone have access in a timely manner. \nWe recognize that changes to the Tariff process for handling confidential \ninformation is beyond the scope of this proceeding. But the inability of consumer \nrepresentatives to review Registry data that is the lynchpin of the IRAS proposal renders \nthe proposal unjust and unreasonable. State Consumer Advocates should have express \nauthorization to access the Large Load Registry because doing so will provide the strongest \nlikelihood that retail ratepayers will be protected from the imposition of costs and \ncurtailment impacts wrought by the presence of new large loads. And both they and their \nrespective state commissions should have access to any information designated \nconfidential by means of adequate protective orders or other forms of certification. At its \ncore, the successful implementation of IRAS depends upon successfully engaging federal \nand state actors—which can happen only where the necessary transparency protections are \nin place. \nVII. \nTHE ACCEPTANCE OF IRAS IS FURTHER REASON TO \nREJECT RBP. \nPursuant to its RBP proposal, pending before the Commission in Docket No. \nER26-3380-000, PJM seeks to procure an initial target of 6.8 gigawatts of new capacity for \n15-year terms (or less) beginning with the 2028/2029 Delivery Year until the 2042/2043 \nDelivery Year at an average price of $555/MW-day.125 The RBP is proposed as a “one-\n \n124 Id. The grounds for filing such a complaint are set forth in Section 18.17, and they are expansive, including \nthe existence of “exceptional circumstances . . . such that complying with the Information Request would \nresult in harm to the complainant.” Id. \n125 See JCA RBP Protest at 5-7, 13-14 (describing PJM RBP Filing)."},{"page":38,"startToken":12217,"endToken":12558,"text":"- 38 - \ntime, supplementary mechanism” and an “interim step” to address a “near-term” \nshortfall,126 and identifies its object as a discrete, near-term reliability gap rather than a \ndurable long-term deficiency. The Initial RBP Target is the 6,831.3 MW UCAP shortfall \nobserved in the July 2026 BRA for the 2028/2029 Delivery Year.127 \nProvided that the Commission fixes the BYONC eligibility requirements to exclude \nresources that have cleared in a BRA auction, FERC’s acceptance of IRAS—either in its \ncurrent form or as correctly modified as non-firm transmission service—obviates the need \nfor the RBP. IRAS, like the RBP, is a resource adequacy measure intended to address a \nlarge load-induced capacity shortfall. The difference between the two proposals is that \nIRAS can satisfy the capacity need at which the RBP is aimed sooner, more durably, and, \nif correctly modified as non-firm transmission service, at less cost. “IRAS ‘is a load \nreduction service, effective starting with the 2027/2028 Delivery Year . . . for the purpose \nof supporting the integration of New Large Loads to the PJM Region that are not in \narrangements with new capacity additions to the PJM Region.’”128 \nPJM intends to require an amount of IRAS equivalent to the auction shortfall, which \nfor the 2027/2028 Delivery Year was roughly 6.8 GW;129 roughly the same amount as \nPJM’s initial RBP procurement target.130 PJM’s RBP procurement target will be reduced \nby self-supply in the same way that the amount of new large load eligible for IRAS \n \n126 RBP Transmittal Letter at 6-7, 21-22. \n127 Id. at 31; PJM RBP Filing, Attach. A, Attach. DD § 18.1(a). \n128 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 74-75 (quoting Attach. DD-4 § I(a)). JCA in their RBP Protest mistakenly \nasked the Commission to accelerate the implementation date of IRAS. Upon further review of PJM’s IRAS \nFiling, it is clear that there is no need to do so. \n129 RBP Transmittal Letter at 8. \n130 Id. at 31 (initial RBP target of 6.8 GW based upon shortfall in 2028/2029 BRA)."},{"page":39,"startToken":12558,"endToken":12866,"text":"- 39 - \nprocurement will be reduced by self-supply. There is every reason to believe that IRAS—\na resource adequacy measure that will be available to PJM before the availability of any \nRBP resources—will provide a source of new resource adequacy roughly equivalent to \nPJM’s final RBP target. \nAnd unlike the RBP, IRAS is a resource adequacy measure of indefinite duration.131 \nPJM is not proposing an end date to the IRAS program. \nRegardless of whether the PJM Region has maintained \ncapacity sufficient to meet the PJM Region Reliability \nRequirement for three or more years, PJM will continue to \nmaintain the Large Load Registry. However, if the region re-\nenters capacity shortfall conditions, then the need for New \nLarge Loads to provide IRAS will re-emerge. The definition \nof New Large Load allows for this and explicitly provides \nthat New Large Loads will then be defined as entering \nservice “after June 1 of the first Delivery Year” the PJM \nRegion is short of capacity. \nBy comparison, RBP is a one-time procurement of new resources for terms of up \nto 15 years, notwithstanding that PJM has admitted that far shorter and less costly five-\nyear procurements will satisfy regional reliability needs.132 And although PJM has \nprovided no estimate of the costs associated with IRAS, our protest in Docket No. ER26-\n3380-000 demonstrates that the costs associated with PJM’s RBP proposal are excessive \nand unjustified, and will likely reflect the exercise of seller-side market power as opposed \nto competition based upon the sellers’ production costs.133 Moreover, should the \nCommission exercise its FPA section 206 authority (perhaps incident to the June 2026 \nShow Cause Order) and direct PJM to refile IRAS as a non-firm transmission service, \n \n131 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 72. \n132 JCA RBP Protest at 6. See also RBP Transmittal Letter at 39. \n133 JCA RBP Protest at 17-25."},{"page":40,"startToken":12866,"endToken":13052,"text":"- 40 - \nratepayers will not be subject to any IRAS procurement costs, consistent with both the \nRatepayer Protection Pledge and the FPA’s consumer protection objectives. \nThe Commission’s acceptance of IRAS (with proper BYONC eligibility \nrequirements) renders the RBP duplicative and unnecessary and the Commission should \nreject it. \nCONCLUSION \nWHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Commission should direct PJM to \nrevise its IRAS proposal consistent with the recommendations herein. \nRespectfully Submitted, \n   /s/ Susan L. Satter              \n       \n/s/ Scott H. Strauss \nSusan L. Satter \nChief, Public Utilities Bureau \nScott Metzger \nPublic Utilities Policy Counsel \nKimberly B. Janas \nCounsel to the Attorney General \nILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE \n115 South LaSalle Street, 25th Floor \nChicago, IL 60603 \nsusan.satter@ilag.gov \n \nCounsel for the Office of the Illinois \nAttorney General \n \nScott H. Strauss \nPeter J. Hopkins \nJeffrey A. Schwarz \nLauren L. Springett \nSPIEGEL & MCDIARMID LLP \n1818 N Street, NW, 8th Floor \nWashington, DC 20036 \nscott.strauss@spiegelmcd.com \n \nCounsel for Delaware Division of the \nPublic Advocate, District of Columbia \nOffice of People’s Counsel, Illinois Citizens \nUtility Board, Maryland Office of People’s \nCounsel and New Jersey Division of Rate \nCounsel \n \n \nSeptember 3, 2026"},{"page":41,"startToken":13052,"endToken":13118,"text":"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI hereby certify that I have this day caused the foregoing document to be served \nupon each person designated on the official service list compiled by the Secretary in this \nproceeding. \nDated on this 3rd day of September, 2026. \n \n/s/ Lauren L. Springett \nLauren L. Springett \n \nLaw Offices of: \nSPIEGEL & MCDIARMID LLP \n1818 N Street, NW \n8th Floor \nWashington, DC 20036 \n(202) 879-4000"}],"sections":[{"p":1,"at":0,"title":"Opening text","method":"opening text","endPage":1,"endAt":133,"startToken":0,"endToken":18},{"p":1,"at":133,"title":"protest and comments OF JOINT CONSUMER ADVOCATES","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":3,"endAt":7,"startToken":18,"endToken":549},{"p":3,"at":7,"title":"SUMMARY","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":7,"endAt":830,"startToken":549,"endToken":2122},{"p":7,"at":830,"title":"PROTEST AND COMMENTS","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":7,"endAt":852,"startToken":2122,"endToken":2125},{"p":7,"at":852,"title":"I. IF properly implemented, IRAS could Insulate Ratepayers from the Capacity Costs OF Serving Projected New Large Loads by removing those loads from the Bra.","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":14,"endAt":247,"startToken":2125,"endToken":4410},{"p":14,"at":247,"title":"II. IRAS Should Help ease the Demand Pressures Plaguing the BRA.","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":16,"endAt":1738,"startToken":4410,"endToken":5303},{"p":16,"at":1738,"title":"Summary","method":"printed heading","endPage":17,"endAt":1067,"startToken":5303,"endToken":5534},{"p":17,"at":1067,"title":"III. while potentially beneficial, iras as proposed is flawed.","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":22,"endAt":700,"startToken":5534,"endToken":7236},{"p":22,"at":700,"title":"IV. The Commission Should Exercise either Its FPA Section 205 or section 206 authority to Direct PJM to make IRAS a Non-Firm Transmission Service.","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":29,"endAt":502,"startToken":7236,"endToken":9368},{"p":29,"at":502,"title":"V. PJM’S PROPOSAL IS FLAWED BECAUSE IT IMPROPERLY TREATS AS “NEW” CAPACITY THAT previously cleared a base residual auction.","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":31,"endAt":1060,"startToken":9368,"endToken":10123},{"p":31,"at":1060,"title":"VI. The commission should condition acceptance upon revisions to the Large Load Registry.","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":37,"endAt":1201,"startToken":10123,"endToken":12093},{"p":37,"at":1201,"title":"VII. The Acceptance of IRAS Is Further Reason to Reject RBP.","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":40,"endAt":336,"startToken":12093,"endToken":12912},{"p":40,"at":336,"title":"CONCLUSION","method":"printed heading","endPage":41,"endAt":0,"startToken":12912,"endToken":13052},{"p":41,"at":0,"title":"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE","method":"printed heading","endPage":41,"endAt":412,"startToken":13052,"endToken":13118}]}