ER26-3515-000 · 2026-09-03 · Delaware Division of the Public AdvocateDistrict of Columbia Office of People's CounselIllinois Citizens Utility Board ,Maryland Office of People's Counsel ,New Jersey Division of Rate Counsel ,Office of the Illinois Attorney General ,

Protest and Comments of Joint Consumer Advocates on the 08/13/2026 filing by PJM Interconnection, L.L.C

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
BEFORE THE 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. 
Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
 
PROTEST AND COMMENTS OF JOINT CONSUMER ADVOCATES  
Pursuant to Rule 211 of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC or 
Commission) Rules of Practice and Procedure,1 the Delaware Division of the Public 
Advocate, District of Columbia Office of People’s Counsel, Illinois Citizens Utility Board, 
Office of the Illinois Attorney General, Maryland Office of the People’s Counsel, and New 
Jersey Division of Rate Counsel (together, Joint Consumer Advocates or JCA)2 submit this 
protest of and comments on the August 13, 2026, filing by PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. 
(PJM) proposing to establish an Interim Resource Adequacy Service (IRAS) and a Large 
Load Registry.3 While JCA appreciate PJM’s efforts in developing and presenting IRAS, 
and acknowledge that it is a better outcome than potential alternatives, the proposal falls 
short of the just and reasonable standard.  
For the reasons stated below, the Commission should find PJM’s proposal unjust 
and unreasonable, and direct PJM to file an amended version of IRAS. PJM has consented 
to the Commission’s modification or severing of this proposal to the extent “consistent with 
PJM’s overarching objectives in this filing.”4 To the extent this consent is insufficient to 
 
1 18 C.F.R. § 385.211. 
2 Each of the Joint Consumer Advocates has separately and timely moved for leave to intervene in this 
proceeding. 
3 Proposal of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. to Establish Interim Resource Adequacy Service and a Large Load 
Registry to Address System Reliability (Aug. 13, 2026), eLibrary No. 20260813-5118 (IRAS Filing). 
4 IRAS Filing, Transmittal Letter at 9 (IRAS Transmittal Letter).

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implement the changes sought here, the Commission should exercise its Federal Power Act 
(FPA) section 2065 authority to require that PJM implement the identified modifications. 
We note that the Commission’s June 2026 Show Cause Order6 found PJM’s Open Access 
Transmission Tariff (Tariff) “appears to be unjust, unreasonable, or unduly discriminatory 
or preferential,” in part because of its treatment of large load customers.7 
The Commission should reject PJM’s treatment of IRAS as a compensable resource 
adequacy service, and instead direct PJM to modify the proposal to provide that new large 
loads that do not self-supply must take non-firm transmission service. The Commission 
should also direct PJM to revise the proposal and modify the new large load self-supply 
provisions (Bring Your Own New Capacity (BYONC)) such that only resources that have 
not previously cleared a prior Base Residual Auction (BRA) are eligible. In addition, the 
Commission should direct modification of the proposal to require its review and validation 
of data supplied for the Large Load Registry, and to expand access to the information in 
the Registry such that the JCA can review the data. Finally, Commission acceptance of the 
revised IRAS proposal should be coordinated with the disposition—and rejection—of the 
separate Reliability Backstop Procurement (RBP) proceeding pending in Docket 
No. ER26-3380.8  
 
5 16 U.S.C. § 824e. 
6 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,211 (2026) (June 2026 Show Cause Order). 
7 Id. P 3. 
8 PJM, Reliability Backstop Procurement to Address Resource Adequacy Concerns Stemming from New 
Load Adjustments, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. ER26-3380 (July 31, 2026), eLibrary 
No. 20260731-5214 (PJM RBP Filing).

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SUMMARY 
The instant proposal and PJM’s separate RBP initiative address the same reliability 
problem: unprecedented growth in new large loads—chiefly, data centers—that has 
outpaced new generation and transmission development and produced consecutive years 
of capacity shortfalls in PJM’s BRAs.9 RBP seeks to cover the immediate shortfall, though 
does so by means that are unjust and unreasonable in myriad ways.10 IRAS also seeks to 
preserve regional reliability in the face of an unprecedented resource adequacy challenge. 
The mechanism facilitates the interconnection of new large loads but requires (or should 
require) that they make a choice: either bring new capacity sufficient to meet their needs 
or (assuming appropriate state action) face curtailment when circumstances necessitate 
load reductions.  
Joint Consumer Advocates recognize and appreciate that PJM’s IRAS proposal 
seeks to navigate a difficult course, and we support the general thrust of the proposal. If 
implemented correctly, the approach could go far toward maintaining reliability without 
either stopping the interconnection of non-capacity backed new large loads or socializing 
the reliability consequences of non-capacity backed large-load growth. We submit that 
neither of those options was likely to gain regulatory traction or, even more importantly, to 
be consistent with PJM’s obligation to ensure resource adequacy.11 IRAS rightly strikes a 
 
9 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 14, 21. 
10 Protest, Motion to Reject, and Alternative Request for the Imposition of Conditions of Joint  
Consumer Advocates, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. ER26-3380 (Aug. 21, 2026), eLibrary  
No. 20260821-5183 (JCA RBP Protest). 
11 Pursuant to Order No. 2000, PJM serves as the North American Electric Reliability Coordinator (NERC) 
regional security coordinator and is responsible for “directing actions to maintain [system] reliability, 
including firm load shedding.” Reg’l Transmission Orgs., Order No. 2000, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285, FERC Stats. 
& Regs. at 31,089 (1999), order on reh’g, Order No. 2000-A, 90 FERC ¶ 61,201 (2000), appeal dismissed 
for want of standing sub nom., Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 272 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See also PJM 
Manual 03 § 1.1 (“PJM is the Reliability Coordinator for the PJM [regional transmission operator (RTO)] 
and is responsible for all regional Reliability coordination as defined in the NERC and Regional Standards

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different course, requiring new large loads either to balance their load additions with supply 
additions or to accept curtailment risk. But the IRAS proposal that PJM filed departs from 
what it discussed with stakeholders and falls short of being just and reasonable in important 
respects. In short, and as reviewed in the first part of this pleading, PJM’s basic concept is 
largely sound and potentially beneficial. But, as explained in the second part of the 
pleading, PJM’s proposed implementation is flawed. 
The flaws include that PJM’s proposal fails to capture all the new large load that 
should be a curtailable IRAS resource. PJM exempts new large loads from IRAS to the 
extent that they bring their own new capacity but fails to ensure that the “new” capacity in 
fact adds to the system’s existing capacity. As explained below, PJM’s proposal would 
allow a new large load to decrease its IRAS service (and curtailment risk) by procuring 
capacity that already has cleared in previous BRAs. This would increase the amount of 
load on the system without either increasing system supply or making the new load an 
IRAS resource subject to curtailment. That is an unjust and unreasonable loophole.  
Second, PJM’s proposal to compensate IRAS resources when they are curtailed has 
not been shown to be just and reasonable. The compensation proposal departs from the 
“connect and manage” proposal it promoted during the stakeholder process, under which 
non-capacity backed new large loads would be required to take non-firm transmission 
service akin to the approaches adopted and approved in the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) 
and Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT).12 “Connect and manage” was 
 
and applicable PJM Operating Manuals.”). “[T]he role of a security coordinator is central to maintaining grid 
reliability and non-discriminatory access.” Order No. 2000, FERC Stats & Regs. at 31,090 (citation modified) 
(quoting Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, 84 FERC ¶ 61,231 at 62,158, order on reconsideration, 
85 FERC ¶ 61,250, order on reh’g, 85 FERC ¶ 61,372 (1998)). 
12 PJM, Powering Reliability Through Market Design at 37 (May 6, 2026), https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/library/reports-notices/special-reports/2026/20260506-powering-reliability-through-

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presented as a demand-side solution that would not impose resource adequacy costs on 
other customers. But in making its filing initiating this proceeding, PJM has presented 
IRAS as a supply-side measure akin to demand response.13 Thus, PJM proposes that new 
large loads that are curtailed pursuant to IRAS should be entitled to compensation, but 
leaves to the states resolution of the question of who ultimately must fund that 
compensation—which leaves open the possibility that non-large load customers may yet 
end up paying resource adequacy costs to the new large data center loads that are driving 
PJM’s reliability concerns.  
That is an unnecessary risk. PJM could have avoided it, while enabling new large 
load growth and preserving reliability, by having new large loads without incremental 
capacity come on as non-firm customers, without any right to compensation if they are 
curtailed. Instead, by declaring that new large loads will be taking firm transmission 
service14 and will be paid for whatever load curtailments are ordered as a form of 
involuntary demand response,15 PJM needlessly creates a cost that depends on state action 
to allocate correctly. It is an unnecessary, and unjust and unreasonable, regulatory two-step. 
Moreover, as designed, the proposal does not incent new large loads to procure new 
self-supply but instead incents them to engage in a cost-benefit analysis as to whether it is 
in their economic self-interest to instead continue as a non-capacity backed load subject to 
 
market-design.pdf (comparing PJM proposed connect and manage approach to ERCOT and SPP use of non-
firm transmission service to interconnect and serve non-capacity backed new large loads) (White Paper). 
13 PJM, CIFP Framework for Service During Periods of Insufficient Resource Adequacy – PJM Proposal at 
5 (July 31, 2026), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/about-pjm/who-we-are/public-
disclosures/2026/20260727-cifp-framework-for-service-during-periods-of-insufficient-resource-adequacy-
executive-summary.pdf (discussing IRAS credits). See also IRAS Transmittal Letter at 101-04. 
14 “Load reduction under Interim Resource Adequacy Service appropriately treats New Large Loads as 
[network integration transmission service] customers.” IRAS Transmittal Letter at 100. 
15 Id. at 104-06.

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compensation for curtailment. PJM provides no cost analysis to justify its unnecessary 
treatment of non-capacity backed loads as firm transmission customers eligible (depending 
upon state action) for compensation from other ratepayers. And PJM’s proposal violates 
the minimum standards for formula rates because it is not possible to ascertain what 
customers will be responsible for paying curtailment charges. Fundamentally, non-capacity 
backed new large loads cannot come on to the system unless they are subject to curtailment 
and should be treated as such, i.e., non-firm transmission customers. 
Importantly, IRAS itself does not guarantee that any required curtailments will 
necessarily fall on large loads. PJM proposes to issue curtailment directives to Electric 
Distribution Companies (EDCs) in the amount of their IRAS load but leaves specific load 
curtailments to the state and/or Retail Electric Regulatory Rate Authority (RERRA).16 And 
there are questions about the extent to which the data included in the Large Load Registry, 
which is the data engine for the IRAS mechanism, are being properly vetted, supported, 
and made available to regulatory authorities, including ratepayer advocates. Finally, IRAS 
does not purport to address other, significant issues, including the increased transmission 
or energy costs that result from new large loads, which should also be their cost 
responsibility.17 
 
16 Id. at 83-86. One of the problems posed by IRAS is that PJM is unable to dictate which specific loads will 
be curtailed in the event they are necessary. Curtailment decisions will be made by the relevant state/RERRA. 
In other words, IRAS allows new large data centers without BYONC to come onto the grid, but in so doing 
may subject to curtailment customers who are not responsible for the reliability problem IRAS aims to solve. 
Id. “[A]n Interim Resource Adequacy Service Action will not be specific as to which New Large Loads 
would need to be reduced.” Id. at 83 (emphasis in original). 
17 According to the Independent Market Monitor’s August 19, 2026, Market Monitor Report comparing 
January to July 2025 to January to July 2026, energy costs within PJM increased by 46%, capacity costs 
increased by 138%, and transmission costs increased by 6.3%. Monitoring Analytics, Market Monitor 
Report at 27 (Aug. 19, 2026), 
www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/presentations/2026/IMM_MC_Market_Monitor_Report_20260819.
pdf?_sp=674592ab-00d2-413a-9d56-caac654c2c84.1788266063005.

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In short, when considered in context and against alternatives, IRAS is a flawed step 
forward. The Commission can and should take steps to modify the proposal. FERC should 
exercise its FPA sections 205 and/or 206 authority and find IRAS unjust and unreasonable 
as a compensatory resource adequacy measure. PJM should instead be directed to resubmit 
IRAS as requiring non-capacity backed new large loads to take non-firm transmission 
service. Indeed, PJM’s tariff already contains non-firm transmission services that appear 
consistent with the proposed curtailment priority to be accorded IRAS.18 Finally, 
acceptance of an amended IRAS proposal as urged here renders PJM’s proposed RBP 
duplicative and unnecessary. The Commission should couple acceptance of an amended 
IRAS proposal with the rejection of the RBP.  
PROTEST AND COMMENTS 
I. 
IF PROPERLY IMPLEMENTED, IRAS COULD INSULATE 
RATEPAYERS FROM THE CAPACITY COSTS OF SERVING 
PROJECTED NEW LARGE LOADS BY REMOVING THOSE 
LOADS FROM THE BRA. 
The White House’s Ratepayer Protection Pledge states in part that:19 
Companies will build, bring, or buy the new generation 
resources and electricity needed to satisfy their new energy 
demands, paying the full cost of those resources whether by 
building, or buying from, new or otherwise additive power 
plants. Where possible, these companies will also add more 
capacity that serves the broader public by increasing supply. 
 
18 IRAS Filing, Attach. C, Affidavit of Christopher Pilong on Behalf of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. ¶ 12 
& n. 10 (Pilong Aff.). 
19 
Press 
Release, 
The 
White 
House, 
Ratepayer 
Protection 
Pledge 
(Mar. 
4, 
2026), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/03/ratepayer-protection-pledge/. PJM reports that on July 23, 
2026, over 282 utilities, cooperatives, data centers, and 23 governors [had] joined the Ratepayer Protection 
Pledge, including 38 data centers. The signatories included many of the large hyperscaler/data center 
developers in the generative artificial intelligence (GAI) industry including Amazon, Google, Meta, 
Microsoft, OpenAI and Oracle. IRAS Transmittal Letter at 4 n.10.

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PJM identifies two aspects of IRAS that it asserts accord with this Pledge. “First, PJM is 
proposing revisions to the [Reliability Assurance Agreement (RAA)] to clarify a Load 
Serving Entity’s (“LSE”) obligation to bring new capacity [BYONC] in an amount that 
equals or exceeds its New Large Loads’ peak load or be subject to load reduction requests 
during Emergencies prior to Pre-Emergency Load Management Response.”20 Second, 
“PJM is proposing to exclude from the [Variable Resource Requirement (VRR)] Curve 
New Large Loads, to the extent they do not have arrangements with sufficient BYONC, 
beginning with the 2029/2030 Delivery Year.”21 
We focus here on the most beneficial ratepayer aspect of IRAS as currently 
proposed: PJM’s intent to exclude non-capacity backed new large loads from the VRR 
curve. Beyond the Ratepayer Protection Pledge, PJM’s effort to insulate ratepayers from 
the capacity costs associated with serving projected new large loads is grounded in the 
general recognition that data center development and forecasts of data center load are 
driving increases in PJM capacity costs. The Independent Market Monitor has determined 
that “[t]he increase in costs to other PJM customers in the 2027/2028 BRA as a result of 
data center demand was $6,497,653,512. The total increase in costs to other PJM customers 
as a result of data center load in the last three BRAs was $23,100,955,341.”22 PJM likewise 
understands what is driving the recent BRA auction shortfalls, observing that it “hosts the 
largest concentration of data center load in the world.”23 Of the 32 gigawatts (GW) in 
 
20 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 3-4. 
21 Id. at 23-24. 
22 Monitoring Analytics, Analysis of the 2027/2028 RPM Base Residual Auction: Part A at 3 (Jan. 5, 2026), 
https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Reports/2026/IMM_Analysis_of_the_20272028_RPM_Base
_Residual_Auction_Part_A_20260105.pdf. 
23 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 13.

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projected load growth between 2024 and 2030 “30 GW . . .  is projected to be from data 
centers.”24 Each megawatt (MW) of new large load that comes into service without 
accompanying new generation capacity consumes a portion of the resource adequacy 
margin that would otherwise stand between normal system operations and an emergency. 
A new large load that adds to peak demand without contributing commensurate new 
capacity exacerbates PJM’s current and projected capacity shortfall and increases the risk 
that PJM will be forced to shed load to maintain system reliability.25 As that shortfall 
increases, the risk of load-shedding increases correspondingly. Left unaddressed, continued 
large load growth would progressively erode the reliability margin on which existing 
customers rely. 
The stress on PJM’s capacity market is driven by the unique phenomenon of new 
large data center load—real and projected—that is unlike the diffuse, organic load growth 
typical of the U.S. electric industry since its inception. The Commission recognizes that 
large loads are “a separate category of load” and has directed every RTO/Independent 
System Operator (ISO), including PJM, to define “large load” in their respective tariffs— 
because, among other considerations, their integration “poses specific challenges to 
transmission system operation given their size, operational behavior, and unique potential 
to impact the transmission system.”26 
The ability of new large loads to self-supply capacity or default to IRAS is a 
safeguard to protect ratepayers from excessive capacity costs driven by a small class of 
customers. The key to this safeguard is the accompanying removal of IRAS load from the 
 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 June 2026 Show Cause Order PP 50, 58.

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VRR curve beginning with the 2029/2030 Delivery Year. This mechanism will protect 
ratepayers from bearing capacity costs that should rightfully be borne by new large loads 
or otherwise bearing excessive and unnecessary capacity costs associated with phantom 
load projections. PJM explains the “core logic” of its proposal:27 
Large new loads that seek to interconnect to the system 
without bringing commensurate new generation capacity 
are, in a meaningful sense, free-riding on the reliability 
provided by the existing fleet. If the system is short and load 
must be shed, there is a defensible argument that these loads 
– which imposed incremental demand on a strained system 
without yet being able to contribute commensurate supply – 
should be curtailed before legacy load that has been served 
by and paid into the shared reliability pool. 
Interconnecting large load customers that cause the need for network upgrades or system 
stress are “differently situated” from customers whose presence on the system causes no 
such burdens. As such, it is fair and permissible to ask a large load customer to bear “the 
system-reliability burdens that flow from its decision” to operate ahead of the infrastructure 
needed to support it.28 Existing load has long supported the PJM resource adequacy 
framework—through reserve-margin planning, capacity-market procurement, and the 
reliability-coordination function PJM has performed for decades. The present shortfall does 
not arise from any change in that existing load’s behavior; it arises from rapid incremental 
demand growth that is materially different in scale and timing from anything the framework 
has previously accommodated.29 Removing from the BRA the loads that caused the 
 
27 White Paper at 37 (addressing connect and manage predecessor proposal to IRAS). 
28 Tenaska Clear Creek Wind, LLC v. Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 183 FERC ¶ 61,043, P 24 (2023) (Tenaska). 
Although Tenaska was decided in the context of an interconnecting generator, the same reasoning applies 
with respect to new large loads. 
29 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 21, 99.

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incremental need —rather than including them and spreading the cost consequences among 
other customers —honors that existing bargain. 
IRAS likewise seeks to address the problem of uncertain large load projections that 
are currently plaguing the BRA. If the projected large loads materialize, then PJM will have 
a resource adequacy tool to address them. If they fail to materialize, IRAS is unused but 
available as necessary. In either circumstance, removing these large load projections from 
the BRA demand curve insulates ratepayers from bearing the capacity costs that would 
otherwise be associated with meeting these large load projections (though, as discussed 
more fully below, unless corrected, ratepayers could be required to bear the cost of any 
curtailment that does occur). 
The problem of speculative large load forecasts is real. For example, the data center 
at issue in the Commonwealth Edison transmission security agreement cancellation 
litigation has a “maximum planned load of 1,800 MW.”30 Thus, whether this single data 
center project goes forward has resource adequacy implications exceeding the capacity of 
a new nuclear power generating unit.31 PJM concedes that “[u]ncertainty [in current large 
load projections] rises significantly after 2030” but apparently believes that the large 
amount of data centers currently under construction will achieve commercial operation.32 
Perhaps, though the facts on the ground are evolving. In May, a “JP Morgan analysis found 
 
30 Protest of Powerhouse Hillwood Holding LLC and Request for Confidential Treatment at 6, 
Commonwealth Edison Co., Docket No. ER26-3257 (Aug 14, 2026), eLibrary No. 20260814-5241. 
31 Units 3 and 4 of Georgia Power’s Vogtle nuclear plant have a combined rating of 2,234 MWs. Nuclear 
Plant Vogtle, Georgia Power, https://www.georgiapower.com/about/energy/plants/plant-vogtle.html (last 
visited Sep. 2, 2026).   
32 PJM, Shaping a Powerful Change: PJM Five-Year Strategy at 5 (Aug. 2026), https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/library/reports-notices/special-reports/2026/20260819-shaping-a-powerful-change-pjm-
five-year-strategy.pdf (Five Year Strategy).

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that more than 60% of data-center capacity planned for completion in 2027 isn’t yet under 
construction, and another 7% is delayed.”33 Even more recently, Exelon Corporation 
announced a 7-GW reduction (to 11 GW) in its “high probability” data center load within 
PJM following a review that resulted in culling out speculative projects.34 In short, PJM’s 
associated RBP and connect and manage/IRAS proposals have been developed against a 
backdrop of ever-diminishing large load forecasts. On April 17 of this year, PJM identified 
an anticipated RBP procurement target of 14.8 GW.35 In a little over three months, that 
forecast has fallen by more than half, to 6.8 GW, a rate of decline of 2.3 GW per month.36 
Concerns about the financial sustainability of forecasted investment in AI 
infrastructure add to the uncertainty. The June 2026 Annual Report of the Bank for 
International Settlements warns that the Artificial Intelligence (AI) “capex [capital 
expenditure] boom [could transform] into a protracted investment bust”37 and like prior 
investment booms could “induc[e] economy-wide recession[].”38 
In the near term, the ongoing AI investment boom raises 
questions about the sustainability of the current economic 
expansion. The five largest hyperscalers are set to spend over 
a trillion US dollars on AI-related capital expenditure from 
 
33 Katherine Blunt, America’s Data-Center Build-Out Is Falling Way Behind Schedule, Wall Street Journal 
(June 
3, 
2026), 
https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/americas-data-center-build-out-is-falling-way-behind-
schedule-e408a9a8?mod=hp_lead_pos1. 
34 Ethan Howland, Exelon ‘High Probability’ Data Center Load Falls 40%, Utility Dive (July 31, 2026) 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/exelon-data-center-load-new-jersey-battery-earnings/826686/. 
35 PJM Staff, Reliability Backstop Procurement Design: Reliability Backstop CIFP at 11 (Apr. 16-17, 2026), 
https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/committees-groups/cifp-rbp/2026/20260416/20260416-item-05---
pjm-reliability-backstop-procurement-design---pjm-presentation.pdf. 
36 PJM RBP Filing, Attach. C, Affidavit of Danielle Croop ¶ 4. 
37 Bank for International Settlements, Annual Economic Report at 22 (June 2026), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2026e.pdf (BIS Report). The Bank for International Settlements is one of 
the most prestigious financial institutions in the world. Its “mission is to support central banks’ pursuit of 
monetary and financial stability through international cooperation, and to act as a bank for central banks.” 
BIS, About the BIS (last visited Sep. 3, 2026), https://www.bis.org/about/index.htm.   
38 BIS Report at 22-23. See also id. at Graph 11(b) showing potential trillions of dollars in revenue shortfall 
needed to support capex and debt service in an AI industry downside scenario.

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2025 through 2026. These commitments are outpacing 
earnings and the free cash flow of these firms, leading some 
to issue debt to raise additional financing . . . . This 
investment race may be partly driven by the perception that 
only a small number of players with superior technology will 
ultimately dominate the market shares. . . . As competitive 
pressure drives capex higher, the net economic surplus – the 
total payoff less investment costs – declines for the sector as 
a whole and could turn negative in adverse scenarios . . . . 
Disappointment in returns could trigger a sudden pullback in 
financing and turn the capex boom into a protracted 
investment bust, with potential knock-on effects on financial 
conditions. 
Some see “a basic math problem” at the heart of the generative AI industry:39 
There is a fundamental mismatch between the trillions being 
invested in the infrastructure to develop AI and the 
billions people and companies are spending to use AI. 
Specifically, J.P. Morgan Chase analysts anticipate $5 
trillion of spending on AI infrastructure between now and 
2030. This year alone, four tech companies—Amazon, 
Alphabet, Meta and Microsoft— have plans to invest $670 
billion on AI infrastructure. When measured as a percentage 
of U.S. GDP, this is more than the Apollo space program, the 
U.S. interstate highway system, railroads, and every other 
major capital expenditure in U.S. history except the 
Louisiana Purchase, according to the Wall Street Journal. 
Yet OpenAI and Anthropic have annualized revenues of 
about $25 billion and $19 billion, respectively. Unless AI 
revenues grow by orders of magnitude soon, there’s a Grand 
Canyon-sized gap that will be hard to cross. 
The Commission’s “first and foremost duty” under the FPA is to “protect consumers 
from unjust and unreasonable rates.”40 Here, that means that FERC must act to protect 
ratepayers against the risk of “a protracted [AI] investment bust,” including the risk of the 
 
39 Ganesh Sitaraman and Asad Ramzanali, We Must Prepare for an AI Bubble Now, TIME (Mar. 26, 2026); 
https://time.com/article/2026/03/26/we-must-prepare-for-an-ai-bubble-now/.   
40 Morgan Stanley Cap. Grp. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., 554 U.S. 527, 551 (2008). See also 
Atl. Ref. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 360 U.S. 378, 388 (1959) (The FPA’s sister Act, the Natural Gas 
Act, was “framed as to afford consumers a complete, permanent and effective bond of protection from 
excessive rates and charges.”).

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costs of capacity procured but ultimately unneeded to serve failing or abandoned AI data 
center projects. Removing projected new large loads from the BRA going forward, as PJM 
proposes, is essential to safeguarding ratepayer interests. 
II. 
IRAS SHOULD HELP EASE THE DEMAND PRESSURES 
PLAGUING THE BRA. 
In planning and administering the regional transmission system, PJM seeks “to 
meet the demands for firm transmission service, and to support competition, in the PJM 
Region.”41 The misalignment of supply and demand driven by projected new large loads 
is an impediment to competition. In a supply-constrained market, new entry cannot perform 
its function of disciplining the market power of incumbent resources:42 
[C]ontinuing to simply accept the interconnection of large 
data center loads that cannot be served reliably because there 
is not adequate dispatchable capacity, is not a reasonable 
path forward and is not an efficient or competitive market 
solution and is not a solution of any kind. That path leads to 
continued shortfalls, increased reliability issues, continued 
maximum prices, and continued calls to abandon markets.43 
The answer is not to throw out the BRA baby with the new large load bathwater. 
“[C]urrent data center issues [should not be] a pretext for redefining fundamental elements 
of the PJM market design.”44 PJM’s IRAS proposal offers an (albeit flawed) market-based 
solution for new large loads that seek to connect to the grid while providing a pathway for 
 
41 PJM Operating Agreement, Sched. 6 § 1.1. 
42 The forward-looking BRA was the product of a settlement with “design features [intended to] discourage 
the exercise of market power and market manipulation generally. Specific mitigation rules and increased 
competition from new entry are the most important design elements in this regard.” PJM Interconnection 
L.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61,331, P 6 (2006), reh’g granted in part, 119 FERC ¶ 61,318, reh’g denied, 121 FERC 
¶ 61,173 (2007), pet. for review denied sub nom., Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. FERC, 324 Fed. Appx. 1 
(2009). 
43 Monitoring Analytics, L.L.C., State of the Market Report for PJM Q1 2026 at 4 (May 14, 2026). 
44 Id.

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the BRA to return to a more competitive balance of supply and demand. As discussed 
above, a central—and essential—IRAS element is that, beginning with the 2029/2030 
Delivery Year, PJM will exclude from the BRA VRR demand curve the megawatts of New 
Large Loads that have not entered into BYONC arrangements, or do not have Allocated 
RBP Unforced Capacity (UCAP) MW, over and above the megawatts of New Large Loads 
that were included in the load forecast for the 2028/2029 Delivery Year.45 
The competitive market effect follows directly from these mechanics: by removing 
uncommitted New Large Load MW from the demand curve, and by incentivizing BYONC 
arrangements that add real, new, and dispatchable capacity to the system, IRAS addresses 
directly the demand-side driver of the last two BRA shortfalls rather than only adding 
supply-side procurement on top of an unconstrained and speculative demand baseline.46 
Over time, as uncommitted New Large Load MW is either converted to firm, capacity-
backed load through BYONC or excluded from the demand curve altogether, the BRA 
should be expected to reflect a less distorted balance of supply and demand—reducing the 
frequency and severity of future shortfalls of the kind that gave rise to both the RBP and 
IRAS proceedings, and moderating the upward trajectory of capacity prices. 
The numbers bear this out. PJM projects only 2 gigawatts of non-data center load 
growth between 2024 and 2030.47 On the supply side, PJM notes that there was “a net 
increase of 1,294.4 MW Installed Capacity (“ICAP”) of supply between the 2027/2028 and 
2028/2029 [BRA].”48 PJM also observes that its Reliability Resource Initiative resulted in 
 
45 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 109. 
46 Id. at 55-58, 109-18 (Parts II.C.3 and II.F). 
47 Id. at 13 (quoting June 2026 Show Cause Order P 8 & n.24). 
48 Id.

- 16 - 
the “selecti[on of] 51 projects that can come online quickly and provide more than 9,300 
MW of reliable capacity.”49 And PJM states in its RBP filing that “[t]he supply-side 
response to the [Charles Rivers Associates Request for Information] was also significant, 
with 397 potential projects by 87 entities and approximately 136 gigawatt in total potential 
capacity,” interested in entering into bilateral arrangements to serve new large load.50 
Indeed, there is evidence that PJM is significantly underestimating the amount of 
Effective Load Carrying Capability (ELCC) already available to serve current load and 
new load going forward. As explained by a litigant in the RBP proceeding:51 
In December 2025, Energy and Environmental Economics, 
Inc. (“E3”) delivered to PJM a report titled PJM ELCC / RRS 
Model Evaluation. E3 states that it “was retained by PJM to 
independently assess PJM’s Effective Load Carrying 
Capability / Reserve Requirement Study [RRS] Model . . . 
for alignment with industry best practices in loss-of-load-
probability . . . modeling,” and notes that “[t]he outputs of 
the ELCC/RRS model are used directly in PJM’s capacity 
market.”    
E3 determined that if PJM “[u]se[d] more temporal granularity to model capability and 
deliverability of unlimited resources,” this would reflect “[a]pproximately ~8 GW of 
additional unlimited resource capability in the winter months.”52 PJM performed its own 
sensitivity analysis and53  
quantified 
the 
winter 
capability 
question 
directly. 
Comparing summer and winter ICAP for unlimited 
 
49 Id. at 19. 
50 PJM RBP Filing, Transmittal Letter at 18 (RBP Transmittal Letter). See also Charles River Associates, 
PJM 
Reliability 
Backstop 
RFI 
Summary 
(May 
27, 
2026), 
https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/committees-groups/cifp-rbp/2026/20260527/20260527-informational-only---reliability-
backstop-rfi-summary---charles-river-associates.pdf. 
51 Motion to Intervene and Protest of Nicholas Max Neal and David Neal, Delaware Standard Offer Service 
Ratepayers ¶ 22, Docket No. ER26-3380 (Aug. 20, 2026), eLibrary No. 20260820-5015. 
52 Id. ¶ 24. 
53 Id. ¶ 30.

- 17 - 
resources across nuclear, coal, gas combined cycle, gas 
combustion turbine, diesel, steam and other thermal classes, 
PJM's table shows 163,149 MW of summer ICAP against 
171,710 MW of winter ICAP — a difference of 8,561 MW. 
E3’s and PJM’s findings are consistent with (a subset of) the recommendation advanced by 
some of the JCA (in a separate proceeding) that PJM “use winter ratings for combustion 
resources,” which the JCA witness estimated would result in some additional 5,439 MWs 
of available UCAP MWs not reflected in the 2025/2026 BRA.54 PJM’s failure to implement 
these accreditation changes has not been explained, and its inaction is particularly 
noteworthy given the need to restore competitive balance in the BRA and accurately reflect 
the amount of available capacity. 
As the foregoing shows, there is good reason to believe that PJM’s proposal to 
remove new large loads from the VRR curve for the 2029/2030 BRA could begin to restore 
the competitive balance of supply and demand in the auction and there is every reason to 
do so. 
III. 
WHILE POTENTIALLY BENEFICIAL, IRAS AS PROPOSED IS 
FLAWED.  
PJM’s principal means of addressing resource adequacy concerns is the BRA. “The 
objective of [the BRA is] to procure the least-cost, competitively-priced combination of 
resources necessary to meet the region’s reliability objectives.”55 In proposing IRAS, PJM 
seeks to respond to the evident concern that the BRA supply-side mechanism is no longer 
adequate to ensure resource adequacy given projected new data center load. The problem 
facing PJM is that new supply is unable to keep pace with these load projections, which 
 
54 Complaint of Joint Consumer Advocates and Request for Fast Track Processing, Attach. A, Declaration of 
Marc D. Montalvo, ¶¶ 20-21, Docket No. EL25-76 (Apr. 14, 2025), eLibrary No. 20250414-5190. 
55 N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74, 101 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 
137 FERC ¶ 61,145, P 90 (2011) (subsequent history omitted)).

- 18 - 
are driven primarily by (uncertain) forecasts of new data centers. According to PJM affiant 
Pilong:56 
New Large Loads are developing more quickly than 
generation and transmission can be built. As a result, this 
may impact the ability for PJM to maintain a reliable system 
and continue to meet the demand for existing customers and 
maintain reserve requirements during times of peak demand 
and/or significant generator outages. Therefore, a new 
operational tool is needed to ensure the current level of 
reliability for our customers is maintained. 
The White Paper explains that “[t]oday, due to compounding frictions in siting, 
permitting, supply chains and interconnection, it can take two or three times as long to 
build a gas resource as it does to build a hyperscale data center.”57 Other resources, such 
as renewables combined with battery storage, may not face the same supply-chain 
difficulties as gas combustion turbine generators, but nevertheless face permitting, 
financing and other project—including regulatory—hurdles.58 “[T]he addition of new 
supply has not kept pace with rapid large load demand growth, thus giving rise to the 
significant tightening of the capacity market in recent years and subsequent resource 
adequacy shortfalls.”59 
 Given the uncertainties of new generation supply-side capabilities to meet regional 
resource adequacy needs, PJM here proposes IRAS as a demand response solution, aimed 
 
56 Pilong Aff. ¶ 19. 
57 White Paper at 18. 
58 See, e.g., Comments of the Solar Energy Industries Association at 9-12, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 
Docket No. ER26-3380 (Aug. 21, 2026), eLibrary No. 20260821-5105 (identifying barriers to entry resulting 
from PJM rules governing surplus interconnection service). 
59 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 13. See also id. at 21 (highlighting “the ‘unprecedented surge in data center 
load’ at a faster pace than new supply can come online, and the ‘speed of connecting these large loads creates 
a fundamental misalignment between demand and supply cycles,’ resulting in ‘resource adequacy in the PJM 
service area [being] under significant stress.’” (quoting PJM, 2027/2028 Base Residual Auction Reserve 
Target Shortfall Report at 1-4 (Feb. 9, 2026), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-
auction-info/2027-2028/2027-2028-bra-reserve-target-shortfall-report.pdf)).

- 19 - 
at ensuring resource adequacy while requiring the data center loads that are causing the 
problem either to bring sufficient capacity to address their contribution to the concern or 
face the possibility of curtailment should a system problem arise. Under the proposal, PJM 
will calculate the amount of IRAS it needs to procure each year based on BRA shortfalls,60 
identify amounts of available IRAS from the Large Load Registry based upon new large 
loads that have not procured BYONC,61 and when needed direct EDCs with IRAS loads to 
implement necessary curtailments consistent with state/RERRA regulation.62 IRAS is an 
interim resource adequacy measure. Under PJM’s proposal, New Large Loads eligible for 
IRAS procurement will terminate after three consecutive Delivery Years when the BRA 
clears with sufficient capacity to obviate the need for IRAS. If the BRA thereafter clears 
short, however, subsequent New Large Loads will become eligible for IRAS.63 
As proposed, IRAS is a potentially beneficial—but flawed— means to ensure 
resource adequacy and manage the reliability problem posed by new large data center 
loads.64 Rather than treating non-capacity-backed load as involuntary, compensated 
demand response, IRAS should return to its connect and manage roots and require non-
capacity backed new large loads to take non-firm transmission service. Making this change 
should not require a major sea-change or novel tariff development, as PJM already has a 
 
60 IRAS Filing, Attach. A, Attach. DD-4 §§ IV(b)-(c) (Attach. DD-4). 
61 Id.  
62 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 79 (“[I]t is appropriate for PJM to direct Electric Distributors to reduce those 
New Large Loads that have failed to cover their capacity obligations . . . .”). 
63 Id. at 77. See also id. at 79, fig. 1; Pilong Aff. ¶¶ 35-47. 
64 As discussed below, to the extent IRAS is called upon, this will impose unnecessary costs on ratepayers, 
compared to a requirement that new large loads that do not BYONC will be served by non-firm transmission 
service akin to PJM’s original connect and manage proposal.

- 20 - 
Commission-approved menu of non-firm service options and a set of curtailment priorities 
with respect to co-located loads.65 
Similar actions have been taken elsewhere. Texas has successfully used a “connect 
and manage” non-firm transmission service approach to manage large amounts of new data 
center load for over a year.66 In a similar vein, the Commission has approved SPP’s 
implementation of  “a new type of non-firm transmission service called Conditional High 
Impact Large Load Service (CHILLS)” to serve new high impact large loads such as large 
data centers.67 The Commission found that CHILLS is “narrowly tailored to reflect the 
interim nature of CHILLS and the unique characteristics of the CHILLs that transmission 
customers will serve.”68 The Commission has explained that CHILLS allows transmission 
customers serving new large loads (such as data centers) “to reliably receive transfers of 
energy [subject to curtailment and interruption] until sufficient designated resources and/or 
network upgrades are in place to support long-term firm transmission service.”69  
Along the same lines, the academic literature likewise supports the conclusion that 
flexible transmission service is a feasible means of expediting the connection of new large 
data center load to the grid while protecting ratepayers. In 2025, Norris et al. estimated that 
 
65 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,209, P 551 (2026); see also Pilong Aff. ¶ 12. 
66 An Act Relating to the Planning for, Interconnection and Operation of, and Costs Related to Providing 
Service for Certain Electrical Loads and to the Generation of Electric Power by a Water Supply or Sewer 
Service Corporation, S.B. 6, 89th Tex. Leg. (enacted June 20, 2025). Although the Governor of Texas has 
imposed a moratorium on new large load interconnections and ERCOT is performing a new large load 
interconnection audit, connect and manage is operative in ERCOT as a resource adequacy measure with 
respect to the substantial amount of data center load already on the system. Robert Walton, ERCOT aims to 
complete Texas governor’s data center audit by December, Utility Dive (Aug. 21, 2026), 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ercot-texas-puc-data-center-audit/828472/. 
67 Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,196, P 1 (2026) (SPP CHILLS Order). 
68 Id. P 85. 
69 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 4 (alteration in original) (quoting June 2026 Show Cause Order P 17).

- 21 - 
PJM could serve an additional 18 GW of load using interruptible service at “0.5% annual 
curtailment” of their maximum uptime without adding new generation.70 Other 
commentators have noted the ability of data centers to self-supply or operate with flexible 
service:71 
Large loads can deliver on flexibility commitments by 
moderating their energy consumption and by meeting 
electricity needs through nearby resources that provide 
power without relying on the transmission system. Data 
centers—which comprise the largest share of expected 
growth in large loads, and which are typically conceived of 
as 
inflexible 
loads—can 
modulate 
compute-related 
consumption by scaling down computing power for tasks 
that are less performance-sensitive (including some AI 
training tasks), postponing tasks that are less time-sensitive, 
or shifting tasks that are less location-sensitive to other sites. 
Data centers may also be able to reduce consumption in 
certain circumstances by modulating cooling system 
consumption. 
The trade press is rife with reports that one of the core bottlenecks delaying the 
construction and commercial operation of new data centers is access to electrical power: 
“Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, and Microsoft remain on track to deploy more than $650 billion 
in 2026 on AI infrastructure, with some projects now expected to wait up to five years for 
utility power interconnection.”72 Although PJM’s focus in proposing IRAS is to ensure 
 
70 Tyler H. Norris et al., Rethinking Load Growth Assessing the Potential for Integration of Large Flexible 
Loads in US Power Systems at 2, Nicholas Institute for Energy, Environment & Sustainability at Duke 
University (Feb. 2025), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/publications/rethinking-load-growth. 
71 Sam Walsh et al., Leveraging Large Load Flexibility to Facilitate Access to Power While Protecting 
Customers: Considerations for State Regulators at 6, Nicholas Institute for Energy, Environment & 
Sustainability at Duke University (Mar. 2026) (footnote omitted) (citing Williams et al., Power-Flexible AI 
Factories: A UK-First Demonstration of Grid-Responsive AI Infrastructure, National Grid (March 2026), 
https://ngpartners.cdn.prismic.io/ngpartners/aabLtVxvIZEnjRNr_v11_emerald-ai_march2026.pdf), 
https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/publications/leveraging-large-load-flexibility-facilitate-access-power-
while-protecting-customers. 
72 Nadia Dubois, Half of U.S. AI Data Centers Delayed or Canceled: Inside the 7 GW Capacity Crisis 
Reshaping a $650B Buildout, Tech Insider (Apr. 17, 2026), https://tech-insider.org/us-ai-data-center-delays-
cancellations-7gw-capacity-crisis-2026/.

- 22 - 
resource adequacy,73 IRAS could also help to unlock currently untapped electrical service 
within PJM for new data centers by means of flexible service. 
Although PJM has proposed IRAS as a new interim resource adequacy product,74 
it is functionally akin to the interim non-firm CHILLS transmission service used to serve 
large data center load in SPP and the connect and manage non-firm transmission service 
used for that purpose in ERCOT—albeit with the unjust and unreasonable possibility of 
ratepayers potentially having to compensate New Large Loads when they are curtailed. 
The solution to these concerns is for FERC to direct PJM to refile IRAS as non-firm 
transmission service. 
IV. 
THE COMMISSION SHOULD EXERCISE EITHER ITS FPA 
SECTION 205 OR SECTION 206 AUTHORITY TO DIRECT PJM 
TO MAKE IRAS A NON-FIRM TRANSMISSION SERVICE. 
While IRAS offers the promise of significant customer benefits, it also suffers from 
a serious flaw. PJM proposes it as a compensable resource adequacy measure. “PJM is 
proposing a rate for IRAS that is equal to 50% of the Non-Performance Charge Rate.”75 
“Electric Distributors bear the responsibility to implement the compensation scheme for 
New Large Loads that provide the IRAS load reduction service,”76 and PJM envisions a 
collaborative state/federal arrangement where new large loads receive payment for their 
 
73 See IRAS Transmittal Letter at 90 (“[T]he reforms in this filing address issues that the FPA’s drafters 
would have certainly considered science fiction—the resource adequacy impacts of New Large Loads, 
including data centers, driven primarily by exponential technological advancements in artificial 
intelligence.”). 
74 “IRAS is a supplemental capacity product through which Eligible New Large Loads may be directed by 
the Electric Distributor to reduce their load in response to an Interim Resource Adequacy Service Action 
called by PJM.” Id. at 74. 
75 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 102. 
76 Id. at 101.

- 23 - 
service interruption.77 PJM’s proposal to compensate new large loads for interruptible 
service is contrary to precedent, a departure from the Ratepayer Protection Pledge, and a 
potential windfall to new large loads who must take interruptible service to mitigate the 
reliability risks posed by their connection to the grid that are not met through BYONC. 
As  described above, PJM’s current service offerings include some new forms of 
non-firm transmission.78 Similarly, the Commission, in the SPP CHILLS Order, approved 
the applicant’s implementation of “a new type of non-firm transmission service called 
[CHILLS].”79 This new non-firm service enables transmission customers serving new large 
loads (such as data centers) “to reliably receive transfers of energy [subject to curtailment 
and interruption] until sufficient designated resources and/or network upgrades are in place 
to support long-term firm transmission service.”80 PJM nowhere in its filing addresses why 
it has proposed IRAS as a compensable resource adequacy measure, as opposed to non-
firm transmission service akin to the service arrangement the Commission approved in the 
SPP CHILLS Order. 
At its core, PJM’s compensable IRAS service defeats the goal of the rate design. 
PJM portrays IRAS as providing new large loads a choice between bringing their own new 
capacity or taking interruptible IRAS. But unlike the arrangement in the SPP CHILLS 
Order, which “incentivize[s] transmission customers . . . to obtain the designated resources 
and/or complete the network upgrades needed to procure long-term firm transmission 
 
77 “The IRAS rate is compensation for a wholesale load reduction service, but the entities to be paid the rate 
and the loads to be charged to support such compensation must be determined at the state level consistent 
with the Electric Distributor’s state-approved load reduction plans and other state-approved programs, rates, 
and rules.” Id. at 104.  
78 See supra note 69.  
79 SPP CHILLS Order P 1. 
80 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 4 (quoting June 2026 Show Cause Order).

- 24 - 
service,”81 new large loads will receive firm transmission service regardless of whether 
they bring their own new capacity. “Load reduction under [IRAS] appropriately treats New 
Large Loads as [network integration transmission service ] customers.”82 What this means 
is that new large loads are presented with the cost-benefit choice of either providing 
compensable interim resource adequacy service or offering some other form of qualifying 
new resource. Unlike the CHILLS service in SPP, by offering the potential of curtailment 
compensation, IRAS does not necessarily incent new large loads in PJM to obtain new self-
supply resources to avoid possible curtailments. 
PJM’s claims aside, IRAS is not consistent with the Ratepayer Protection Pledge. 
As proposed, IRAS will serve to insulate ratepayers from the increased capacity costs 
associated with: (i) simply connecting more and more new large data center load to the grid 
faster than resources can be built to serve it; or (ii) including speculative new data center 
load forecasts in the VRR demand curve. Nevertheless, it is fundamentally contrary to the 
Ratepayer Protection Pledge for PJM to include the possibility that other customers will be 
obliged to pay new large loads for taking the interruptible service that is a prerequisite to 
those loads connecting to the grid without unduly impairing system reliability. 
PJM seeks to justify IRAS as “similar to the Pre-Emergency Load Response 
Program.”83 But that comparison rests upon a fact that PJM’s filing fails to clarify. Load 
participating in the Pre-Emergency Load Response Program has paid and is paying its 
ratable share of BRA capacity costs and is making the choice of foregoing the benefits of 
the firm service it paid for by providing demand response in Pre-Emergency Load 
 
81 June 2026 Show Cause Order P 17. 
82 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 100. 
83 Id. at 103.

- 25 - 
Response conditions. Beginning with the proposed implementation of IRAS in the 
2027/2028 Delivery Year, PJM intends to treat non-capacity backed new large loads as 
taking network transmission service. What this should mean is that these new large load 
customers will pay their ratable share of BRA capacity costs. But PJM’s filing fails to 
explain whether this is so, leaving the possibility that that service to new large loads is 
being treated simultaneously as both capacity backed and non-capacity backed. Beginning 
with the 2029/2030 Delivery Year, new large loads will be excluded from the VRR demand 
curve. 
But even if PJM proposes to allocate BRA capacity costs to new large loads, they 
are only being allowed to come on to the system by means of taking interruptible service, 
because PJM has determined that for them to do otherwise jeopardizes system reliability. 
As far as we can tell, PJM is both declaring that non-capacity backed new large loads are 
taking firm network transmission service but also involuntarily providing a type of 
compensable demand response. The Commission analyzes compliance with the cost 
causation principle “by comparing the costs assessed against a party to the burdens imposed 
or benefits drawn by that party.”84 Here, it is the new large loads that are the causal basis 
for IRAS. And as regards the benefits of IRAS, “FERC is not authorized to approve a 
pricing scheme that requires a group of [customers] to pay for [services] from which its 
members derive no benefits, or benefits that are trivial in relation to the costs sought to be 
shifted to its members.”85 Other customers are not benefiting from new large loads taking 
 
84 Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1361, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
85 Ill. Com. Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 2009).

- 26 - 
interruptible service because that is the minimum safeguard necessary for these new large 
loads to interconnect with the PJM grid. 
Although PJM has made no effort to calculate the potential adverse cost impact if 
IRAS compensation obligations are visited on other customers, there is reason to believe 
that the cost of that obligation could be substantial. FERC approved a 50% reduction on 
the Non-Performance Charge Rate for purposes of the Pre-Emergency Load Response 
Program penalty rate “‘to appropriately reflect that such events may be twice as common’ 
as [Performance Assessment Interval (PAI)] events.”86 The Commission, market 
participants, and stakeholders recognize that PAI Non-Performance Charge penalties can 
be substantial. Due to generator non-performance during Winter Storm Elliot, PJM initially 
assessed $1.8 billion in PAI penalties, an amount reduced in settlement to $1.25 billion.87 
While currently unknown, PJM’s projections indicate that it is possible that the amount of 
new large load eligible for IRAS could be substantial, and as much as several thousand 
megawatts.88 Other customers should not bear any costs—let alone millions of dollars—as 
an accommodation to new large loads. The just and reasonable approach is to require new 
large loads that do not bring their own new capacity to take non-firm transmission service, 
consistent with service offerings within PJM and the Commission’s decision in the SPP 
CHILLS Order. 
 
86 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,253 P 14 (2026). 
87 PJM, Winter Storm Elliott Performance Assessment Interval Settlement Agreement  Frequently Asked 
Questions For Public Use at 3 (Dec. 20, 2023), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/markets-ops/winter-
storm-elliott/ferc-settlement-faq.pdf. “About 45,950 MW, or 23.2% of PJM’s generating fleet, was 
unexpectedly offline on Dec. 24, mainly because of plant equipment that didn’t operate and fuel supply 
problems . . . .” Ethan Howland, PJM generators face up to $2B in penalties for failing to run during 
December’s Winter Storm Elliott, Utility Dive (Jan. 12, 2023) https://www.utilitydive.com/news/pjm-
generators-penalties-power-winter-storm-elliott/640242/. 
88 From 2024 to 2030, PJM projects 30 GW of additional data center load. IRAS Transmittal Letter at 13.

- 27 - 
The alternative is to prohibit new large loads from coming on to the system 
altogether unless they BYONC or the BRA secures sufficient resources to serve them. 
There is no principle of utility law that requires service to customers that jeopardizes utility 
operations, let alone system reliability. PJM is no stranger to service moratoriums and 
sought and obtained approval of a multi-year suspension of its interconnection process.89 
Although uncommon, moratoriums denying the provision of service to new customers to 
preserve system reliability are a feature of the utility landscape. For example, in 1971, local 
regulators authorized Washington Gas to suspend the provision of service to new customers 
due to the unavailability of natural gas, a service restriction that lasted almost six years.90 
Of particular relevance here, Texas, which has adopted a connect and manage non-firm 
transmission approach to accommodate new large loads, has suspended data center 
interconnection requests in response to the Governor of Texas’s request for a moratorium 
due to the threat posed to ERCOT reliability. The Governor’s letter explains:91 
The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) is 
currently considering approximately 474 gigawatts of 
requests to connect to the Texas grid. That is more than five 
times Texas’ record peak electricity demand for ERCOT. 
Approximately 90 percent of the new power requests are 
data centers. That unprecedented load growth could 
endanger the reliability and stability of the Texas electric 
grid. 
   
 
89 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 181 FERC ¶ 61,162 (2022). 
90 Washington Gas, Growing With Washington, Part III at 44 (2012),  https://cdn.prod.website-
files.com/68c82ad46f5fe4c05f17bdf0/68f264a6a9f3949565d0c8d1_growing_with_washington_part-
2_ch_3.pdf.  
91 Letter from Governor Greg Abbott to Mr. Thomas Gleeson, Chairman, Public Utilities Commission of 
Texas at 1 (Aug. 3, 2026).

- 28 - 
PJM also seeks to defend its “IRAS framework [as] strik[ing] a straightforward 
bargain.”92 PJM makes clear that part of this so-called bargain is that “[t]hese Eligible New 
Large Load customers will be compensated under the IRAS framework to the extent that 
they reduce load pursuant to IRAS and do not waive compensation.”93 But a bargain 
implies that there are parties on both sides of a dispute agreeing to a package of 
gives-and-takes. There is no such bargain here. IRAS is not the product of a settlement. It 
did not receive stakeholder approval. Indeed, PJM first proposed compensation for IRAS 
after the June 30, 2026, conclusion of the stakeholder process. The “bargain” was first 
announced  as part of the Board’s July 27, 2026 decision, and explained in a July 31, 2026 
presentation.94  
In addition, PJM seeks to defend its compensation proposal because it “provides 
Electrical Distributors and states flexibility in the applicable IRAS rate for its territory, and 
affords the New Large Load the ability to waive compensation.”95 That is not an adequate 
safeguard for PJM ratepayers. While new large loads could waive compensation, it is not 
in their economic interests to do so. This means that cost responsibility for PJM’s IRAS 
proposal is neither fixed nor predictable. The inability of PJM ratepayers to know whether 
they will be subject to IRAS compensation charges falls well short of the “irreducible 
minimum of detail needed for a valid formula rate.”96 
 
92 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 94. 
93 Id.  
94 See supra note 8. 
95 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 102. 
96 Pub. Utils. Of Cal. v. FERC, 254 F.2d 250, 255 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

- 29 - 
The Commission should adhere to the approach adopted in the SPP CHILLS Order  
and act in a manner consistent with the Ratepayer Protection Pledge. Specifically, FERC 
should find IRAS to be unjust and unreasonable, and, as explained at the outset, direct 
PJM—whether pursuant to sections 205 or 206—to refile its IRAS proposal not as a 
compensable resource adequacy service but instead as a requirement that new large loads 
that do not self-supply must take non-firm transmission service. 
V. 
PJM’S PROPOSAL IS FLAWED BECAUSE IT IMPROPERLY 
TREATS AS “NEW” CAPACITY THAT PREVIOUSLY CLEARED 
A BASE RESIDUAL AUCTION. 
IRAS is intended to enable PJM to address auction shortfalls and ensure system 
reliability.97 Because new large loads are driving BRA shortfalls, PJM proposes through 
IRAS to require these loads either to bring their own new capacity or be subject to 
curtailment (depending upon state load shed protocols). But PJM’s eligibility criteria defeat 
that objective by allowing new large loads to satisfy their BYONC and avoid curtailment 
with capacity that has already cleared in the BRA.98 Such capacity should not be considered 
the additional or “new” capacity PJM needs to redress the recent series of auction shortfalls. 
PJM knows this. PJM’s treatment of capacity that has previously cleared an auction 
as “new” for IRAS purposes cannot be reconciled with its treatment of “new” capacity for 
the proposed RBP. Both initiatives are intended to redress the recent series of BRA 
shortfalls. PJM explains in its RBP filing that “[t]he RBP is focused on procuring new 
capacity. Thus, to be eligible to be offered into the RBP, a resource must: (1) never have 
 
97 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 6. 
98 Attach. DD-4 § VI(a)(i) (“Capacity Resources that cleared an RPM Auction for the first time in the Base 
Residual Auction for the 2027/2028, 2028/2029, and 2029/2030 Delivery Years may qualify as BYONC to 
the extent the underlying resource meets the criteria in subsection (b) below.”).

- 30 - 
been committed to provide capacity; [and] (2) not have been the subject of a notice of intent 
to participate in an RPM Auction prior to and including the 2028/2029 Delivery Year, but 
if so, must have offered and not cleared any RPM Auction.”99 
But the outcome under IRAS is different. As explained in the filing’s Transmittal 
Letter, “[g]iven that PJM is currently short of capacity and looking to reestablish a healthy 
capacity reserve margin, . . . any capacity added to the system starting with the 2027/2028 
BRA will qualify as new—subject to the gating criteria.”100 This explanation makes no 
sense: the shortfall in the 2027/2028 BRA is one of the reasons PJM is proposing IRAS.101 
PJM suggests that its proposal accommodates purported reliance interests. “Given that 
New Large Loads are included in the RPM Auctions through the 2028/2029 Delivery Year 
and eligible BYONC that previously cleared an RPM Auction through the 2028/2029 
Delivery Year was not on notice of this limitation, any eligible BYONC that is offered in 
RPM Auctions through the 2028/2029 Delivery Year can be procured by New Large Loads 
to avoid IRAS.”102 The seller’s purported reliance interest is irrelevant: the seller’s bid has 
been selected and the seller has a must offer obligation going forward. But the benefit of 
this arrangement goes to new large loads—on whose part PJM posits no reliance. Most 
importantly, PJM nowhere addresses the reliability consequences of this loophole, which 
include the procurement of a smaller amount of IRAS against an unreduced shortfall. 
A simple example should flesh out the problems in treating capacity that has cleared 
an auction as “new” capacity. Assume that prior to the start of the 2028/2029 Delivery 
 
99 RBP Transmittal Letter at 51 (original emphasis) (footnote omitted). 
100 IRAS Filing Transmittal Letter at 52. 
101 Id. at 6. 
102 Id. at 115 n.302.

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Year, new large loads had acquired 6.8 gigawatts of otherwise BYONC-eligible capacity 
that had cleared in the 2027/2028 BRA. The 2028/2029 BRA auction fell short of PJM’s 
reliability requirement by 6.8 gigawatts.103 Pursuant to PJM’s IRAS protocol, PJM would 
look to the Large Load Registry to identify 6.8 GWs of new large load eligible for IRAS 
in the 2028/2029 Delivery Year. But PJM would not find any. The new large loads who 
purchased the 6.8 GWs of previously cleared capacity would not be listed in the Registry 
as eligible for IRAS because they had brought their own “new” capacity.104 The auction 
shortfall would still exist, but PJM would not have an amount of curtailable IRAS to 
address its reliability needs in the 2028/2029 Delivery Year. This result holds true for any 
amount of capacity that new large loads procure that had cleared the 2027/2028 BRA.  
For IRAS to meet its intended purpose, the BYONC eligibility criteria must be 
revised and limited to capacity that, as with the RBP, has not cleared a prior BRA auction. 
VI. 
THE COMMISSION SHOULD CONDITION ACCEPTANCE 
UPON REVISIONS TO THE LARGE LOAD REGISTRY.  
As stated in proposed Attachment DD-4 to the Tariff, PJM shall maintain a Large 
Load Registry, which “shall inform which New Large Loads are eligible to be called on to 
provide Interim Resource Adequacy Service.”105 PJM acknowledges that the successful 
implementation of IRAS is premised upon the inclusion of accurate data in the proposed 
Registry, explaining:106  
The information provided in the Large Load Registry will 
form the foundation for an accurate, complete, and reliable 
 
103 RBP Transmittal Letter at 7. 
104 In a Delivery Year where IRAS applies, the MW subject to IRAS that PJM will allocate to an Electric 
Distributor zone/area will be limited to the MW quantity of New Large Loads in that zone/area without 
arrangements for BYONC or RBP UCAP MW allocated to them.” IRAS Transmittal Letter at 40. 
105 Attach. DD-4 § I(c). 
106 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 43-44 (footnote omitted).

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database that will inform, inter alia, decisions about the MW 
quantity of New Large Loads that is available to provide 
IRAS in a Delivery Year.  
PJM is aware that false or misleading statements about, for 
example, Peak Load Contributions could give rise to 
inaccurate baselines on which PJM would rely in the course 
of determining Eligible New Large Load Amounts, i.e., the 
MW value of load that an Eligible New Large Load in a 
given zone/area may be required to be made available for 
IRAS. 
The proposed Tariff language creating the Registry includes details on the various 
types of information to be provided to PJM. But the obligation to submit the information 
falls on the EDCs rather than the large loads themselves. The duty to populate the Registry 
falls on “[e]ach Party,” which must “submit, or cause to be submitted,” the required 
information “related to each Large Load served by the Party.”107 Electric Distributors, in 
turn, are required to provide “any information or data the Electric Distributor believes 
appropriate to facilitate an accurate Large Load Registry.”108 The new large load itself—
the entity that presumably possesses firsthand knowledge of its peak, ramp, in-service 
timing, 
backup 
generation, 
and 
coverage—apparently 
bears 
no 
affirmative, 
tariff-expressed obligation either to submit data or to substantiate them. 
Given the importance of the information provided for inclusion in the registry, PJM 
states in its Transmittal Letter that it “will review the information provided and coordinate 
with the applicable Transmission Owner and Electric Distributor to check the validity of 
the information provided, request additional information if needed, and consult with the 
 
107 IRAS Filing, Attach. A, Sched. 11 § B.1(a) (“Each Party shall submit, or cause to be submitted, to the 
Office of the Interconnection the following information . . . related to each Large Load served by the Party”). 
The obligation thus runs to the Party serving the load (the LSE), not to the Large Load; no provision of the 
proposed Tariff imposes a submission or substantiation duty on the New Large Load itself. 
108Attach. DD-4 § III(b) (Electric Distributor to provide “any information or data the Electric Distributor 
believes appropriate to facilitate an accurate Large Load Registry”).

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Large Load.”109 Unfortunately, this level of commitment is not matched by the proposed 
Tariff language. The proposed revisions to Tariff Schedule 11 phrase PJM’s obligation to 
assess the validity of the data received to create the Registry in permissive terms, stating 
that PJM, “may review information and coordinate with the applicable Transmission 
Owner and Electric Distributor as needed, regarding the validity of the information 
provided, including through requesting additional information as the Office of the 
Interconnection deems necessary,” and “also may consult with the Large Load.”110 
Given that the Registry is essential to the success of IRAS, PJM should be required 
to review and validate the information provided to populate it. The Commission should 
condition any approval on PJM modifying the Tariff language to make mandatory PJM’s 
obligation to vet and verify data provided in connection with the establishment of the 
Registry. 
Separate from the vetting issues, PJM’s Registry proposal includes two 
unreasonable restrictions on access to Registry data: (1) State Consumer Advocates111 are 
missing from the list of entities that can access the Registry; and (2) even those entities that 
can do so are subject to onerous and perhaps insurmountable confidentiality restrictions. 
These limitations are unreasonable, particularly given the important role that states are 
anticipated to play in IRAS implementation. 
PJM’s proposal specifies the entities that “may” access the Large Load Registry 
and the conditions under which they may do so.112 Access to the Registry is confined to 
 
109 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 43 (emphasis added). 
110 IRAS Filing, Attach. A, Sched. 11 § B.1(c) (emphasis added). 
111 See id. § B.1(d). 
112 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 28.

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“Authorized Commissions, Transmission Owners, Electric Distributors, Load Serving 
Entities, the Market Monitoring Unit, and FERC.”113 “Authorized Commission” is defined 
in the PJM Operating Agreement:114 
“Authorized Commission” shall mean (i) a State public 
utility commission that regulates the distribution or supply 
of electricity to retail customers and is legally charged with 
monitoring the operation of wholesale or retail markets 
serving retail suppliers or customers within its State or (ii) 
an association or organization comprised exclusively of 
State public utility commissions described in the 
immediately preceding clause (i) [presumably, the 
Organization of PJM States, Inc. (OPSI)]. 
PJM’s RAA includes a separate Tariff definition for “State Consumer Advocate,” 
defined as “a legislatively created office from any State, all or any part of the territory of 
which is within the PJM Region, and the District of Columbia established, inter alia, for 
the purpose of representing the interests of energy consumers before the utility regulatory 
commissions of such states and the District of Columbia and the FERC.”115 State 
Consumer Advocates are PJM voting members. The JCA are all State Consumer 
Advocates, required by state statute to represent the interest of retail customers.  
PJM should be directed to modify the definitions such that State Consumer 
Advocates have access to the Registry. The information available in the Registry will play 
a central role in their advocacy efforts. The offices need these data to seek and support 
IRAS curtailment protocols that ensure that new large loads are curtailed before other retail 
load. Similarly, these advocates will need access to this data to challenge any proposal that 
 
113 IRAS Filing, Attach. A., Sched. 11 § B.1(d). 
114 PJM Operating Agreement, Definitions A-B. 
115 PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement, art. 1, Definitions. This definition of State Consumer Advocate 
tracks the definition of State Consumer Advocate in the Operating Agreement. See PJM Operating 
Agreement, Definitions S-T.

- 35 - 
other retail customers fund demand response payments to the new large loads that must 
take curtailable service in order to come on the system. 
The Registry’s proposed confidentiality provisions pose another unreasonable 
obstacle—both to State Consumer Advocates seeking to carry out their regulatory 
missions, and to state commissions seeking to exercise their oversight function. All entities 
must comply with “appropriate data protection safeguards required by Operating 
Agreement, section 18.17.”116  Specifically, to “the extent such documents, data, or other 
information provided to” PJM “has been designated as confidential by a Party, Electric 
Distributor, or other entity supplying the information,” then PJM “shall maintain the 
confidentiality of the information provided under this RAA, Schedule 11, section B 
consistent with its obligations under Operating Agreement, section 18.17.”117 Put another 
way, if a Party118 to the RAA, Electric Distributor, or any un-identified “entity” (such as a 
new large load) that is “supplying information” to PJM, decides that any such information 
headed for the Large Load Registry is confidential, then that entity may request that their 
information be included in the Registry, and it will thereafter be subject to the “appropriate” 
data protection safeguards set forth in Section 18.17. 
Most significant to the Large Load Registry, Section 18.17.4 governs the disclosure 
of confidential information to Authorized Commissions (i.e., the PJM state commissions 
and OPSI). Under Section 18.17, an Authorized Commission may only request access to 
confidential information after successfully completing a certification process with FERC 
 
116 IRAS Filing, Attach. A, Sched. 11 § B.1(d). 
117 Id. 
118 “Party” is defined as “an entity bound by the terms of the Operating Agreement.” See PJM Reliability 
Assurance Agreement, art. 1, Definitions.

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that will, at a minimum, take over three months to complete, if successful at all.119  As 
reported by PJM on its website, only six of the 14 state commissions in the PJM footprint 
have completed the FERC certification process and have the opportunity to post their list 
of “authorized persons” who may receive confidential information successfully requested 
by the Authorized Commission.120  It does not appear that OPSI has completed the required 
FERC certification, though it is included in the definition of Authorized Commission. 
For the remaining eight state Authorized Commissions (and OPSI),121 there is no 
guarantee of obtaining FERC certification. Timing considerations alone counsel that most 
Authorized Commissions will not obtain certification before the IRAS proposed effective 
date. And even if an Authorized Commission has been FERC-certified, it must still engage 
in a PJM process to request confidential information. The Authorized Commission must 
specify the confidential information it is requesting and provide “a general description of 
the purpose” of the Authorized Commission in making the request.122 Both PJM and an 
“affected” PJM Member may object to the release of the confidential information.123 Such 
objections are to be resolved first with a conference, but absent resolution may lead to the 
 
119 PJM Operating Agreement § 18.17.4(a)(i). Section 18.17.4(a)(i) specifies that “[e]ach party shall bear its 
own costs in connection with such a FERC protest proceeding.” It is unclear what other party would pay the 
costs of a party’s protest. 
120 PJM, State Commissions, Authorized Persons Schedule, https://www.pjm.com/committees-and-
groups/state-commissions (last visited Sep. 3, 2026). According to the posting of authorized person lists, it 
appears that the six state commissions that have obtained FERC certification are Indiana, Maryland, New 
Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Illinois, Delaware, Michigan, Tennessee, Kentucky, North 
Carolina, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia are not on the list. 
121 While it appears that OPSI has not attempted the certification process at FERC, OPSI may take on an 
enhanced role in governance at PJM. See, e.g., Post-Technical Conference Joint Comments of the 
Organization of PJM States, Inc. and PJM Governors’ Collaborative, PJM Governance & Stakeholder 
Reforms, Docket No. AD26-7 (Aug. 21, 2026), eLibrary No. 20260821-5102. 
122 PJM Operating Agreement § 18.17.4(c)(i). 
123 Id. § 18.17.4(c)(iii).

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filing of a FERC complaint.124  While how and when such complaints would be resolved 
is unclear, what is clear is that absent resolution, state commissions may never see the 
information, let alone have access in a timely manner. 
We recognize that changes to the Tariff process for handling confidential 
information is beyond the scope of this proceeding. But the inability of consumer 
representatives to review Registry data that is the lynchpin of the IRAS proposal renders 
the proposal unjust and unreasonable. State Consumer Advocates should have express 
authorization to access the Large Load Registry because doing so will provide the strongest 
likelihood that retail ratepayers will be protected from the imposition of costs and 
curtailment impacts wrought by the presence of new large loads. And both they and their 
respective state commissions should have access to any information designated 
confidential by means of adequate protective orders or other forms of certification. At its 
core, the successful implementation of IRAS depends upon successfully engaging federal 
and state actors—which can happen only where the necessary transparency protections are 
in place. 
VII. 
THE ACCEPTANCE OF IRAS IS FURTHER REASON TO 
REJECT RBP. 
Pursuant to its RBP proposal, pending before the Commission in Docket No. 
ER26-3380-000, PJM seeks to procure an initial target of 6.8 gigawatts of new capacity for 
15-year terms (or less) beginning with the 2028/2029 Delivery Year until the 2042/2043 
Delivery Year at an average price of $555/MW-day.125 The RBP is proposed as a “one-
 
124 Id. The grounds for filing such a complaint are set forth in Section 18.17, and they are expansive, including 
the existence of “exceptional circumstances . . . such that complying with the Information Request would 
result in harm to the complainant.” Id. 
125 See JCA RBP Protest at 5-7, 13-14 (describing PJM RBP Filing).

- 38 - 
time, supplementary mechanism” and an “interim step” to address a “near-term” 
shortfall,126 and identifies its object as a discrete, near-term reliability gap rather than a 
durable long-term deficiency. The Initial RBP Target is the 6,831.3 MW UCAP shortfall 
observed in the July 2026 BRA for the 2028/2029 Delivery Year.127 
Provided that the Commission fixes the BYONC eligibility requirements to exclude 
resources that have cleared in a BRA auction, FERC’s acceptance of IRAS—either in its 
current form or as correctly modified as non-firm transmission service—obviates the need 
for the RBP. IRAS, like the RBP, is a resource adequacy measure intended to address a 
large load-induced capacity shortfall. The difference between the two proposals is that 
IRAS can satisfy the capacity need at which the RBP is aimed sooner, more durably, and, 
if correctly modified as non-firm transmission service, at less cost. “IRAS ‘is a load 
reduction service, effective starting with the 2027/2028 Delivery Year . . . for the purpose 
of supporting the integration of New Large Loads to the PJM Region that are not in 
arrangements with new capacity additions to the PJM Region.’”128 
PJM intends to require an amount of IRAS equivalent to the auction shortfall, which 
for the 2027/2028 Delivery Year was roughly 6.8 GW;129 roughly the same amount as 
PJM’s initial RBP procurement target.130 PJM’s RBP procurement target will be reduced 
by self-supply in the same way that the amount of new large load eligible for IRAS 
 
126 RBP Transmittal Letter at 6-7, 21-22. 
127 Id. at 31; PJM RBP Filing, Attach. A, Attach. DD § 18.1(a). 
128 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 74-75 (quoting Attach. DD-4 § I(a)). JCA in their RBP Protest mistakenly 
asked the Commission to accelerate the implementation date of IRAS. Upon further review of PJM’s IRAS 
Filing, it is clear that there is no need to do so. 
129 RBP Transmittal Letter at 8. 
130 Id. at 31 (initial RBP target of 6.8 GW based upon shortfall in 2028/2029 BRA).

- 39 - 
procurement will be reduced by self-supply. There is every reason to believe that IRAS—
a resource adequacy measure that will be available to PJM before the availability of any 
RBP resources—will provide a source of new resource adequacy roughly equivalent to 
PJM’s final RBP target. 
And unlike the RBP, IRAS is a resource adequacy measure of indefinite duration.131 
PJM is not proposing an end date to the IRAS program. 
Regardless of whether the PJM Region has maintained 
capacity sufficient to meet the PJM Region Reliability 
Requirement for three or more years, PJM will continue to 
maintain the Large Load Registry. However, if the region re-
enters capacity shortfall conditions, then the need for New 
Large Loads to provide IRAS will re-emerge. The definition 
of New Large Load allows for this and explicitly provides 
that New Large Loads will then be defined as entering 
service “after June 1 of the first Delivery Year” the PJM 
Region is short of capacity. 
By comparison, RBP is a one-time procurement of new resources for terms of up 
to 15 years, notwithstanding that PJM has admitted that far shorter and less costly five-
year procurements will satisfy regional reliability needs.132 And although PJM has 
provided no estimate of the costs associated with IRAS, our protest in Docket No. ER26-
3380-000 demonstrates that the costs associated with PJM’s RBP proposal are excessive 
and unjustified, and will likely reflect the exercise of seller-side market power as opposed 
to competition based upon the sellers’ production costs.133 Moreover, should the 
Commission exercise its FPA section 206 authority (perhaps incident to the June 2026 
Show Cause Order) and direct PJM to refile IRAS as a non-firm transmission service, 
 
131 IRAS Transmittal Letter at 72. 
132 JCA RBP Protest at 6. See also RBP Transmittal Letter at 39. 
133 JCA RBP Protest at 17-25.

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ratepayers will not be subject to any IRAS procurement costs, consistent with both the 
Ratepayer Protection Pledge and the FPA’s consumer protection objectives. 
The Commission’s acceptance of IRAS (with proper BYONC eligibility 
requirements) renders the RBP duplicative and unnecessary and the Commission should 
reject it. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Commission should direct PJM to 
revise its IRAS proposal consistent with the recommendations herein. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
   /s/ Susan L. Satter              
       
/s/ Scott H. Strauss 
Susan L. Satter 
Chief, Public Utilities Bureau 
Scott Metzger 
Public Utilities Policy Counsel 
Kimberly B. Janas 
Counsel to the Attorney General 
ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE 
115 South LaSalle Street, 25th Floor 
Chicago, IL 60603 
susan.satter@ilag.gov 
 
Counsel for the Office of the Illinois 
Attorney General 
 
Scott H. Strauss 
Peter J. Hopkins 
Jeffrey A. Schwarz 
Lauren L. Springett 
SPIEGEL & MCDIARMID LLP 
1818 N Street, NW, 8th Floor 
Washington, DC 20036 
scott.strauss@spiegelmcd.com 
 
Counsel for Delaware Division of the 
Public Advocate, District of Columbia 
Office of People’s Counsel, Illinois Citizens 
Utility Board, Maryland Office of People’s 
Counsel and New Jersey Division of Rate 
Counsel 
 
 
September 3, 2026

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have this day caused the foregoing document to be served 
upon each person designated on the official service list compiled by the Secretary in this 
proceeding. 
Dated on this 3rd day of September, 2026. 
 
/s/ Lauren L. Springett 
Lauren L. Springett 
 
Law Offices of: 
SPIEGEL & MCDIARMID LLP 
1818 N Street, NW 
8th Floor 
Washington, DC 20036 
(202) 879-4000