{"document":{"slug":"filing-20260918-5412","title":"Motion to Intervene and Comments of the Data Center Coalition re Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.'s 08/28/2026 filing","issued":"2026-09-18","accession":"20260918-5412","docket":"ER26-3650-000","group":"MISO filings","filer":"Data Center Coalition","kind":"comments","file":"sources/originals/20260918-5412_01.pdf","url":"https://elibrary.ferc.gov/eLibrary/filelist?accession_Number=20260918-5412","sha256":"20bbad72479dde41d3ffc39ade55fc623b5cb6573ae610ca29bd63a2461395d8","pages":32,"tokens":9317,"emptyPages":[]},"pages":[{"page":1,"startToken":0,"endToken":301,"text":"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  \nBEFORE THE  \nFEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \n) \nMidcontinent Independent System \nOperator, Inc. \n ) \n Docket No. ER26-3650-000\n) \nMOTION TO INTERVENE  \nAND COMMENTS OF THE DATA CENTER COALITION \nPursuant to Rules 212 and 214 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Federal Energy \nRegulatory Commission (“FERC” or the “Commission”)1 and the Commission’s August 31, 2026 \nCombined Notice of Filings #1,2 the Data Center Coalition (“DCC”) hereby moves to intervene \nand submits these comments on Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc.’s (“MISO”) \nproposal to establish certain Interconnection Reliability Requirements (“IRR”) for large loads.3 \nI.\nOVERVIEW OF THE DATA CENTER COALITION\nDCC is the membership organization for the U.S. data center industry, representing leading\ndata center owners and operators that develop, operate, and maintain data center infrastructure and \nteams across the country.4  DCC members operate data centers that constitute significant loads \nwithin the MISO region and DCC has been an active stakeholder in regional efforts to ensure \nreliability, enable new generation, and discipline load forecasts.  DCC and its members have been \nat the forefront of efforts to advance reforms in MISO and at the state level to accommodate the \n1 18 C.F.R. §§ 385.212 and 385.214. \n2 Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc., et al., Docket No. ER26-3650-000, et al., Combined \nNotice of Filings #1 (Aug. 31, 2026). \n3 Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER26-3650-000, Proposal of Midcontinent \nIndependent System Operator, Inc. to Establish Certain Interconnection Reliability Requirements for Large Loads \n(Aug. 28, 2026) (“Filing”).  \n4 The DCC is a membership organization of leading data center owners and operators. Public testimony and \nwritten comments submitted by DCC do not necessarily reflect the views of each individual DCC member. A list of \ncurrent DCC members is accessible at https://www.datacentercoalition.org/members."},{"page":2,"startToken":301,"endToken":573,"text":"- 2 - \ngrowth of large loads within the MISO region while maintaining reliability and protecting existing \nretail customers.   \nII. \nINTRODUCTION \nDCC appreciates MISO’s continued proactive engagement with the data center industry, \nand its efforts to develop reliability requirements that facilitate the integration of large loads while \npreserving the reliable operation of the transmission system.  DCC member facilities depend upon \nreliable electricity service, and DCC shares MISO’s objective of ensuring that the interconnection \nand operation of large load customers does not adversely affect reliability, system operations, or \nother customers.  DCC recognizes that large loads may present operational characteristics that \nwarrant distinct reliability requirements and standards to maintain transmission system reliability.  \nDCC is committed to working collaboratively with MISO, the North American Electric Reliability \nCorporation (“NERC”), and stakeholders to establish requirements that maintain reliability, \nprotect customers, and avoid creating barriers to large load growth.  \nThe issue presented by MISO’s Filing is not whether transmission customers taking service \nfor large loads should be subject to distinct visibility and operational requirements.  The \nCommission already resolved this issue in its June 2026 show cause order finding the MISO tariff \nunjust and unreasonable because it does not include provisions establishing ride-through, ramping, \nand other operational requirements to address the challenges of large load integration.5  Instead, \nthe issue is whether the framework that MISO has proposed in this proceeding represents a just \nand reasonable means of mitigating these reliability risks.  While DCC appreciates MISO’s efforts \nto develop a compliance framework and recognizes the difficulty of the task, DCC respectfully \n \n5 Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., et al., 195 FERC ¶ 61,212, at PP 43, 64 (2026) (“Show Cause \nOrder”)."},{"page":3,"startToken":573,"endToken":873,"text":"- 3 - \nsubmits that MISO’s proposal, as filed, falls short of the clear and consistent framework that the \nShow Cause Order contemplated.   \nOne of the primary objectives of the Show Cause Order is to ensure that the MISO tariff \nincludes clear rules governing the provision of transmission service to customers serving large \nloads “to ensure regulatory and process certainty, fairness and consistency, and efficiency as large \nand co-located loads are added to the transmission system[.]”6  Indeed, MISO has acknowledged \nthe need for reform, stating that its “existing Tariff provisions ‘do not provide a consistent or \ntransparent framework to evaluate’ large loads and that interested parties ‘face uncertainty \nregarding applicable criteria, study assumptions, data requirements, and post-interconnection \nobligations.’”7  DCC agrees with that assessment—and it is precisely because DCC shares MISO’s \ndiagnosis of the problem—that it believes that MISO’s tariff revisions must go farther to establish \nthe types of “clear and consistent” tariff provisions contemplated by the Commission.8   \nMISO has not demonstrated that the framework that MISO has proposed would resolve the \nuncertainty, consistency, or transparency issues identified in the Show Cause Order.  MISO \nproposes to revise its tariff to provide itself with new authority to impose new visibility and \nreliability requirements on Large Loads and Computational Loads.  But the proposed tariff \nrevisions do not clearly define the customers that will be subject to those requirements and the \nobligations that will apply.  Instead, MISO proposes to include the substance of the reliability \nrequirements in a future Business Practices Manual (“BPM”).  The result is a tariff framework that \n \n6 Id. at P 12.  \n7 Id. at P 29 (quoting MISO, Issue Submission Report (Apr. 15, 2026), available at: \nhttps://cdn.misoenergy.org/New%20Issue%20-\n%20Large%20Load%20Interconnection%20Reliability%20Requirements748710.pdf). \n8 Id. at PP 12, 61, 64, 126."},{"page":4,"startToken":873,"endToken":1156,"text":"- 4 - \nfails to deliver the regulatory certainty, consistency, and notice required by the Show Cause Order \nand the Federal Power Act (“FPA”). \nMISO’s proposed grandfathering framework suffers from similar issues.  Although the \nCommission directed MISO to minimize disruption to existing commercial arrangements, MISO \nties grandfathered treatment primarily to whether an associated transmission project has reached \nspecified milestones in the MISO Transmission Expansion Plan (“MTEP”) or Expedited Project \nReview (“EPR”) rather than to whether the Large Load customer has entered into binding \nagreements or made material investments in reliance on the existing regulatory framework.  The \nresult is a grandfathering framework that is disconnected from the commercial arrangements that \nthe Commission sought to preserve in the Show Cause Order.9  Additionally, MISO has proposed \nto grant itself broad discretion to subject customers that otherwise qualify for an exemption to its \nreliability standards without including any objective standards or procedures in the tariff, creating \nuncertainty about whether customers will be exempt from these requirements or whether MISO \nmay later withdraw that protection.  \nDCC is not opposed to efforts by MISO or other transmission providers to impose \nreliability requirements necessary to account for the operational characteristics of large loads.  \nMaintaining grid reliability is a top priority for DCC and its members.  If MISO demonstrates that \nnew reliability requirements are necessary to mitigate reliability risks, then the MISO tariff should \nbe modified to include the necessary safeguards to ensure that transmission customers install \nequipment and abide by operational limitations needed to maintain reliability.   \nHowever, any reliability framework that is implemented should be objective, transparent, \nand provide clear notice to customers of the scope of their obligations and the steps needed to \n \n9 See id. at PP 5, 36."},{"page":5,"startToken":1156,"endToken":1382,"text":"- 5 - \ncomply with such requirements, with appropriate measures to minimize disruption to existing \ncommercial arrangements and reasonable implementation periods.  Customers must have clarity \non their compliance obligations so they can make the design decisions necessary to meet these \nobligations.  At the same time, it is important to recognize that customers with facilities that are \nunder development or that have commenced operation may not be able to easily revisit investment \nand design decisions without incurring significant delays and costs.  Reliability requirements \nshould be implemented in a manner that respects settled expectations and avoids unnecessary \ndisruption to existing investment decisions to the extent consistent with the objective of \nmaintaining reliability.  \nThus, while DCC supports the critically important reliability imperatives underlying \nMISO’s Filing, DCC respectfully requests that the Commission decline to accept MISO’s \nproposed tariff revisions as filed, without prejudice to a future filing that proposes implementation \nof new reliability requirements in a manner that is objective, transparent, and consistent with the \nobjectives of the Show Cause Order.  Although DCC believes that the Filing should be rejected, \nDCC encourages MISO to work with the region to further refine and clarify its proposals and \nidentify a path forward that provides the certainty and durability needed to effectively ensure that \nlarge loads take the steps and make the investments necessary to meet the reliability imperatives \nthat MISO rightly aims to safeguard."},{"page":6,"startToken":1382,"endToken":1753,"text":"- 6 - \nIII. \nCOMMENTS \nA. \nMISO’s Filing Is Inconsistent With The Show Cause Order, The FPA, And \nThe Rule Of Reason    \n1. \nMISO’s Proposal To Relegate The Substance Of Its Requirements To \nIts BPMs Is Inconsistent With The FPA \nSection 205 of the FPA requires public utilities to file the rates, terms, and conditions of \nFERC-jurisdictional service with the Commission.10  This obligation includes “classifications, \npractices, and regulations affecting such rates and charges[.]”11  Additionally, “no change shall be \nmade” in any rate, term, condition, or practice without a Section 205 filing providing notice of the \nchange to the Commission and the public, and only after the Commission determines that the \nchange is just and reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.12  These basic \nstatutory requirements are reflected in the Filed Rate Doctrine, which prohibits public utilities from \nimposing any rates, terms, and conditions other than those that have been filed with and approved \nby the Commission.13   \nSection 205 and the Filed Rate Doctrine are designed to ensure that customers receive \nadvance notice of the rates, terms, and conditions of service and the Commission can exercise its \nauthority necessary to maintain just and reasonable rates.14  As the courts have recognized, the \n \n10 16 U.S.C. § 824d. \n11 Id.; see also 18 C.F.R. § 35.1(a) (requiring that any “rates and charges . . . classifications, practices, rules \nand regulations affecting such rates, charges, classifications, services, rules, regulations or practices,” be filed). \n12 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d).  \n13 See Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981) (stating that the filed rate doctrine “forbids a \nregulated entity to charge rates for its services other than those properly filed with the appropriate federal regulatory \nauthority”) (“Arkansas Louisiana Gas”). \n14 Cogentrix Energy Power Mgmt., LLC v. FERC, 24 F.4th 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2022); see also Town of \nConcord v. FERC, 955 F.2d 67, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (explaining that purpose of filed rate doctrine is “preservation of \nthe agency’s primary jurisdiction over reasonableness of rates and the need to insure that regulated companies charge \nonly those rates of which the agency has been made cognizant”) (quoting Arkansas Louisiana Gas  at 577-578)."},{"page":7,"startToken":1753,"endToken":2101,"text":"- 7 - \nrequirement “of transparent, public filing of rates ensures evenhandedness, fairness, stability, and \npredictability” in the rates charged for FERC-jurisdictional service.15   \nBut the FPA and Filed Rate Doctrine are not satisfied merely because a public utility has \nfiled a tariff with FERC.  The FPA, FERC’s regulations, and the Filed Rate Doctrine require that \nthe tariff “clearly and specifically” set forth the rates, terms, and conditions, and practices affecting \nsuch rates, terms, and conditions, of FERC-jurisdictional service.16  A tariff that omits key terms \nand conditions of service in favor of vague or open-ended references to a public utility’s \nprocedures and practices is inconsistent with the FPA and the Filed Rate Doctrine, and ultimately \nunjust and unreasonable.17   \nMISO’s proposed tariff revisions do not satisfy these requirements.  While DCC recognizes \nthat not every ministerial implementation detail must be included in the tariff, MISO’s tariff \nrevisions do not include the substantive standards that MISO proposes to apply, leave key aspects \nof MISO’s proposed framework unaddressed, and grant MISO broad discretion to apply the \nstandards to customers as it deems appropriate without any objective requirements to constrain \nthis discretion.  Instead, the tariff repeatedly defers the substance of these standards and key aspects \nof how these standards will be applied to a new Large Load BPM that remains under development \nby MISO, including the performance standards and limits that customers will be held to,18 testing \nrequirements and other procedures for demonstrating compliance with MISO’s standards, and the \ntimelines for providing required information to MISO.19  The result is a tariff framework that \n \n15 See, e.g., West Deptford Energy, LLC v. FERC, 766 F.3d 10, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  \n16 Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 182 FERC ¶ 61,100, at P 34 (2023) (“SPP Order”).  See also 18 C.F.R. § 35.1(a) \n(stating that tariffs must “clearly and specifically” set out rates, charges, and practices for FERC-jurisdictional \nservice). \n17 Keyspan-Ravenswood, LLC v. FERC, 474 F.3d 804, 810-11 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Keyspan-Ravenswood”). \n18 Filing, Tab A, Proposed §§ 37A.6, 37A.7. \n19 Id., Proposed § 37A.1."},{"page":8,"startToken":2101,"endToken":2458,"text":"- 8 - \ninforms customers that they will be subject to ride-through requirements, ramp-rate limitations, \nand other requirements, but leaves customers in the dark about the substance of their compliance \nobligations.   \nThe Commission’s Rule of Reason does not justify MISO’s decision to leave the substance \nof its proposed requirements to the BPMs.  Instead, the Commission’s Rule of Reason requires \npublic utilities to file those practices or provisions that “significantly affect rates and services”20 \nwhile permitting only implementation details of “practical insignificance”21 to be included in \nBPMs or other manuals.  The Rule of Reason requires terms and conditions to be included in the \ntariff if they “affect rates and services significantly, . . . are realistically susceptible of specification, \n. . . are not so generally understood . . . as to render recitation superfluous,”22 and are not “clearly \nimplied by the tariff’s express terms.”23  Rather than supporting MISO’s proposal, applying the \nRule of Reason to the tariff provisions that MISO has filed in this proceeding highlights the \nproblems with MISO’s approach.   \ni. \nThe Tariff Must Include The Reliability Standards That \nCustomers Will Be Required To Meet \nMISO proposes to require that a transmission customer taking service on behalf of a \nComputational Load comply with ramping limits and ride-through requirements.  Although MISO \nnotes in its transmittal letter that it is considering an initial limit of 30 MW/minute, MISO does \nnot propose to include the actual limits and requirements in the tariff.24  For instance, MISO’s \n \n20 See, e.g., Boston Energy Trading & Mktg. LLC v. Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 153 FERC ¶ \n61,336, at P 39 (2015). \n21 Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y. v. FERC, 813 F.2d 448, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that the Commission \nproperly excused utilities from filing policies or practices that dealt with only matters of “practical insignificance” to \nserving customers). \n22 Id. (quoting City of Cleveland v. FERC, 773 F.2d 1368, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).   \n23 Cometa Energia, S.A. de C.V. v. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 191 FERC ¶ 61,089, at PP 10, 19 \n(2025), order on reh’g, 193 FERC ¶ 61,011 (2025). \n24 Filing, Tab A, Proposed § 37A.7."},{"page":9,"startToken":2458,"endToken":2773,"text":"- 9 - \ntariff revisions state that Computational Load will be subject to “up-ramp and down-ramp limits \nestablished by [MISO]” and must have “an effective up and down ramp rate not exceeding the \nspecified limit,” but the tariff does not specify the actual limits that will apply, the procedures that \nwill be used to determine the applicable limits, or how MISO will determine a load’s “effective” \nramp rate.25  Similarly, MISO’s proposed ride-through requirements state that Computational Load \nmust remain connected to the transmission system and continue to operate during voltage and \nfrequency disturbances within the “performance criteria” established by MISO, but does not \nprovide any detail regarding the performance criteria that will be applied.26  The tariff also states \nthat the ride-through requirements “may include evaluation, testing, modeling, monitoring, and \nother compliance measures,” but states that these measures will be detailed in MISO’s BPMs.27 \nMISO has not demonstrated that excluding the substance of these requirements from the \ntariff is just, reasonable, and consistent with the FPA.  There is little question that the ramp rate \nand ride-through requirements applied to transmission customers serving Large Loads \nsignificantly affect the rates, terms, and conditions of FERC-jurisdictional service.  The \nCommission recognized as much in the Show Cause Order by directing MISO to include ramp \nrate and ride-through requirements in its tariff.28  Additionally, compliance with MISO’s proposed \nramp rate and ride-through requirements is a precondition to receiving service, and failure to abide \nby these requirements may lead MISO to delay or limit the availability of service.   \nLikewise, there is little question that these requirements are readily susceptible to \nspecification.  Indeed, MISO states that it plans to impose an initial limit of 30 MW per minute, \n \n25 Id. \n26 Id. Proposed § 37A.6. \n27 Id. \n28 Show Cause Order at P 64 (stating that absence of tariff provisions addressing ramp and ride-through \nrequirements may lead to unjust and unreasonable rates)."},{"page":10,"startToken":2773,"endToken":3184,"text":"- 10 - \ndemonstrating that the limit is both known and realistically susceptible to specification.29  Both \nthe Commission and the courts have recognized that numerical thresholds, such as the ramp limit, \nare “susceptible of specification” and should be included in the tariff.30  Similarly, MISO already \nhas published a technical compendium describing its proposed ride-through requirements, \nincluding minimum ride-through times,31 and the MISO tariff has long included ride-through \nrequirements for generation resources.32  Neither the proposed ramp rate nor the ride-through \nrequirements are generally understood or implied by the tariff’s express terms, as there is no set of \nstandard “ramp rates” or “ride-through” requirements that are applicable and nothing in the \nproposed terms of the tariff implies a specific ramp limitation or ride-through requirement.   \nAlso, the procedures and protocols that are used by MISO to verify a transmission \ncustomer’s compliance with these requirements significantly affect the rates, terms, and conditions \nof service and should be described in the tariff.  The Commission has found that the tariff should \ndescribe procedures that are used to measure and verify compliance with tariff requirements.33  \nIndeed, the MISO tariff includes detailed provisions describing how MISO evaluates compliance \nwith operational restrictions for other resource and customer classes, including the frequency of \ntesting, the nature of the tests that will be administered, applicable performance standards, \n \n29 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 20. \n30 See City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. FERC, 24 F.4th 652, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“Even if the 75 kW \nthreshold is a guidepost, however, that kind of numerical threshold is the type of requirement that the ‘rule of reason’ \nrequires be stated in the [t]ariff, as a numerical threshold is ‘realistically susceptible of specification.’” (quoting \nKeyspan-Ravenswood, 474 F.3d at 811)). \n31 See MISO, Interconnection Reliability Requirements for Large Load Technical Compendium (Aug. \n2026), available at: \nhttps://cdn.misoenergy.org/20260827%20LLWG%20Item%2002c%20MISO%20Large%20Load%20Interconnectio\nn%20Reliability%20Requirements_Technical%20Compendium777982.pdf. \n32 See Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 114 FERC ¶ 61,270 (2006) (approving addition of \nride-through standards and other technical requirements to Appendix G of the pro forma generator interconnection \nagreement); Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 187 FERC ¶ 61,144 (2024) (approving revisions to Appendix G \nto establish performance standards for inverter-based resources).  \n33 Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 137 FERC ¶ 61,214, at P 79 (2011) (directing MISO to \nrevise its tariff to include measurement and verification protocols, including metering standards, in the tariff)."},{"page":11,"startToken":3184,"endToken":3501,"text":"- 11 - \nprocedures for seeking waivers, and other pertinent details.34  DCC is not arguing that every \nministerial detail of MISO’s proposed compliance procedures need to be included in the tariff.  But \ntransmission customers serving Large Load customers should be given a level of certainty and \ntransparency that is comparable to that regularly afforded to other customers and market \nparticipants. \nii. \nThe Terms And Conditions Of “Ramp Smoothing” Must Be In \nThe Tariff \nMISO proposes to allow customers to comply with the ramp requirements using \n“reduction/ramp smoothing provided by generation or other resources that meet[] the eligibility \nrequirements specified in” the BPM for Large Load.35  Absent from the proposed tariff, however, \nis any description of how ramp smoothing would affect ramp limits, what resources would be \neligible to provide this service, or how resource contributions would be measured and accounted \nfor in the effective ramp rate.  In fact, neither the transmittal letter nor the testimony submitted in \nsupport of MISO’s filing provides any detail about this ramp smoothing “service” or how it would \nfigure into a customer’s ramp limitations.   \nThe terms and conditions of ramp smoothing must be included in the tariff.  The eligibility \nrequirements to provide ramp smoothing, the methodology used to measure a resource’s \ncontribution, and the extent to which these contributions may offset a customer’s ramp limitations \nsignificantly affect rates, as these requirements will dictate the ability of resources to provide ramp \nsmoothing and whether a customer will be deemed to have met applicable compliance \n \n34 MISO Tariff, § 69.A.3.5(j) (stating that market participant must demonstrate demand reduction capability \nby performing annual test, testing conditions, procedures for obtaining waiver from these requirements, and the \nperformance standards that must be demonstrated during the test); id. §§ 1F, 40.2.5 (describing testing requirements \nfor fast ramping resources, including applicable performance standards and consequences of non-compliance).  \n35 Filing, Tab A, Proposed § 37A.7."},{"page":12,"startToken":3501,"endToken":3789,"text":"- 12 - \nobligations.36  Additionally, the requirements governing ramp smoothing are readily susceptible \nto specification, as MISO could easily identify the categories of eligible resources, the performance \ncriteria applicable to these resources, and the methodology used to calculate the contribution of \nthese resources to meeting ramping requirements, as MISO already does for other services and \nproducts that are traded within the MISO markets.37  Nor are the requirements associated with \nramp smoothing reasonably implied by, or otherwise apparent from, the tariff itself.   \niii. \nThe Tariff Must Include Objective Standards And Procedures \nFor Revoking Exemptions \nThe problems with MISO’s approach are not limited to the substance of the reliability \nrequirements that MISO proposes to apply to customers.  While MISO proposes to include \ngrandfathering criteria in its tariff, MISO also proposes to grant itself authority to require an \notherwise exempt customer to comply with its proposed reliability requirements whenever it \n“determines that operation of a Large Load results in a material adverse effect on Transmission \nSystem reliability.”38  MISO’s proposed tariff language does not describe the criteria that it would \napply to revoke a customer’s exemption, any rights to appeal or challenge this determination, the \nprocess that it would use to require compliance with these standards, or the transition period that \nwould be provided for a customer to bring itself into compliance.  Instead, the tariff states that \n \n36 See, e.g., Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 169 FERC ¶ 61,048, at P 62 (2019) (finding that four-hour minimum-run-\ntime requirement significantly affects rates because it determined eligibility of resources to satisfy resource adequacy \nrequirements).  \n37 See, e.g., MISO Tariff, §§ 39.2.1A(f)(i)-(ii), 39.2.1B(D), 40.2.4(d). \n38 Filing, Tab A, Proposed § 37A(II)(3)."},{"page":13,"startToken":3789,"endToken":4069,"text":"- 13 - \n“[t]he process by which [MISO] will make such a determination and which, if any, of the \nrequirements of . . . Section 37A are to be applied” will be included in the BPM for Large Load.39  \nThe criteria and process used by MISO to make the extraordinary decision to revoke an \nexemption conferred by the express terms of the tariff will have a significant effect on the \ntransmission service provided to customers serving Large Loads.  A determination by MISO to \nrevoke a customer’s exemption would fundamentally change the operational requirements that \nwould apply to a transmission customer and the associated Large Load.  Additionally, the criteria \nMISO applies when evaluating whether to revoke an exemption will determine whether revocation \nis reserved for extraordinary circumstances or may occur as a matter of course.  Equally important, \nthe timing of any such evaluation and the compliance timeline afforded to an affected customer \nwill determine whether revocation is a manageable transition or a significant disruption to the \ncustomer’s operations.  \nAdditionally, without tariff provisions that clearly set out the standards and procedures \ngoverning revocation, the Commission cannot meaningfully evaluate whether MISO’s proposed \ngrandfathering framework will achieve the objective of minimizing disruption to existing \ncommercial arrangements.  The practical effect is that the Commission is being asked to approve \na framework for protecting settled expectations without knowing the criteria under which those \nprotections may be withdrawn.  \nThere is no reason that MISO cannot describe the standards and processes that it would use \nto revoke an exemption in the tariff—just as it has described the criteria that customers would be \nrequired to meet to qualify for an exemption in the first place.  And nothing about MISO’s \n \n39 Id."},{"page":14,"startToken":4069,"endToken":4469,"text":"- 14 - \nprocess—from the standards applied to how MISO would implement this authority—is generally \nunderstood or implied by the limited description that MISO has proposed to include in the tariff.  \niv. \nMISO Has Not Justified The Omission Of Metering Standards \nAnd Other Requirements \nMISO’s proposed tariff language also omits other significant requirements related to the \nstandards and procedures that will be applied to transmission customers and the Large Loads that \nthey serve.  For instance, while the Commission has recognized that the Rule of Reason requires \nmetering standards to be described in the tariff and the existing tariff already includes detailed \nmetering requirements for market participants,40 MISO’s proposed tariff revisions in this \nproceeding do not provide any detail about the metering standards that will be applied to Large \nLoad or any generation resources serving these customers.41  The Commission also has found that \nprocedural deadlines, such as deadlines for submitting data and information to a transmission \nprovider, should be specified in the tariff, particularly where the failure to abide by these \nrequirements could have adverse consequences for entities taking service under the tariff.42  Yet, \nMISO again proposes to leave such deadlines to its BPMs even though failure to comply with \nthese requirements may adversely affect a customer’s ability to receive transmission service.43 \nThe matters described above may not be as consequential as the criteria used to determine \nwhether to revoke an exemption from tariff requirements or the substance of the reliability \n \n40 See, e.g., Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 169 FERC ¶ 61,137 at P 252 (2019) (finding that MISO’s \ntariff should include a “description of MISO’s proposed metering methodology and accounting practices for Electric \nStorage Resources”); MISO Tariff § 38.2.5(e) (describing metering standards applicable to market participants, \nincluding applicable minimum standards, accuracy standards, and testing requirements). \n41 Filing, Tab A, Proposed § 37A.3. \n42 See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 182 FERC ¶ 61,143 at P 249 (2023), order on compliance, 188 \nFERC ¶ 61,076 at P 101 (2025) (finding tariff incomplete because it omitted deadline for meter submissions). \n43 See, e.g., Filing, Tab A, Proposed § 37A.1 (stating that transmission customer will provide basic \ninformation, one-line diagrams, and description of electrical characteristics consistent with timelines specified in the \nBPMs); Id., § 37A.2 (stating that transmission customer must provide modeling information in format and consistent \nwith timelines specified in BPMs)."},{"page":15,"startToken":4469,"endToken":4763,"text":"- 15 - \nstandards that MISO proposes to apply.  But they nonetheless significantly affect FERC-\njurisdictional service as transmission customers and the Large Loads that they serve must comply \nwith these requirements to obtain service.  They also are the types of details that are regularly \nincluded in transmission provider tariffs.  MISO has not demonstrated that providing transmission \ncustomers serving Large Loads and their customers with less notice and transparency than other \ncustomers is just, reasonable, and consistent with the Rule of Reason.     \nv. \nMISO’s Approach Undermines Certainty, Predictability, And \nCommission Oversight \nThe practical effect of the tariff revisions that have been proposed is that neither the \nCommission nor commenters have the information necessary to determine whether the substance \nof MISO’s proposed framework is just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.  \nThis places the Commission and commenters in the impossible position of being asked to evaluate \na reliability framework without any insight into the substance of the standards or other key terms \nand conditions of service. Without the operative standards and procedures before it, the \nCommission cannot determine whether the proposed requirements are supported by demonstrated \nreliability needs, reasonably tailored to the risks MISO seeks to address, capable of being applied \nconsistently to similarly situated customers, or will achieve the objective of minimizing disruption \nto existing commercial arrangements.  \nMISO’s proposed framework undermines the certainty that the Show Cause Order sought \nto promote.  The proposed tariff language does not provide customers with notice of the \nrequirements that will apply, how compliance will be assessed, or even whether their facilities \nultimately will be deemed subject to these requirements.  Large Load customers need to understand \nthe scope of their obligations when making investment decisions and entering commercial \narrangements.  And the tariff must provide customers with assurance that exemptions, once"},{"page":16,"startToken":4763,"endToken":5039,"text":"- 16 - \ngranted, cannot be summarily revoked based on a subjective MISO assessment without regard to \nthe stage of development of their facilities.  \n \nMISO’s proposal also creates a risk of inconsistent standards and application.  \nTransmission customers serving Large Loads or Computational Loads should be subject to a \ncommon set of standards and requirements, as applicable.  Yet, since the details of these \nrequirements are not provided in the tariff, neither the Commission nor customers have any \nassurance that the requirements that ultimately are adopted will be applied in a manner that ensures \nconsistent and non-discriminatory treatment of customers.  \nFinally, the proposed framework would allow MISO to create through future BPM \nrevisions the very disruption to settled expectations that the Show Cause Order directed MISO to \navoid.  Placing the substance of MISO’s reliability requirements in the BPMs means that the \nstandards, as well as their application to individual customers, can be modified by MISO without \nformal notice to customers or approval by the Commission.  As the Commission recognized in the \nShow Cause Order, the application of new reliability requirements to customers has the potential \nto disrupt the settled expectations of customers that have relied on existing market rules when \ndeveloping their facilities.44  It was precisely for this reason that the Commission directed MISO \nto propose measures to minimize disruption to existing commercial arrangements.45  Yet, MISO’s \nproposal would allow it to revise these same requirements through the BPMs after customers have \ndesigned their facilities and entered commercial arrangements without making a Section 205 filing \nor seeking Commission approval—and without any obligation to take steps to protect settled \nexpectations.       \n \n44 Show Cause Order at P 123.  \n45 Id."},{"page":17,"startToken":5039,"endToken":5387,"text":"- 17 - \nB. \nMISO Has Not Demonstrated That Its Proposed Definition Of Large Load Is \nJust, Reasonable, And Not Unduly Discriminatory Or Preferential \nMISO’s proposed definition of Large Load also creates ambiguity regarding the scope and \napplication of MISO’s proposed requirements.  Because classification as a “Large Load” carries \nsubstantial regulatory and commercial consequences, it is critical that any definition of Large Load \nprovide clear notice to transmission customers and the loads they serve of whether they will be \nsubject to these requirements.  At the same time, the definition of Large Load should be limited to \ncustomers serving load whose size, location, and operating characteristics present the reliability \nrisks that the Commission sought to address in the Show Cause Order.  MISO’s proposed \ndefinition of Large Load does not meet these standards.   \nIndeed, MISO has proposed a definition that departs in material respects from the definition \nidentified in the Show Cause Order without adequately explaining those departures, clarifying \ntheir effect on the scope of the proposed requirements, or demonstrating how they correspond to \nthe reliability concerns underlying this proceeding. In the Show Cause Order, the Commission \nstated that it would be reasonable to define a large load as  \na new, commercial or industrial customer, located at a single site behind one or \nmore points of interconnection, and that has a peak load of 50 MW or greater, \ninterconnects to the transmission system at a voltage level of greater than 69 kV, \nand is not part of a co-location arrangement.46 \nIn its Filing, however, MISO proposes a definition of Large Load that omits any voltage \nthresholds, is not expressly limited to transmission-connected load, and provides MISO the \nauthority to aggregate customers based on vague and subjective standards:   \nLoad with Demand of 50 MW or more associated with any facility or aggregation \nof facilities located at a single substation behind one or more Point(s) of Withdrawal \nfrom the Transmission System that is owned, operated, or controlled by: (a) a single \nentity, or (b) a group of entities that will coordinate with respect to the profile of \n \n46 Id. at P 58."},{"page":18,"startToken":5387,"endToken":5752,"text":"- 18 - \nthe Load. Large Load does not include Load used exclusively for charging an \nElectric Storage Resource.47 \n \nAs discussed further below, MISO’s proposed definition of Large Load appears \ninconsistent with the Show Cause Order and only injects further uncertainty into the scope of \nMISO’s requirements.  The Commission’s definition of Large Load was tailored to capture large, \ntransmission-connected loads that the Commission believed present distinct operational and \nreliability risks “given their size, operational behavior, and unique potential to impact the \ntransmission system.”48  It is not clear that MISO’s definition is so limited.  Instead, the definition \nappears broad enough to be interpreted as extending to transmission customers that are taking \ntransmission service to serve loads that are interconnected solely to the distribution system and has \nthe potential to result in the aggregation of facilities that do not exhibit the scale or characteristics \nthat were the focus of the Show Cause Order.       \n1. \nThe Definition Of Large Load Should Be Limited To Transmission-\nInterconnected Loads \nThe absence of any voltage criteria or requirement that a customer be interconnected to the \ntransmission system from the definition of Large Load could be interpreted as extending the term \nto loads that are interconnected solely to the distribution network.  Under MISO’s proposed \ndefinition, an entity or group of entities with 50 MW or more of load located at a single substation \nbehind one or more “Point(s) of Withdrawal” from the transmission system would be classified as \na Large Load.  Because Point of Withdrawal is defined as the point where a non-transmission \n \n47 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 10.  DCC notes that, in contrast to the Commission’s definition, MISO’s \nproposed definition does not distinguish between Large Loads and loads participating in a co-location arrangement.  \nMISO should clarify the application of the Large Load definition to co-located loads consistent with the Commission’s \nrecognition of the distinct issues presented by such arrangements in the MISO Show Cause Order.  Show Cause Order \nat P 86.  Additionally, if MISO is going to apply its proposed reliability requirements to co-located load, it should \ndemonstrate that the proposed standards are appropriately tailored to account for the characteristics of these \narrangements. \n48 Show Cause Order at P 58."},{"page":19,"startToken":5752,"endToken":5979,"text":"- 19 - \nfacility that is used to withdraw energy to serve load connects with the transmission system, the \ndefinition of Large Load could be interpreted as extending to distribution-connected loads merely \nbecause they are located downstream of the transmission-distribution interface.  \n \nThe potential issues created by MISO’s proposed definition can be illustrated by \nconsidering the position of a 75 MW industrial or commercial customer interconnected to a \ndistribution substation within the MISO region as reflected in Figure 1 below.  Although the \ncustomer’s facility is not connected to the MISO transmission system, the customer’s facility \nwould appear to meet the definition of Large Load because (1) its facility has a load of 50 MW or \nmore interconnected at a single substation; (2) the facility is located behind the point at which the \ndistribution system interconnects with the MISO transmission system; and (3) the facility is owned \nby a single entity.   \nFigure 1: Single Distribution-Connected Facility \n \n \nDefining Large Load to include distribution-interconnected loads would extend the tariff’s \nrequirements beyond the category of customers that the Commission identified in the Show Cause \nOrder as giving rise to the reliability concerns underlying this proceeding.  The Commission \ninitiated this proceeding because it recognized that the integration of large loads into the \ntransmission system has the potential to materially affect transmission planning, system \noperations, and resource adequacy.  Loads that are interconnected solely to the distribution"},{"page":20,"startToken":5979,"endToken":6391,"text":"- 20 - \nnetwork lack the same nexus that justified the Commission’s intervention in the Show Cause \nOrder.  Absent revision and clarification, MISO’s proposed definition could be interpreted as \nsweeping in customers whose relationship to the transmission network may be indistinguishable \nfrom any other retail customer served through bundled retail service. \nExtending the definition of Large Load to customers that are interconnected to distribution \nfacilities also presents jurisdictional concerns.  In the Show Cause Order, the Commission \nrecognized that the FPA reserves to the states the authority to regulate retail sales and facilities for \nthe distribution of electricity and that nothing in the order was intended to intrude upon state \njurisdiction.49  To respect the jurisdictional boundaries established by Congress, the Commission \nmade clear that it was exercising its authority solely to address the rules governing the “provision \nof jurisdictional transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads \ninterconnecting to the transmission system[.]”50   \n \nClassifying distribution-connected loads as Large Loads would be particularly problematic \nin MISO where most retail customers continue to receive service under traditional bundled retail \nrates.51  The Commission has long drawn, and the courts have upheld, a jurisdictional line under \nwhich transmission that remains bundled with the sale and delivery of electric energy to an ultimate \nconsumer is treated as part of a state-regulated retail sale.52  Yet, MISO’s proposed definition could \n \n49 Id. at P 46.  \n50 Id. at P 47 (emphasis added).   \n51 Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 192 FERC ¶ 61,064 at PP 35-36 (2025), order on reh’g, 194 \nFERC ¶ 61,050 (2026) (noting that MISO region is largely comprised of vertically integrated utilities).  \n52 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by \nPublic Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888, 61 Fed. \nReg. 21,540, 21,625 (May 10, 1996). (“[W]hen transmission is sold at retail as part and parcel of the delivered product \ncalled electric energy, the transaction is a sale of electric energy at retail.”), clarified, 76 FERC ¶ 61,009 (1996), order \non reh’g, Order No. 888-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,048, at 30272 (1997), order on reh’g, Order No. 888-B, 81 \nFERC ¶ 61,248 (1997), order on reh’g, Order No. 888-C, 82 FERC ¶ 61,046 (1998), aff’d in part and remanded in \npart sub nom. Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d sub nom. New \nYork v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002)."},{"page":21,"startToken":6391,"endToken":6704,"text":"- 21 - \nresult in customers interconnected solely to state-jurisdictional distribution facilities and receiving \nservice through bundled retail rates being required to comply with operational requirements \ndeveloped for large transmission-interconnected load.  \n \nDCC notes that it is not entirely clear that MISO intends for the definition of Large Load \nto extend to transmission customers that are serving loads that are interconnected solely to the \ndistribution network, as certain tariff revisions proposed by MISO appear to contemplate \ntransmission-interconnected loads.53  But this same limitation is not reflected in the definition of \nLarge Load.  If MISO intends to limit the definition of Large Load to customers directly \ninterconnected to transmission facilities, the tariff language should explicitly include that \nlimitation consistent with the definition included in the Show Cause Order.  Because classification \nas a Large Load carries significant regulatory consequences, affected customers should not be \nrequired to infer from context whether a definition applies to transmission-interconnected \nfacilities, distribution-interconnected facilities, or both. \n2. \nMISO Has Not Demonstrated That Its Proposal To Aggregate \nCustomer Facilities Is Just And Reasonable \nMISO also does not demonstrate that its proposal to aggregate facilities and customers is \njust, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory.  As a starting point, MISO’s proposal to define \nLarge Load based on the load of facilities sharing a substation—rather than on the load of \nindividual customers—risks sweeping in relatively small commercial and industrial loads that do \nnot present the reliability concerns that the Commission sought to address in the Show Cause \nOrder.  Consider the example in Figure 2 of the load associated with two 20 MW industrial \nfacilities and a 10 MW commercial facility located within a single industrial park that is owned by \n \n53 See, e.g., Filing, Transmittal Letter at 22 (stating that “Large Load Equipment” is defined as the “facilities, \ndevices, or equipment that . . . are used to interconnect the Large Load to the Transmission System”) (emphasis added)."},{"page":22,"startToken":6704,"endToken":6868,"text":"- 22 - \na single commercial landlord and that share a single substation.  Although the tenants leasing these \nfacilities may operate separate businesses, with different load profiles, MISO’s proposed definition \ncould be interpreted as requiring them to be treated as a single large load because (1) the aggregate \nload of the facilities meets the 50 MW threshold; (2) the facilities are owned by a single entity \n(i.e., the same landlord); and (3) the facilities share a single substation.  \nFigure 2: Aggregation Of Customers \n \nMISO’s aggregation proposal also could result in the application of MISO’s proposed \nComputational Load standards to customers whose primary business is unrelated to computing.  \nFor instance, if the example described in Figure 2 were modified such that one of the facilities \nwere a 30 MW data center or cryptocurrency miner, it could result in the aggregation of facilities \nbeing deemed a Computational Load because it contains 25 MW or more of demand from \ninformation technology equipment, as reflected in Figure 3 below."},{"page":23,"startToken":6868,"endToken":7065,"text":"- 23 - \nFigure 3: Aggregation With Computational Load \n \nLike the application of the definition to distribution-connected load, it is not clear that the \nintent of MISO’s definition is to capture these types of arrangements within the definitions of \nLarge Load or Computational Load.  But these examples highlight that the scope of the definition \nof Large Load remains unclear and requires further tailoring to ensure that the definition provides \ncustomers with adequate notice and captures those loads that present the reliability concerns \ndiscussed in the Show Cause Order.   \nMISO’s proposal to aggregate facilities is even more concerning given its proposal to grant \nitself authority to aggregate facilities owned by entities that MISO deems to be “coordinating” \nwith respect to their load profile.  Notably, neither the tariff nor the transmittal letter defines what \nconstitutes coordination or provides objective criteria for making that determination.  The Filing \ndoes not explain, for instance, whether the relevant inquiry turns on common ownership, \ncontractual arrangements, operational practices, or some other form of relationship between the \nfacilities.   \nNor does MISO explain the degree of coordination necessary to warrant treatment as a \nsingle Large Load.  For example, it is unclear whether two facilities would be aggregated because"},{"page":24,"startToken":7065,"endToken":7415,"text":"- 24 - \nthey coordinate maintenance outages, share common equipment, or simply share a contractual \nrelationship with the same service provider.  Instead, MISO’s proposal leaves that determination \nto an undefined and inherently subjective assessment of whether entities are sufficiently \n“coordinated” with respect to their load profile. \nIf MISO is going to adopt a standard that would allow it to aggregate facilities owned by \nseparate entities into a single “Large Load” under the MISO tariff, then it should be required to \nadopt objective and transparent criteria that are narrowly tailored to capture those loads that present \nthe reliability concerns at issue and that provides customers with clear notice of a customer’s \ntreatment and regulatory obligations.  Classification as a Large Load should not be left to a \ntransmission provider’s subjective determination based on vague and undefined standards.   \nThe Commission has recognized the importance of ensuring that tariffs contain transparent \nand objective standards that constrain opportunities for the exercise of subjective discretion.54  For \ninstance, the Commission previously rejected a proposal by PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“PJM”) \nto define Fast-Start Resource as a resource that PJM deemed capable of meeting start-up and \nminimum run-time requirements set out in the tariff on the basis that it provided PJM with “too \nmuch discretion, and that this process should be more clearly defined in the Tariff.”55  MISO’s \nproposal suffers from a similar defect.  Without objective standards defining when multiple \nfacilities will be treated as a Large Load, the application of MISO’s definition would rest on the \ntype of case-by-case assessment that the Commission has found insufficient to ensure consistent \nand non-discriminatory treatment.   \n \n54 See Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 175 FERC ¶ 61,198, at PP 9, 39–40 (2021) (rejecting provision that would allow \nSPP board to waive zonal allocation of Byway facilities where tariff “contains no objective standards, criteria, or \nthresholds for the SPP’s Board’s decision whether to approve or deny a waiver”); order on reh’g, 184 FERC ¶ 61,028, \nat PP 49–52, order on reh’g, 185 FERC ¶ 61,189 (2023). \n55 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 173 FERC ¶ 61,244, at PP 22-26 (2020)."},{"page":25,"startToken":7415,"endToken":7774,"text":"- 25 - \n \nFor the foregoing reasons, DCC requests that the Commission reject MISO’s proposed \ndefinition of Large Load without prejudice to MISO filing a revised proposal that includes \nnarrowly tailored, objective, and transparent criteria for the classification of Large Loads.   \nC. \nMISO Has Not Demonstrated That Its Grandfathering Proposal Will \nMinimize Disruption To Existing Commercial Arrangements  \nIn the Show Cause Order, the Commission recognized that while changes to the MISO \ntariff are warranted, large loads already are working with transmission owners and other entities \nto interconnect their projects and obtain transmission service, including that customers are \n“negotiating, entering into, and/or have executed various agreements related to interconnecting to \nthe transmission system and/or the provision of transmission service.”56  Accordingly, the \nCommission directed MISO to address in its response to the Show Cause Order how MISO would \n“ensure minimal disruption to such existing commercial arrangements” and allow a “reasonable \namount of time to finalize ongoing agreements that are nearing completion as of the date such \nTariff provisions are filed with the Commission.”57 \n \nMISO proposes to respond to this directive by exempting certain resources from the \nreliability requirements proposed in its Filing.  Specifically, MISO proposes that:  \n• A Large Load, or portion of a Large Load, with a Service Commencement Date on \nor before December 4, 2026 would be fully exempt from Section 37A.  \n• A Large Load, or portion of a Large Load, with a Service Commencement Date \nafter December 4, 2026 that is associated with a transmission project that either (i) \nhas been approved by the MISO Board in MTEP 2026, or a prior MTEP, or (ii) has \nbeen submitted to MISO for EPR on or prior to June 18, 2026 (the “MTEP/EPR \nCondition”) would be exempt from ride-through and ramp requirements.   \n• A Large Load, or portion of a Large Load, that does not have a Service \nCommencement Date prior to December 4, 2026 and does not meet the MTEP/EPR \nCondition but is associated with a transmission project submitted to MISO for EPR \nbetween June 19, 2026 and October 31, 2026 would be subject to all of the \n \n56 Show Cause Order at P 123.  \n57 Id."},{"page":26,"startToken":7774,"endToken":8073,"text":"- 26 - \nrequirements of Section 37A unless MISO waives the ride-through requirements \nafter concluding that such waiver would not have an adverse reliability impact and \ncompliance with such requirements would result in significant costs.58 \nDCC appreciates MISO’s effort to recognize the potential impact that its proposed \nreliability requirements could have on existing large load customers that already have entered \ncommercial arrangements based on existing market rules.  In practice, requiring customers that \nhave already commenced the development of their facilities to comply with new ride-through, \nramp limits, and other requirements has the potential to create significant disruption by forcing \ncustomers to redesign their projects, modify protection and control systems, replace equipment, \nand implement other project-specific engineering modifications.  As a result, it is critically \nimportant that any new reliability requirements that are adopted include measures to respect the \nsettled expectations of customers, including appropriate exemptions and transition periods for \ncustomers that are required to comply with these requirements.  \nDCC believes, however, that MISO has not demonstrated that its proposal is appropriately \ntailored to avoid disruption to existing commercial arrangements that the Commission sought to \naddress in the Show Cause Order.  MISO’s proposed grandfathering framework turns entirely on \nthe status of an associated transmission project in the MTEP or EPR process rather than on the \ncommitments or progress made by Large Load customers.  In practice, whether a transmission \nproject satisfies the MTEP/EPR Condition may reflect little more than the timing or nature of a \ntransmission upgrade rather than the maturity of the underlying project.  Indeed, a customer may \nexecute utility service agreements, secure financing, procure major equipment, commit substantial \ncapital, and make irreversible business decisions prior to when an associated transmission project \nreaches the applicable MTEP or EPR milestone.   \n \n58 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 14; Filing, Tab A, Proposed § 37A.II."},{"page":27,"startToken":8073,"endToken":8408,"text":"- 27 - \nMISO’s proposal also has the potential to result in arbitrary differences in treatment \nbetween similarly situated transmission customers serving Large Loads.  Because the \ngrandfathering proposal is tied to the status of transmission upgrades associated with a particular \nLarge Load, a Large Load customer that has not triggered the need for transmission upgrades \nrequiring approval through the MTEP or EPR processes would not have any path to achieving \ngrandfathered treatment except energizing its project prior to December 2026.  The result is a \nframework under which projects at identical stages of development may receive materially \ndifferent treatment simply because one project requires transmission upgrades subject to the MTEP \nor EPR processes while the other does not.   \nIndeed, MISO’s proposal could create barriers to the timely development of projects that \nhave a relatively clear path to obtaining service in the near-term while providing grandfathered \ntreatment to less advanced customers.  For instance, a Large Load customer with a facility in the \nfinal stages of development that did not trigger significant transmission upgrades may have to \ndelay placing its facility into operation in order to redesign its facility, including procuring and \ninstalling new equipment and hardware, because it is unable to qualify for an exemption, even \nthough existing grid capacity is sufficient to support its load.  At the same time, a Large Load \ncustomer that may have to wait several years to commence operations while necessary \ntransmission facilities are constructed may be exempt from these requirements based solely on the \ntiming of when relevant transmission upgrades were submitted to MISO for review and approval. \nSuch arbitrary differences in treatment are unduly discriminatory and preferential.59 \nMISO argues that it proposed the MTEP/EPR Condition because MISO does not have a \n“Load interconnection process” and the need for transmission upgrades or related projects can be \n \n59 Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. FERC, 45 F.4th 265, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“[U]ndue discrimination \noccurs when similarly situated entities are charged different rates for no good reason.”)."},{"page":28,"startToken":8408,"endToken":8707,"text":"- 28 - \nidentified through the MTEP or EPR process.60  But MISO need not examine its MTEP and EPR \nprocesses to try to discern the relative maturity of different customers’ projects.  Instead, MISO \ncan address any potential gaps by requiring customers to provide evidence of their commercial \narrangements as a precondition of obtaining an exemption.   \nIn short, MISO has not demonstrated that its proposal to tie grandfathered treatment to the \nstatus of necessary transmission upgrades will further the objective of minimizing disruption to \nexisting commercial arrangements or why the status of transmission upgrades in the MTEP or EPR \nprocesses is a useful proxy for the commercial maturity of Large Load projects.  And while \nMISO’s proposal would result in customers that satisfy the MTEP/EPR Condition receiving \npreferential treatment relative to other customers, MISO has not demonstrated that satisfaction of \nthe MTEP/EPR Condition is an appropriate basis for disparate treatment.    \nTo achieve the objective that the Commission articulated in the Show Cause Order, DCC \nbelieves that MISO should adopt grandfathering provisions that exempt projects based on \nobjective evidence that a customer has entered material commercial arrangements for its project \nprior to the effective date of MISO’s proposed tariff revisions.  This could include, for instance, \nexecuted interconnection agreements, transmission service agreements, utility service agreements, \nor major equipment orders.  Such an approach would tie the grandfathering provisions to the types \nof commercial arrangements that the Commission sought to respect in the Show Cause Order. \nDCC believes that customers that provide objective evidence that they have entered into \nthe types of agreements described above should be exempt from the proposed ride-through and \nramp-rate requirements while remaining subject to the remaining requirements outlined in MISO’s \nfiling.  Complying with new ride-through and ramp requirements may require a customer to \n \n60 Filing, Tab C at 19."},{"page":29,"startToken":8707,"endToken":8976,"text":"- 29 - \nredesign its facility, replace and procure additional equipment, and modify existing operating and \ncontractual requirements.  For instance, a customer subject to new ride-through and ramp \nrequirements may need to install new power-electronic conversion equipment, battery energy \nstorage systems, and site protection relays/facility control systems.  As a result, it is the application \nof ride-through and ramp limit requirements that are most likely to undermine existing commercial \narrangements.  Providing an exemption only from ride-through and ramp limit requirements would \nprotect objectively verifiable reliance interests while preserving MISO’s access to the information \nnecessary to maintain system visibility and address demonstrated reliability risks.     \nIV. \nMOTION TO INTERVENE  \nDCC respectfully moves to intervene in this proceeding.  DCC is the membership \norganization for the U.S. data center industry, representing leading data center owners and \noperators that develop, operate, and maintain data center infrastructure and teams across the \ncountry.  DCC members operate data centers that constitute significant loads within the MISO \nregion and DCC has been an active stakeholder in regional efforts to ensure reliability, enable new \ngeneration, and discipline load forecasts.  \nDCC’s member companies provide the essential digital infrastructure that underpins the \nmodern economy and supports critical public services, including cloud computing, artificial \nintelligence, emergency response systems, and public safety operations.  From 2017 to 2023, the \ndata center industry contributed $3.5 trillion to U.S. GDP.  As the industry unlocks unprecedented \neconomic opportunities across the country and in the MISO region, supporting affordability is a \nfoundational priority for DCC members and the communities they serve.  DCC advocates for grid \nreforms that minimize unnecessary cost burdens, align with cost causation principles, facilitate"},{"page":30,"startToken":8976,"endToken":9173,"text":"- 30 - \nresponsible load growth, support the development of new generation, and enhance grid resilience \nsystem-wide without imposing undue costs on existing ratepayers.   \nFor the above reasons, DCC has a substantial interest in the outcome of this proceeding \nthat cannot be represented adequately by any other participant to this proceeding.  DCC’s \nintervention is in the public interest and its motion for leave to intervene in this proceeding should \nbe granted. \nV. \nCORRESPONDENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS \nDCC requests that the following names be placed on the official service list for this \nproceeding by the Commission and that all correspondence and communications with respect to \nthis proceeding be addressed to the following:61 \nMorgan A. Sipple \nDirector, Energy Policy – FERC and RTOs \nDATA CENTER COALITION \n1250 H Street, NW \nWashington, DC  20005 \nmorgan@datacentercoalition.org  \n \n \nStephen J. Hug \nChristopher Hargett \nAKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP \n2001 K Street, N.W. \nWashington, D.C.  20006 \nTel: (202) 887-4000 \nshug@akingump.com  \nchargett@akingump.com  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n61 DCC respectfully requests waiver of Rule 203(b)(3) of the Commission’s regulations, 18 C.F.R. § \n385.203(b)(3), in order to permit designation of more than two persons for service in this proceeding."},{"page":31,"startToken":9173,"endToken":9265,"text":"- 31 - \nVI. \nCONCLUSION \nFor the reasons set out above, DCC respectfully requests that the Commission issue an \norder consistent with these comments.  \n \nRespectfully submitted, \n \n \n \n/s/ Stephen J. Hug \nMorgan A. Sipple \nDirector, Energy Policy – FERC and RTOs \nDATA CENTER COALITION \n1250 H Street, NW \nWashington, DC  20005 \nmorgan@datacentercoalition.org  \n \nData Center Coalition \nStephen J. Hug \nChristopher Hargett \nAKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP \n2001 K Street, N.W. \nWashington, D.C.  20006 \nTel: (202) 887-4000 \nshug@akingump.com \nchargett@akingump.com  \n \n \n \nDated: September 18, 2026 \n \n \nCounsel for the Data Center Coalition"},{"page":32,"startToken":9265,"endToken":9317,"text":"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI hereby certify that I have this day served a copy of the foregoing document on the persons \ndesignated on the official service list compiled by the Secretary in this proceeding. \n \nDated at Washington, D.C., this 18th day of September 2026. \n/s/ Stephen J. Hug \n \n \n \nStephen J. Hug"}],"sections":[{"p":1,"at":0,"title":"Opening text","method":"opening text","endPage":1,"endAt":690,"startToken":0,"endToken":97},{"p":1,"at":690,"title":"I. OVERVIEW OF THE DATA CENTER COALITION","method":"printed heading","endPage":2,"endAt":128,"startToken":97,"endToken":318},{"p":2,"at":128,"title":"II. INTRODUCTION","method":"printed heading","endPage":2,"endAt":133,"startToken":318,"endToken":319},{"p":2,"at":133,"title":"INTRODUCTION","method":"printed heading","endPage":6,"endAt":7,"startToken":319,"endToken":1383},{"p":6,"at":7,"title":"III. COMMENTS","method":"printed heading","endPage":6,"endAt":23,"startToken":1383,"endToken":1385},{"p":6,"at":23,"title":"A. MISO’s Filing Is Inconsistent With The Show Cause Order, The FPA, And","method":"printed heading","endPage":17,"endAt":8,"startToken":1385,"endToken":5040},{"p":17,"at":8,"title":"B. MISO Has Not Demonstrated That Its Proposed Definition Of Large Load Is","method":"printed heading","endPage":25,"endAt":283,"startToken":5040,"endToken":7454},{"p":25,"at":283,"title":"C. MISO Has Not Demonstrated That Its Grandfathering Proposal Will","method":"printed heading","endPage":29,"endAt":782,"startToken":7454,"endToken":8808},{"p":29,"at":782,"title":"IV. MOTION TO INTERVENE","method":"printed heading","endPage":30,"endAt":470,"startToken":8808,"endToken":9045},{"p":30,"at":470,"title":"V. CORRESPONDENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS","method":"printed heading","endPage":31,"endAt":8,"startToken":9045,"endToken":9174},{"p":31,"at":8,"title":"VI. CONCLUSION","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":31,"endAt":13,"startToken":9174,"endToken":9175},{"p":31,"at":13,"title":"CONCLUSION","method":"printed heading","endPage":32,"endAt":0,"startToken":9175,"endToken":9265},{"p":32,"at":0,"title":"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE","method":"printed heading","endPage":32,"endAt":308,"startToken":9265,"endToken":9317}]}