{"document":{"slug":"filing-20261103-5190","title":"Motion for Leave to Answer and Answer of the Data Center Coalition re the 10/13/2026 Answer of Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. et al","issued":"2026-11-03","accession":"20261103-5190","docket":"ER26-3650-000","group":"MISO filings","filer":"Data Center Coalition","kind":"answer","file":"sources/originals/20261103-5190_01.pdf","url":"https://elibrary.ferc.gov/eLibrary/filelist?accession_Number=20261103-5190","sha256":"01a547cf9dc70445ccc1bc696ce887b5ebdd4f2d1ce45fc709b2924f047824d9","pages":21,"tokens":6181,"emptyPages":[]},"pages":[{"page":1,"startToken":0,"endToken":398,"text":"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nBEFORE THE \nFEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \n) \nMidcontinent Independent System \nOperator, Inc. \n ) \n Docket No. ER26-3650-000\n) \n \nMOTION FOR LEAVE TO ANSWER \nAND ANSWER OF THE DATA CENTER COALITION \nPursuant to Rules 212 and 213 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Federal Energy \nRegulatory Commission (“FERC” or the “Commission”),1 the Data Center Coalition (“DCC”)2 \nhereby moves for leave to answer3 and answers the answer of Midcontinent Independent System \nOperator, Inc. (“MISO”)4 and certain other parties concerning MISO’s proposal to establish \nInterconnection Reliability Requirements (“IRR”) for Large Loads.5 \nI. \nANSWER \nDCC supports the objectives underlying MISO’s Filing in this proceeding.  DCC and its \nmembers have led efforts, both in MISO and at the state level, to advance reforms that \n \n1 18 C.F.R. §§ 385.212 and 385.213. \n2 DCC is a membership organization of leading data center owners and operators. Public testimony and \nwritten comments submitted by DCC do not necessarily reflect the views of each individual DCC member.  A list of \ncurrent DCC members is accessible at https://www.datacentercoalition.org/members. \n3 DCC acknowledges that the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure do not typically allow answers \nto answers.  However, the Commission has accepted answers in the past when they have (i) assisted the Commission \nin understanding the issues presented, (ii) provided additional information for the Commission’s decision-making \nprocess, and (iii) helped ensure an accurate record. See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 181 FERC ¶ 61,162, at P \n29 (2022); Canal Generating LLC, 181 FERC ¶ 61,157, at P 14 (2022); Equitrans, L.P., 134 FERC ¶ 61,250, at P 6 \n(2011); Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 132 FERC ¶ 61,023, at P 16 (2010).  DCC’s answer will help the Commission \nunderstand the issues presented by MISO’s answer and provide further information related to the issues in this \nproceeding to inform the Commission’s decision-making process.  DCC therefore respectfully requests leave to file \nthis answer and asks the Commission to consider this answer in its deliberations in this proceeding. \n4 Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER26-3650-000, Motion for Leave to Answer and \nAnswer of the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. (Oct. 13, 2026) (“MISO Answer”). \n5 Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER26-3650-000, Proposal of Midcontinent \nIndependent System Operator, Inc. to Establish Certain Interconnection Reliability Requirements for Large Loads \n(Aug. 28, 2026) (“Filing”)."},{"page":2,"startToken":398,"endToken":787,"text":"- 2 - \naccommodate large-load growth across the region.  DCC shares the goal of creating a durable, \ntransparent framework that maintains reliability, protects retail customers, and provides large-load \ncustomers, utilities, and states the certainty they need to plan and invest with confidence. \nUnfortunately, as DCC explained in its comments, MISO’s proposal falls short of \nestablishing the “clear and consistent” framework contemplated by the Commission’s Show Cause \nOrder and ultimately required by the filing requirements of the Federal Power Act (“FPA”).6  \nMISO’s proposed tariff revisions in this proceeding tell transmission customers that they will be \nsubject to new reliability requirements but without providing any detail on the substance of the \nrequirements that will be applied.  MISO’s proposed definition of Large Load and its proposal to \ngrant itself authority to revoke a customer’s exemption from the reliability requirements only \ncreate further uncertainty about the scope and application of these requirements.  \nDCC is not alone in expressing concern about MISO’s Filing in this proceeding.   \nStakeholders representing a broad cross-section of interests have objected to MISO’s decision to \nleave substantive requirements outside the tariff and expressed concern about the uncertainty that \ncustomers will face under the proposal.7  Entergy, for example, explained that “[w]ithout defined \nand clear reliability standards,” transmission customers and Large Loads lack the transparency \n \n6 Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER26-3650-000, Motion to Intervene and Comments \nof the Data Center Coalition (Sept. 18, 2026) (“DCC Comments”); Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., et al., \n195 FERC ¶ 61,212, at P 48 (2026) (“Show Cause Order”). \n7 See Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER26-3650-000, Limited Protest of Entergy \nServices, LLC at 1-17 (Sept. 18, 2026) (“Entergy Protest”); Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No. \nER26-3650-000, Protest of the Southern Regulators at 1-2 (Sept. 18, 2026) (“Southern Regulators Protest”); \nMidcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER26-3650-000, Comments of Google LLC at 7-8 (Sept. 18, \n2026); Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER26-3650-000, Comments and Requests for \nClarification and in the Alternative Limited Protest of the Large Energy Users at 6-9 (Sept. 18, 2026); Midcontinent \nIndep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER26-3650-000, Protest of Sierra Club, et al. at 18-23 (Sept. 18, 2026); \nMidcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER26-3650-000, Comments, Request for Clarification, and \nLimited Protest of Rowan Digital Infrastructure, LLC at 1-3 (Sept. 18, 2026)."},{"page":3,"startToken":787,"endToken":1088,"text":"- 3 - \nnecessary to understand their obligations or evaluate their operational and financial impacts.8  The \nSouthern Regulators put the point more starkly: developers and transmission owners risk \n“installing equipment, consistent with good utility practices, only to then replace that equipment \nat great expense after MISO later publishes the actual requirements.”9  The breadth of opposition \nto MISO’s proposal reinforces the serious issues created by a framework in which MISO can \nunilaterally change the standards applicable to customers. \nMISO’s Answer fails to allay these concerns or address the legal defects in its preferred \napproach.  MISO states that it intends to keep the substance of the reliability requirements in its \nBusiness Practice Manuals (“BPM”) given its expectation that they will “require periodic updates” \nand wants to ensure that MISO can change them “without repeatedly reopening the Tariff.”10  \nMISO further suggests that customers that are nominally exempt from the reliability requirements \nunder its proposed transition provisions cannot rely on these exemptions, as they “do not create an \nabsolute or perpetual reliability exemption” and that MISO retains the discretion to “require \ncompliance with any or all Section 37A requirements” based on criteria and procedures that will \nnot be filed with or approved by the Commission.11  The effect of this proposal would be to \nestablish a framework under which MISO can unilaterally define, change, and apply reliability \nrequirements as it deems fit and without meaningful Commission oversight.   \nMISO argues that commenters that advocate for additional details to be included in the \ntariff are merely presenting “alternative approaches to particular aspects of MISO’s proposal, but \ndo not establish that the framework proposed by MISO fails to satisfy the requirements of Section \n \n8 Entergy Protest at 3.   \n9 Southern Regulators Protest at 1 (emphasis in original).   \n10 MISO Answer at 26, 33. \n11 Id. at 19."},{"page":4,"startToken":1088,"endToken":1407,"text":"- 4 - \n205 of the [FPA].”12  This is not a case, however, where a filing party and commenters are arguing \nover which of a range of just and reasonable alternatives should be adopted.  As the filing utility, \nMISO has the burden of submitting tariff revisions that comport with the FPA and the Rule of \nReason, and MISO has not made any effort to demonstrate how its proposed tariff revisions meet \nthese statutory requirements.  \nDCC does not seek to tie MISO’s hands by requiring it to incorporate every detail of its \nproposed reliability requirements in the MISO tariff.  But the Rule of Reason already strikes a \nbalance between customers’ interests in receiving advance notice of the terms and conditions of \nservice and the potential burden on utilities by allowing transmission providers to place \nimplementation details of “practical insignificance” in their manuals13 while requiring the utility \nto file those practices that “significantly affect rates, terms, and conditions” of FERC-jurisdictional \nservice.14  The balance struck by the Rule of Reason does not permit a utility to avoid the filing \nrequirements of the FPA simply because it wishes to retain greater flexibility; where, as here, \nrequirements significantly affect the terms and conditions of jurisdictional service, they must be \nincluded in the tariff and remain subject to Commission oversight.  \nNor is there any tension between MISO’s stated interest in protecting reliability and the \nnotice requirements of the FPA.  To the contrary, the two go hand in hand.  Large Loads can only \nmake the investments needed to maintain reliability if they understand the requirements that will \napply to them.  A framework that tells customers they must comply with reliability requirements \n \n12 Id. at 2-3. \n13 Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y. v. FERC, 813 F.2d 448, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1987). \n14 See, e.g., Boston Energy Trading & Mktg. LLC v. Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 153 FERC ¶ \n61,336, at P 39 (2015)."},{"page":5,"startToken":1407,"endToken":1738,"text":"- 5 - \nbut leaves customers guessing as to whether they are subject to these requirements and the \nsubstance of their obligations undermines the very reliability objectives MISO seeks to advance.   \nIndeed, MISO’s proposal to relegate the substance of the reliability requirements to its \nBPMs creates an enforceability problem.  The Commission and the courts have recognized that \nthe Commission has no obligation to enforce the terms of an unfiled BPM.15  Even in cases where \nBPMs were incorporated by reference into the tariff, the courts have found that provisions of \nunfiled BPMs that significantly affected the rates, terms, and conditions of service were \nunenforceable as a matter of law.16  MISO’s proposal to include the substance of its standards in \nits BPMs raises serious questions as to whether these standards are enforceable against \ntransmission customers at all.   \nMISO’s desire to refine these requirements in the future does not require leaving them out \nof the tariff.  If MISO later determines that its reliability requirements should be modified, the FPA \nalready provides a path: MISO may file proposed tariff revisions under Section 205 of the FPA.  \nGiven the significant effect that these requirements can have on customers’ investment decisions \nand their ability to obtain transmission service, requiring MISO to give 60 days’ notice and obtain \nCommission acceptance before changing them is hardly an undue burden.   \nFor the reasons described herein and in DCC’s comments, the Commission should reject \nthe IRR proposal without prejudice to MISO filing a revised proposal that (1) places the \nsubstantive requirements and standards required by Section 205 and the Rule of Reason in the \ntariff, (2) adopts objective and transparent Large Load classification and aggregation criteria, and \n(3) establishes transition protections reasonably tied to objectively demonstrable commercial \n \n15 RWE Clean Energy, LLC v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 194 FERC ¶ 61,212, at P 38 (2026); Keyspan-\nRavenswood, LLC v. FERC, 474 F.3d 804, 810 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Keyspan-Ravenswood”). \n16 Keyspan-Ravenswood, LLC v. FERC, 474 F.3d at 811."},{"page":6,"startToken":1738,"endToken":2007,"text":"- 6 - \ncommitments and reliance interests rather than solely to the status of associated transmission \nupgrades.   \nA. \nMISO Has Not Demonstrated That Its Proposal To Leave The Substance Of \nThe Standards To Its BPMs Is Consistent With The FPA \n1. \nMISO Overstates The Detail Provided In The Tariff \nMISO argues that proposed Section 37A “contains the core obligations” applicable to Large \nLoads and Computational Loads, while the BPMs will merely supply the “technical and \nadministrative detail” needed to implement them.17  According to MISO, the Rule of Reason does \nnot require “every engineering parameter, data format, testing protocol, or implementation \nprocedure to be frozen in a filed tariff.”18 \nMISO vastly overstates the level of detail included in its proposed tariff revisions.  While \nMISO maintains that it is merely proposing to leave implementation details to the manuals, the \ndetail omitted from the tariff goes far beyond engineering details and technical data submission \nrequirements.  To the contrary, MISO’s proposed tariff revisions effectively grant MISO authority \nto impose new reliability requirements on transmission customers serving Large Loads, but \nwithout providing any detail regarding the substance of these reliability requirements.   \nMISO’s treatment of ramp smoothing illustrates the problem.  MISO explains for the first \ntime in its Answer that associated generation, energy storage, uninterruptible power supply \nsystems, and other load-management technologies may be used to smooth a customer’s changes \nin demand.19  None of this detail appears in the tariff.  The only reference to ramp smoothing in \nMISO’s proposed tariff revisions is a single statement in Section 37A.7 that ramp limits shall \n \n17 MISO Answer at 22. \n18 Id.  \n19 Id. at 24-25."},{"page":7,"startToken":2007,"endToken":2376,"text":"- 7 - \ninclude “any reduction/ramp smoothing provided by generation or other resources[.]”20  \nNotwithstanding MISO’s claim that the tariff establishes “eligibility for ramp smoothing,”21 the \nproposed tariff does not identify which resources qualify, the criteria these resources need to meet, \nhow their contributions will be measured, or how those contributions will be factored into whether \na customer has complied with the ramp limits.  Indeed, a customer that reviewed the language of \nSection 37A.7 would have difficulty even understanding what ramp smoothing is or how it relates \nto MISO’s proposed ramp limits.   \nThe same is true of the ramp limits and ride-through requirements themselves.  The \nproposed tariff states that transmission customers taking service on behalf of Computational Loads \nmust comply with ramp limits and ride-through requirements, but leaves the substance of those \nobligations to the BPMs, including the applicable ramp limit, the disturbances that customers must \nride through, the performance criteria that customers must meet, and the manner in which \ncompliance will be evaluated and tested.22  MISO confirms that it intends to impose an initial ±30 \nMW/minute ramp limit, yet it declines to include that limit in the tariff.23  These are not mere \nimplementation details; they represent the core of the obligations that transmission customers \nserving Large Loads will be required to meet to obtain FERC-jurisdictional service.   \nMISO acknowledges that a tariff “must state the operative obligation and sufficiently \nconstrain discretion.”24  But proposed Section 37A does neither.  By MISO’s own description, \n \n20 Filing, Tab A, Proposed § 37A.7. \n21 MISO Answer at 22.  \n22 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 25-26, Tab A, Proposed §§ 37A.6, 37A.7; MISO Answer at 22, 24. \n23 MISO Answer at 24-25.  DCC’s position that the ramp limit must be stated in the tariff does not concede \nthat a ±30 MW/minute limit is just and reasonable. Absent the operative standards in the filed tariff, neither the \nCommission nor commenters can determine whether MISO’s proposed requirements are supported by demonstrated \nreliability needs or reasonably tailored to the risks MISO seeks to address. DCC Comments at 4, 15; see also MISO \nAnswer at 25 (stating that this figure is an “industry-informed baseline” that “may be refined”). \n24 MISO Answer at 24."},{"page":8,"startToken":2376,"endToken":2698,"text":"- 8 - \nComputational Loads must comply with ramp limits and ride through disturbances “within \nperformance criteria established through the BPM” and MISO will have complete discretion to \nmodify these requirements by revising its BPM.25  MISO’s proposed tariff language does not \nconstrain discretion; it reserves it. \nMISO likewise does not justify placing the substance of its proposed standards in its BPMs \nwhen its tariff has specified ride-through requirements for generators and detailed testing and \nverification standards for other resources.26  MISO does not explain why Large Loads should \nreceive materially less certainty and transparency regarding the standards against which their \ncompliance will be measured.   \nNor does MISO meaningfully respond to the precedent DCC cited concerning metering, \nmeasurement, and verification, and submission deadlines.27  The Commission previously required \nMISO to include measurement and verification protocols, including metering standards, in its \ntariff, and has found a tariff deficient where it omitted a deadline for submitting meter data.28  Yet \nproposed Sections 37A.1 and 37A.2 require customers to submit facility, one-line, and modeling \ninformation “consistent with timelines specified in the BPMs,” rather than establishing those \ndeadlines in the tariff.29  These are not mere administrative details.  The measurement and \nverification requirements establish how compliance will be demonstrated, while the submission \ndeadlines determine when customers must provide the information necessary to obtain and \n \n25 Id.   \n26 DCC Comments at 10-11 (citing Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 114 FERC ¶ 61,270 \n(2006); Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 187 FERC ¶ 61,144 (2024); MISO Tariff § 69.A.3.5(j)). \n27 DCC Comments at 10-11, 14. \n28 Id. at 10, 14 (citing Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 137 FERC ¶ 61,214, at P 79 (2011); \nMidcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 169 FERC ¶ 61,137, at P 252 (2019); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 182 \nFERC ¶ 61,143, at P 249 (2023)). \n29 DCC Comments at 14-15 (citing Filing, Tab A, Proposed §§ 37A.1, 37A.2)."},{"page":9,"startToken":2698,"endToken":3069,"text":"- 9 - \nmaintain service.  MISO does not explain why comparable requirements were required to be \nincluded in filed tariffs in those proceedings but may be left to the BPMs here. \nMISO argues that its proposed approach is consistent with the Commission’s acceptance \nof Southwest Power Pool, Inc.’s (“SPP”) High Impact Large Load (“HILL”) framework.30  But \nMISO’s reliance on the Commission’s order approving the SPP HILL proposal is misplaced, as the \nCommission’s order did not address the Rule of Reason or its application to the tariff revisions \nproposed in that proceeding.  Thus, the Commission’s decision cannot be construed as an \nendorsement of any application of the Rule of Reason, let alone the approach taken by MISO in \nthis proceeding.31 \n2. \nMISO’s Desire For Flexibility Does Not Justify Leaving Its Standards \nIn The BPMs And Would Undermine Settled Expectations \nMISO’s principal justification for leaving the substance of its requirements to the BPMs is \nthat it may wish to modify those standards in the future.32  But including the substantive standards \nin the tariff does not freeze them in time.  MISO will retain its right under Section 205 of the FPA \nto propose changes to these requirements as needed, just as it does for every other aspect of its \ntariff and markets.  MISO’s reliability requirements are no different from any other market rule.  \n \n30 MISO Answer at 24 (citing Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 194 FERC ¶ 61,031, at PP 13-21, 61, 63 (2026)). \n31 Duke Energy Progress, LLC, 177 FERC ¶ 61,001, at P 37 n.64 (2021), order on reh’g, 179 FERC ¶ 61,007 \n(2022) (finding that prior approval of agreements that did not require the transmission provider to reimburse customers \nfor network upgrade costs were not determinative as the issue of reimbursement was not raised in prior proceedings \nand “[q]uestions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not \nto be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedent”) (quoting Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507 (1925)).  \nSee also PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 153 FERC ¶ 61,308, at P 13 (2015) (“[S]ilence is not evidence of Commission \npolicy.”). \n32 MISO Answer at 23, 33."},{"page":10,"startToken":3069,"endToken":3311,"text":"- 10 - \nIndeed, if the possibility that a requirement may later change were sufficient to keep it out of the \ntariff, virtually no requirement would ever need to be filed. \nMISO’s approach also would expose the substantial, long-term investments of Large Load \ncustomers to material uncertainty.  These customers must make equipment, engineering, \nprocurement, and operational decisions based on the standards that govern their service.  The \nCommission recognized in the Show Cause Order that new requirements could disrupt those \ninvestments and directed MISO to minimize disruption to existing commercial arrangements.33  \nYet MISO’s framework would allow it to create through future BPM revisions the very disruption \nthat the Commission directed it to avoid. \nFor instance, nothing in proposed Section 37A would prevent MISO from tightening the \nramp limit from ±30 MW/minute to a fraction of that level, or materially changing the ride-through \ncriteria, after customers have procured and installed equipment to satisfy the existing standards—\nall without a Section 205 filing or Commission review.  And since MISO would be able to make \nthis change unilaterally, it would have no obligation to propose a transition period or other \nmeasures to avoid disrupting existing contractual arrangements and investments that were made \nbased on the prior standards.  MISO’s statement that BPMs allow technical requirements to be \nrefined “without repeatedly reopening the Tariff” therefore confirms, rather than resolves, DCC’s \nconcern.34 \n \n33 Show Cause Order at P 123; DCC Comments at 16. \n34 MISO Answer at 26."},{"page":11,"startToken":3311,"endToken":3649,"text":"- 11 - \nB. \nMISO Has Not Demonstrated That Its Proposed Large Load Definition Is Just \nAnd Reasonable Or Provides Customers Adequate Notice \n1. \nMISO Does Not Resolve The Treatment Of Distribution-Connected \nLoads \nAs DCC and other parties have pointed out, MISO’s proposed definition of Large Load \ncould be interpreted as extending to loads interconnected to the distribution system.35  Although \nother tariff revisions proposed by MISO appear to contemplate transmission-interconnected load, \nthe definition of Large Load is ambiguous.36  To eliminate any ambiguity, DCC and other parties \nurge the Commission to direct MISO to revise the definition of Large Load to explicitly reference \na voltage threshold and/or interconnection to the MISO transmission system.37 \nIn its Answer, MISO argues that these concerns are misplaced and that Section 37A does \nnot apply to “distribution-connected load that is not taking MISO Transmission Service.”38 While \nDCC appreciates MISO’s effort to provide additional clarity, MISO’s statement does not resolve \nthe ambiguity DCC identified or eliminate the need for tariff language explicitly limiting the \ndefinition to load interconnected to the MISO transmission system.39  In practice, utilities take \ntransmission service to serve all of their loads, including those interconnected to the distribution \nsystem.40  As a result, MISO’s statement could be interpreted as implying that the proposed \ndefinition of Large Load extends to customers that are interconnected to the distribution system \nmerely because the energy used to serve these customers flows over the transmission system.  \n \n35 DCC Comments at 18-20; Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER26-3650-000, Motion \nto Intervene and Comments of Central Municipal Power Agency/Services, Indiana Municipal Power Agency, \nMissouri Joint Municipal Electric Utility Commission, and WPPI Energy at 4-8 (Sept. 18, 2026) (“Midwest TDUs \nComments”). \n36 DCC Comments at 18-20; Midwest TDUs Comments at 5-7. \n37 DCC Comments at 18-20; Midwest TDUs Comments at 4, 7-8. \n38 MISO Answer at 26-27. \n39 Id. at 27 (citing Filing, Transmittal Letter at 12; Filing, Tab C at 14-16). \n40 DCC Comments at 18-20; see also MISO Answer at 27."},{"page":12,"startToken":3649,"endToken":3944,"text":"- 12 - \nNeither the Commission nor customers should be required to guess at the proper \ninterpretation of MISO’s statement or the meaning of the tariff.  The definition of Large Load that \nthe Commission proposed in the Show Cause Order was limited to load that “interconnects to the \ntransmission system at a voltage level of greater than 69 kV[.]”41 The SPP HILL framework on \nwhich MISO relies in this proceeding similarly includes a voltage threshold.42  MISO does not \nexplain why it cannot provide customers with a comparable level of clarity regarding the scope of \nits proposed definition. \nMISO states that no “separate voltage threshold is necessary because Points of Withdrawal \nbound applicability across the Transmission System”43 and that the MISO “Transmission System \nincludes both facilities over which functional control has been transferred to MISO and certain \nfacilities over which MISO does not have functional control.”44  But even if MISO believes that a \nspecific voltage threshold would be inappropriate—which has not been shown—MISO has not \nexplained why the definition of Large Load cannot include explicit language limiting its \napplication to load interconnected to the MISO transmission system.  \nA clear definition of Large Load is needed to ensure that MISO’s requirements only extend \nto those loads that present the reliability risks that MISO cites in support of its Filing.  MISO offers \nno analysis showing that 50 MW attributable to one distribution-connected customer affects the \ntransmission system differently than 50 MW attributable to multiple retail customers that are \ninterconnected to the distribution system.45  Extending MISO’s proposed reliability requirements \n \n41 Show Cause Order at P 58. \n42 MISO Answer at 7-8 (citing Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 194 FERC ¶ 61,031, at PP 13-21). \n43 Id. at 10.  \n44 Id. \n45 DCC Comments at 19-20."},{"page":13,"startToken":3944,"endToken":4242,"text":"- 13 - \nto customers interconnected to the distribution system would be unjust, unreasonable, unduly \ndiscriminatory, and contrary to the Show Cause Order.  \n2. \nMISO’s Aggregation Standard Remains Overbroad And Undefined \nMISO argues that its proposal to aggregate load associated with facilities that are owned, \noperated, or controlled by a “single entity or . . . a group of entities that will coordinate with respect \nto the profile of the Load” provides customers sufficient notice of whether they will be classified \nas a Large Load.46  According to MISO, its proposal provides “clear and objective aggregation \ncriteria” \nincluding \na \n“single-substation \nlocation, \ncommon \nor \ncoordinated \nownership/operation/control, and a 50 MW Demand threshold.”47   \nBut merely restating MISO’s proposed definition of Large Load does not resolve the \nambiguities that DCC pointed out in its comments.  For example, while MISO states that it will \naggregate customers that coordinate with respect to their load, neither the Filing nor the Answer \nidentifies the degree of coordination required to subject customers to regulation.  As a result, it is \nunclear how a customer will be able to determine in advance whether its facility will be aggregated \nwith the load of an adjacent facility.  Indeed, MISO states that the definition is intended to preserve \n“MISO’s ability to evaluate the system impacts and coordinated operations of coordinated \nfacilities,”48 suggesting that aggregation is likely to turn on MISO’s after-the-fact evaluation rather \nthan criteria a customer can apply in advance.49  If MISO intends to aggregate separately owned \nfacilities based on coordination, the tariff should define the conduct, contractual arrangements, or \noperational relationships that constitute “coordination,” and the degree of coordination required, \n \n46 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 10; Filing, Tab A, Proposed Module A, § 1.L.  MISO Answer at 9-10. \n47 MISO Answer at 9. \n48 Id. at 10. \n49 Id."},{"page":14,"startToken":4242,"endToken":4494,"text":"- 14 - \nso that customers can determine in advance whether their facilities will be treated as a single Large \nLoad.50 \nMISO attempts to justify its aggregation proposal based on the potential effects of facilities \nthat coordinate their operations and behave as a unified electrical entity.51  But MISO’s definition \nis not limited to facilities that coordinate their operations or otherwise behave as a unified electrical \nentity.  MISO’s definition provides for aggregation based on common ownership alone.52  \nIndependent tenants therefore could be aggregated merely because they lease facilities from a \ncommon owner, even when their operations and load profiles are unrelated.53   \nThe consequences of MISO’s overbroad aggregation standard are likely to be particularly \nsevere where one facility contains enough information technology demand to trigger the \nComputational Load definition.  As DCC’s comments demonstrated, a single computational tenant \ncould sweep unrelated industrial and commercial facilities into regulation as Computational \nLoad.54  MISO defends computational activity as a proxy for the rapid, coordinated behavior that \nits heightened requirements are intended to address, but it does not demonstrate that it is just and \nreasonable for unrelated non-computational facilities to become subject to those requirements \nthrough aggregation.55   \n \n50 DCC Comments at 23-24. \n51 MISO Answer at 10. \n52 Filing, Tab A, Proposed Module A, § 1.L (defining Large Load to include qualifying facilities owned, \noperated, or controlled by “a single entity”); see also MISO Answer at 9. \n53 DCC Comments at 21-22. \n54 Id. at 22-23. \n55 MISO Answer at 12-13; DCC Comments at 22-24."},{"page":15,"startToken":4494,"endToken":4798,"text":"- 15 - \nC. \nMISO Has Not Demonstrated That Its Transition Framework Will Minimize \nDisruption To Existing Commercial Arrangements  \n1. \nMTEP/EPR Status Is Not A Reasonable Proxy For Commercial \nReliance \nMISO maintains that its proposal to exempt from ramp and ride‑through requirements \ncertain Large Loads that are associated with a transmission project approved in the MISO \nTransmission Expansion Plan (“MTEP”) or submitted for Expedited Project Review (“EPR”) prior \nto certain dates will “limit the potential need to revisit equipment selections and operating \narrangements made in reliance on existing requirements[.]”56  But MISO fails to demonstrate that \nthere is any nexus between when a transmission project is approved in the MTEP process or \nsubmitted to the EPR process and the timing of when customers make binding investment \ndecisions.  In practice, customers may execute utility service agreements, secure financing, procure \nmajor equipment, and make other irreversible business decisions well in advance of when \nassociated transmission is approved in MTEP or submitted into the EPR process.57  While limiting \nthe exemption to customers based on the status of transmission facilities in the MTEP and EPR \nprocesses may be administratively convenient for MISO, MISO has not provided any evidence \nthat its proposal will avoid disruption to existing arrangements consistent with the Show Cause \nOrder.    \nMISO also does not respond to DCC’s showing that this mismatch will result in materially \ndifferent treatment of projects based solely on whether they require transmission upgrades through \nthe MTEP or EPR processes.58  A substantially developed project that does not require such \nupgrades would receive no transition protection unless it commences service by December 4, 2026, \n \n56 Filing, Tab A, Proposed §§ 37A.II.1, 37A.II.2(b); MISO Answer at 15.  \n57 DCC Comments at 26. \n58 Filing, Tab A, Proposed § 37A.II.2; MISO Answer at 15-16; DCC Comments at 27."},{"page":16,"startToken":4798,"endToken":5081,"text":"- 16 - \nwhile a less-developed project may qualify merely because an associated transmission project was \napproved through the MTEP or submitted into the EPR process.  In practice, a facility in the final \nstages of development that can come online in the near term without the construction of significant \ntransmission upgrades could be required to delay energization to redesign its equipment, while a \nproject that must wait years for transmission construction could receive transition protection.59  \nProviding less favorable treatment to a project that is more mature based solely on the status of \nassociated transmission is unduly discriminatory and preferential and inconsistent with the \nobjectives of the Show Cause Order. \n2. \nMISO Regularly Relies On Commercial Commitments As Evidence Of \nProject Maturity \nMISO’s principal defense of its framework is that it is preferable to a “project-by-project \ninquiry into private commercial commitments.”60  MISO argues that “[t]reating all agreements as \na sufficient determination of project maturity would render the requirement largely meaningless” \nand that “developing prescribed contractual terms and requirements would be unworkable for \nLarge Loads whose commercial arrangements do not conform to predefined structures.”61  MISO \nadds that requiring it to make an individualized determination for “each piece of evidence would \nrequire a degree of specialized legal knowledge and commercial expertise that MISO does not \npossess and could not reasonably acquire without significant staff augmentation.”62 \nMISO’s arguments are flawed in several respects.  As an initial matter, even if the \nalternative proposal that DCC outlined were unworkable, the fact remains that MISO has not \nprovided any evidence that the proposal that it has filed in this proceeding will avoid disruptions \n \n59 DCC Comments at 27. \n60 MISO Answer at 16.  \n61 Id.  \n62 Id."},{"page":17,"startToken":5081,"endToken":5441,"text":"- 17 - \nto existing commercial arrangements consistent with the Show Cause Order and is otherwise just, \nreasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.  MISO cannot avoid its burden by \nclaiming that alternatives identified by commenters are administratively inconvenient.    \nMISO also mischaracterizes DCC’s proposal.  DCC did not propose that the ability of a \ncustomer to produce any type of agreement would qualify a project for an exemption.  Instead, \nDCC proposed that grandfathering be based on a defined set of verifiable commercial \ncommitments—such as executed interconnection, transmission-service, or utility-service \nagreements and major equipment orders—that objectively demonstrate project maturity and \ncommercial viability serve as the basis for relief from the ramp and ride-through requirements \nonly.  That proposal would require MISO to verify that the customer has entered into one of the \nlisted commitments, not to assess the commercial merits of private contracts.63 \nMISO’s claim that such a framework would be unworkable is undermined by the fact that \nMISO regularly requires customers to provide evidence of contractual commitments to \ndemonstrate commercial viability and maturity.  For instance, MISO’s Expedited Resource \nAddition Study (“ERAS”) process, which expedites interconnection of generating facilities needed \nto address an identified resource adequacy need, requires an executed agreement linking the \nproposed generating facility to that need, while MISO’s standard interconnection process requires \n \n63 DCC Comments at 28-29.  ON Energy Storage, Inc. generally agrees that commercial reliance interests \nwarrant protection, but proposes, among other things, an outside energization date for transition relief and prospective \nreliability assessments that could result in otherwise-exempt Large Loads being required to implement ride-through \ncapability or other mitigation.  See Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER26-3650-000, Motion for \nLeave to Answer and Limited Answer of ON Energy Storage, Inc. (Sept. 24, 2026).  DCC does not address the merits \nof this alternative here because the question presented under Section 205 is whether MISO has demonstrated that its \nown proposal is just and reasonable.  The relevant point is that MISO has not demonstrated that its MTEP/EPR-based \nframework adequately protects the commercial reliance interests identified in the Show Cause Order, while the record \nidentifies readily available alternatives that would more directly account for objectively demonstrable commercial \ncommitments."},{"page":18,"startToken":5441,"endToken":5877,"text":"- 18 - \ncustomers to provide contractual evidence of Site Control.64  Similarly, MISO’s pending Large \nLoad Addition Resource Study (“LARS”) would require customers to provide executed, legally \nbinding agreements as a condition of participating in the process to prevent speculative requests \nand ensure that only commercially viable, “shovel ready” projects proceed.65  Requiring market \nparticipants to provide executed contracts is not only workable, but aligns with the practices that \nMISO and other transmission providers regularly use to evaluate project maturity in a variety of \ncontexts.66    \n3. \nMISO Has Not Justified Giving Itself Unconstrained Authority To \nOverride Transition Protections \nWhatever protection MISO’s transition framework provides is further undermined by \nproposed Section 37A.II.3, which would allow MISO to apply otherwise-exempt requirements to \na Large Load whenever MISO determines that its operation results in a material adverse effect on \ntransmission system reliability.  Although MISO describes this provision as a “targeted reliability \nbackstop” that “preserves commercial certainty,” MISO’s proposal to leave the criteria that it will \nuse to determine whether to revoke an exemption to the BPMs means that the Commission does \nnot have any way of verifying MISO’s representations.67  Nor does the Commission have any \n \n64 See MISO Tariff, Attachment X §§ 1, 3.3.1, 3.9.1, 7.2.1, 7.3.1.4.1. Section 3.9.1 requires an ERAS \napplicant to provide an executed agreement evidencing that the proposed project is intended to be used by the entity \nasserting the applicable resource-adequacy or reliability need; Section 1 defines Site Control to include specified \nproperty and contractual rights; and Sections 3.3.1, 7.2.1, and 7.3.1.4.1 establish Site Control and financial-milestone \nrequirements as an Interconnection Request enters and advances through the Definitive Planning Phase. \n65 Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Docket No. ER27-25-000, Large Load Addition Resource Study \nProcess at 9, 11, 27 (Oct. 2, 2026). \n66 Nor is reliance on such evidence unique to MISO’s own processes. FERC-approved North American \nElectric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”) Reliability Standard PRC-029-2 permits certain inverter-based resources \nwith documented hardware limitations to obtain relief from otherwise-applicable ride-through requirements based in \npart on objectively verifiable prior commitments, including an executed interconnection agreement and an equipment \nprocurement contract executed before specified dates. See N. Am. Elec. Reliability Corp., Docket No. RD26-10-000, \n(Sept. 30, 2026) (delegated letter order); NERC Reliability Standard PRC-029-2, Requirement R4 & Measure M4. \nThe standard therefore provides another example of executed agreements and equipment commitments serving as \nadministrable criteria for transition relief from applicable reliability requirements. \n67 Filing, Tab A, Proposed § 37A.II.3; MISO Answer at 19; DCC Comments at 12-14."},{"page":19,"startToken":5877,"endToken":6025,"text":"- 19 - \nassurance that the exemption process will be administered in a manner that is fair, transparent, and \nthat provides customers with an adequate timeline for coming into compliance.  A provision that \ngrants MISO effectively unbounded discretion to revoke a customer’s exemption is the opposite \nof commercial certainty.  \nNo one disputes that MISO must be able to act to preserve reliability.  But providing \ncustomers and the Commission with notice and the opportunity to review the criteria and \nprocedures that MISO will apply to determine whether to revoke an exemption is not incompatible \nwith the objective of maintaining reliability.  If MISO is going to have the authority to revoke a \ncustomer’s exemption from ramp and ride-through requirements, then the criteria and procedures \nthat will be applied in connection with this authority must be memorialized in the tariff and filed \nwith the Commission for approval.68   \n \n68 DCC Comments at 12-16."},{"page":20,"startToken":6025,"endToken":6129,"text":"- 20 - \nII. \nCONCLUSION \nFor the foregoing reasons, DCC respectfully requests that the Commission reject the IRR \nproposal without prejudice to MISO filing a revised proposal consistent with DCC’s comments \nand this answer.  \n \nRespectfully submitted, \n \n \n \n/s/ Stephen J. Hug \nMorgan A. Sipple \nDirector, Energy Policy – FERC and RTOs \nDATA CENTER COALITION \n1250 H Street, N.W. \nWashington, D.C.  20005 \nmorgan@datacentercoalition.org  \n \nData Center Coalition \nStephen J. Hug \nChristopher Hargett \nAKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP \n2001 K Street, N.W. \nWashington, D.C.  20006 \nTel: (202) 887-4000 \nshug@akingump.com \nchargett@akingump.com  \n \n \n \nDated: November 3, 2026 \n \n \nCounsel for the Data Center Coalition"},{"page":21,"startToken":6129,"endToken":6181,"text":"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI hereby certify that I have this day served a copy of the foregoing document on the persons \ndesignated on the official service list compiled by the Secretary in this proceeding. \n \nDated at Washington, D.C., this 3rd day of November 2026. \n/s/ Stephen J. Hug \n \n \n \nStephen J. Hug"}],"sections":[{"p":1,"at":0,"title":"Opening text","method":"opening text","endPage":1,"endAt":666,"startToken":0,"endToken":95},{"p":1,"at":666,"title":"I. ANSWER","method":"printed heading","endPage":6,"endAt":116,"startToken":95,"endToken":1753},{"p":6,"at":116,"title":"A. MISO Has Not Demonstrated That Its Proposal To Leave The Substance Of","method":"printed heading","endPage":11,"endAt":8,"startToken":1753,"endToken":3312},{"p":11,"at":8,"title":"B. MISO Has Not Demonstrated That Its Proposed Large Load Definition Is Just","method":"printed heading","endPage":15,"endAt":8,"startToken":3312,"endToken":4495},{"p":15,"at":8,"title":"C. MISO Has Not Demonstrated That Its Transition Framework Will Minimize","method":"printed heading","endPage":20,"endAt":8,"startToken":4495,"endToken":6026},{"p":20,"at":8,"title":"II. CONCLUSION","method":"printed heading","endPage":20,"endAt":13,"startToken":6026,"endToken":6027},{"p":20,"at":13,"title":"CONCLUSION","method":"printed heading","endPage":21,"endAt":0,"startToken":6027,"endToken":6129},{"p":21,"at":0,"title":"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE","method":"printed heading","endPage":21,"endAt":306,"startToken":6129,"endToken":6181}]}