Topics in the text: Cost allocation · Credit and exit · Reliability and curtailment
What the document says
PDF p. 1
FERC accepts the backstop, suspends it to February 28, 2027, and sets a paper hearing.
we accept the proposed RBP for filing, suspend it for five months, effective February 28, 2027, subject to refund, and establish a paper hearing PDF p. 1
PDF p. 9
Only cost allocation, TO exit rules and LSE collateral go to hearing; the rest stands.
Aside from the three issues discussed directly below, we find that the other aspects of PJM’s RBP proposal are just and reasonable PDF p. 9
PDF p. 7
The backstop buys 6,831 MW, the 2028/29 auction shortfall, less offsets and opt-outs.
the RBP aims to procure capacity equal to the 6,831 MW shortfall in the 2028/2029 BRA (Initial RBP Target) PDF p. 7
PDF p. 7
Winning resources get fixed terms of up to 15 years, from 2028/29 through 2042/43.
for a fixed term of up to 15 years, starting with the 2028/2029 delivery year at the earliest and ending no later than the 2042/2043 delivery year PDF p. 7
PDF p. 31
Winning resources get fixed terms of up to 15 years, from 2028/29 through 2042/43.
we disagree with JCA that PJM unreasonably requires commitment terms ending no earlier than 2042/2043 PDF p. 31
PDF p. 29
FERC approves the $555/MW-day price cap and the pay-as-bid selection process.
we find that PJM has shown that its proposed $555/MW-day maximum willingness to pay and process for selecting RBP Resources in the RBP auction are just and reasonable PDF p. 29
PDF p. 30
FERC approves the $555/MW-day price cap and the pay-as-bid selection process.
We agree with PJM that the proposed pay-as-bid structure for the RBP auction is reasonable. PDF p. 30
PDF p. 20
FERC accepts a 120% UCAP quantity cap, 20% shortfall charge, for up to three years.
We agree with PJM that the proposed cap represents a reasonable balance between providing sellers with flexibility and managing UCAP risk for load. PDF p. 20
PDF p. 33
FERC accepts a 120% UCAP quantity cap, 20% shortfall charge, for up to three years.
RBP shortfall charges are equal to the product of the RBP Resource’s committed RBP UCAP MW shortfall and 20% of the RBP price. PDF p. 33
PDF p. 63
A zonal growth snapshot may be fine; measuring growth with Load Adjustments may not be.
we agree with concerns in the record that relying on Load Adjustments to measure load growth may be inconsistent or not reasonably capture forecasted load growth or actual large load growth PDF p. 63
PDF p. 63
A zonal growth snapshot may be fine; measuring growth with Load Adjustments may not be.
it appears some large loads may never have been accounted for as Load Adjustments because PJM accounted for them when calculating the initial load forecast PDF p. 63
PDF p. 64
FERC floats 2026/27 actual load against the latest 2028/29 forecast as the allocation basis.
PJM could base the RBP allocation on the difference between the actual load for 2026/2027 delivery year in each Electric Distributor zone/area with the most recent 2028/2029 delivery year load forecast PDF p. 64
PDF p. 62
The co-op and municipal opt-out may discriminate, since their large loads are similarly situated.
We find that PJM’s proposed opt-out for qualifying cooperatives and municipal utilities may be unjust, unreasonable, and unduly discriminatory. PDF p. 62
PDF p. 62
The co-op and municipal opt-out may discriminate, since their large loads are similarly situated.
Because cooperatives and municipal utilities serve large loads that are similarly situated to large loads served by other LSEs PDF p. 62
PDF p. 62
FERC keeps FRR entities out of the backstop because they never contributed to the gap.
we find that FRR Entities have not contributed towards the resource adequacy gap that the RBP will address PDF p. 62
FERC leaves charging data centers at retail to the states and the Ratepayer Protection Pledge.
states determine how Commission-approved rates are collected among the relevant retail consumers along with the rates for state-jurisdictional matters PDF p. 65
PDF p. 65
FERC leaves charging data centers at retail to the states and the Ratepayer Protection Pledge.
Our partners in the states are more than capable of ensuring that these promises reach fruition. PDF p. 65
PDF p. 73
Exit fees on departing Transmission Owners may be unjust; LSEs are the buyers and beneficiaries.
we find that PJM’s proposed exit provisions may be unjust and unreasonable because they would assess RBP Charges to exiting Transmission Owners, rather than the LSEs in the relevant Transmission Owner’s zone PDF p. 73
The existing reliability backstop auction tariff may itself be unjust, so FERC opens EL26-108.
We therefore conclude on a preliminary basis that the existing Reliability Backstop Auction Tariff provisions may be unjust and unreasonable. PDF p. 12
PDF p. 9
FERC invites a 205 refiling within 30 days and says it would expect to grant abeyance.
we anticipate that the Commission would grant a motion to hold that briefing in this proceeding in abeyance if PJM submitted a new section 205 filing within 30 days from the date of this order PDF p. 9
FERC invites a 205 refiling within 30 days and says it would expect to grant abeyance.
We anticipate that, following the paper hearing, the Commission may need to direct significant modifications to certain aspects of PJM’s proposal PDF p. 10
PDF p. 3
The 2027/28 auction cleared at the $333.44 cap, a third straight historically high result.
The 2027/2028 BRA, which cleared at the temporary price cap of $333.44/MW-day, was the third BRA in a row to clear at historically high prices. PDF p. 3
Responses and related views
Swett wanted a record FERC could test
Chairman Laura Swett · Direct response
Swett said the original procurement arrived too late for a deficiency letter or further evidence. She urged a prompt section 205 filing to repair the rejected terms. Her September concurrence did not address the later timetable.
Rosner supported directing costs to zones whose data center growth drove the shortfall. He called on states to set retail tariffs, enforce collateral and decide curtailment priorities. He wanted a return to ordinary hedging and capacity procurement after the backstop.
See wanted dependable generation quickly but said the first proposal left existing customers exposed. Better evidence about which projects will actually connect should guide who pays for the resulting capacity.
LaCerte urged PJM to refile promptly rather than wait for more briefs. He said new loads should pay for the capacity they require and cited the commitment to build, bring or buy that capacity.
Printed headings where available; page ranges otherwise. Excerpts below are selected from the text by keyword.
Opening text
opening text · Topic match: Reliability and curtailment
The RBP is a one-time procurement of new capacity to address significant resource adequacy challenges primarily driven by an influx of large loads.3 As discussed below, we accept the proposed RBP for filing, suspend it for five months, effective February 28, 2027, subject to refund, and establish a…
Despite these differences, many of the core components of the two proposals were the same, including resource commitments up to the 2042/2043 delivery year, requiring a resource in-service date by the 2032/2033 delivery year, a must-offer RPM requirement with contracts for differences, and similar…
Pursuant to the proposed Tariff provisions, new load is load that has an executed electric service agreement or transmission service agreement indicating that the load will come online during the 2027/2028 or 2028/2029 delivery year.28 To avoid double procurement, PJM proposes to require all…
We accept the answers filed by AEP, the Kentucky Attorney General, EKPC, the Market Monitor, NJBPU, NOVEC, Voltus, PJM, P3, Constellation, PPL, Indicated PJM TOs, and FirstEnergy because they have provided information that assisted us in our decision-making process.
In response, NOVEC maintains PJM’s proposal does require suppliers to provide duplicative collateral because PJM proposes to determine RBP collateral obligations as if suppliers were paying the entire RBP Charge—which means suppliers are providing collateral for the cost of capacity of their RBP MW…