{"document":{"slug":"order-er26-3515-pjm-large-load","title":"Order accepting PJM's Large Load definition and Large Load Registry and rejecting the Interim Resource Adequacy Service, BYONC and VRR-curve revisions","issued":"2026-10-09","accession":"20261009-3055","docket":"ER26-3515-000","group":"PJM Large Load definition, Registry and Interim Resource Adequacy Service","filer":"FERC","kind":"order","file":"sources/originals/20261009-3055_ER26-3515-000.pdf","url":"https://elibrary.ferc.gov/eLibrary/filelist?accession_number=20261009-3055","sha256":"b4dc477b5aa5985b42aa10b372a888196499f9d2b70ab310b6541cb3f35bc002","pages":57,"tokens":21287,"emptyPages":[]},"pages":[{"page":1,"startToken":0,"endToken":326,"text":"197 FERC ¶ 61,019 \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nFEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \n \nBefore Commissioners:  Laura V. Swett, Chairman; \n                                        David Rosner, Lindsay S. See, \n                                        Judy W. Chang, and David LaCerte. \n \nPJM Interconnection, L.L.C. \nDocket No. ER26-3515-000 \n \nORDER ACCEPTING TARIFF REVISIONS IN PART  \nAND REJECTING TARIFF REVISIONS IN PART \n \n(Issued October 9, 2026) \n \n1. \nOn August 13, 2026, pursuant to section 205 of the Federal Power Act (FPA),1 \nPJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM) submitted proposed revisions to its Open Access \nTransmission Tariff (OATT) and Reliability Assurance Agreement (RAA) (collectively, \nTariff) to establish:  (1) a definition of Large Load; (2) a Large Load Registry; (3) a new \nInterim Resource Adequacy Service (IRAS); (4) a requirement for Load Serving Entities \n(LSE) serving New Large Load to designate new capacity resources in an amount at least \nequal to the New Large Load’s peak load to avoid the New Large Load being subject to \nIRAS; (5) rules for Bring Your Own New Capacity (BYONC) arrangements; and (6) \nrules to exclude Eligible New Large Load from the Variable Resource Requirement \n(VRR) curve beginning with Delivery Year 2029/2030.   \n2. \nIn this order, we accept PJM’s proposed Tariff revisions to establish a definition of \nLarge Load and a Large Load Registry, effective October 12, 2026, as requested, and \nrequire PJM to submit a compliance filing within 30 days of the date of issuance of this \norder.  We reject PJM’s remaining proposed Tariff revisions, as discussed below. \nI. \nFiling Overview \n3. \nPJM states that, beginning in the 2027/2028 Delivery Year, it will be short of \nsufficient capacity to meet the PJM Region Reliability Requirement, particularly due to \ndata center load growth and the pace of data center interconnection.2  PJM’s proposal to \naddress this challenge includes several elements:  (1) a definition of Large Load; (2) a \nLarge Load Registry, which is a database of information pertaining to Large Loads that \n \n1 16 U.S.C. § 824d. \n2 Transmittal at 21."},{"page":2,"startToken":326,"endToken":788,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 2 - \nPJM proposes to establish and maintain; (3) IRAS, which PJM states will involve \ncurtailments during periods when there are insufficient resources to reliably meet demand \nin real-time operations; (4) a requirement for LSEs serving New Large Load to designate \nnew capacity resources in an amount at least equal to the New Large Load’s peak load; \n(5) rules for BYONC arrangements; and (6) rules to exclude Eligible New Large Load \nfrom the VRR curve beginning with Delivery Year 2029/2030.  PJM’s proposed Tariff \nrevisions, as described further below, would implicate and assign responsibilities to \nseveral entities in PJM, including the Electric Distributor,3 the LSE,4 and the \nTransmission Owner.5 \n4. \nPJM states that each element of the filing is severable, although some elements \nbuild upon each other.6  PJM explains that, to facilitate Commission approval and \nsmoothly implement its IRAS framework on June 1, 2027, PJM consents to the \nCommission’s exercise of authority to modify and/or sever the proposed Tariff language, \nas needed and permitted under the FPA and NRG Power Marketing, LLC v. FERC,7 \n“where such modification is consistent with PJM’s overarching objectives.”8  PJM \n \n3 The Operating Agreement (OA) defines Electric Distributor as a PJM Member \nthat (1) owns or leases with rights equivalent to ownership of electric distribution \nfacilities that are used to provide electric distribution service to electric load within the \nPJM Region; or (2) is a generation and transmission cooperative or a joint municipal \nagency that has a member that owns electric distribution facilities used to provide electric \ndistribution service to electric load within the PJM Region.  See PJM, Intra-PJM Tariffs, \nOperating Agreement, § 1 Definitions E – F (25.1.0). \n4 The RAA defines LSE as any entity (or the duly designated agent of such an \nentity), including a load aggregator or power marketer, (i) serving end-users within \nthe PJM Region, and (ii) that has been granted the authority or has an obligation pursuant \nto state or local law, regulation or franchise to sell electric energy to end-users located \nwithin the PJM Region.  LSEs include any end-use customer that qualifies under state \nrules or a utility retail tariff to manage directly its own supply of electric power and \nenergy and use of transmission and ancillary services.  PJM, Intra-PJM Tariffs, RAA, \nart. 1 (Definitions) (55.0.0). \n5 The RAA defines Transmission Owner as a Member that owns or leases with \nrights equivalent to ownership Transmission Facilities and is a signatory to \nthe PJM Transmission Owners Agreement.  Id. \n6 Transmittal at 9-10. \n7 862 F.3d 108 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (NRG).  \n8 Transmittal at 122.  PJM states that it “is not, for example, suggesting that the \nCommission may modify or sever provisions of its proposal to result in an ‘entirely"},{"page":3,"startToken":788,"endToken":1243,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 3 - \nrequests that, if the Commission elects to modify or sever any portion of the proposal, it \nshould expressly prescribe the revised rate or rule.9  The majority of PJM’s proposed \nTariff revisions are not intended to take effect until June 1, 2027, consistent with the start \nof the 2027/2028 Delivery Year.  However, PJM requests an effective date for its entire \nfiling of October 12, 2026, which PJM argues is necessary so that it may modify the \nplanning parameters for the VRR curve underlying the 2029/2030 Base Residual Auction \n(BRA) in time for the 2029/2030 BRA set to run in December 2026.10   \nII. \nNotice of Filing and Responsive Pleadings \n5. \nNotice of PJM’s filing was published in the Federal Register, 91 Fed. Reg. 53407 \n(Aug. 18, 2026), with interventions and protests due on or before September 3, 2026.  \nNotices of intervention and timely-filed motions to intervene were submitted by the \nentities listed in the Appendix of this order, which also lists the abbreviated names for \neach entity and identifies those entities that submitted comments and protests.   \n6. \nOn August 28, 2026, OPSI filed a motion requesting an extension of time to \nsubmit comments in response to PJM’s filing.  On August 31, 2026, Google submitted an \nanswer in support of OPSI’s motion.  On September 1, 2026, EKPC and Pennsylvania \nCommission submitted answers in support of OPSI’s motion.  On September 2, 2026, the \nCommission issued a notice denying OPSI’s motion.  \n7. \nOn September 3, after the 5:00 p.m. deadline, OPSI and Voltus each filed          \nout-of-time comments, and Equinix filed an out-of-time protest.  On September 4, \nCyrusOne filed a motion to intervene out-of-time.  On September 8, 2026, the Virginia \nCommission filed out-of-time comments.  On September 11, 2026, CyrusOne filed     \nout-of-time comments.  On September 11, 2026, Governor Shapiro filed a motion to \nintervene out-of-time.  On September 15, 2026, IECA filed out-of-time comments.  \n8. \nOn September 16, 2026, Governor Shapiro filed a motion for leave to answer and \nan answer to certain comments and protests.  On September 18, 2026, Buckeye and \nNJBPU each filed motions for leave to answer and an answer to certain comments and \nprotests.  On September 23, 2026, PJM filed a motion for leave to answer and an answer \nto certain comments and protests.  On September 25, 2026, AEP filed a motion for leave \nto answer and an answer to certain comments and PJM’s answer.  On September 28, \n2026, Representative Pallone filed out-of-time comments; and CEBA and Vistra each \nfiled motions for leave to answer and an answer to certain comments and answers.  On \n \ndifferent rate design.’”  Id. at 122 n.314 (quoting NRG, 862 F.3d at 115). \n9 Id. at 123.  \n10 Id. at 7-8, 121-22."},{"page":4,"startToken":1243,"endToken":1671,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 4 - \nSeptember 29, 2026, AEU, Constellation, and Voltus each filed motions for leave to \nanswer and answer to certain answers.  On September 30, 2026, Google filed a motion \nfor leave to answer and answer to certain comments, protests, and answers.  On      \nOctober 1, 2026, Data Center Coalition filed a motion for leave to answer and answer to \ncertain comments, protests, and answers.  On October 2, 2026, FirstEnergy filed a motion \nfor leave to answer and answer to certain comments, protests, and answers.  On     \nOctober 6, 2026, PPL filed a motion for leave to answer and answer to certain answers.  \nOn October 7, 2026, EPKC and SMECO each filed a motion for leave to answer and \nanswer to certain answers.  On October 8, 2026, PAG filed out-of-time comments.  On      \nOctober 9, 2026, IMM filed a motion for leave to answer and answer to certain answers. \nIII. \nDiscussion \nA. \nProcedural Matters \n9. \nPursuant to Rule 214 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure,        \n18 C.F.R. § 385.214 (2025), the notices of intervention and timely, unopposed motions to \nintervene serve to make the entities that filed them parties to this proceeding. \n10. \nPursuant to Rule 214(d) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure,     \n18 C.F.R. § 385.214(d), we grant CyrusOne and Governor Shapiro’s late-filed motions to \nintervene given their interest in the proceeding, the early stage of the proceeding, and the \nabsence of undue prejudice or delay.  We also accept the out-of-time comments and \nprotests submitted by CyrusOne, Equinix, IECA, OPSI, PAG, Representative Pallone, the \nVirginia Commission, and Voltus. \n11. \nRule 213(a)(2) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 C.F.R. \n§ 385.213(a)(2) (2025), prohibits an answer to a protest or answer unless otherwise \nordered by the decisional authority.  We accept the answers filed by AEP, AEU, \nBuckeye, CEBA, Constellation, Data Center Coalition, EKPC, FirstEnergy, Google, \nGovernor Shapiro, IMM, NJBPU, PJM, PPL, SMECO, Vistra, and Voltus because they \nhave provided information that assisted us in our decision-making process. \nB. \nSubstantive Matters \n12. \nPJM’s proposal consists of several elements that, when combined, are intended to \naddress the capacity shortfall that, absent the entrance of new capacity resources, will \nprevent PJM from satisfying the PJM Region Reliability Requirement starting in the \n2027/2028 Delivery Year.  The first element of PJM’s proposal is to establish definitions \nof Large Load and New Large Load.  The latter is designed to capture the Delivery Year \nwhen PJM’s capacity shortfall, which PJM contends is the result of data center load"},{"page":5,"startToken":1671,"endToken":2125,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 5 - \ngrowth,11 first emerges.  Next, PJM proposes to develop a Large Load Registry to foster \ntransparency regarding Large Load additions.  With that foundation, PJM proposes to \nadopt the IRAS framework, under which LSEs that seek to use Network Integration \nTransmission Service (NITS)12 to serve New Large Loads must designate sufficient new \ncapacity resources, referred to as BYONC, to serve the New Large Load.  If an LSE \nusing NITS to serve New Large Load fails to designate sufficient capacity resources, \nsuch New Large Load will be “subject to load reduction requests” when there are \ninsufficient resources to reliably meet demand in real-time operations.13  In essence, the \nrequirement that these New Large Loads must curtail under certain emergency conditions \nis designed to allow PJM to address its capacity shortfall.14   \n13. \nAs outlined in greater detail below, we accept PJM’s proposal in part, effective \nOctober 12, 2026, as requested, reject PJM’s proposal in part, and direct PJM to submit a \ncompliance filing within 30 days of the date of this order.15  Specifically, we accept \nPJM’s proposal to establish a definition for Large Load and a Large Load Registry.16  We \nfind that those two elements of PJM’s proposal are just and reasonable and not unduly \ndiscriminatory or preferential.  Given PJM’s consent to sever or modify its proposal, we \ndo so here.  We find that the elements of PJM’s proposal to establish a new definition of \nLarge Load and a Large Load Registry are severable from the remainder of the filing and \ntherefore may be accepted even though we reject the remainder of the proposal. \n \n11 Id. at 21. \n12 Under NITS, Transmission Providers provide firm transmission service to the \nNetwork Customer for the delivery of capacity and energy from its designated Network \nResources to service its Network Loads on a basis that is comparable to each \nTransmission Owner’s use of the Transmission System to reliably service its Native Load \nCustomers.  PJM, Intra-PJM Tariffs, OATT, pt. III, § 28.3 (Network Integration \nTransmission Service) (0.0.0). \n13 Transmittal at 4, 21, 55; Proposed RAA, § 7.8. \n14 See Transmittal at 39 (“IRAS, as proposed, is a service that specifically allows \nfor Large Loads to interconnect without bringing their own capacity, on the condition that \nthey must reduce their load or switch to on-site backup resources under specific, limited \nemergency conditions.”).  \n15 See NRG, 862 F.3d at 114-15 (discussing the Commission’s authority to propose \nmodifications to a utility’s FPA section 205 rate proposal). \n16 As discussed below, although we accept PJM’s proposal to establish a definition \nof Large Load and a Large Load Registry, we reject the proposed Tariff sheets due to \ninclusion of language pertaining to IRAS or BYONC."},{"page":6,"startToken":2125,"endToken":2529,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 6 - \n14. \nWhile we recognize the imminent capacity shortfall in PJM, we find that two key \naspects of PJM’s proposal—IRAS and BYONC—are either outside of the Commission’s \nauthority or have not been sufficiently demonstrated to be just and reasonable and not \nunduly discriminatory or preferential.  We do not take this decision lightly.  But given the \nsignificant discrepancies between PJM’s transmittal letter description of its proposed \nIRAS framework and its proposed Tariff revisions, as well as the lack of justification for \nmany aspects of IRAS and BYONC, we cannot find that these elements of PJM’s \nproposal are just and reasonable.  We therefore reject these elements of the proposal.  \nHowever, we provide guidance on how PJM could modify its proposal should PJM seek \nto refile it. \n15. \nMoreover, because the elements of PJM’s proposal other than the Large Load \ndefinition and Large Load Registry represent an integrated package that must be viewed \nas a whole, we reject the remainder of PJM’s proposal.  PJM, while consenting to \nseverance and modification of the proposal, acknowledges that the RAA and OATT \nrevisions are “designed to work in lockstep and provide complementary pieces.”17  We \nfind that the remaining elements of PJM’s proposal, such as the proposed rules for \nBYONC arrangements and the exclusion of Eligible New Large Loads from the VRR \ncurve, are not simply complementary, but instead are inextricably linked.  For example, \nthe new obligation for LSEs seeking to use NITS to serve New Large Load to bring new \ncapacity to avoid curtailment under IRAS is foundational to both the IRAS and BYONC \nframeworks.  It also establishes the need for the rules for BYONC arrangements and \nfacilitates excluding Eligible New Large Loads from the VRR curve.  As such, we \nconclude that, contrary to PJM’s statements in its transmittal, the only elements of its \nproposal that are severable are the proposed definition of Large Load and the proposed \nLarge Load Registry, which can be implemented independent of the IRAS and BYONC \nframeworks. \n1. \nLarge Load Definition and Registry \na. \nDefinition of Large Load   \ni. \nPJM’s Proposal \n16. \nPJM proposes to define Large Load as:   \nend-use customer(s) load that has a cumulative peak load of \n50 [MW] or greater at a single electrical site behind one or \nmore points of interconnection, where for configurations \ninvolving multiple affiliated load facilities or multiple points \nof interconnection with affiliated load facilities behind them, \n \n17 Transmittal at 124."},{"page":7,"startToken":2529,"endToken":2921,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 7 - \nall affiliated load facilities within a one-mile radius will be \nconsidered a single electrical site as further described in the \nPJM Manuals.18   \n17. \nAcknowledging that the Commission recently stated that PJM may establish its \nown definition of large load,19 PJM states that its definition differs from the \nCommission’s preliminary definition in several ways, and that these differences reflect \nthe characteristics and realities of Large Loads in the PJM Region.20  The differences \ninclude:  (1) setting a 50 MW cumulative peak threshold; (2) establishing a one-mile \nradius at a single electrical site for Large Loads interconnected at multiple points; (3) \nusing the term “end-use customer(s) load” instead of “new, commercial or industrial \ncustomer;” (4) including co-located loads and loads with behind-the-meter generation; \nand (5) excluding a voltage threshold.21  PJM states that it proposes to define a Large \nLoad as located at a single electrical site behind one or more points of interconnection \nwithin a one-mile radius to avoid a scenario where, for example, a data center owner is \nnot categorized as Large Load simply because the owner has elected to site a number of \nsmaller data centers, each with peak loads below 50 MW, close together.  PJM states that \nthe Commission has explicitly adopted a one-mile test in other situations to determine \nwhether facilities are “at the same site” to be a Qualifying Facility.   \n18. \nPJM states that Large Load is not limited to “new” load, and instead proposes a \nseparate definition, “New Large Load,” to capture the temporal aspect of such load with \ngreater specificity.22  PJM proposes that New Large Load shall mean:  \nend-use customer load that is either (a) a Large Load that \ngoes into service after June 1, 2027, or (b) incremental load \nin-service after June 1, 2027, that increases the existing end-\nuse customer load at a single electrical site that, prior to such \nincremental load, did not previously meet the definition of \nLarge Load.  However, to the extent three consecutive \nDelivery Years meet the requirements of Tariff, Attachment \nDD-4, section IV(b)(iii),[23] then New Large Load shall mean \n \n18 Proposed RAA, Definitions (Large Load). \n19 Transmittal at 32 (citing PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,211 \n(2026) (PJM Large Load Show Cause Order)). \n20 Id. at 32-33. \n21 Id. at 33-35. \n22 Id. at 36."},{"page":8,"startToken":2921,"endToken":3302,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 8 - \nend-use customer load that is either (a) a Large Load that \ngoes into service after June 1 of the first Delivery Year for \nwhich the requirements of Tariff, Attachment DD-4, section \nIV(b)(iii) are not met or (b) incremental load in-service after \nJune 1 of the first Delivery Year for which the requirements \nof Tariff, Attachment DD-4, section IV(b)(iii) are not met that \nincreases the existing end-use customer load at a single \nelectrical site that, prior to such incremental load, did not \npreviously meet the definition of Large Load.24 \nii. \nPleadings \n19. \nProtesters argue that PJM has not properly justified the 50 MW threshold for \nLarge Loads.25  EPSA, for example, asserts that PJM has articulated no valid reason why \na new 49.9 MW load will not be subject to IRAS.26  The IMM argues that the 50 MW \ncutoff will exclude a significant number of data centers.27  On the other hand, some \nparties argue that the threshold should be higher28 or that PJM has not justified including \ntypes of load other than data centers in the definition of Large Load.29  FirstEnergy \nargues that the definition of Large Load should be adjusted, either to raise the minimum \nMW threshold to 200 MW, or to limit the definition to new data centers, to avoid \ncapturing small and medium-sized manufacturing facilities.30  FirstEnergy acknowledges \nthat similar energy infrastructure must be built regardless of the type of load, but that \n \n23 PJM explains that it proposes new Attachment DD-4 to house the rules for \nIRAS.  Id. at 24.  Attachment DD-4, section IV(b)(iii) states that, if a committed Capacity \nResources equals or exceeds the PJM Region Reliability in a given Delivery Year, then \nPJM does not need Eligible New Large Loads to provide IRAS for that Delivery Year.  \nProposed OATT, attach. DD-4, § IV(b)(iii). \n24 Proposed OATT, Definitions – New Large Load. \n25 Buckeye Answer at 3; EKPC Protest at 11-12, 26; EPSA Protest at 4; \nFirstEnergy Protest at 10; IECA Protest at 2; Ohio ELC Comments at 1, 3-8. \n26 EPSA Protest at 4. \n27 IMM Protest at 29, 31. \n28 FirstEnergy Protest at 10. \n29 Id.; Buckeye Answer at 3; EKPC Protest at 11-12, 26. \n30 FirstEnergy Protest at 10."},{"page":9,"startToken":3302,"endToken":3669,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 9 - \nmanufacturing should not be subject to IRAS because it generates investment and jobs, \nwhereas data centers do not.  EKPC similarly argues that PJM’s justification for IRAS is \nbased on data center load, and PJM has not justified the inclusion of industrial and \nmanufacturing load, which does not present the same timing, concentration, or \noperational risks as data centers.31   \n20. \nSome protesters also assert that PJM’s distinction between new and existing Large \nLoads turns solely on an arbitrary date and has not been justified.32  They argue that PJM \nhas not explained why load that goes into service on May 31, 2027, should be treated \ndifferently from load that goes into service just one day later, on June 1, 2027.  Industrial \nCustomers and IECA assert that only incremental expansions of load that are greater than \n50 MW should be subject to IRAS and that PJM’s definitions of new and existing Large \nLoad establish a baseline load value for existing Large Load customers based on \nhistorical usage and allow customers to demonstrate that growth is a normal fluctuation.33   \n21. \nProtesters argue that the definition of New Large Load fails to protect existing \ncommercial arrangements34 or argue for grandfathering rules for pre-expansion load.35  \nProtesters also seek clarity on how the proposed definition will apply to multi-year \nprojects developed in phases, some of which are built prior to June 1, 2027 and some \nafter.36  Equinix and CyrusOne contend that PJM’s one-mile aggregation rule for Large \nLoads is unjust and unreasonable as applied to independently developed legacy data \ncenter facilities.37  In addition, ODEC argues that PJM should clarify how affiliation will \nbe determined for the purposes of the one-mile radius measurement.38   \n \n31 EKPC Protest at 11-12, 26. \n32 America’s Power Protest at 7-8; Microsoft Protest at 6; FirstEnergy Protest at 9. \n33 PJM ICC Comments at 8-10; IECA Protest at 1-2; Buckeye Answer at 4. \n34 Equinix Protest at 2, 8-14; FirstEnergy Protest at 9. \n35 CyrusOne Comments at 6-8; Equinix Protest at 17; IECA Protest at 2. \n36 CyrusOne Comments at 6-8; Microsoft Comments at 6. \n37 CyrusOne Comments at 4-6; Equinix Protest at 2, 12. \n38 ODEC Comments at 8."},{"page":10,"startToken":3669,"endToken":4044,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 10 - \n22. \nIn its answer, PJM highlights the importance of timely Commission approval of \nthe definition of Large Load.39  In response to arguments that the 50 MW threshold is \nunsupported and should be changed, PJM asserts that the 50 MW threshold is in keeping \nwith what was contemplated by the Commission and that no information presented \nrenders PJM’s proposed threshold unjust and unreasonable.40  Further, PJM contends \nthat, since PJM has proposed that 50 MW is the appropriate threshold necessary for \npurposes of tracking Large Loads and ensuring PJM has visibility into them to ensure \nreliability, it would be contradictory to ignore any MW that may have existed as a Large \nLoad before an additional 50 MW were added. \n23. \nIn response to parties’ arguments that PJM should differentiate between data \ncenter Large Loads and other types of Large Loads (e.g., manufacturing or industrial \nloads), PJM asserts that it is implementing the approach the Commission set forth in the \nPJM Large Load Show Cause Order—i.e., treating data center and computational, \nmanufacturing, industrial, or other types of large loads the same.  PJM argues that the \nparties have shown no basis for deviating from the Commission’s approach.41 \n24. \nIn its answer, Data Center Coalition argues the PJM’s one-mile rule is not just and \nreasonable.42  Data Center Coalition argues that the proposed one-mile rule would \nunfairly subject long-operating legacy facilities to IRAS and potential curtailment merely \nbecause an unrelated facility is later developed nearby, despite those legacy loads having \nalready been accounted for through regional planning.43  Data Center Coalition also \nargues that PJM’s undefined use of “affiliated” to aggregate facilities within a one-mile \nradius could improperly treat independent facilities as a single Large Load; therefore, \nData Center Coalition asserts, the term’s criteria and application should be clearly \nspecified in the Tariff rather than deferred to the PJM Manuals.44  The IMM similarly \nargues that PJM has not provided clear, uniform criteria for applying the one-mile radius \n \n39 PJM Answer at 6-7. \n40 Id. at 15 (citing PJM Large Load Show Cause Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,211 at      \nP 58).  \n41 Id. at 16. \n42 Data Center Coalition Answer at 23.  \n43 Id. at 23-24. \n44 Id. at 24."},{"page":11,"startToken":4044,"endToken":4439,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 11 - \nrule or defined “affiliated load facilities,” creating uncertainty about how co-located or \nconnected data centers should be grouped.45 \n25. \nFirstEnergy argues that PJM has not justified applying the Large Load definition \nto manufacturing or other industrial facilities because, unlike data centers, short-notice \ncurtailment of manufacturing facilities may disrupt product and supply chains, strand \ninventory, damage equipment, and require costly cleaning and restart procedures.46  \n26. \nEKPC argues that PJM does not justify the 50 MW threshold and requests that the \nCommission should either require PJM to narrow the definitions or to establish objective \ncriteria demonstrating that non-computational load presents the same IRAS-relevant \nrisks.47  The IMM argues that the 50 MW threshold would exclude a significant and \ngrowing share of data center load and that lowering the threshold would more effectively \nprevent gaming and reflect advances in prefabricated, scalable data center technology.48 \niii. \nDetermination \n27. \nWe find that PJM’s proposed definition of Large Load is just and reasonable and \nnot unduly discriminatory or preferential.49  First, we find that establishing the threshold \nto qualify as a Large Load at a cumulative peak of 50 MW strikes a just and reasonable \nbalance between capturing the larger loads into which PJM needs visibility to ensure the \nreliability of its system and excluding smaller loads that do not raise the same reliability \nconcerns in PJM.50  We acknowledge protesters’ arguments that PJM has not explained \n \n45 IMM Answer at 15-16. \n46 FirstEnergy Answer at 5. \n47 EKPC Answer at 6-7. \n48 IMM Answer at 14-15. \n49 Although we find PJM’s proposed definition of Large Load just and reasonable, \nwe reject the proposed Tariff records due to inclusion of language pertaining to the IRAS \nand BYONC frameworks, which we reject, as explained below (proposed OATT, \nDefinitions – Large Load; proposed RAA, Definitions – Large Load).   \n50 PJM Answer at 15; see also Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 194 FERC ¶ 61,031, at        \nPP 10, 61 (2026) (accepting a proposed definition of a high impact large load that \nincluded a 50 MW threshold for new or increased load at a single site connected to the \ntransmission system at a voltage level greater than 69 kV); Tri-State Generation & \nTransmission Ass’n, Inc., 196 FERC ¶ 61,127, at P 76 (2026) (Tri-State) (accepting a \nproposal to define a high impact load as load exceeding or forecasted to exceed 45 MW"},{"page":12,"startToken":4439,"endToken":4927,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 12 - \nwhy a new 49.9 MW load should not be subject to the same requirements as a new        \n50 MW load.  But any cutoff criterion would inevitably exclude loads sized just below \nthe threshold, and that alone does not render the definition unjust or unreasonable.51   \n28. \nIn addition, we disagree with protesters’ arguments that the definition of Large \nLoad should be modified to exclude manufacturing facilities and include only data \ncenters.  Protesters do not appear to argue that other types of large loads do not use \nenergy at the same magnitude as data centers or do not have the same potential impacts \non the transmission system.  Nor do protesters appear to argue that other types of large \nloads otherwise have different effects on resource adequacy that would justify excluding \nthem from the definition of Large Load.  As such, we find reasonable PJM’s proposal to \ninclude all types of large loads in the Large Load definition.   \n29. \nWe acknowledge that commenters put forth alternate definitions of Large Load in \nthe record.  However, having found PJM’s proposed definition of Large Load just and \nreasonable, as discussed above, we need not opine on these alternate definitions.  For \nfilings made under FPA section 205, the Commission evaluates whether the proposal in \nthe filing is just and reasonable, and not whether alternative proposals are more or less \nreasonable than the filing party’s proposal.52 \n30. \nWe also disagree with protesters’ arguments that defining a Large Load as a single \nelectrical site behind one or more points of interconnection within a one-mile radius is \nunjust and unreasonable.  As PJM explains, the one-mile radius paired with the single \nelectrical site requirement is necessary to ensure that loads that are physically located \ntogether and affiliated are considered as a single facility for the purposes of the Large \nLoad definition.  We agree with PJM that this requirement will preclude a scenario \nwhere, for example, a data center load is not categorized as Large Load simply because \n \nwithin four years and served from a single delivery point). \n51 See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 181 FERC ¶ 61,162, at P 66 (2022) \n(stating with respect to PJM’s proposed threshold, “while specific cutoff criteria ‘will \nexclude certain interconnection customers’ from participation in a transition cluster, ‘any \ncutoff date inevitably will have that effect’”), order on reh’g, 184 FERC ¶ 61,006, at      \nP 30 (2023) (finding “any cutoff amount will inevitably exclude certain interconnection \ncustomers from access to the expedited process”); see also Tri-State Generation & \nTransmission Ass’n, Inc., 175 FERC ¶ 61,128, at P 14 (2021) (citing PacifiCorp,          \n173 FERC ¶ 61,016, at P 25 (2020)). \n52 See Cities of Bethany v. FERC, 727 F.2d 1131, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding \nthat, when determining whether a rate was just and reasonable, the Commission properly \ndid not consider “whether a proposed rate schedule is more or less reasonable than \nalternative rate designs”)."},{"page":13,"startToken":4927,"endToken":5395,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 13 - \nthe owner has elected to site a number of smaller data centers, each with peak loads \nbelow 50 MW, close together.53  Regarding ODEC’s request for clarification for how \naffiliation will be determined for the purposes of measuring the one-mile radius, we note \nthat “affiliate” is a defined term in the Tariff,54 and PJM explains that it intends to detail \nin the PJM Manuals the method of calculating the one-mile distance and for examining \ndifferent configurations to determine whether they may constitute a single electrical site.  \nWe agree with PJM that these are implementation details that are not necessary to include \nin the Tariff. \n31. \nWe find that PJM’s proposal to add a definition of New Large Load is \nfundamentally a part of PJM’s IRAS package, discussed below.  PJM explains that the \nterm New Large Load is needed to describe the subset of Large Loads that PJM proposes \nmay be subject to curtailment where the LSE does not designate capacity to offset the \nload.55  Given that we are rejecting these aspects of PJM’s proposal, as discussed below, \nwe also sever and reject the definition of New Large Load without prejudice.  While we \ndo not reach the merits of the definition of New Large Load, we note that protesters argue \nthat the definition of New Large Load does not protect existing commercial arrangements \nfor incremental large load additions to existing Large Loads, and because we do not reach \nthe merits of the definition of New Large Load, we do not address protesters’ remaining \ncomments related to the definition of New Large Load.56  Should PJM choose to refile a \nmodified version of its proposed IRAS framework, we encourage PJM to address how its \ndefinition of New Large Load would be tailored to protect existing commercial \narrangements. \n \n53 Transmittal at 33-34. \n54 The PJM OATT defines “Affiliate” as any two or more entities, one of which \nControls the other or that are under common Control.  “Control,” as that term is used in \nthis definition, is defined as the possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to direct \nthe management or policies of an entity.  Ownership of publicly-traded equity securities \nof another entity shall not result in Control or affiliation for purposes of the Tariff or \nOperating Agreement if the securities are held as an investment, the holder owns (in its \nname or via intermediaries) less than 10 percent (10%) of the outstanding securities of the \nentity, the holder does not have representation on the entity’s board of directors (or \nequivalent managing entity) or vice versa, and the holder does not in fact exercise \ninfluence over day-to-day management decisions.  PJM, Intra-PJM Tariffs, OATT, \nDefinitions A – B (19.1.1). \n55 Transmittal at 38-40. \n56 E.g., Equinix Protest at 2, 8-14; FirstEnergy Protest at 9."},{"page":14,"startToken":5395,"endToken":5778,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 14 - \n32. \nBecause we reject PJM’s proposed definition of New Large Load, we direct PJM \nto submit a compliance filing, within 30 days of the date of this order, with OATT and \nRAA revisions that include only the definition of Large Load and do not include the \ndefinition of or references to New Large Load.   \nb. \nLarge Load Registry \ni. \nPJM’s Proposal \n33. \nPJM proposes to require LSEs to submit information to PJM about the Large \nLoads they serve, which PJM will maintain in a Large Load Registry.57  Specifically, \nPJM proposes revisions to Schedule 11 of the RAA to establish a registry of Large Loads \nin the PJM Region capturing existing Large Loads and New Large Loads that will \ninterconnect in the future.58  PJM explains the Large Load Registry will include \ninformation such as the Eligible Customer for the Large Load; a description of the Large \nLoad; its location; the in-service date for each increment of load; any peak shaving \nadjustment value; the delivery point/point of interconnection; peak load quantity and \nramp schedule; telemetry specifications; backup generation including fuel type and \npermitting limitations; contracts or service agreements between the Large Load and the \nLSE; points of contact at the applicable transmission owner, Electric Distributor, and \nLSE; and other details as necessary in accordance with the PJM Manuals.59  PJM \nproposes to maintain the confidentiality of the information in the Large Load Registry \nconsistent with PJM’s existing confidentiality obligations under Operating Agreement, \nsection 18.17.60 \n34. \nPJM states that the purpose of this registry is to:  (1) enable PJM to better forecast \nload growth, plan and manage the transmission system, and study and provide the \nanticipated new transmission services for co-located loads and Large Loads; and (2) \nmake information available to Authorized Commissions,61 Transmission Owners, Electric \n \n57 Transmittal at 36-37. \n58 Id. at 22, 28-48. \n59 Id. at 37. \n60 Id. at 42. \n61 “Authorized Commission” means (i) a State public utility commission that \nregulates the distribution or supply of electricity to retail customers and is legally charged \nwith monitoring the operation of wholesale or retail markets serving retail suppliers or \ncustomers within its State or (ii) an association or organization comprised exclusively of \nState public utility commissions described in the immediately preceding clause (i).  PJM,"},{"page":15,"startToken":5778,"endToken":6221,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 15 - \nDistributors, LSEs, the IMM, the Commission, and other entities pursuant to the \nOperating Agreement, subject to appropriate confidentiality and data protection \nsafeguards.  PJM likewise notes that this information will be useful for states in \nmonitoring adherence to Large Loads’ commitments to bringing capacity to offset \ndemand and protect against higher prices for other customers, as well as implementing \ntheir own retail constructs.62  PJM also proposes to aggregate data from the Large Load \nRegistry and post it on the PJM website.63  Additionally, PJM states that it will use the \nLarge Load Registry to implement its proposed IRAS framework. \n35. \nPJM proposes to require that the information used to develop and maintain the \nLarge Load Registry be “submit[ted] or cause to be submitted” to PJM by LSEs.  In \naddition, PJM proposes to obtain information from Electric Distributors to coordinate \nwith applicable Transmission Owners and Electric Distributors, as needed, to validate the \ninformation provided in the Large Load Registry or to consult with relevant Large \nLoads.64  PJM states that the Commission has previously accepted proposals by PJM to \nrequire and obtain information from jurisdictional entities such as Electric Distributors \nand LSEs.65  PJM argues that its authority to obtain “data and details concerning large \nload additions” finds support in the PJM Large Load Show Cause Order, which expressly \nrequired PJM and the PJM Transmission Owners to post and regularly update data and \ndetails concerning large load additions.66   \n \nIntra-PJM Tariff, Operating Agreement, Definitions A-B (9.2.2). \n62 Id. at 28-29. \n63 Id. at 28. \n64 Id. at 45-46 (citing proposed RAA, Schedule 11, § B.1). \n65 Id. at 46 (citing PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 188 FERC ¶ 61,200, at P 40        \n& n.65 (2024) (finding that an “Electric Distributor is the party with the distribution and \nmetering facilities defining a zone/area and responsible for reporting load information to \nPJM[,]” and also noting that, “under the current framework, each LSE already reports \ntheir peak load contribution to the Electric Distributor, which is the entity ultimately \nresponsible for reporting that information to PJM.” (citation modified)).  PJM states that \nits information-gathering authority is wide.  Id. (citing FERC v. Elec. Power Supply \nAss’n, 577 U.S. 260, 278-79 (2016) (EPSA); 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)).  PJM also notes \nsimilarities to longstanding requirements applicable to Demand Resources, as set forth in \nOrder No. 719-A.  Id. at 46-47 (citing Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized \nElec. Mrkts., Order No. 719-A, 128 FERC ¶ 61,059, order on clarification, Order No. \n719-B, 129 FERC ¶ 61,252 (2009)). \n66 Id. at 47-48 (quoting PJM Large Load Show Cause Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,211"},{"page":16,"startToken":6221,"endToken":6576,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 16 - \nii. \nPleadings \n36. \nSeveral parties support the creation of a Large Load Registry.67  Google asserts \nthat the Commission has the authority to accept only the Large Load Registry and should \nsever the remainder of the proposal.  According to Google, this approach would be \nconsistent with PJM’s goals of improving resource adequacy in the region while ensuring \nthat service to existing residential customers remains reliable.68  Public Interest \nOrganizations (PIO)69 argue that PJM’s proposal addresses some of the concerns related \nto large load interconnection, cost transparency, and reliability impacts laid out in the \nPJM Large Load Show Cause Order by proposing to establish a Large Load Registry.70  \nMany state consumer advocates assert that they support the Large Load Registry, but \nargue that excluding state consumer advocates from the category of entities eligible to \naccess confidential Large Load Registry information is not just and reasonable.71  Some \ncommenters suggest additional improvements to the database.72 \n37. \nProtesters object to the responsibility for accuracy and any costs for compliance \nfor the Large Load Registry falling on Transmission Owners and Electric Distributors.  \nJoint Consumer Advocates73 assert that, because the Large Load Registry is critical to the \nsuccess of IRAS, it is unreasonable that, under PJM’s proposed Large Load Registry, \nNew Large Loads apparently bear no affirmative, Tariff-expressed obligation either to \nsubmit data or to substantiate it.74  SMECO similarly asserts that the proposed Large \n \nat P 74). \n67 Google Protest at 3; NJBPU Protest at 13-14; Ohio Consumers’ Counsel Protest \nat 20. \n68 Google Protest at 18. \n69 PIOs include Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council, Environmental \nLaw and Policy Center, Appalachian Voices, and the Center for Progressive Reform. \n70 PIOs Protest at 16-18. \n71 Ohio Consumers’ Counsel Protest at 20; OPSI Comments at 7; Pennsylvania \nCommission Comments at 6. \n72 PAG Comments at 1-2; PAG Supplemental Comments at 2-3. \n73 Joint Consumer Advocates include the Delaware Division of the Public \nAdvocate, District of Columbia Office of People’s Counsel, Illinois Citizens Utility \nBoard, Office of the Illinois Attorney General, Maryland Office of the People’s Counsel, \nand New Jersey Division of Rate Counsel."},{"page":17,"startToken":6576,"endToken":6943,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 17 - \nLoad Registry’s data reporting mandate is deferred to future PJM Manual revisions, with \nno mechanism identified for Electric Distributors to recover the costs of compliance.75  \nSMECO requests that the Commission require PJM to file Manual provisions for review \nbefore the Large Load Registry becomes effective, clarify the scope of Electric \nDistributor liability for information sourced from LSEs or Large Loads, and identify a \nmechanism for recovering costs of complying with its obligations related to the Large \nLoad Registry.   \n38. \nEquinix argues that PJM’s proposed Large Load Registry lacks essential due \nprocess protections and that PJM may rely on registry data without requiring notice to \naffected customers, verification by those customers, or a meaningful correction \nmechanism.76  Equinix states that this prevents customers from determining their IRAS \nobligations, undermines long-term procurement planning, and may force loads to commit \nto BYONC arrangements without assurance that the Large Load Registry’s treatment \naligns with retail curtailment rules.77  Industrial Customers request additional substantive \nand due process protections if existing Large Loads are included in the registry, including \ncustomer notice, correction, and appeal procedures and robust confidentiality safeguards \nfor sensitive operational and commercial information.78 \n39. \nIndustrial Customers and IECA assert that existing large loads should be excluded \nfrom the proposed Large Load Registry to the extent it is used to implement IRAS; in \ntheir view, the Large Load Registry’s purpose is to track New Large Loads driving new \nsystem costs, not existing customers already integrated into the grid and reflected in \nhistorical forecasts.79  Other parties, such as Joint Consumer Advocates and ODEC, raise \nconfidentiality concerns with the registry.  ODEC seeks clarification from PJM as to \nwhether LSEs will be required to provide Large Load Registry information, and is \nconcerned that PJM’s proposal will require LSEs to provide information that they may \nnot be able to obtain.80  Joint Consumer Advocates claim that PJM’s proposal \nunreasonably restricts state consumer advocates’ access to the Large Load Registry, \n \n74 Joint Consumer Advocates Protest at 32-33. \n75 SMECO Protest at 11-13. \n76 Equinix Protest at 2. \n77 Id. at 12-14. \n78 Industrial Customers Comments at 7-8. \n79 Id. at 4; IECA Protest at 1. \n80 ODEC Comments at 3-6."},{"page":18,"startToken":6943,"endToken":7320,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 18 - \narguing entities with access are subject to onerous and insurmountable confidentiality \nrestrictions.81  Joint Consumer Advocates and Ohio Consumers’ Counsel argue that PJM \nshould allow state consumer advocates access to the Large Load Registry because the \ninformation will play a central role in their advocacy efforts.82  Pennsylvania \nCommission similarly states that it supports PJM’s proposed Large Load Registry, but \nrequests that state utility commissions have access, and that the Large Load Registry \nshould contain curtailment data.83  OPSI and Ohio Consumers’ Counsel assert that states \nmust have meaningful access to the registry so they can determine how curtailment \nshould be implemented at the retail level and how resulting costs or responsibilities \nshould be allocated consistent with state law and policy.84  Similarly, Representative \nPallone argues that the Large Load Registry, or as much of it as possible, must be public \nbecause it would be invaluable for improving forecasts of electricity demand.85 \n40. \nThe IMM argues that the proposed Large Load Registry, by itself, does not \nestablish that PJM will receive real-time telemetry sufficient to monitor the load during \nan IRAS event, or to determine whether the required reduction action actually occurred.86  \nThe IMM contends that telemetry and performance measurement requirements are \nparticularly important if IRAS reductions are to be treated as an operational reliability \nresource rather than merely as a forecasted or administrative load adjustment.   \n41. \nIn its answer, PJM highlights the importance of timely Commission approval of \nthe Large Load Registry.87  PJM states that the Commission has recognized that PJM \nmust have visibility into where Large Loads will be located to be prepared for operational \nissues distinctive to Large Loads.88  PJM states that there have been severe incidents of \nlarge loads tripping offline in PJM, which could have led to significant outages had PJM \n \n81 Joint Consumer Advocates Protest at 33. \n82 Id. at 34; Ohio Consumers’ Counsel Protest at 22. \n83 Pennsylvania Commission Comments at 6. \n84 Ohio Consumers’ Counsel Protest at 9; OPSI Comments at 7. \n85 Representative Pallone Comments at 3. \n86 IMM Protest at 27. \n87 PJM Answer at 6-7. \n88 Id. at 9 (citing PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 193 FERC ¶ 61,217, at P 212 n.444 \n(2025) (PJM Co-Location Order))."},{"page":19,"startToken":7320,"endToken":7705,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 19 - \nnot been able to respond in time.89  PJM asserts that such information will also be \ninvaluable for states and other planning entities. \n42. \nIn response to states and state consumer advocates asserting that they should have \nbroader, less-restricted access to the Large Load Registry, PJM asserts that the \ninformation contained in the Large Load Registry will be available to Authorized \nCommissions, among others, subject to confidentiality requirements.90  PJM states that \n“Authorized Commission” is currently defined to include state public utility \ncommissions, as well as organizations thereof.91  PJM clarifies that the proposal does not \nrecommend any new restrictions and that PJM plans to adhere to its existing rules for \ndisseminating confidential information, as set forth in the Operating Agreement, and \nwhich the Commission approved many years ago.92  PJM explains that the Large Load \nRegistry is expected to collect information that may be confidential or commercially \nsensitive, or that may implicate infrastructure security concerns.  Therefore, PJM asserts, \nit must only permit access to this registry to “as small a universe of entities as possible,” \nwhile still making sure it is available to those who require access to implement their \nresponsibilities, as well as operational and planning needs.93   \n43. \nIn response to ODEC, PJM clarifies that it is the LSE serving a Large Load that is \nobligated to provide PJM with the information for the Large Load Registry, but \nacknowledges that there may be instances where an LSE may not have all the information \n \n89 Id. (citing James Downing, Data Centers’ Reliability Impacts Examined at \nFERC Meeting, RTO Insider (Apr. 17, 2025), https://www.rtoinsider.com/103130-ferc-\ngets-update-data-center-reliability/ (discussing 1,500 MW drop from Louden County data \ncenter tripping offline)). \n90 Id. at 10. \n91 Id. (citing PJM, Intra-PJM Tariffs, Operating Agreement, Definitions (A – B) \n(9.2.2) (“‘Authorized Commission’ shall mean (i) a State public utility commission that \nregulates the distribution or supply of electricity to retail customers and is legally charged \nwith monitoring the operation of wholesale or retail markets serving retail suppliers or \ncustomers within its State or (ii) an association or organization comprised exclusively of \nState public utility commissions described in the immediately preceding clause (i).”)). \n92 Id. at 12 (citing PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 107 FERC ¶ 61,322 (2004)). \n93 Id. at 11."},{"page":20,"startToken":7705,"endToken":8041,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 20 - \nrequired readily available, which is why the RAA language contemplates that the Electric \nDistributor may provide such information.94   \n44. \nIn response to Industrial Customers and IECA’s arguments that the Large Load \nRegistry should not include existing Large Loads, PJM states that, regardless of IRAS, \nPJM must have visibility into the full spectrum of all Large Loads in its footprint to \nproperly manage its system and ensure reliability.95 \n45. \nIn their answers, Constellation and Google argue that the Commission should \nreject PJM’s proposal, other than the proposal to create the Large Load Registry.96 \n46. \nFirstEnergy argues that PJM’s assertion that it does not presently perceive a \nconnection between the Large Load Registry and the forthcoming pro forma transmission \nservice agreement does not demonstrate that finalizing the Large Load Registry now will \navoid overlapping, inconsistent, or duplicative requirements.97 \n47. \nSMECO requests that the Commission direct PJM to conform proposed Tariff, \nAttachment DD-4, section III(b) to PJM’s stated position that the LSE bears the Large \nLoad Registry reporting obligation, and to clarify that an Electric Distributor that relays, \nin good faith, information originating with an LSE or Large Load is not responsible for \nthe accuracy of that information.98 \niii. \nDetermination \n48. \nWe find that PJM’s proposed Large Load Registry is just and reasonable and not \nunduly discriminatory or preferential because it will require LSEs to provide information \nabout the Large Loads that they serve to PJM, which in turn will provide PJM with the \ninformation necessary to address the operational impacts of Large Loads on the PJM \ntransmission system.  We agree with PJM that its proposed Large Load Registry will \nenable PJM to better forecast load growth and to plan and manage its transmission \nsystem.99  We further find that the Large Load Registry will provide valuable information \n \n94 Id. at 13. \n95 Id. at 13-14. \n96 Constellation Answer at 21; Google Answer at 6. \n97 FirstEnergy Answer at 5. \n98 SMECO Answer at 7.  \n99 Transmittal at 28-29."},{"page":21,"startToken":8041,"endToken":8512,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 21 - \nconcerning—and visibility into—all Large Loads connecting to the PJM transmission \nsystem, separate and apart from implementation of PJM’s proposed IRAS framework.100  \nTherefore, we sever PJM’s proposed Large Load Registry from the remainder of PJM’s \nproposal and accept it.101  We direct PJM to submit a compliance filing, within 30 days of \nthe date of this order, with the OATT and RAA provisions for the Large Load Registry, \nremoving the language regarding the proposed IRAS and BYONC frameworks. \n49. \nWe also find just and reasonable PJM’s proposal to make information in the Large \nLoad Registry available to Authorized Commissions, Transmission Owners, Electric \nDistributors, LSEs, the IMM, the Commission, and other entities, subject to appropriate \nconfidentiality and data protection safeguards.  Some protesters express concern \nregarding the Large Load Registry information being subject to confidentiality \nrestrictions.  We disagree with these parties and find that PJM’s proposal includes \nreasonable safeguards for confidential information.  PJM explains that the Large Load \nRegistry will be available only to entities that already have access to this sort of \ninformation and consistent with existing confidentiality rules, i.e., PJM proposes to \nfollow its existing, Commission-approved rules, rules that currently do not allow state \nconsumer advocates or similar entities to have access to this type of information.  PJM \nfurther states that it will post only aggregated data on the PJM website, consistent with its \nexisting confidentiality protections.  We find that PJM’s existing confidentiality rules and \ncommitment to make only aggregate data publicly available will adequately safeguard \nconfidential information submitted and maintained as part of the Large Load Registry, \nwhile balancing the need for broader transparency concerning Large Loads in the \naggregate in PJM. \n50. \nWe disagree with protesters’ arguments that it is not reasonable for Electric \nDistributors to be responsible for the accuracy of the information in the Large Load \nRegistry.  As PJM clarifies in its answer, the LSE serving a Large Load is obligated to \nprovide PJM with the information for the Large Load Registry, and the Electric \nDistributor may provide information when the LSE does not have all the information \nrequired readily available.102  With respect to SMECO’s concern that there is no \n \n100 We note that the proposed Large Load definition accepted above includes all \nLarge Loads regardless of the in-service date.   \n101 Specifically, we find that PJM’s proposed Large Load Registry as described in \nproposed OATT, Attachment DD-4, § II(a), III(b), and proposed RAA Schedule 11 \nrevisions in sections (B)(1), B(2)(a), and B(2)(b), is just and reasonable and not unduly \ndiscriminatory or preferential.  However, consistent with our findings regarding PJM’s \nproposed IRAS framework below, we reject proposed OATT, attach. DD-4, § II and        \n§ III, as well as proposed RAA, Schedule 11.   \n102 Transmittal at 13.  The proposed RAA states that, “each [entity bound by the"},{"page":22,"startToken":8512,"endToken":8972,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 22 - \nmechanism for Electric Distributors to recover the costs of compliance, SMECO has not \nexplained what costs it will incur, whether these are costs related to a wholesale service, \nor what information included in the Large Load Registry it would not otherwise already \npossess.  Also, given our findings elsewhere in this order, we expect that PJM will update \nthe information that must be provided for inclusion in the registry to remove the \npreviously identified items that are part of the IRAS package (such as the amount of \nBYONC brought by a particular Large Load).  Additionally, because we are rejecting \nPJM’s IRAS proposal, industrial customers will only be included in the Large Load \nRegistry for informational purposes.  Similar to our finding concerning PJM’s proposed \ndefinition of Large Load in section III.B.1.a.iii above, we agree with PJM that it must \nhave visibility into all Large Loads in the PJM Region to manage its system and ensure \nreliability.103  Finally, as to commenters suggesting improvements to the Large Load \nRegistry, we note that the Commission evaluates whether the proposal in the filing is just \nand reasonable, and not whether alternative proposals are more or less reasonable than \nthe filing party’s proposal.104 \n51. \nGiven that, as discussed below, we are rejecting PJM’s proposed IRAS \nframework, we find that it is unnecessary to address protests arguing that the Large Load \nRegistry is unjust and unreasonable because of how it is proposed to interact with IRAS.  \nFor the same reason, we decline to address protests regarding telemetry or how the \naccuracy of the information in the Large Load Registry affects Eligible New Large \nLoads’ IRAS obligations.  We similarly find that it is unnecessary to address protests that \nstates must have access to the Large Load Registry to determine curtailment and cost \nallocation given that, as discussed below, we are rejecting PJM’s proposed IRAS \nframework. \n2. \nInterim Resource Adequacy Service Package \n52. \nAlthough PJM asserts that its proposal can be viewed as containing discrete \nelements, we decline to sever the remaining aspects of the proposal because they appear \nto be an integrated package.  Below, we find that elements of the package are outside of \n \nOperating Agreement] shall submit, or cause to be submitted, to [PJM] the following \ninformation, as may be further described in the PJM Manuals, related to each Large Load \nserved by [the entity bound by the Operating Agreement].”  Proposed RAA, Schedule 11, \n§ B(1)(a).    \n103 Transmittal at 13-14. \n104 See Cities of Bethany v. FERC, 727 F.2d 1131, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding \nthat, when determining whether a rate was just and reasonable, the Commission properly \ndid not consider “whether a proposed rate schedule is more or less reasonable than \nalternative rate designs”)."},{"page":23,"startToken":8972,"endToken":9369,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 23 - \nthe Commission’s jurisdiction or that PJM has not demonstrated that certain elements of \nthe package are just and reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or preferential, \nincluding the proposed IRAS and BYONC frameworks.  As discussed below, we reject \nthe entirety of the package.   \na. \nPJM’s Proposal \n53. \nPJM proposes that, during years when the PJM Region experiences a resource \nadequacy shortfall, it may issue an IRAS Action105 directing Electric Distributors to \nreduce load attributable to Eligible New Large Loads106 in the Electric Distributor’s \nzone/area, unless the New Large Load is offset by new capacity through Reliability \nBackstop Procurement Unforced Capacity (UCAP) MW or BYONC arrangements.107  \nPJM states that it may issue an IRAS Action when reserves or Interconnection Reliability \nOperating Limits cannot be maintained, and it “generally” would do so before Pre-\nEmergency Load Management Reductions but after the deployment of available \ngeneration and economic demand resources, and curtailment of non-firm interchange and \napplicable non-firm transmission service.108  Specifically, in the affidavit, Mr. Pilong \nexplains that IRAS Actions would occur after PJM dispatchers have issued a NERC \nEnergy Emergency Alert Level 1 (EEA1).109  PJM states that IRAS would be suspended \n \n105 PJM explains that an IRAS Action is an “Operating Instruction, as defined by \nNERC.”  Transmittal at 75 (citing Proposed OATT, Definitions – Interim Resource \nAdequacy Service Action).   \n106 PJM proposes to define Eligible New Large Loads as “a New Large Load \neligible to provide Interim Resource Adequacy Service in accordance with Tariff, \nAttachment DD-4, section V.”  Proposed OATT, Definitions – Eligible New Large \nLoads. \n107 Transmittal at 82-83, 97-98. \n108 Id. at 82.  PJM explains that details as to how and when PJM may call an IRAS \nAction will be set forth by PJM Manual 13, along with its other Emergency Procedures.  \nId. at 75-76. \n109 Id., attach. C (Affidavit of Mr. Christopher Pilong) ¶¶ 38-40 (Pilong Aff.).    \nMr. Pilong explains that there are three levels of NERC Energy Emergency Alert Levels \n(EEA1 through EEA3), with an EEA3 being the highest alert level.  EEA1 signals that \nPJM foresees or is experiencing conditions where all available resources are scheduled to \nmeet firm load, firm transactions, and reserve commitments, and is concerned about \nsustaining its required Contingency Reserves.  An EEA3 is issued when PJM is unable to \nmeet minimum Contingency Reserve Requirements.  Pilong Aff. ¶ 11 (citing PJM \nManual 13, §§ 2.3.1, 2.3.2)."},{"page":24,"startToken":9369,"endToken":9688,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 24 - \nafter three consecutive Delivery Years of PJM meeting its Reliability Requirements.110  \nPJM proposes to set a maximum wholesale compensation rate for IRAS that is equal to \n50% of the capacity performance Non-Performance Charge Rate, but the proposed Tariff \nstates that the rate could be reduced if the Eligible New Large Load accepts in its retail \nrate a sum less than 50% of the Non-Performance Charge Rate or waives receipt of any \ncompensation in its retail rate.111  \n54. \nUnderpinning IRAS, PJM proposes a new obligation on LSEs that seek to procure \nNITS to support New Large Loads by designating new capacity resources in an amount at \nleast equal to the load’s peak demand or such New Large Loads may be subject to \ncurtailment under IRAS.112  PJM also proposes to establish a new category of capacity \nresources, BYONC, that may be designated to address the needs of New Large Loads.113  \nPJM states that BYONC would include new UCAP and eligible generation, storage, and \neligible demand-side resources that satisfy gating criteria demonstrating their newness to \nthe capacity market and PJM system, with UCAP fixed when the resource first clears.114  \nPJM states that BYONC resources would remain subject to applicable capacity market \nobligations, including deficiency charges, performance penalties, plus a 10-year        \nmust-offer requirement and $0/MW-day price-taker requirement, annual performance \ndemonstrations for demand response and distributed energy resources, and a prohibition \non external sales.115   \n55. \nFinally, beginning with the 2029/2030 Delivery Year, PJM proposes to exclude \nfrom the VRR curve New Large Load MW that has neither entered into BYONC \narrangements nor received allocated Reliability Backstop Procurement UCAP MW, \nregardless of whether an IRAS-triggering shortfall exists.116 \n \n110 Transmittal at 72. \n111 Id. at 102; proposed OATT, attach. DD-4, § X(a). \n112 Transmittal at 21. \n113 Id. at 23. \n114 Id. at 49-57, 64-65. \n115 Id. at 55-58.  \n116 Id. at 109-10."},{"page":25,"startToken":9688,"endToken":10073,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 25 - \nb. \nJurisdiction \ni. \nPJM’s Filing \n56. \nPJM argues that the proposed IRAS framework falls within the Commission’s \nestablished transmission jurisdiction and wholesale electricity jurisdiction.117  PJM \nmaintains that IRAS respects existing bright-line divisions between retail and wholesale \njurisdiction over transmission and distribution.  According to PJM, IRAS represents a \nfederal regime encouraging, but not mandating, states to re-evaluate load reduction plans, \nproviding PJM the necessary tools to address situations where regional resource \nadequacy shortfalls would jeopardize reliability.118  Moreover, PJM argues that it is \npreserving state authority by leaving retail load reduction and retail cost allocation to \nstate-level entities, while offering non-mandatory options under the federal tariff to aid \ncollection and settlement of compensation for IRAS. \n57. \nPJM asserts that its proposal to direct the Electric Distributor, rather than a \nspecific end-use customer, to reduce a quantity of load is in keeping with PJM’s \nlongstanding practice and reflects the allocation of jurisdiction between the federal and \nstate levels.119  PJM states that it will not direct specific LSEs and/or specific customers \nof LSEs, including specific Large Loads, to reduce their load and/or switch to on-site \nback up resources; rather, those decisions would be worked out through state retail \ntariffs.120  PJM asserts that this division of responsibility between PJM and the states \nand/or the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority (RERRA) is supported by \nprecedent.121  PJM asserts that states have exclusive jurisdiction to ensure the appropriate \nretail customers are reduced when IRAS Actions are called.122  PJM argues that it may \nissue directives to Electric Distributors to reduce load by a certain MW quantity during \ncertain, limited emergency conditions.123  PJM states that while the amount attributable to \n \n117 Id. at 2-3. \n118 Id. at 3. \n119 Id. at 86 (citing New PJM Cos., 107 FERC ¶ 61,272, at P 21 (2004)). \n120 Id. at 86-87. \n121 Id. at 89-90.  The Operating Agreement defines a RERRA as “an entity that has \njurisdiction over and establishes prices and policies for competition for providers of retail \nelectric service to end-customers, such as the city council for a municipal utility, the \ngoverning board of a cooperative utility, the state public utility commission or any other \nsuch entity.”  PJM, Intra-PJM Tariffs, Operating Agreement, Definitions, Q - R (13.1.0). \n122 Transmittal at 90-91."},{"page":26,"startToken":10073,"endToken":10449,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 26 - \neach Electric Distributor zone/area will be guided by the Large Load Registry, PJM will \nleave it to Electric Distributors (in coordination with the states, LSEs, and LSE \ncustomers) to determine which loads should ultimately reduce subject to IRAS.  PJM \nargues the IRAS framework divides authority between PJM and the states in a manner \nconsistent with the FPA’s basic division of authority. \n58. \nPJM also argues that this is not an improper delegation of federal authority to the \nstates because the division of responsibility reflected in the Tariff would be on file and \nremain subject to the Commission’s authority.124  PJM asserts that its resource adequacy \nframework recognizes the traditional role of state and local entities, and that the \nCommission has found that the appropriate course of action has been to defer to state and \nlocal entities’ decisions when possible while not shirking its responsibility under the \nFPA.125 \n59. \nPJM likewise argues that its compensation framework respects and reflects the \nfederal and state division of authority.126  PJM asserts that the IRAS rate is compensation \nfor a wholesale load reduction service.127  However, PJM also asserts that the rate is \nintended to be conjoined with retail rates and that the entities to be paid the rate and the \nloads to be charged to support such compensation must be determined at the state level.128  \nPJM argues that the net result is a reduced capacity charge for the Eligible New Large \nLoad, and thus is a practice that directly affects wholesale capacity rates assessed.129  \nPJM states that, while it enlists or invites state action through their jurisdictional retail \nprocess, it does not mandate any state-specific action, nor does it require any specific \nterms and conditions on retail service.130  Rather, PJM asserts that its proposed filed rate \nfacilitates and respects the handoff of responsibilities between federal wholesale rate \ndevelopment and state retail rate development.  PJM states that, like demand response \n \n123 Id. at 92. \n124 Id. at 92-93. \n125 Id. at 93-94 (citing PJM Interconnection L.L.C., 119 FERC ¶ 61,318, at P 40 \n(2007)). \n126 Id. at 101. \n127 Id. at 105. \n128 Id. at 104. \n129 Id. (citing EPSA, 577 U.S., 261, 265). \n130 Id. at 107."},{"page":27,"startToken":10449,"endToken":10829,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 27 - \nrules, this framework respects state law choices about whether and how to facilitate \nimplementation of a wholesale paradigm.131 \nii. \nPleadings \n60. \nMany protesters argue that PJM’s proposal impermissibly intrudes on state \nauthority by directly regulating retail customers, contrary to section 201(b) of the FPA.  \nThey argue that decisions regarding retail service, rates, and curtailment priorities are \nreserved for states and local regulators.132  Protesters assert that the customers proposed \nto be curtailed are retail customers and the compensation will be collected from and paid \nto retail customers.133  Protesters assert that PJM’s proposal contains several triggers that \n“target” specific retail customers by conditioning curtailment on retail characteristics, \nsuch as size, vintage, and whether the retail customer brings offsetting new capacity.134  \nProtesters also assert that the proposal does not directly affect wholesale rates.135   \n61. \nProtesters contend that PJM’s assertion that it is only imposing curtailment \nobligations on Electric Distributors does not alleviate the jurisdictional intrusion.  \nFurther, some protesters argue that the operative Tariff language places obligations \ndirectly on New Large Loads.136  Protesters assert that assigning curtailment to Electric \nDistributors merely makes them conduits for PJM’s retail-focused directives, leaving \nstates powerless. Protesters assert that PJM’s use of Electric Distributors demonstrates \n \n131 Id. at 108 (citing Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Elec. \nMrkts., Order No. 719, 125 FERC ¶ 61,071, at P 154 (2008); Order No. 719-B,            \n129 FERC ¶ 61,252 at P 5). \n132 CEBA Protest at 6-7; Constellation Protest at 13-18; Data Center Coalition \nProtest at 8; EPSA Protest at 3 n.7; Equinix Protest at 6-10; Google Protest at 8-11 (citing \nEPSA, 577 U.S. at 279); P3 Protest at 41-44; PPL Protest at 17 (citing EPSA, 577 U.S. at \n288); Virginia Commission Comments at 3-4; West Virginia Commission Comments at \n1-4. \n133 Constellation Protest at 13; Virginia Commission Comments at 3; Vistra \nProtest at 5-10.  \n134 CEBA Protest at 5-7; Constellation Protest at 13; Data Center Coalition Protest \nat 10-13 (citing Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373, 385 (2015) (Oneok)); Google \nProtest at 8; Vistra Protest at 2-3, 6. \n135 CEBA Protest at 7; Constellation Protest at 26-27 (citing EPSA, 577 U.S. at \n277-79). \n136 Pennsylvania Commission Comments at 2-4; PPL Protest at 10-11."},{"page":28,"startToken":10829,"endToken":11165,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 28 - \nthat PJM is doing indirectly what it cannot do directly.137  Protesters also assert that \ndemand response participation rules and Midcontinent Independent System Operator, \nInc.’s Expedited Resource Addition Study are not analogous to IRAS because those \nprograms addressed only wholesale market compensation for voluntary participation, \nwhere states permit such participation.138  \n62. \nProtesters also assert that PJM’s proposal impermissibly compels states to \nimplement a federal program.  Specifically, they argue that PJM is pressuring states to \nconform by deferring key curtailment and compensation decisions to state and local \nauthorities, requiring the creation of new programs or retail tariff changes, and imposing \nobligations on Electric Distributors without clear state oversight.139 \n63. \nProtesters also argue that the IRAS compensation framework establishes a retail \nrate.140  For example, Constellation asserts that PJM sets compensation and requires \nElectric Distributors to pay that amount by assessing charges against retail customers in \ntheir zone/area to pay other retail customers.141  West Virginia Commission warns that \nWest Virginia’s tools for setting retail rates for uncovered New Large Load could be \nchallenged if the Commission approved PJM’s wholesale compensation for those New \nLarge Loads that do not voluntarily turn down compensation.142   \n64. \nSeveral protesters also argue that the proposal impermissibly delegates authority to \nset the Commission-jurisdictional wholesale rate to states.  They contend that PJM’s \nproposal leaves compensation and curtailment decisions to state-regulated entities, \n \n137 Data Center Coalition Protest at 11; P3 Protest at 43. \n138 EKPC Protest at 29-30; FirstEnergy Protest at 3-4; P3 Protest at 25; PPL \nProtest at 14-15. \n139 AEU Comments at 10; Constellation Protest at 19-21; Data Center Coalition \nProtest at 12-13; FirstEnergy Protest at 3-5; Google Protest at 11; IMM Protest at 6; Ohio \nConsumers’ Counsel Protest at 26-27; P3 Protest at 33-35; PPL Protest at 3; Talen Protest \nat 13-15; Vistra Protest at 8-9. \n140 AEU Comments at 2-3, 10; FirstEnergy Protest at 3-5; Pennsylvania \nCommission Comments at 2-3. \n141 Constellation Protest at 14. \n142 West Virginia Commission Comments at 4."},{"page":29,"startToken":11165,"endToken":11570,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 29 - \nmaking the wholesale rate unclear and effectively set by the states rather than the \nCommission.143 \n65. \nOn the other hand, certain commenters assert that the proposal generally respects \nthe division of state and federal authority under the FPA.144  They argue that the proposal \nfalls squarely within PJM’s authority to maintain resource adequacy at the wholesale \nlevel.  PIOs note that the FPA does not prohibit rules that indirectly affect retail customer \nbehavior.145  PIOs explain that PJM has a specific and limited role with no direct control \nover retail end-use customers and that IRAS Actions will be implemented through \nElectric Distributors at the wholesale level.  PIOs assert that PJM will rely on aggregate \nMW quantities of load and supply to implement IRAS and that, while it will track retail \ncustomers, it will act at the macro level using aggregate quantities by zone.  Appalachian \nVoices likewise asserts that PJM’s proposal operates within the Commission’s \njurisdiction over transmission service and bulk power system reliability, and that tying \nthe MW quantity to be shed to New Large Loads is a matter of reliability and cost \ncausation.146  The IMM argues that PJM’s proposal does not go far enough; it asserts that \nPJM has authority to curtail individual Large Loads and should not abdicate the \nresponsibility to set and implement the terms and conditions of curtailment to the Electric \nDistributor and/or states.147 \n66. \nGovernor Shapiro argues that IRAS is a supplemental wholesale capacity product \ndesigned to ensure the reliability of the bulk power system, which is within PJM’s \njurisdiction.148  Governor Shapiro states that the Operating Agreement already grants \nPJM the ability to coordinate curtailment of load where PJM determines the aggregate \namount of MW load reduction required to be curtailed and the Transmission Owner or \nElectric Distributor determines which end-use entities are curtailed.149  Governor Shapiro \n \n143 CEBA Protest at 6-7; Constellation Protest at 20-23; Data Center Coalition \nProtest at 9-14; OPSI Comments at 7-8; P3 Protest at 42-45; Pennsylvania Commission \nComments at 5-6. \n144 Appalachian Voices Comments at 7-9; NJBPU Comments at 3; PIOs Protest at \n18-19. \n145 PIOs Protest at 18. \n146 Appalachian Voices Comments at 8. \n147 IMM Protest at 8. \n148 Governor Shapiro Answer at 7. \n149 Id. at 7-8 (citing PJM, Intra-PJM Tariffs, Operating Agreement, Schedule 1,     \n§ 1.6 (Office of the Interconnection) (3.1.0), § 1.6.2 (v) and (vii) (“The Office of the"},{"page":30,"startToken":11570,"endToken":12001,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 30 - \nargues that IRAS differs from this pre-existing authority in two ways, neither of which \nimpact jurisdiction:  (1) curtailment direction takes place prior to EEA1; and (2) the \nmeans by which PJM determines the aggregate MW of load to be curtailed in a zone or \narea.150  Governor Shapiro states that implementing IRAS Actions prior to EEA1 will \navoid escalating emergency procedures that would impose financial and reliability costs \ncaused by Large Loads on all customers.  Governor Shapiro states that, while PJM \ndetermines aggregate MW reductions within a zone based on that zone’s share of New \nLarge Loads, PJM does not direct the curtailment of loads, and that it remains up to the \nretail authority to implement the retail end-user priority.  Governor Shapiro argues that it \nis appropriate for PJM to focus on non-capacity backed New Large Loads when \ndetermining aggregate MW reduction targets, as it is those entities that are causing the \nreliability emergency, and is consistent with requirements in the Operating Agreement \nthat PJM not order a load shed in one zone to address deficiencies in another zone.151  \nGovernor Shapiro argues that protesters acknowledge that PJM’s proposal does not target \nspecific retail customers.152 \n67. \nGovernor Shapiro argues that there is no merit to the position that PJM is legally \nbarred from acting on information about characteristics of load growth in a zone when \nthat information is directly relevant to the operation of the bulk power system.153  \nGovernor Shapiro states that case law has never imposed such strict boundaries, that the \ncharacteristics of retail loads and generation are highly relevant to informing a wholesale \nrate, and that taking this information into account when setting wholesale rates does not \nconstitute regulation of those matters.154  Governor Shapiro states that, if this position \nwere to be adopted, both the Commission and PJM would be barred from considering \ninformation about generating facilities when setting wholesale rates, because neither the \nCommission nor PJM may directly regulate generation.  Governor Shapiro argues that \nthis jurisdictional position would be unworkable if applied to generation and is equally so \nif applied to retail loads. \n \nInterconnection shall . . . Determine and declare that an Emergency is expected to exist . . \n. Coordinate the curtailment of shedding of load . . . .”)). \n150 Id. at 8-9. \n151 Id. at 9 (citing PJM, Intra-PJM Tariffs, Operating Agreement, Schedule 1 § 1.7 \n(General) (21.1.0), § 1.7.11). \n152 Id. (citing Data Center Coalition Protest at 11; Constellation Protest at 20). \n153 Id. at 10. \n154 Id. at 11 (citing EPSA, 577 U.S. at 281-82; Oneok, 575 U.S. at 387-88)."},{"page":31,"startToken":12001,"endToken":12411,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 31 - \n68. \nAs to the compensation framework, Governor Shapiro asserts that, although PJM \n“confusingly” appears to speak about compensation that would be provided to individual \nretail customers, because PJM will only direct a MW quantity to be curtailed, wholesale \ncompensation will therefore accrue as a credit on a wholesale bill to the wholesale \ncustomers based on that total MW quantity of load curtailment.155  Governor Shapiro \nacknowledges that PJM could clean up the proposed Tariff provisions related to IRAS \ncompensation to (1) remove all references to “Eligible New Large Loads” to clarify that \nit is setting a wholesale rate; and (2) clarify that the particular level of compensation \ndepends on certain conditions, which inform the implementation of and are an input into \nthe wholesale rate.  \n69. \nIn its answer, PJM asserts that IRAS is targeted at improving the wholesale market \nby supporting resource adequacy and reliability, which directly affects Commission \njurisdictional rates.156  PJM argues that IRAS operates within PJM’s authority to require \nload reduction under real-time conditions that may give rise to system instability or \ncapacity shortfalls.157  PJM argues that IRAS may ultimately affect retail customers but \ndoes not present an impermissible intrusion on retail rate regulation because the proposal \nplaces the terms and conditions on LSEs, not end-use retail customers.158  PJM reiterates \nthat it will only determine the quantity of load to be curtailed by Electric Distributors, \nthat it will leave to the states to determine which resources will be called upon to reduce \nload, and that it will not determine whether any specific retail customer is called upon to \nreduce load or whether any load may say no to such a directive.159  PJM contends that \nprotesters make contradictory claims that IRAS imposes mandatory rules on end-use \nretail customers, but also that IRAS leaves too much discretion to states to determine \nwhich entities are curtailed.  \n70. \nPJM likewise argues that its compensation mechanism targets wholesale rates for \nwholesale customers and is not an attempt to create a retail compensation scheme for \ncurtailed large loads or an impermissible delegation to states of its wholesale ratemaking \nauthority.160  PJM explains that IRAS compensation neither mandates state-specific \naction nor imposes specific terms and conditions on retail rates.161  Instead, PJM asserts \n \n155 Id. at 14-15. \n156 PJM Answer at 19-21. \n157 Id. at 23 \n158 Id. at 26 (citing Tri-State, 196 FERC ¶ 61,127 at P 68). \n159 Id. at 28-29. \n160 Id. at 54."},{"page":32,"startToken":12411,"endToken":12842,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 32 - \nthat it is using its authority to set rates for operational actions to reduce energy \nconsumption as part of the Commission’s wholesale jurisdiction, with all other aspects of \nratemaking, including application of that rate to different retail customer classes, left to \nthe states.  PJM states that, just like wholesale demand response participation depends on \nstate permission, wholesale compensation for IRAS at a reduced level depends on \nRERRA action specifying an alternative compensation below the maximum rate.  \nFurthermore, PJM states that the Tariff contemplates that entities to be paid the rate and \nthe loads to be charged to support such compensation are determined at the state level. \n71. \nIn its answer, Google asserts that when it comes to determining whether a rate is \njurisdictionally permissible under the FPA, the dispositive question is how it works in \npractice, not the relevant public utility’s transmittal letter.162  Constellation and Data \nCenter Coalition argue that the express language of the proposed Tariff unlawfully targets \nand requires curtailment of a specific category of retail customers, i.e., Eligible New \nLarge Loads, thereby regulating the terms of retail service and intruding on state \njurisdiction.163  Specifically, Constellation and Data Center Coalition cite the proposed \nTariff, which states that “Electric Distributors” shall “execute the [PJM] Office of the \nInterconnection’s directives to implement Interim Resource Adequacy Service Actions \namong the Eligible New Large Loads in the Electric Distributor’s zone/area.”164  \nConstellation asserts that the proposed Tariff language leaves no doubt that Electric \nDistributors would actually violate the PJM Tariff if they bypassed curtailment of \nEligible New Large Loads and chose to curtail other retail customers instead.   \n72. \nConstellation, Data Center Coalition, FirstEnergy, Google, and Vistra further \nargue that the Tri-State order does not support PJM’s proposal because, unlike the \naccepted Tri-State tariff, PJM’s proposed Tariff leaves Electric Distributors no discretion \nto determine whether and how retail customers will be affected.165 \n \n161 Id. at 56-57. \n162 Google Answer at 13. \n163 Constellation Answer at 4; Data Center Coalition Answer at 10. \n164 Constellation Answer at 4-5 (citing proposed OATT, attach. DD-4, §§ II(e), \nIII(a) (emphasis added); id. (stating that the PJM “shall . . . request Electric Distributors \nto direct that a quantity of Eligible New Large Load Amounts . . . be reduced in \naccordance with an [IRAS] Action”); id. § IV(a) (“All Eligible New Large Loads shall be \navailable to be requested to provide [IRAS] by the [PJM] Office of the \nInterconnection.”)); Data Center Coalition Answer at 10 (citing proposed OATT, attach. \nDD-4 § III(a)). \n165 Constellation Answer at 7-8; Data Center Coalition Answer at 7-8; FirstEnergy"},{"page":33,"startToken":12842,"endToken":13242,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 33 - \n73. \nConstellation also argues that the answers fail to explain how the proposal’s \ncompensation provisions target wholesale rates when they effectively set retail \ncompensation for interrupted service, making them jurisdictionally improper.166  \nConstellation contends that, even if the compensation is wholesale, the proposal \nimpermissibly gives states direct authority to set or vary wholesale compensation, unlike \nOrder No. 719’s permissible deference to state preferences.167 \n74. \nConstellation argues, in response to answers’ claims that IRAS is no different \nfrom PJM’s existing curtailment authority and falls within the Commission’s and states’ \nresource adequacy powers, that the proposal instead creates a novel curtailment regime \nbased on retail customer characteristics and rates that requires jurisdictionally proper \naction.168 \n75. \nPPL argues that it is not clear in PJM’s proposal and Tariff language that state \nregulatory authorities have the power to opt-out individual Eligible New Large Loads \nfrom the requirement to provide IRAS.169  Specifically, PPL argues that it is unclear \nunder what legal authority state regulatory authorities in the PJM Region would be able \nto compel end-use retail customers (Eligible New Large Loads) to provide a \nCommission-jurisdictional wholesale service to PJM.170  PPL asserts that states lack \nauthority to compel end-use retail customers to provide Commission-jurisdictional \nwholesale services to PJM, and that doing so would be an unprecedented and \nconstitutionally problematic intrusion into the Commission’s plenary jurisdiction under \nthe FPA.  PPL suggests that PJM either (1) have the Tariff language stop at the issuance \nof the Operating Instruction to Electric Distributors to curtail load, and leave the rates, \nterms, and conditions of that load curtailment service to state and local regulatory \n \nAnswer at 5; Google Answer at 19; Vistra Answer at 10-11. \n166 Constellation Answer at 8. \n167 Id. at 9-10. \n168 Id. at 11-12. \n169 PPL Answer at 1-2 (citing PJM Answer at 29 (“Third, the IRAS framework \ndoes not determine whether any specific retail customers can say no.  Just as the identity \nof the retail customers who are ultimately implicated by PJM’s directives to reduce a \nMW quantity of load is not decided by PJM, under the IRAS framework, it is also not up \nto PJM to determine whether, as PPL puts it, retail customers can say no.  That—and the \nregulation of the terms and conditions of retail rates, and the regulation of retail \ncustomers—remains within the exclusive jurisdiction of the states.”)). \n170 Id. at 6."},{"page":34,"startToken":13242,"endToken":13605,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 34 - \nauthorities; or (2) make IRAS a voluntary Commission-jurisdictional service, whereby \nElectric Distributors and/or Large Load customers themselves can choose whether to \nparticipate like any other wholesale market service provider in PJM.171 \n76. \nThe IMM argues that, although the IRAS proposal is within the Commission’s \njurisdiction, PJM’s proposal fails to establish consistent regional curtailment rules and \nrelies on states to complete the proposal.172  The IMM argues that Data Center Coalition’s \nassertion that data centers’ status as retail customers prevents PJM from imposing \nwholesale-market capacity and curtailment requirements is inconsistent with the \nCommission’s recognized jurisdiction over retail customers’ participation in wholesale \nmarkets and with the RAA’s existing requirements for LSEs to procure qualifying \ncapacity.173   \niii. \nDetermination \n77. \nWe find that certain aspects of PJM’s proposal appear to present an impermissible \nintrusion on retail rate regulation and are not subject to the Commission’s authority \npursuant to section 205 of the FPA.174  We find that several provisions of the proposed \nTariff appear to place obligations directly on Eligible New Large Loads, which are, for \nthe most part,175 retail customers; that certain other provisions appear to dictate which \nretail customers taking retail service will be curtailed; and that the proposed \ncompensation framework appears to establish a retail rate.176  Therefore, we reject PJM’s \nproposed IRAS framework. \n \n171 Id. at 7-8. \n172 IMM Answer at 6-7. \n173 Id. at 7-9. \n174 16 U.S.C. §§ 824(b), 824e(a). \n175 For example, an Eligible New Large Load could take unbundled retail \ntransmission service from PJM if authorized to do so under state law and therefore \nbecome an Eligible Customer that falls within the Commission’s jurisdiction.  However, \nthe rates for energy sales to such a customer would still be subject to state regulation.     \n16 U.S.C. §§ 824(b), 824e(d). \n176 The proposed OATT states that any Eligible New Large Load can elect to “(i) \naccept in its retail rates a sum less than 50% of the Non-Performance Charge Rates as \ncompensation for the provision of wholesale [IRAS], or (ii) waive receipt in its retail \nrates any compensation for provision of wholesale [IRAS].”  Proposed OATT, attach. \nDD-4, § X(a)."},{"page":35,"startToken":13605,"endToken":14002,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 35 - \n78. \nThe FPA authorizes the Commission to regulate “rates, terms, and conditions” and \nany “rule, regulation, practice, or contract” directly “affecting” such transmission or \nwholesale rates.177  But the law places beyond the Commission’s jurisdiction, and leaves \nto the states alone, the regulation of “any other sale”—most notably, any retail sale—of \nelectricity.178  Section 201 of the FPA further limits the Commission’s jurisdiction to \n“those matters which are not subject to regulation by the states.”179  \n79. \nIn EPSA, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that although “the wholesale and retail \nmarkets in electricity are inextricably linked,”180 the Commission “may not regulate . . . \nretail sales of electricity.”181  The Court further stated that “no matter how direct, or \ndramatic” a proposal’s impact on wholesale rates, the Commission may not regulate retail \nelectricity sales.182  The Court also clarified that the FPA limits the Commission’s \njurisdiction to wholesale sales, reserving regulatory authority over retail sales to the states \nalone, and that any regulation that “specifies terms of sale at retail” exceeds the \nCommission’s authority under the FPA.183   \n80. \nIn the instant proceeding, protesters argue that PJM is proposing, via a \nCommission-jurisdictional tariff, terms of retail service for Eligible New Large Loads.  \nThese protesters contend that PJM is doing so by placing obligations on Eligible New \nLarge Loads, which are, for the most part, retail customers taking retail service; by \ndictating which retail customers an Electric Distributor must curtail; and by establishing \nthe compensation for Eligible New Large Loads.184  PJM’s proposed construct appears to \nregulate the terms and conditions of a retail customer’s service in ways that are beyond \nthe Commission’s authority.   \n \n177 EPSA, 577 U.S. at 264-65 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 824(b), 824e(a)). \n178 Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)). \n179 16 U.S.C. § 824(a). \n180 EPSA, 577 U.S. at 265. \n181 Id. at 264-65 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 824(b), 824e(a)). \n182 Id. at 279-80.  This statement presents a limit on the Court’s finding that the \nCommission has authority under the FPA to ensure that practices directly affecting \nwholesale rates are just and reasonable.  Id. at 277-78. \n183 Id. at 279-80. \n184 See Constellation Protest at 9-23; FirstEnergy Protest at 3-5; Google Protest at \n8-11; PPL Protest at 5-16; Virginia Commission Comments at 3-5; Vistra Protest at 5-11."},{"page":36,"startToken":14002,"endToken":14473,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 36 - \n81. \nFirst, the proposed Tariff appears to direct specific retail customers to provide \nIRAS for wholesale service and, therefore, to curtail.  For example, IRAS is defined as “a \nload reduction service through which New Large Loads reduce load as directed by the \napplicable Electric Distributor in response to an [IRAS] Action requested by [PJM].”185  \nThe IRAS Tariff provisions also state that the Electric Distributor “shall” implement the \ncurtailment among “Eligible New Large Loads” and therefore specifies the class of retail \ncustomers that should be curtailed.186  Further, the proposed Tariff states that when IRAS \nis suspended, “[PJM] does not need any Eligible New Large Loads to be available to \nprovide [IRAS] for that Delivery Year.”187  Eligible New Large Loads are, for the most \npart, retail customers taking retail service.  PJM’s transmittal seems to recognize this, \nproposing that IRAS MWs be assigned to Electric Distributors, with the state/RERRAs \nresponsible for identifying which loads will be obligated to curtail under IRAS.  As such, \nPJM’s transmittal states that its proposed Tariff imposes obligations only on the Electric \nDistributor by assigning curtailment obligations to Electric Distributors, who can then, at \nthe direction of retail regulators, determine which retail customers are curtailed.188  While \nthe proposal described in PJM’s transmittal may be within the Commission’s jurisdiction, \nwe find that the plain language of the Tariff, as proposed, appears to place obligations \ndirectly on the Eligible New Large Loads and requires Electric Distributors to curtail the \nEligible New Large Loads.  We note that PJM’s answer fails to engage with the concern \nthat its proposal, as described in its transmittal, is inconsistent with the proposed Tariff’s \nplain language that imposes obligations directly on Eligible New Large Loads and \nrequires Electric Distributors to curtail Eligible New Large Loads.   \n82. \nSecond, the proposed Tariff appears to be setting a retail rate because it establishes \na compensation rate for IRAS payable to the Eligible New Large Load.189  The proposed \nTariff directs compensation at Eligible New Large Loads, which are, for the most part, \n \n185 Proposed OATT, Definitions – Interim Resource Adequacy Service (emphasis \nadded).  Similarly, the proposed OATT Introduction to IRAS states that “[IRAS] is a load \nreduction service, effective starting with the 2027/2028 Delivery Year, through which \nEligible New Large Loads may be compensated for providing load reductions requested \nby [PJM].”  Id. attach. DD-4, § I(a) (emphasis added). \n186 Id. attach. DD-4, § II(e).  The proposed Tariff further requires that the Electric \nDistributor must implement the instructions “among the Eligible New Large Loads in the \nElectric Distributor’s zone/area” and that “[a]ll Eligible New Large Loads shall be \navailable to be requested to provide [IRAS] by [PJM].”  Id. attach DD-4, §§ III(a), IV(a).  \n187 Id. attach. DD-4, § IV(b)(iii). \n188 Transmittal at 99. \n189 Proposed OATT, attach. DD-4, § X."},{"page":37,"startToken":14473,"endToken":14859,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 37 - \nretail customers taking retail service.  The proposed Tariff also appears to specify that \nretail customers will be charged to fund such compensation.190  The proposed Tariff \nlanguage thus appears to establish a framework whereby retail customers will be paid by \nother retail customers for what PJM describes as a wholesale capacity service.  Although \nGovernor Shapiro asserts that the wholesale customer would receive a credit,191 and PJM \nasserts in its answer that the LSE would be compensated for load reduction,192 this is not \nspecified anywhere in the proposed Tariff language.  The proposed Tariff does not \nspecify what wholesale customer would be paid for IRAS or how; it only mentions \npayment to the Electric Distributor’s customers, who are retail customers.193  Nor is \npayment guaranteed under PJM’s proposal, as PJM only proposes a default rate that \nappears subject to further change and beyond the reach of the Tariff.  Furthermore, while \nPJM’s transmittal recognizes that the retail entities to be paid the rate and the loads \ncharged for the rate must be set by state regulators, protesters like the Virginia \nCommission highlight that the proposed Tariff does not include any language stating that \nretail regulators may establish the rate.194  Instead, the proposed Tariff indicates that the \nNew Large Load may elect to reduce or waive its compensation for IRAS.195  \nAccordingly, we find that the proposed Tariff appears to impermissibly set a retail rate.     \n83. \nFinally, the proposed Tariff also appears to allow the Electric Distributor, which \nPJM’s transmittal explains would occur in consultation with the RERRA, to determine \nwhich customers will pay the compensation to the entities providing IRAS pursuant to \nthe PJM Tariff and the level of compensation, which we interpret as allowing a retail \nregulator to set a wholesale rate.196  \n \n190 Id. § X(b)(i).  We note that other provisions of the Tariff appear to suggest that \nwholesale customers could be charged or paid; however, the proposed Tariff does not \nexplain how such charges or payments will be allocated.  See id. § X(b)(ii). \n191 Governor Shapiro Answer at 14. \n192 PJM Answer at 56. \n193 See proposed OATT, attach. DD-4, §§ X, X(b)(i). \n194 Virginia Commission Comments at 4-5. \n195 Proposed OATT, attach. DD-4, § X(a). \n196 Proposed OATT, attach. DD-4, § X(b); Transmittal at 110-13."},{"page":38,"startToken":14859,"endToken":15271,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 38 - \nc. \nUndue Discrimination – IRAS Curtailment \ni. \nPJM’s Filing \n84. \nPJM asserts that its proposal is not unduly discriminatory or preferential because \nthe IRAS framework recognizes that New Large Loads are not similarly situated to other \nloads.197  To support this conclusion, PJM states that members of Congress have \nexpressed to PJM that “[i]t is not unduly discriminatory to identify and manage demand \nfrom new data centers given their incomparably large energy demands, how quickly data \ncenters can come online, and their unique potential to impact the reliability of the electric \ngrid as a collective class and to increase rates for all customers.”198  Further, PJM states \nthat New Large Loads constitute a separate, new class of load, and are therefore \nappropriately subject to different treatment.199  PJM asserts that New Large Loads are not \nsimilarly situated to other loads in the PJM Region because, according to the \nCommission, large loads constitute “a separate category of load.”200  Additionally, PJM \nstates that the Commission has highlighted the uniqueness of large loads, noting \nspecifically that their integration “poses specific challenges to transmission system \noperation given their size, operational behavior, and unique potential to impact the \ntransmission system.”201   \n85. \nSimilarly, PJM points to the Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (SPP) Conditional High \nImpact Large Load Service (CHILLS) order, where the Commission found that the \nproposal for new large loads was just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or \npreferential.  PJM states that the Commission observed that “SPP has shown that \nunprecedented growth in large loads in the SPP region presents significant and unique \n \n197 Transmittal at 94. \n198 Id. at 94-95 (quoting Letter from the Members of Congress to David E. Mills, \nPJM Board Chair, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 4 (Nov. 5, 2025), https://www.pjm.com/-\n/media/DotCom/about-pjm/who-we-are/public-disclosures/2025/20251106-\ncongressional-letter-re-cifp-lla.pdf. \n199 Id. at 95. \n200 Id. at 96 (quoting PJM Large Load Show Cause Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,211 at   \nP 50). \n201 Id. (citing PJM Large Load Show Cause Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,211 at P 58; \nMidcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,212, at P 58 (2026); Sw. Power \nPool, 195 FERC ¶ 61,213 at P 15 & n.54 (2026); Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.,       \n195 FERC ¶ 61,214, at P 57 (2026); ISO New Eng. Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,215, at P 56 \n(2026); N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,216, at P 64 (2026))."},{"page":39,"startToken":15271,"endToken":15686,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 39 - \noperational and planning challenges.”202  PJM states that in the last two Delivery Years, \nsince the influx of new large loads consisting primarily of data centers, PJM has cleared \nshort of its PJM Region Reliability Requirement in the face of exponential load growth. \nii. \nPleadings \n86. \nProtesters generally argue that IRAS is unduly discriminatory because it treats \nLarge Loads, and/or the LSE or Electric Distributor serving them, differently on the basis \nof the retail customer’s size, vintage, or capacity procurement.203  This disparate \ntreatment, they contend, is not justified by the actual impact these customers have on \nsystem reliability, nor does PJM demonstrate material differences relevant to reliability or \nresource adequacy.  Specifically, protesters assert that PJM has not demonstrated that the \nsize or in-service date is relevant to the load’s impact on reliability or capacity because \nthe capacity of the system is burdened in the same way by a new or existing large load, \nand by a single new large load or many new smaller loads.204  Some protesters also assert \nthat these characteristics are not material because existing or smaller new loads can also \nprocure capacity and provide the same curtailment.205 \n87. \nSome protesters argue that PJM’s proposal unduly discriminates against LSEs \ntaking NITS on behalf of New Large Loads, as compared to LSEs taking NITS on behalf \nof other new loads.  Constellation and the Data Center Coalition argue that PJM’s \nproposal unfairly creates a subclass of NITS customers—those serving Eligible New \nLarge Loads—who pay the same transmission and capacity rates as other NITS \ncustomers but receive inferior service and are subject to involuntary curtailment ahead of \nother firm customers.206  The Data Center Coalition further argues that PJM’s proposal \nundermines traditional curtailment priority of NITS customers, effectively turning them \ninto second-class customers by depriving them of equal protection from service \ninterruptions and equal curtailment treatment.207  Protesters contend that PJM’s rationale \n \n202 Id. at 97 (quoting Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,196 at P 84). \n203 Constellation Protest at 31-37; Data Center Coalition Protest at 27-30; Google \nProtest at 11-13; Microsoft Comments at 4; P3 Protest at 28; Vistra Protest at 11-12,    \n13-14. \n204 Constellation Protest at 31-35; Data Center Coalition Protest at 28-29; EPSA \nProtest at 4; Google Protest at 12-13; P3 Protest at 28; Vistra Protest at 13-14. \n205 Talen Protest at 6-10. \n206 Constellation Protest at 36; Data Center Coalition Protest at 5. \n207 Data Center Coalition Protest at 26."},{"page":40,"startToken":15686,"endToken":16069,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 40 - \nfor disparate treatment based on Large Loads is arbitrary and unsupported, and that \nsimilarly situated NITS customers should receive comparable service and rates, rather \nthan being subject to unduly discriminatory and preferential treatment.208   \n88. \nSome protesters also argue that PJM’s proposal unduly discriminates against \nElectric Distributors with LSEs serving Eligible New Large Loads in their zone/area as \ncompared to Electric Distributors that do not have LSEs serving Eligible New Large \nLoads in their zone/area.  They further contend that retail customer characteristics are not \na relevant distinction for resource adequacy challenges.  Vistra argues that the \nconsideration relevant to resource adequacy is instead whether an Electric Distributor is \ngeneration deficient.209  Google likewise asserts that the relevant factor that causes the \nresource adequacy challenge is aggregate load growth in a zone/area, not the load growth \nof only a subset of customers.210 \n89. \nOther commenters assert that differential treatment is not undue because the size \nand operational characteristics of New Large Loads create unique concerns for resource \nadequacy, reliability, and affordability, and so New Large Loads, and the entities that \nserve them, are not similarly situated.211  PIOs assert that New Large Loads are different \nfrom traditional residential and commercial load because they grow rapidly and \nunpredictably with concentrated impacts on the electricity system, and develop \nsignificantly faster than construction of new supply.212  PIOs argue that as such, New \nLarge Loads pose distinct challenges for reliability and affordability.  PIOs argue that \nNew Large Loads are having an outsized impact on future resource adequacy and on   \nreal-time reliability, which warrants placing unique requirements on them through LSEs \nand Electric Distributors.  Appalachian Voices likewise argues that the distinction is \nbased on legitimate operational constraints caused by the sudden and unexpected influx \nof New Large Load demand, which has significantly higher demand requirements and \nhigher load factors.213 \n90. \nIn its answer, PJM reiterates that IRAS is not unduly discriminatory because of the \nunique characteristics of Large Loads that are relevant to ensuring just and reasonable \n \n208 Constellation Protest at 36; Data Center Coalition Protest at 30. \n209 Vistra Protest at 12. \n210 Google Protest at 12. \n211 Appalachian Voices Comments at 1, 10-12; PIOs Protest at 13-18. \n212 PIOs Protest at 13-18. \n213 Appalachian Voices Comments at 10-12."},{"page":41,"startToken":16069,"endToken":16442,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 41 - \nrates and the reliable operation of the bulk power system.214  PJM further asserts that \nIRAS is narrowly tailored to address capacity shortfalls caused by New Large Loads that \nlack sufficient capacity and applies only during specifically defined emergency \nsituations.215  PJM also argues that distinguishing between existing Large Loads and New \nLarge Loads based on vintage is justified because new, rather than existing, load causes \nthe capacity shortfall that necessitates IRAS.  \n91. \nIn their answers, Constellation, Data Center Coalition, and Vistra argue that \nparties do not explain why New Large Loads are solely or disproportionately responsible \nfor the region’s resource adequacy shortfall.216  They assert that both new and existing \nLarge Loads contribute to the resource adequacy shortfall because every transmission \nsystem user is economically marginal.217  Data Center Coalition and Vistra also argue \nthat PJM misread the SPP CHILLS precedent, which they argue supports offering \ndifferent services to differently situated loads but not reducing NITS for Electric \nDistributors serving materially identical loads.218 \n92. \nConstellation further argues that Governor Shapiro’s justification for \ndiscriminating against new large computational loads highlights, rather than resolves, the \nproposal’s unlawfulness because it fails to explain why those loads differ in their capacity \nneeds or resource adequacy burdens, and conflicts with PJM’s rejection of distinctions \nbetween computational and other large loads.219 \n \n214 PJM Answer at 59-60.  \n215 Id. at 60-61.  \n216 Constellation Answer at 12-13; Data Center Coalition Answer at 16-18; Google \nAnswer at 20; Vistra Answer at 16. \n217 Constellation Answer at 13 (citing BNP Paribas Energy Trading v. FERC, 743 \nF.3d 264, 269 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that “imputing an exclusive or even primary \ncausal role to the . . . demand” of the newest market entrants is not equitable)); Se. Mich. \nGas v. FERC, 133 F.3d 34, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“every shipper is economically marginal, \nthe costs of increased demand may equitably be attributed to every user.”)); Google \nAnswer at 22 (citing BNP Paribas Energy Trading GP v. FERC, 743 F.3d at 268-69); \nVistra Answer at 16 (citing BNP Paribas Energy Trading GP v. FERC, 743 F.3d at    \n268-69). \n218 Data Center Coalition Answer at 18-19; Vistra Answer at 17. \n219 Constellation Answer at 14."},{"page":42,"startToken":16442,"endToken":16876,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 42 - \n93. \nThe IMM disagrees with Data Center Coalition that IRAS is unduly \ndiscriminatory because the IMM argues that data centers uniquely drive PJM’s reliability \nchallenges through their rapid, large-scale interconnection requests and reliance on \ncurtailments before the necessary infrastructure is available, making data center specific \nrules consistent with cost-causation principles.220 \niii. \nDetermination \n94. \nWe find that PJM has not currently offered sufficiently detailed evidence \nconcerning how its treatment of Electric Distributors and LSEs taking NITS differently in \nthe resource adequacy context based on the characteristics of their retail customers is not \nunduly discriminatory.221  PJM’s proposal imposes capacity procurement and curtailment \nobligations on Electric Distributors and LSEs taking NITS to serve certain loads based on \nretail customer characteristics, yet PJM has not at this time produced evidence sufficient \nto demonstrate how such characteristics are material to the resource adequacy challenges \nits proposal seeks to address.  Historically, PJM’s capacity market has treated all load \ntaking NITS comparably, procuring capacity on its behalf regardless of retail customer \nclass or whether the load is new or existing.  While PJM now proposes to distinguish \nbetween different loads taking NITS on these bases for purposes of both procuring \ncapacity through its Reliability Pricing Model (RPM) and curtailing NITS, it fails to \nprovide sufficiently detailed evidence to support why Electric Distributors and LSEs \nusing NITS to serve New Large Loads should not be treated comparably to Electric \nDistributors and LSEs using NITS to serve equivalent quantities of load growth.  We note \nPJM’s explanation that New Large Loads have unique characteristics compared to \ntraditional load growth and are the primary cause for the resource adequacy shortfall, \nassertions with which some commenters agree,222 but we find that PJM’s generic \nreferences to these retail customer characteristics without more detail are insufficient \nevidence to counter the current resource adequacy construct in PJM, i.e., that PJM will \nprocure sufficient capacity to serve all NITS load in the PJM Region.  Therefore, we find \nthat, in its current filing, PJM did not adequately support its proposal to treat Electric \nDistributors and LSEs differently based on the characteristics of their retail customers. \n \n220 IMM Answer at 5-6. \n221 It is a well-established principle that all similarly situated entities should be \ncharged consistent and congruent rates.  Tenaska Clear Creek Wind, LLC v. FERC,     \n108 F.4th 858, 868 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (“And undue discrimination occurs when similarly \nsituated entities are charged different rates for no good reason.” (quoting Consol. Edison \nCo. of N.Y., Inc. v. FERC, 45 F.4th 265, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2022)). \n222 See supra P 84."},{"page":43,"startToken":16876,"endToken":17260,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 43 - \n95. \nShould PJM choose to refile a modified version of its proposed IRAS framework, \nwe encourage PJM to either provide further justification regarding its proposed treatment \nof Electric Distributors or LSEs using NITS to serve New Large Loads or revise its \nproposal to not expressly single out LSEs using NITS to serve New Large Loads, or \nElectric Distributors on the basis of the amount of New Large Loads in its zones/areas.  \nAs we have previously stated, we recognize that the rapid emergence of large loads \npresents a shared regulatory challenge that implicates both federal and state authority.223  \nStates have a crucial role to play in this challenge by designating which retail customers \nmust be curtailed when the system is stressed, and we strongly encourage states to \ncontinue their important work on this issue. \nd. \nBYONC Accreditation \ni. \nPJM’s Filing \n96. \nPJM proposes that New Large Loads can avoid curtailment under IRAS by \nbringing new capacity to offset their capacity needs.224  PJM states that BYONC \nresources will be subject to all of the requirements for capacity resources associated with \ntheir resource type, including deficiency charges and capacity performance penalties.225  \nPJM proposes that:  (1) a BYONC resource’s UCAP level be determined in the first \nauction it clears; and (2) BYONC resources are subject to a 10-year must-offer and \n$0/MW-Day offer requirement in PJM’s capacity market, including resource types \nusually exempt from the must-offer requirement, such as demand response resources.226  \nDemand response and distributed energy resources will be required to demonstrate their \nperformance each year of the 10-year period consistent with those resource classes’ \ntreatment in the capacity market.227   \n97. \nPJM explains that the timing of the BYONC arrangement is central to the \ndetermination of the BYONC’s Accredited UCAP value because the ICAP equivalent of \n \n223 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 196 FERC ¶ 61,245, at P 161 (2026). \n224 Transmittal at 49. \n225 Id. at 55 (citing Proposed OATT, attach. DD-4, § VIII(c)). \n226 Id. at 55-56, 65-66.  Only BYONC supported by a demand resource or \ndistributed energy resource Capacity Aggregation Resource may be replaced during the \n10-year commitment period, and it must be replaced by another eligible resource willing \nto fulfill the rest of the 10-year requirement.  Id. at 56-57. \n227 Id. at 64-65."},{"page":44,"startToken":17260,"endToken":17610,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 44 - \nthe Accredited UCAP value is used to reduce a New Large Load’s potential IRAS \navailability.228 \nii. \nPleadings \n98. \nAMP requests that the Commission direct PJM to modify its proposal to set the \nlevel of BYONC for a generation or storage resource at the resource’s accredited capacity \nin the first year it is in arrangement with a New Large Load.229  AMP argues PJM expects \nthe Effective Load Carrying Capability (ELCC) of some resource classes, especially \nstorage, to decline over the BYONC commitment term, and using a fixed ELCC value for \nBYONC would therefore over-credit New Large Loads for BYONC.230  AMP argues that \nthe portion of the New Large Load that exceeds the ELCC-measured UCAP of the \nsupporting BYONC resource is effectively the same as Eligible New Large Load but \nwithout the IRAS obligation. \n99. \nFurther, AMP argues that PJM has not explained how BYONC will be accredited \nfor the purposes of the RPM.  AMP states that, if the fixed Accredited UCAP is used, and \nexceeds the UCAP that would have resulted from applying updated ELCC values to the \nunderlying resources, PJM would be counting and clearing MW of Accredited UCAP \nthat may not exist.231  However, AMP continues, if the Accredited UCAP of BYONC \nresources is updated for the RPM, the BYONC MW in the RPM could be less than the \nMW of New Large Loads, potentially shifting costs to other customers.232   \n100. EPSA and FirstEnergy assert that the proposal to lock in the BYONC resource’s \naccreditation grants BYONC resources unduly preferential treatment under ELCC \naccreditation.233  EPSA similarly argues that the lock-in mechanism may result in a \nBYONC’s capacity contribution being overstated in RPM Auctions, which will further \nerode the fidelity of the RPM BRA or incremental auction price signal.234  The IMM \nargues that it is unjust and unreasonable to protect new generation from ELCC risk.235  \n \n228 Id. at 65-66. \n229 AMP Protest at 4. \n230 Id. at 4-6. \n231 Id. at 7. \n232 Id. at 8. \n233 EPSA Protest at 10-11. \n234 Id. at 11; FirstEnergy Protest at 5."},{"page":45,"startToken":17610,"endToken":17959,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 45 - \nThe IMM explains that, regardless of the technology, fixing the accredited UCAP at a \nsingle value over the period will misrepresent the actual UCAP.236  AEU supports the \nlock-in mechanism, asserting that this prevents resources from being exposed to \nunhedgeable ELCC risk.237 \n101. In its answer, PJM argues that IRAS is intended to incent New Large Loads to \nbring new capacity to meet their resource adequacy needs, and asserts that the lock-in \nmechanism avoids introducing uncertainty to the BYONC arrangement and undermining \nthe BYONC incentive.238  PJM asserts that “the risk of changes to ELCC values (both \nincreases and decreases) remains just as it is today—on individual generators in the first \ninstance and all customers in the event that PJM has to purchase more capacity due to an \naggregate ELCC decline.”239  \n102. The IMM argues that disregarding changes in actual ELCC values does not \neliminate uncertainty; it shifts the risks of any capacity shortfall, and the cost of \nprocuring additional capacity, to other PJM customers.240 \niii. \nDetermination \n103. We find that PJM has not sufficiently justified its proposal to lock in the \naccreditation of BYONC resources over the lifetime of the BYONC arrangement to be \njust and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.  Generation resources \nvary considerably in their operating characteristics, including various fuel types, \ndispatchability, and maximum run times.  UCAP accreditation, as implemented through \nPJM’s ELCC, is designed to create a single tradeable capacity product from a field of \ndiverse and distinct generation resources.241  We find that PJM has failed to provide \n \n235 IMM Protest at 20. \n236 Id. at 22. \n237 AEU Comments at 9. \n238 PJM Answer at 45. \n239 Id. \n240 IMM Answer at 13-14. \n241 See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 186 FERC ¶ 61,080, at P 42 & n.85 (2024) \n(finding that PJM’s marginal ELCC framework provides a reliability-neutral basis for \ncomparison between different resource types for PJM’s capacity market because marginal \naccreditation establishes a framework where capacity resources are interchangeable or \nsubstitutable as they offer equivalent reliability contributions per accredited unit of"},{"page":46,"startToken":17959,"endToken":18383,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 46 - \nsufficient record evidence to substantiate its rationale for allowing BYONC resources to \nprovide capacity when that capacity is not equivalent to the single tradable capacity \nproduct that PJM procures through its RPM because its accreditation value is fixed over \nthe term of the BYONC arrangement.  This lack of substantiation is heightened by the \nfact that PJM’s proposed Tariff language and its description of the lock-in arrangement \nare inconsistent. \n104. Specifically, PJM states that the lock-in period acts as a “shield” to BYONC \nresources from changes in their capacity accreditation (as determined through PJM’s \nELCC capacity accreditation method) by locking in their accreditation for the period of \nthe BYONC arrangement.  While, in its answer, PJM contends that locking in a BYONC \nresource’s capacity accreditation will provide certainty to a New Large Load contracting \nwith a BYONC resource and incentivize parties to enter into BYONC arrangements,242 \nPJM also asserts that “the risk of changes to ELCC values (both increases and decreases) \nremains just as it is today—on individual generators in the first instance and all customers \nin the event that PJM has to purchase more capacity due to an aggregate ELCC \ndecline.”243  Yet, despite PJM’s assertion in its answer, PJM’s proposed Tariff provides \nthat the “Accredited UCAP of any BYONC shall be the Accredited UCAP for the RPM \nAuction in which the BYONC cleared for the initial Delivery Year . . . .”244  We find that \nPJM has not sufficiently demonstrated that the potential benefits of locking in BYONC \nresources’ capacity accreditation outweigh PJM’s obligation to ensure that the PJM \nRegion’s resource adequacy needs are met.   \n105. With respect to the arguments PJM has offered, we are concerned with whether \nPJM’s lock-in Tariff language proposal may worsen the problems it is attempting to \nsolve.  Specifically, PJM’s proposal to lock in the accreditation value of BYONC \nresources may also risk the capacity market procuring too little or too much capacity \nshould the BYONC resource’s actual ELCC accreditation fall or rise over time.245  While \nPJM contends that the risk of the ELCC accreditation decreasing will still lie with \nindividual capacity resources in the first instance, that statement does not appear to hold \nwith respect to BYONC resources, whose accreditation value will be locked in for the \n \ncapacity).  \n242 PJM Answer at 45. \n243 Id.  \n244 Proposed OATT, attach. DD-4, § VIII(i). \n245 We note that PJM’s long-term ELCC forecast projects lower ELCC ratings for \nall resource types over time.  See PJM, Preliminary ELCC Class Ratings for 2028/29 to \n2042/43, preliminary-elcc-class-ratings-for-period-dy28-dy42-elcc.pdf."},{"page":47,"startToken":18383,"endToken":18838,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 47 - \nterm of the BYONC arrangement per the proposed Tariff language.246  We agree with \nPJM that whenever ELCC accreditation declines, it will affect all load because PJM will \nhave to procure additional capacity.  However, the risk that a BYONC resource’s    \nlocked-in accreditation value be higher than the capacity that it can actually provide has \nthe potential to create a new resource adequacy risk for the entire PJM Region, \nparticularly given the potential magnitude of BYONC MW that will be offered into and \nclear the capacity market.  We note PJM’s explanation that the lock-in mechanism would \navoid introducing uncertainty to the BYONC arrangement that would undermine the \nincentive for Large Loads to contract with new capacity.  However, PJM has not \nsufficiently substantiated in the current record—especially with the conflicting Tariff \nlanguage and explanation—that those considerations outweigh the potential downsides of \nintroducing new resource adequacy risks and therefore merit a different approach to \nELCC accreditation for BYONC resources.  For these reasons, we find that PJM has not \nsufficiently substantiated that its proposal to lock in the value of BYONC UCAP \naccreditation is just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.  \ne. \nOther Issues \n106. Because we are rejecting PJM’s proposed IRAS framework, which as noted above \nappears to be an integrated package, we need not address other issues raised in this \nproceeding regarding the merits of other aspects of IRAS.  However, we note that several \nelements of PJM’s proposed IRAS framework (including but not limited to those \ndiscussed below) may require additional justification to demonstrate that they are just and \nreasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.  Should PJM choose to refile a \nmodified version of its proposed IRAS framework that does not infringe on retail rate \nregulation, we encourage PJM to address the concerns discussed below. \n107. First, we are concerned that, as designed, PJM’s proposal may not be consistent \nwith mandatory Reliability Standards.  Reliability Standard EOP-011-4 only permits firm \nloads to be curtailed following initiation by the reliability coordinator of an EEA3, which \nis when “[t]he energy deficient Balancing Authority is unable to meet minimum \nContingency Reserve requirements.”247  In contrast, PJM’s proposal would direct Electric \n \n246 PJM has not sufficiently explained in this record how factors specific to the \ninstant proposal could mitigate the concerns the Commission expressed when it \npreviously rejected a proposal from PJM to establish a 13-year ELCC accreditation floor \nfor new capacity resources, finding that PJM failed to justify why the benefits of reducing \nELCC volatility for certain resources outweigh the risks of establishing potentially \ninaccurate ELCC accreditation values.  PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 175 FERC              \n¶ 61,084, at P 105 (2021). \n247 N. Am. Elec. Reliability Corp., Reliability Standard EOP-011-4 — Emergency"},{"page":48,"startToken":18838,"endToken":19301,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 48 - \nDistributors to curtail certain load, which comprise a portion of a Transmission \nCustomer’s firm NITS load under PJM’s proposal, earlier in the emergency process, at \nEEA1, when all generation is committed and non-firm wholesale energy sales have been \ncurtailed.  Although firm loads willing to receive a lower curtailment priority, such as \ndemand response resources, may be voluntarily curtailed before EEA3 under the \nmandatory Reliability Standards, PJM’s proposal would shed firm load on an involuntary \nbasis.  Several parties argue that it is not just and reasonable to curtail IRAS MW before \ndemand response resources.248  Others argue that curtailing New Large Loads prior to \ncalling on Pre-Emergency Load Management is just and reasonable.249  Nevertheless, \nPJM has crafted curtailment rules that do not appear internally consistent with its Tariff \n(i.e., curtailing certain transmission customers on a pro rata basis).  It appears that PJM’s \nproposal ignores the plain language of mandatory Reliability Standard EOP-011-4 \nregarding the curtailment priority of loads for whom an Eligible Customer is taking and \npaying for firm transmission service, which would result in PJM dispatch actions that \nconflict with the mandatory Reliability Standards.   \n108. Second, the current record suggests that the LSE using NITS to serve an Eligible \nNew Large Load would be required to pay the same capacity charges and transmission \ncharges as LSEs using NITS to serve other types of load that are not subject to \ncurtailment under IRAS and on whose behalf PJM procures capacity.250  Protesters argue \nthat LSEs should not be allocated capacity charges based on the MW of Eligible New \nLarge Loads when PJM has excluded such loads from the VRR curve, and is therefore \nnot procuring capacity for said loads, or when these loads will be curtailed before \ncapacity resources that are demand response resources are deployed.251  It appears that \nPJM has not sufficiently justified why it is just and reasonable and not unduly \ndiscriminatory or preferential for LSEs using NITS to serve Eligible New Large Loads to \nbe charged for capacity based on the quantity of Eligible New Large Load MW when \nPJM does not procure capacity on behalf of that load.  The Commission has previously \nfound that Eligible Customers taking non-firm transmission service on behalf of co-\nlocated load should not be charged for capacity because PJM does not procure capacity \non their behalf.252  We are concerned that PJM has not adequately explained why it is just \n \nOperations, Requirement, attach. 1, § B(3) (approved Feb. 15, 2024).  \n248 Constellation Protest at 42; IMM Protest at 17. \n249 See, e.g., Governor Shapiro Answer at 24-25. \n250 See, e.g., Data Center Coalition Protest at 5, 23-24. \n251 Data Center Coalition Protest at 19-22; Google Protest at 15; Microsoft \nComments at 4; Vistra Protest at 16-17."},{"page":49,"startToken":19301,"endToken":19780,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 49 - \nand reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential to diverge from this \nprinciple.   \n109. Third, we are concerned that PJM’s proposal does not take into account locational \nor deliverability considerations for BYONC resources.  We note that under PJM’s \nexisting Tariff, PJM identifies LDA Reliability Requirements, which require sufficient \ncapacity to be inside or deliverable to the LDA based on transmission constraints.  Under \nPJM’s proposal, the New Large Load would not be subject to IRAS, and its load would \nnot be counted towards the Eligible New Large Load amount for its EDC zone/area, \nregardless of transmission constraints between the New Large Load and the BYONC \nresource, which could exacerbate the resource adequacy shortfall in the New Large \nLoad’s zone.  If PJM chooses to file a new proposal, PJM may consider if it is \nappropriate to condition IRAS consideration of BYONC arrangements on PJM finding \nthat the BYONC resources are deliverable to the LDAs where the New Large Loads with \nwhich they are in agreements are located. \n110. Fourth, the record suggests that PJM’s designation of New Large Loads to provide \nIRAS obligations may disrupt existing commercial arrangements, including binding \nagreements between large loads that will ramp up after June 1, 2027 and existing \ngeneration.253  Should PJM choose to refile, PJM should consider how to account for or \nacknowledge these concerns, to the extent they persist given our other findings and \nguidance in this order.  It also appears that PJM has not adequately explained why a \nthreshold only on the overall size of the Large Load, and not on the incremental increase \nof an existing Large Load, is just and reasonable.  The proposed Tariff appears to treat \nexisting NITS customers differently even on the basis of small MW increases, such that a \n49 MW existing load that increased its consumption by 1 MW would become a 50 MW \nNew Large Load and impose new requirements on the existing NITS customer for the \nentire 50 MW.  Should PJM choose to file a new proposal, we encourage PJM to clarify \nexactly how the definition of New Large Load and any IRAS or IRAS-like framework \nwould apply to such existing commercial arrangements.  The proposed Tariff also does \nnot appear to account for existing Behind the Meter Generation rules, although the \nCommission has found that NITS customers may net up to 50 MW of load at a particular \nelectrical location using Behind the Meter Generation.254   \n111. We also note that the new non-firm transmission services proposed in the order to \nshow cause proceeding on co-located load—specifically Non-Firm Contract Demand \n \n252 PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at PP 200-201, 214-215. \n253 CyrusOne Comments at 6-8; Equinix Protest at 2, 8-14; FirstEnergy Protest at \n9; Microsoft Comments at 6; Talen Protest at 12. \n254 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,209, at P 207 (2026)."},{"page":50,"startToken":19780,"endToken":20129,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 50 - \ntransmission service—demonstrate a concept that PJM could consider as another possible \navenue to achieve some of the aims of PJM’s proposed IRAS framework.  In the PJM \nLarge Load Show Cause Order, the Commission preliminarily found that PJM’s Tariff \nappears to be unjust and unreasonable because it does not include transmission services \nthat reflect Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of flexible large \nloads that are willing and able to limit their use of the transmission system under certain \nconditions.255  The Commission directed PJM to explain whether its Tariff remains just \nand reasonable without Non-Firm Contract Demand Service for flexible large loads.256  It \nappears that a non-firm transmission service similar to Non-Firm Contract Demand \ntransmission service, with appropriate adjustments, might be considered as a potential \navenue to achieve some of the aims of PJM’s proposed IRAS framework.  However, we \nnote that Non-Firm Contract Demand transmission service is affirmatively a voluntary \noption, while the product or service here is not.  Should PJM choose to refile its IRAS \nproposal, we encourage PJM to clearly identify the product or service IRAS is intended \nto provide and ensure its proposed Tariff revisions consistently reflect that \ncharacterization.  We also encourage PJM to consider providing a description of how it \nwill transition from any proposed types of service back to its traditional market structures \nand how it will avoid a long-term bifurcation of loads in the PJM market.  Although we \nare rejecting PJM’s proposal, PJM may consider refiling an alternative proposal under \nFPA section 205 that considers the guidance provided herein. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nThe Commission orders: \n \n(A) \nPJM’s proposal is hereby accepted in part, effective October 12, 2026, as \nrequested, and rejected in part, as discussed in the body of the order. \n(B) \nPJM is hereby directed to submit a compliance filing within 30 days of the \ndate of this order, as discussed in the body of this order.  \nBy the Commission.  Commissioner Rosner is concurring with a separate statement \n \n \n \n  attached. \n \n255 PJM Large Load Show Cause Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,211 at P 86. \n256 Id. at P 87."},{"page":51,"startToken":20129,"endToken":20141,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 51 - \n \n( S E A L ) \n \n \nDebbie-Anne A. Reese, \nSecretary."},{"page":52,"startToken":20141,"endToken":20339,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 52 - \nAppendix \nList of Intervenors and Commenters \n* Filed comments or protests \n+ Filed comments or protests without a motion for intervention  \n# Motions to intervene out-of-time \n^ Out-of-time comments/protest \n \n \nAdvanced Energy United (AEU)* \nAmerican Clean Power Association  \nAmerican Council on Renewable Energy* \nAmerican Electric Power Service Corporation (AEP)* \nAmerican Municipal Power, Inc. (AMP)* \nAmerica’s Power* \nAnthropic, PBC \nAppalachian Voices* \nAvangrid Networks, Inc. and Avangrid Power, LLC257 \nBase Power, Inc. \nBrookfield Renewable Trading and Marketing LP \nBuckeye Power, Inc. (Buckeye)* \nCalibrant Energy* \nChief Energy Officer for the Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia + \nCitizens’ Electric Company of Lewisburg, PA and Wellsboro Electric Company \nConstellation Energy Generation, LLC (Constellation)* \nCorporate Energy Buyers Association (CEBA)* \nCPV Power Holdings, L.P. \nCyrusOne LP (CyrusOne) #^ \nData Center Coalition* \nDelaware Division of the Public Advocate* \nDistrict of Columbia Office of People’s Counsel + \nDominion Energy Services, Inc.258* \nDuke Energy Corporation259 \n \n257 Avangrid Networks, Inc. and Avangrid Power, LLC on behalf of their \nrespective subsidiaries.  \n258 Dominion Energy Service on behalf of Virginia Electric Power Company. \n259 Duke Energy Corporation on behalf of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.; Duke Energy \nKentucky, Inc.; Duke Energy Indiana, LLC; Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC; and Duke \nEnergy Progress, LLC."},{"page":53,"startToken":20339,"endToken":20529,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 53 - \nDuquesne Light Company \nEast Kentucky Power Cooperative, Inc. (EKPC)* \nEDF Power Solutions, Inc. \nEdison Electric Institute  \nElectric Power Supply Association (EPSA)* \nEnchanted Rock, LLC \nEnel North America, Inc. \nENGIE North America Inc. \nEnvironmental Law & Policy Center \nEquinix Inc. (Equinix)^ \nExelon Corporation \nFirstEnergy Service Company (FirstEnergy)260* \nGoogle LLC (Google)* \nGovernor Josh Shapiro, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Governor Shapiro) # \nHans Royal + \nIllinois Citizens Utility Board* \nIllinois Commerce Commission \nIllinois Municipal Electric Agency \nIndustrial Energy Consumers of America (IECA) #^ \nInvenergy261 \nJ-POWER USA Development Co., Ltd. \nKentucky Attorney General  \nLS Power Development, LLC \nMaryland Office of People’s Counsel* \nMaryland Public Service Commission \nMichigan Public Service Commission \nMicrosoft Corporation (Microsoft)* \nMN8 Energy LLC \nMonitoring Analytics, LLC, acting in its capacity as the Independent Market Monitor for  \nPJM (IMM)* \nNational Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners \nNational Grid Plc262 \n \n260 FirstEnergy on behalf of Ohio Edison Company, The Cleveland Electric \nIlluminating Company, The Toledo Edison Company, FirstEnergy Pennsylvania Electric \nCompany, Jersey Central Power & Light Company, Monongahela Power Company, and \nThe Potomac Edison. \n261 Invenergy includes Invenergy Wind Development North America LLC, \nInvenergy Solar Development North America LLC, and Invenergy Thermal Development \nHoldings LLC."},{"page":54,"startToken":20529,"endToken":20783,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 54 - \nNatural Resources Defense Council* \nNew Jersey Board of Public Utilities (NJBPU)* \nNew Jersey Division of Rate Counsel* \nNicholas Max Neal and David Neal* \nNorth Carolina Electric Membership Corporation* \nNorthern Virginia Electric Cooperative, Inc. \nNRG Business Marketing LLC (NRG)263* \nNucor and Stell Dynamics, Inc. \nOffice of the Illinois Attorney General*  \nOffice of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel (Ohio Consumers’ Counsel)* \nOhio Energy Leadership Council (Ohio ELC)* \nOld Dominion Electric Cooperative (ODEC)* \nOrganization of PJM States, Inc. (OPSI)^ \nPennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate  \n \nPennsylvania Public Utility Commission (Pennsylvania Commission)* \nPersistence Analytics Group LLC (PAG)* \nPJM Industrial Customer Coalition (Industrial Customers)* \nPJM Power Providers Group (P3)* \nPPL Electric Utilities Companies (PPL)* \nPSEG Companies264 \nPublic Citizen, Inc. \nPublic Service Commission of West Virginia (West Virgina Commission)* \nPublic Utilities Commission of Ohio’s Office of Federal Energy Advocate* \nRetail Energy Supply Association* \nRockland Electric Company \nSierra Club* \nSolar Energy Industries Association* \nSouthern Maryland Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SMECO)* \nSunrun Inc.* \n \n262 National Grid Plc on behalf of National Grid Ventures. \n263 NRG on behalf of Aspen Gen Funding, LLC; Direct Energy Business, LLC; \nDoswell, LLC; Energy Plus Holding LLC; Green Mountain Energy Company; Helix \nIronwood, LLC; Enerwise Global Technologies, LLC; Independent Energy Group LLC; \nLSP University Park, LLC; Midwest Generation LLC; Reliant Energy Northeast LLC; \nRiverside Generating Company, LLC; Stream Energy Pennsylvania, LLC; University \nPark Energy, LLC; XOOM Energy, LLC; NRG Energy, Inc.; and NRG Curtailment \nSolutions, Inc. \n264 PSEG Companies include PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC, PSEG \nService Electric and Gas Company, and PSEG Power LLC."},{"page":55,"startToken":20783,"endToken":20835,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000 \n- 55 - \nTalen Energy Corporation (Talen)* \nTesla, Inc.+ \nThe Center for Progressive Reform* \nU.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce Ranking Member \nFrank Pallone, Jr. (Representative Pallone) ^ \nVerrus LLC \nVC Renewables LLC and Vitol Inc. \nVirginia State Corporation Commission (Virginia Commission) ^ \nVistra Corp. (Vistra)* \nVoltus, Inc. (Voltus) ^"},{"page":56,"startToken":20835,"endToken":21186,"text":"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nFEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \n \nPJM Interconnection, L.L.C. \nDocket No. ER26-3515-000 \n \n \n(Issued October 9, 2026) \n \nROSNER, Commissioner, concurring:  \n \n1. \nI agree with the decision to reject the bulk of PJM’s filing for the reasons \narticulated in today’s order.  I write separately to emphasize that, if PJM chooses to refile \nits proposal, it must justify its proposal to curtail IRAS load on a mandatory basis before \nload that has voluntarily enrolled in a demand response program.  I also urge PJM to \ncarefully consider the consequences any refiled proposal might have on its capacity \nmarket. \n2. \nCustomers in a demand response program allow a utility to reduce their demand \nwithout resorting to the extreme measure of manually pulling breakers on the utility’s \ndistribution network.  Demand response customers also receive payments in exchange for \nvolunteering to reduce their usage when the grid is stressed.  This structure is designed to \nprotect consumers and their equipment from the draconian measure of being involuntarily \nforced off the system, as well as to send efficient market signals based on actual system \nconditions. \n3. \nPJM’s filing flips this paradigm, proposing to force IRAS load off the system in \nthe earliest stages of emergency conditions,1 before PJM deploys demand response.2   \n4. \nMoreover, PJM’s proposal would force IRAS load off the system in lieu of \nsending capacity price signals that are needed to get new infrastructure built.  Because \nPJM would forcibly curtail IRAS load before other firm load, PJM excludes IRAS load \nfrom its capacity market demand curve.  The result could be a capacity market signaling \nthat PJM has more than enough capacity while the region sheds thousands of megawatts \nof demand on an involuntary basis.  That’s not only economically inefficient, but also \nlikely to prevent supply and demand from coming back into balance.   \n \n1 That is, during a NERC EEA 1 event. \n2 PJM cleared 7,017 MW of demand response in its most recent capacity auction.  \nSee PJM, 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction Report, at 15 (Jul. 14, 2026), \nhttps://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2028-\n2029/2028-2029-bra-results-report.pdf."},{"page":57,"startToken":21186,"endToken":21287,"text":"Docket No. ER26-3515-000  \n- 2 - \n \n5. \nTo be clear, in an emergency, data centers not serving critical functions should be \nshut off before ordinary customers (Hint: homes, hospitals, and schools should never be \ncurtailed before data centers).  We need state regulators to establish clear rules for which \ncustomers should be curtailed first when circumstances require it.  And we need PJM to \nbe ready to adjust their operations to this evolving paradigm.  But such measures should \nonly be taken when necessary to keep the system reliable, after voluntary demand \nresponse resources have been exhausted.   \n \nFor these reasons, I respectfully concur. \n \n \n________________________ \nDavid Rosner \nCommissioner"}],"sections":[{"p":1,"at":0,"title":"Opening text","method":"opening text","endPage":1,"endAt":1620,"startToken":0,"endToken":242},{"p":1,"at":1620,"title":"I. Filing Overview","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":3,"endAt":638,"startToken":242,"endToken":897},{"p":3,"at":638,"title":"II. Notice of Filing and Responsive Pleadings","method":"PDF bookmark","endPage":4,"endAt":897,"startToken":897,"endToken":1390},{"p":4,"at":897,"title":"III. 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