ER26-3515-000 · 2026-10-09 · FERC

Order accepting PJM's Large Load definition and Large Load Registry and rejecting the Interim Resource Adequacy Service, BYONC and VRR-curve revisions

197 FERC ¶ 61,019 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 
 
Before Commissioners:  Laura V. Swett, Chairman; 
                                        David Rosner, Lindsay S. See, 
                                        Judy W. Chang, and David LaCerte. 
 
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. 
Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
 
ORDER ACCEPTING TARIFF REVISIONS IN PART  
AND REJECTING TARIFF REVISIONS IN PART 
 
(Issued October 9, 2026) 
 
1. 
On August 13, 2026, pursuant to section 205 of the Federal Power Act (FPA),1 
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM) submitted proposed revisions to its Open Access 
Transmission Tariff (OATT) and Reliability Assurance Agreement (RAA) (collectively, 
Tariff) to establish:  (1) a definition of Large Load; (2) a Large Load Registry; (3) a new 
Interim Resource Adequacy Service (IRAS); (4) a requirement for Load Serving Entities 
(LSE) serving New Large Load to designate new capacity resources in an amount at least 
equal to the New Large Load’s peak load to avoid the New Large Load being subject to 
IRAS; (5) rules for Bring Your Own New Capacity (BYONC) arrangements; and (6) 
rules to exclude Eligible New Large Load from the Variable Resource Requirement 
(VRR) curve beginning with Delivery Year 2029/2030.   
2. 
In this order, we accept PJM’s proposed Tariff revisions to establish a definition of 
Large Load and a Large Load Registry, effective October 12, 2026, as requested, and 
require PJM to submit a compliance filing within 30 days of the date of issuance of this 
order.  We reject PJM’s remaining proposed Tariff revisions, as discussed below. 
I. 
Filing Overview 
3. 
PJM states that, beginning in the 2027/2028 Delivery Year, it will be short of 
sufficient capacity to meet the PJM Region Reliability Requirement, particularly due to 
data center load growth and the pace of data center interconnection.2  PJM’s proposal to 
address this challenge includes several elements:  (1) a definition of Large Load; (2) a 
Large Load Registry, which is a database of information pertaining to Large Loads that 
 
1 16 U.S.C. § 824d. 
2 Transmittal at 21.

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PJM proposes to establish and maintain; (3) IRAS, which PJM states will involve 
curtailments during periods when there are insufficient resources to reliably meet demand 
in real-time operations; (4) a requirement for LSEs serving New Large Load to designate 
new capacity resources in an amount at least equal to the New Large Load’s peak load; 
(5) rules for BYONC arrangements; and (6) rules to exclude Eligible New Large Load 
from the VRR curve beginning with Delivery Year 2029/2030.  PJM’s proposed Tariff 
revisions, as described further below, would implicate and assign responsibilities to 
several entities in PJM, including the Electric Distributor,3 the LSE,4 and the 
Transmission Owner.5 
4. 
PJM states that each element of the filing is severable, although some elements 
build upon each other.6  PJM explains that, to facilitate Commission approval and 
smoothly implement its IRAS framework on June 1, 2027, PJM consents to the 
Commission’s exercise of authority to modify and/or sever the proposed Tariff language, 
as needed and permitted under the FPA and NRG Power Marketing, LLC v. FERC,7 
“where such modification is consistent with PJM’s overarching objectives.”8  PJM 
 
3 The Operating Agreement (OA) defines Electric Distributor as a PJM Member 
that (1) owns or leases with rights equivalent to ownership of electric distribution 
facilities that are used to provide electric distribution service to electric load within the 
PJM Region; or (2) is a generation and transmission cooperative or a joint municipal 
agency that has a member that owns electric distribution facilities used to provide electric 
distribution service to electric load within the PJM Region.  See PJM, Intra-PJM Tariffs, 
Operating Agreement, § 1 Definitions E – F (25.1.0). 
4 The RAA defines LSE as any entity (or the duly designated agent of such an 
entity), including a load aggregator or power marketer, (i) serving end-users within 
the PJM Region, and (ii) that has been granted the authority or has an obligation pursuant 
to state or local law, regulation or franchise to sell electric energy to end-users located 
within the PJM Region.  LSEs include any end-use customer that qualifies under state 
rules or a utility retail tariff to manage directly its own supply of electric power and 
energy and use of transmission and ancillary services.  PJM, Intra-PJM Tariffs, RAA, 
art. 1 (Definitions) (55.0.0). 
5 The RAA defines Transmission Owner as a Member that owns or leases with 
rights equivalent to ownership Transmission Facilities and is a signatory to 
the PJM Transmission Owners Agreement.  Id. 
6 Transmittal at 9-10. 
7 862 F.3d 108 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (NRG).  
8 Transmittal at 122.  PJM states that it “is not, for example, suggesting that the 
Commission may modify or sever provisions of its proposal to result in an ‘entirely

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requests that, if the Commission elects to modify or sever any portion of the proposal, it 
should expressly prescribe the revised rate or rule.9  The majority of PJM’s proposed 
Tariff revisions are not intended to take effect until June 1, 2027, consistent with the start 
of the 2027/2028 Delivery Year.  However, PJM requests an effective date for its entire 
filing of October 12, 2026, which PJM argues is necessary so that it may modify the 
planning parameters for the VRR curve underlying the 2029/2030 Base Residual Auction 
(BRA) in time for the 2029/2030 BRA set to run in December 2026.10   
II. 
Notice of Filing and Responsive Pleadings 
5. 
Notice of PJM’s filing was published in the Federal Register, 91 Fed. Reg. 53407 
(Aug. 18, 2026), with interventions and protests due on or before September 3, 2026.  
Notices of intervention and timely-filed motions to intervene were submitted by the 
entities listed in the Appendix of this order, which also lists the abbreviated names for 
each entity and identifies those entities that submitted comments and protests.   
6. 
On August 28, 2026, OPSI filed a motion requesting an extension of time to 
submit comments in response to PJM’s filing.  On August 31, 2026, Google submitted an 
answer in support of OPSI’s motion.  On September 1, 2026, EKPC and Pennsylvania 
Commission submitted answers in support of OPSI’s motion.  On September 2, 2026, the 
Commission issued a notice denying OPSI’s motion.  
7. 
On September 3, after the 5:00 p.m. deadline, OPSI and Voltus each filed          
out-of-time comments, and Equinix filed an out-of-time protest.  On September 4, 
CyrusOne filed a motion to intervene out-of-time.  On September 8, 2026, the Virginia 
Commission filed out-of-time comments.  On September 11, 2026, CyrusOne filed     
out-of-time comments.  On September 11, 2026, Governor Shapiro filed a motion to 
intervene out-of-time.  On September 15, 2026, IECA filed out-of-time comments.  
8. 
On September 16, 2026, Governor Shapiro filed a motion for leave to answer and 
an answer to certain comments and protests.  On September 18, 2026, Buckeye and 
NJBPU each filed motions for leave to answer and an answer to certain comments and 
protests.  On September 23, 2026, PJM filed a motion for leave to answer and an answer 
to certain comments and protests.  On September 25, 2026, AEP filed a motion for leave 
to answer and an answer to certain comments and PJM’s answer.  On September 28, 
2026, Representative Pallone filed out-of-time comments; and CEBA and Vistra each 
filed motions for leave to answer and an answer to certain comments and answers.  On 
 
different rate design.’”  Id. at 122 n.314 (quoting NRG, 862 F.3d at 115). 
9 Id. at 123.  
10 Id. at 7-8, 121-22.

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September 29, 2026, AEU, Constellation, and Voltus each filed motions for leave to 
answer and answer to certain answers.  On September 30, 2026, Google filed a motion 
for leave to answer and answer to certain comments, protests, and answers.  On      
October 1, 2026, Data Center Coalition filed a motion for leave to answer and answer to 
certain comments, protests, and answers.  On October 2, 2026, FirstEnergy filed a motion 
for leave to answer and answer to certain comments, protests, and answers.  On     
October 6, 2026, PPL filed a motion for leave to answer and answer to certain answers.  
On October 7, 2026, EPKC and SMECO each filed a motion for leave to answer and 
answer to certain answers.  On October 8, 2026, PAG filed out-of-time comments.  On      
October 9, 2026, IMM filed a motion for leave to answer and answer to certain answers. 
III. 
Discussion 
A. 
Procedural Matters 
9. 
Pursuant to Rule 214 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure,        
18 C.F.R. § 385.214 (2025), the notices of intervention and timely, unopposed motions to 
intervene serve to make the entities that filed them parties to this proceeding. 
10. 
Pursuant to Rule 214(d) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure,     
18 C.F.R. § 385.214(d), we grant CyrusOne and Governor Shapiro’s late-filed motions to 
intervene given their interest in the proceeding, the early stage of the proceeding, and the 
absence of undue prejudice or delay.  We also accept the out-of-time comments and 
protests submitted by CyrusOne, Equinix, IECA, OPSI, PAG, Representative Pallone, the 
Virginia Commission, and Voltus. 
11. 
Rule 213(a)(2) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 C.F.R. 
§ 385.213(a)(2) (2025), prohibits an answer to a protest or answer unless otherwise 
ordered by the decisional authority.  We accept the answers filed by AEP, AEU, 
Buckeye, CEBA, Constellation, Data Center Coalition, EKPC, FirstEnergy, Google, 
Governor Shapiro, IMM, NJBPU, PJM, PPL, SMECO, Vistra, and Voltus because they 
have provided information that assisted us in our decision-making process. 
B. 
Substantive Matters 
12. 
PJM’s proposal consists of several elements that, when combined, are intended to 
address the capacity shortfall that, absent the entrance of new capacity resources, will 
prevent PJM from satisfying the PJM Region Reliability Requirement starting in the 
2027/2028 Delivery Year.  The first element of PJM’s proposal is to establish definitions 
of Large Load and New Large Load.  The latter is designed to capture the Delivery Year 
when PJM’s capacity shortfall, which PJM contends is the result of data center load

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growth,11 first emerges.  Next, PJM proposes to develop a Large Load Registry to foster 
transparency regarding Large Load additions.  With that foundation, PJM proposes to 
adopt the IRAS framework, under which LSEs that seek to use Network Integration 
Transmission Service (NITS)12 to serve New Large Loads must designate sufficient new 
capacity resources, referred to as BYONC, to serve the New Large Load.  If an LSE 
using NITS to serve New Large Load fails to designate sufficient capacity resources, 
such New Large Load will be “subject to load reduction requests” when there are 
insufficient resources to reliably meet demand in real-time operations.13  In essence, the 
requirement that these New Large Loads must curtail under certain emergency conditions 
is designed to allow PJM to address its capacity shortfall.14   
13. 
As outlined in greater detail below, we accept PJM’s proposal in part, effective 
October 12, 2026, as requested, reject PJM’s proposal in part, and direct PJM to submit a 
compliance filing within 30 days of the date of this order.15  Specifically, we accept 
PJM’s proposal to establish a definition for Large Load and a Large Load Registry.16  We 
find that those two elements of PJM’s proposal are just and reasonable and not unduly 
discriminatory or preferential.  Given PJM’s consent to sever or modify its proposal, we 
do so here.  We find that the elements of PJM’s proposal to establish a new definition of 
Large Load and a Large Load Registry are severable from the remainder of the filing and 
therefore may be accepted even though we reject the remainder of the proposal. 
 
11 Id. at 21. 
12 Under NITS, Transmission Providers provide firm transmission service to the 
Network Customer for the delivery of capacity and energy from its designated Network 
Resources to service its Network Loads on a basis that is comparable to each 
Transmission Owner’s use of the Transmission System to reliably service its Native Load 
Customers.  PJM, Intra-PJM Tariffs, OATT, pt. III, § 28.3 (Network Integration 
Transmission Service) (0.0.0). 
13 Transmittal at 4, 21, 55; Proposed RAA, § 7.8. 
14 See Transmittal at 39 (“IRAS, as proposed, is a service that specifically allows 
for Large Loads to interconnect without bringing their own capacity, on the condition that 
they must reduce their load or switch to on-site backup resources under specific, limited 
emergency conditions.”).  
15 See NRG, 862 F.3d at 114-15 (discussing the Commission’s authority to propose 
modifications to a utility’s FPA section 205 rate proposal). 
16 As discussed below, although we accept PJM’s proposal to establish a definition 
of Large Load and a Large Load Registry, we reject the proposed Tariff sheets due to 
inclusion of language pertaining to IRAS or BYONC.

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14. 
While we recognize the imminent capacity shortfall in PJM, we find that two key 
aspects of PJM’s proposal—IRAS and BYONC—are either outside of the Commission’s 
authority or have not been sufficiently demonstrated to be just and reasonable and not 
unduly discriminatory or preferential.  We do not take this decision lightly.  But given the 
significant discrepancies between PJM’s transmittal letter description of its proposed 
IRAS framework and its proposed Tariff revisions, as well as the lack of justification for 
many aspects of IRAS and BYONC, we cannot find that these elements of PJM’s 
proposal are just and reasonable.  We therefore reject these elements of the proposal.  
However, we provide guidance on how PJM could modify its proposal should PJM seek 
to refile it. 
15. 
Moreover, because the elements of PJM’s proposal other than the Large Load 
definition and Large Load Registry represent an integrated package that must be viewed 
as a whole, we reject the remainder of PJM’s proposal.  PJM, while consenting to 
severance and modification of the proposal, acknowledges that the RAA and OATT 
revisions are “designed to work in lockstep and provide complementary pieces.”17  We 
find that the remaining elements of PJM’s proposal, such as the proposed rules for 
BYONC arrangements and the exclusion of Eligible New Large Loads from the VRR 
curve, are not simply complementary, but instead are inextricably linked.  For example, 
the new obligation for LSEs seeking to use NITS to serve New Large Load to bring new 
capacity to avoid curtailment under IRAS is foundational to both the IRAS and BYONC 
frameworks.  It also establishes the need for the rules for BYONC arrangements and 
facilitates excluding Eligible New Large Loads from the VRR curve.  As such, we 
conclude that, contrary to PJM’s statements in its transmittal, the only elements of its 
proposal that are severable are the proposed definition of Large Load and the proposed 
Large Load Registry, which can be implemented independent of the IRAS and BYONC 
frameworks. 
1. 
Large Load Definition and Registry 
a. 
Definition of Large Load   
i. 
PJM’s Proposal 
16. 
PJM proposes to define Large Load as:   
end-use customer(s) load that has a cumulative peak load of 
50 [MW] or greater at a single electrical site behind one or 
more points of interconnection, where for configurations 
involving multiple affiliated load facilities or multiple points 
of interconnection with affiliated load facilities behind them, 
 
17 Transmittal at 124.

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all affiliated load facilities within a one-mile radius will be 
considered a single electrical site as further described in the 
PJM Manuals.18   
17. 
Acknowledging that the Commission recently stated that PJM may establish its 
own definition of large load,19 PJM states that its definition differs from the 
Commission’s preliminary definition in several ways, and that these differences reflect 
the characteristics and realities of Large Loads in the PJM Region.20  The differences 
include:  (1) setting a 50 MW cumulative peak threshold; (2) establishing a one-mile 
radius at a single electrical site for Large Loads interconnected at multiple points; (3) 
using the term “end-use customer(s) load” instead of “new, commercial or industrial 
customer;” (4) including co-located loads and loads with behind-the-meter generation; 
and (5) excluding a voltage threshold.21  PJM states that it proposes to define a Large 
Load as located at a single electrical site behind one or more points of interconnection 
within a one-mile radius to avoid a scenario where, for example, a data center owner is 
not categorized as Large Load simply because the owner has elected to site a number of 
smaller data centers, each with peak loads below 50 MW, close together.  PJM states that 
the Commission has explicitly adopted a one-mile test in other situations to determine 
whether facilities are “at the same site” to be a Qualifying Facility.   
18. 
PJM states that Large Load is not limited to “new” load, and instead proposes a 
separate definition, “New Large Load,” to capture the temporal aspect of such load with 
greater specificity.22  PJM proposes that New Large Load shall mean:  
end-use customer load that is either (a) a Large Load that 
goes into service after June 1, 2027, or (b) incremental load 
in-service after June 1, 2027, that increases the existing end-
use customer load at a single electrical site that, prior to such 
incremental load, did not previously meet the definition of 
Large Load.  However, to the extent three consecutive 
Delivery Years meet the requirements of Tariff, Attachment 
DD-4, section IV(b)(iii),[23] then New Large Load shall mean 
 
18 Proposed RAA, Definitions (Large Load). 
19 Transmittal at 32 (citing PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,211 
(2026) (PJM Large Load Show Cause Order)). 
20 Id. at 32-33. 
21 Id. at 33-35. 
22 Id. at 36.

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end-use customer load that is either (a) a Large Load that 
goes into service after June 1 of the first Delivery Year for 
which the requirements of Tariff, Attachment DD-4, section 
IV(b)(iii) are not met or (b) incremental load in-service after 
June 1 of the first Delivery Year for which the requirements 
of Tariff, Attachment DD-4, section IV(b)(iii) are not met that 
increases the existing end-use customer load at a single 
electrical site that, prior to such incremental load, did not 
previously meet the definition of Large Load.24 
ii. 
Pleadings 
19. 
Protesters argue that PJM has not properly justified the 50 MW threshold for 
Large Loads.25  EPSA, for example, asserts that PJM has articulated no valid reason why 
a new 49.9 MW load will not be subject to IRAS.26  The IMM argues that the 50 MW 
cutoff will exclude a significant number of data centers.27  On the other hand, some 
parties argue that the threshold should be higher28 or that PJM has not justified including 
types of load other than data centers in the definition of Large Load.29  FirstEnergy 
argues that the definition of Large Load should be adjusted, either to raise the minimum 
MW threshold to 200 MW, or to limit the definition to new data centers, to avoid 
capturing small and medium-sized manufacturing facilities.30  FirstEnergy acknowledges 
that similar energy infrastructure must be built regardless of the type of load, but that 
 
23 PJM explains that it proposes new Attachment DD-4 to house the rules for 
IRAS.  Id. at 24.  Attachment DD-4, section IV(b)(iii) states that, if a committed Capacity 
Resources equals or exceeds the PJM Region Reliability in a given Delivery Year, then 
PJM does not need Eligible New Large Loads to provide IRAS for that Delivery Year.  
Proposed OATT, attach. DD-4, § IV(b)(iii). 
24 Proposed OATT, Definitions – New Large Load. 
25 Buckeye Answer at 3; EKPC Protest at 11-12, 26; EPSA Protest at 4; 
FirstEnergy Protest at 10; IECA Protest at 2; Ohio ELC Comments at 1, 3-8. 
26 EPSA Protest at 4. 
27 IMM Protest at 29, 31. 
28 FirstEnergy Protest at 10. 
29 Id.; Buckeye Answer at 3; EKPC Protest at 11-12, 26. 
30 FirstEnergy Protest at 10.

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manufacturing should not be subject to IRAS because it generates investment and jobs, 
whereas data centers do not.  EKPC similarly argues that PJM’s justification for IRAS is 
based on data center load, and PJM has not justified the inclusion of industrial and 
manufacturing load, which does not present the same timing, concentration, or 
operational risks as data centers.31   
20. 
Some protesters also assert that PJM’s distinction between new and existing Large 
Loads turns solely on an arbitrary date and has not been justified.32  They argue that PJM 
has not explained why load that goes into service on May 31, 2027, should be treated 
differently from load that goes into service just one day later, on June 1, 2027.  Industrial 
Customers and IECA assert that only incremental expansions of load that are greater than 
50 MW should be subject to IRAS and that PJM’s definitions of new and existing Large 
Load establish a baseline load value for existing Large Load customers based on 
historical usage and allow customers to demonstrate that growth is a normal fluctuation.33   
21. 
Protesters argue that the definition of New Large Load fails to protect existing 
commercial arrangements34 or argue for grandfathering rules for pre-expansion load.35  
Protesters also seek clarity on how the proposed definition will apply to multi-year 
projects developed in phases, some of which are built prior to June 1, 2027 and some 
after.36  Equinix and CyrusOne contend that PJM’s one-mile aggregation rule for Large 
Loads is unjust and unreasonable as applied to independently developed legacy data 
center facilities.37  In addition, ODEC argues that PJM should clarify how affiliation will 
be determined for the purposes of the one-mile radius measurement.38   
 
31 EKPC Protest at 11-12, 26. 
32 America’s Power Protest at 7-8; Microsoft Protest at 6; FirstEnergy Protest at 9. 
33 PJM ICC Comments at 8-10; IECA Protest at 1-2; Buckeye Answer at 4. 
34 Equinix Protest at 2, 8-14; FirstEnergy Protest at 9. 
35 CyrusOne Comments at 6-8; Equinix Protest at 17; IECA Protest at 2. 
36 CyrusOne Comments at 6-8; Microsoft Comments at 6. 
37 CyrusOne Comments at 4-6; Equinix Protest at 2, 12. 
38 ODEC Comments at 8.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
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22. 
In its answer, PJM highlights the importance of timely Commission approval of 
the definition of Large Load.39  In response to arguments that the 50 MW threshold is 
unsupported and should be changed, PJM asserts that the 50 MW threshold is in keeping 
with what was contemplated by the Commission and that no information presented 
renders PJM’s proposed threshold unjust and unreasonable.40  Further, PJM contends 
that, since PJM has proposed that 50 MW is the appropriate threshold necessary for 
purposes of tracking Large Loads and ensuring PJM has visibility into them to ensure 
reliability, it would be contradictory to ignore any MW that may have existed as a Large 
Load before an additional 50 MW were added. 
23. 
In response to parties’ arguments that PJM should differentiate between data 
center Large Loads and other types of Large Loads (e.g., manufacturing or industrial 
loads), PJM asserts that it is implementing the approach the Commission set forth in the 
PJM Large Load Show Cause Order—i.e., treating data center and computational, 
manufacturing, industrial, or other types of large loads the same.  PJM argues that the 
parties have shown no basis for deviating from the Commission’s approach.41 
24. 
In its answer, Data Center Coalition argues the PJM’s one-mile rule is not just and 
reasonable.42  Data Center Coalition argues that the proposed one-mile rule would 
unfairly subject long-operating legacy facilities to IRAS and potential curtailment merely 
because an unrelated facility is later developed nearby, despite those legacy loads having 
already been accounted for through regional planning.43  Data Center Coalition also 
argues that PJM’s undefined use of “affiliated” to aggregate facilities within a one-mile 
radius could improperly treat independent facilities as a single Large Load; therefore, 
Data Center Coalition asserts, the term’s criteria and application should be clearly 
specified in the Tariff rather than deferred to the PJM Manuals.44  The IMM similarly 
argues that PJM has not provided clear, uniform criteria for applying the one-mile radius 
 
39 PJM Answer at 6-7. 
40 Id. at 15 (citing PJM Large Load Show Cause Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,211 at      
P 58).  
41 Id. at 16. 
42 Data Center Coalition Answer at 23.  
43 Id. at 23-24. 
44 Id. at 24.

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rule or defined “affiliated load facilities,” creating uncertainty about how co-located or 
connected data centers should be grouped.45 
25. 
FirstEnergy argues that PJM has not justified applying the Large Load definition 
to manufacturing or other industrial facilities because, unlike data centers, short-notice 
curtailment of manufacturing facilities may disrupt product and supply chains, strand 
inventory, damage equipment, and require costly cleaning and restart procedures.46  
26. 
EKPC argues that PJM does not justify the 50 MW threshold and requests that the 
Commission should either require PJM to narrow the definitions or to establish objective 
criteria demonstrating that non-computational load presents the same IRAS-relevant 
risks.47  The IMM argues that the 50 MW threshold would exclude a significant and 
growing share of data center load and that lowering the threshold would more effectively 
prevent gaming and reflect advances in prefabricated, scalable data center technology.48 
iii. 
Determination 
27. 
We find that PJM’s proposed definition of Large Load is just and reasonable and 
not unduly discriminatory or preferential.49  First, we find that establishing the threshold 
to qualify as a Large Load at a cumulative peak of 50 MW strikes a just and reasonable 
balance between capturing the larger loads into which PJM needs visibility to ensure the 
reliability of its system and excluding smaller loads that do not raise the same reliability 
concerns in PJM.50  We acknowledge protesters’ arguments that PJM has not explained 
 
45 IMM Answer at 15-16. 
46 FirstEnergy Answer at 5. 
47 EKPC Answer at 6-7. 
48 IMM Answer at 14-15. 
49 Although we find PJM’s proposed definition of Large Load just and reasonable, 
we reject the proposed Tariff records due to inclusion of language pertaining to the IRAS 
and BYONC frameworks, which we reject, as explained below (proposed OATT, 
Definitions – Large Load; proposed RAA, Definitions – Large Load).   
50 PJM Answer at 15; see also Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 194 FERC ¶ 61,031, at        
PP 10, 61 (2026) (accepting a proposed definition of a high impact large load that 
included a 50 MW threshold for new or increased load at a single site connected to the 
transmission system at a voltage level greater than 69 kV); Tri-State Generation & 
Transmission Ass’n, Inc., 196 FERC ¶ 61,127, at P 76 (2026) (Tri-State) (accepting a 
proposal to define a high impact load as load exceeding or forecasted to exceed 45 MW

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
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why a new 49.9 MW load should not be subject to the same requirements as a new        
50 MW load.  But any cutoff criterion would inevitably exclude loads sized just below 
the threshold, and that alone does not render the definition unjust or unreasonable.51   
28. 
In addition, we disagree with protesters’ arguments that the definition of Large 
Load should be modified to exclude manufacturing facilities and include only data 
centers.  Protesters do not appear to argue that other types of large loads do not use 
energy at the same magnitude as data centers or do not have the same potential impacts 
on the transmission system.  Nor do protesters appear to argue that other types of large 
loads otherwise have different effects on resource adequacy that would justify excluding 
them from the definition of Large Load.  As such, we find reasonable PJM’s proposal to 
include all types of large loads in the Large Load definition.   
29. 
We acknowledge that commenters put forth alternate definitions of Large Load in 
the record.  However, having found PJM’s proposed definition of Large Load just and 
reasonable, as discussed above, we need not opine on these alternate definitions.  For 
filings made under FPA section 205, the Commission evaluates whether the proposal in 
the filing is just and reasonable, and not whether alternative proposals are more or less 
reasonable than the filing party’s proposal.52 
30. 
We also disagree with protesters’ arguments that defining a Large Load as a single 
electrical site behind one or more points of interconnection within a one-mile radius is 
unjust and unreasonable.  As PJM explains, the one-mile radius paired with the single 
electrical site requirement is necessary to ensure that loads that are physically located 
together and affiliated are considered as a single facility for the purposes of the Large 
Load definition.  We agree with PJM that this requirement will preclude a scenario 
where, for example, a data center load is not categorized as Large Load simply because 
 
within four years and served from a single delivery point). 
51 See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 181 FERC ¶ 61,162, at P 66 (2022) 
(stating with respect to PJM’s proposed threshold, “while specific cutoff criteria ‘will 
exclude certain interconnection customers’ from participation in a transition cluster, ‘any 
cutoff date inevitably will have that effect’”), order on reh’g, 184 FERC ¶ 61,006, at      
P 30 (2023) (finding “any cutoff amount will inevitably exclude certain interconnection 
customers from access to the expedited process”); see also Tri-State Generation & 
Transmission Ass’n, Inc., 175 FERC ¶ 61,128, at P 14 (2021) (citing PacifiCorp,          
173 FERC ¶ 61,016, at P 25 (2020)). 
52 See Cities of Bethany v. FERC, 727 F.2d 1131, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding 
that, when determining whether a rate was just and reasonable, the Commission properly 
did not consider “whether a proposed rate schedule is more or less reasonable than 
alternative rate designs”).

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the owner has elected to site a number of smaller data centers, each with peak loads 
below 50 MW, close together.53  Regarding ODEC’s request for clarification for how 
affiliation will be determined for the purposes of measuring the one-mile radius, we note 
that “affiliate” is a defined term in the Tariff,54 and PJM explains that it intends to detail 
in the PJM Manuals the method of calculating the one-mile distance and for examining 
different configurations to determine whether they may constitute a single electrical site.  
We agree with PJM that these are implementation details that are not necessary to include 
in the Tariff. 
31. 
We find that PJM’s proposal to add a definition of New Large Load is 
fundamentally a part of PJM’s IRAS package, discussed below.  PJM explains that the 
term New Large Load is needed to describe the subset of Large Loads that PJM proposes 
may be subject to curtailment where the LSE does not designate capacity to offset the 
load.55  Given that we are rejecting these aspects of PJM’s proposal, as discussed below, 
we also sever and reject the definition of New Large Load without prejudice.  While we 
do not reach the merits of the definition of New Large Load, we note that protesters argue 
that the definition of New Large Load does not protect existing commercial arrangements 
for incremental large load additions to existing Large Loads, and because we do not reach 
the merits of the definition of New Large Load, we do not address protesters’ remaining 
comments related to the definition of New Large Load.56  Should PJM choose to refile a 
modified version of its proposed IRAS framework, we encourage PJM to address how its 
definition of New Large Load would be tailored to protect existing commercial 
arrangements. 
 
53 Transmittal at 33-34. 
54 The PJM OATT defines “Affiliate” as any two or more entities, one of which 
Controls the other or that are under common Control.  “Control,” as that term is used in 
this definition, is defined as the possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to direct 
the management or policies of an entity.  Ownership of publicly-traded equity securities 
of another entity shall not result in Control or affiliation for purposes of the Tariff or 
Operating Agreement if the securities are held as an investment, the holder owns (in its 
name or via intermediaries) less than 10 percent (10%) of the outstanding securities of the 
entity, the holder does not have representation on the entity’s board of directors (or 
equivalent managing entity) or vice versa, and the holder does not in fact exercise 
influence over day-to-day management decisions.  PJM, Intra-PJM Tariffs, OATT, 
Definitions A – B (19.1.1). 
55 Transmittal at 38-40. 
56 E.g., Equinix Protest at 2, 8-14; FirstEnergy Protest at 9.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 14 - 
32. 
Because we reject PJM’s proposed definition of New Large Load, we direct PJM 
to submit a compliance filing, within 30 days of the date of this order, with OATT and 
RAA revisions that include only the definition of Large Load and do not include the 
definition of or references to New Large Load.   
b. 
Large Load Registry 
i. 
PJM’s Proposal 
33. 
PJM proposes to require LSEs to submit information to PJM about the Large 
Loads they serve, which PJM will maintain in a Large Load Registry.57  Specifically, 
PJM proposes revisions to Schedule 11 of the RAA to establish a registry of Large Loads 
in the PJM Region capturing existing Large Loads and New Large Loads that will 
interconnect in the future.58  PJM explains the Large Load Registry will include 
information such as the Eligible Customer for the Large Load; a description of the Large 
Load; its location; the in-service date for each increment of load; any peak shaving 
adjustment value; the delivery point/point of interconnection; peak load quantity and 
ramp schedule; telemetry specifications; backup generation including fuel type and 
permitting limitations; contracts or service agreements between the Large Load and the 
LSE; points of contact at the applicable transmission owner, Electric Distributor, and 
LSE; and other details as necessary in accordance with the PJM Manuals.59  PJM 
proposes to maintain the confidentiality of the information in the Large Load Registry 
consistent with PJM’s existing confidentiality obligations under Operating Agreement, 
section 18.17.60 
34. 
PJM states that the purpose of this registry is to:  (1) enable PJM to better forecast 
load growth, plan and manage the transmission system, and study and provide the 
anticipated new transmission services for co-located loads and Large Loads; and (2) 
make information available to Authorized Commissions,61 Transmission Owners, Electric 
 
57 Transmittal at 36-37. 
58 Id. at 22, 28-48. 
59 Id. at 37. 
60 Id. at 42. 
61 “Authorized Commission” means (i) a State public utility commission that 
regulates the distribution or supply of electricity to retail customers and is legally charged 
with monitoring the operation of wholesale or retail markets serving retail suppliers or 
customers within its State or (ii) an association or organization comprised exclusively of 
State public utility commissions described in the immediately preceding clause (i).  PJM,

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
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Distributors, LSEs, the IMM, the Commission, and other entities pursuant to the 
Operating Agreement, subject to appropriate confidentiality and data protection 
safeguards.  PJM likewise notes that this information will be useful for states in 
monitoring adherence to Large Loads’ commitments to bringing capacity to offset 
demand and protect against higher prices for other customers, as well as implementing 
their own retail constructs.62  PJM also proposes to aggregate data from the Large Load 
Registry and post it on the PJM website.63  Additionally, PJM states that it will use the 
Large Load Registry to implement its proposed IRAS framework. 
35. 
PJM proposes to require that the information used to develop and maintain the 
Large Load Registry be “submit[ted] or cause to be submitted” to PJM by LSEs.  In 
addition, PJM proposes to obtain information from Electric Distributors to coordinate 
with applicable Transmission Owners and Electric Distributors, as needed, to validate the 
information provided in the Large Load Registry or to consult with relevant Large 
Loads.64  PJM states that the Commission has previously accepted proposals by PJM to 
require and obtain information from jurisdictional entities such as Electric Distributors 
and LSEs.65  PJM argues that its authority to obtain “data and details concerning large 
load additions” finds support in the PJM Large Load Show Cause Order, which expressly 
required PJM and the PJM Transmission Owners to post and regularly update data and 
details concerning large load additions.66   
 
Intra-PJM Tariff, Operating Agreement, Definitions A-B (9.2.2). 
62 Id. at 28-29. 
63 Id. at 28. 
64 Id. at 45-46 (citing proposed RAA, Schedule 11, § B.1). 
65 Id. at 46 (citing PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 188 FERC ¶ 61,200, at P 40        
& n.65 (2024) (finding that an “Electric Distributor is the party with the distribution and 
metering facilities defining a zone/area and responsible for reporting load information to 
PJM[,]” and also noting that, “under the current framework, each LSE already reports 
their peak load contribution to the Electric Distributor, which is the entity ultimately 
responsible for reporting that information to PJM.” (citation modified)).  PJM states that 
its information-gathering authority is wide.  Id. (citing FERC v. Elec. Power Supply 
Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 278-79 (2016) (EPSA); 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)).  PJM also notes 
similarities to longstanding requirements applicable to Demand Resources, as set forth in 
Order No. 719-A.  Id. at 46-47 (citing Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized 
Elec. Mrkts., Order No. 719-A, 128 FERC ¶ 61,059, order on clarification, Order No. 
719-B, 129 FERC ¶ 61,252 (2009)). 
66 Id. at 47-48 (quoting PJM Large Load Show Cause Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,211

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
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ii. 
Pleadings 
36. 
Several parties support the creation of a Large Load Registry.67  Google asserts 
that the Commission has the authority to accept only the Large Load Registry and should 
sever the remainder of the proposal.  According to Google, this approach would be 
consistent with PJM’s goals of improving resource adequacy in the region while ensuring 
that service to existing residential customers remains reliable.68  Public Interest 
Organizations (PIO)69 argue that PJM’s proposal addresses some of the concerns related 
to large load interconnection, cost transparency, and reliability impacts laid out in the 
PJM Large Load Show Cause Order by proposing to establish a Large Load Registry.70  
Many state consumer advocates assert that they support the Large Load Registry, but 
argue that excluding state consumer advocates from the category of entities eligible to 
access confidential Large Load Registry information is not just and reasonable.71  Some 
commenters suggest additional improvements to the database.72 
37. 
Protesters object to the responsibility for accuracy and any costs for compliance 
for the Large Load Registry falling on Transmission Owners and Electric Distributors.  
Joint Consumer Advocates73 assert that, because the Large Load Registry is critical to the 
success of IRAS, it is unreasonable that, under PJM’s proposed Large Load Registry, 
New Large Loads apparently bear no affirmative, Tariff-expressed obligation either to 
submit data or to substantiate it.74  SMECO similarly asserts that the proposed Large 
 
at P 74). 
67 Google Protest at 3; NJBPU Protest at 13-14; Ohio Consumers’ Counsel Protest 
at 20. 
68 Google Protest at 18. 
69 PIOs include Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council, Environmental 
Law and Policy Center, Appalachian Voices, and the Center for Progressive Reform. 
70 PIOs Protest at 16-18. 
71 Ohio Consumers’ Counsel Protest at 20; OPSI Comments at 7; Pennsylvania 
Commission Comments at 6. 
72 PAG Comments at 1-2; PAG Supplemental Comments at 2-3. 
73 Joint Consumer Advocates include the Delaware Division of the Public 
Advocate, District of Columbia Office of People’s Counsel, Illinois Citizens Utility 
Board, Office of the Illinois Attorney General, Maryland Office of the People’s Counsel, 
and New Jersey Division of Rate Counsel.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
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Load Registry’s data reporting mandate is deferred to future PJM Manual revisions, with 
no mechanism identified for Electric Distributors to recover the costs of compliance.75  
SMECO requests that the Commission require PJM to file Manual provisions for review 
before the Large Load Registry becomes effective, clarify the scope of Electric 
Distributor liability for information sourced from LSEs or Large Loads, and identify a 
mechanism for recovering costs of complying with its obligations related to the Large 
Load Registry.   
38. 
Equinix argues that PJM’s proposed Large Load Registry lacks essential due 
process protections and that PJM may rely on registry data without requiring notice to 
affected customers, verification by those customers, or a meaningful correction 
mechanism.76  Equinix states that this prevents customers from determining their IRAS 
obligations, undermines long-term procurement planning, and may force loads to commit 
to BYONC arrangements without assurance that the Large Load Registry’s treatment 
aligns with retail curtailment rules.77  Industrial Customers request additional substantive 
and due process protections if existing Large Loads are included in the registry, including 
customer notice, correction, and appeal procedures and robust confidentiality safeguards 
for sensitive operational and commercial information.78 
39. 
Industrial Customers and IECA assert that existing large loads should be excluded 
from the proposed Large Load Registry to the extent it is used to implement IRAS; in 
their view, the Large Load Registry’s purpose is to track New Large Loads driving new 
system costs, not existing customers already integrated into the grid and reflected in 
historical forecasts.79  Other parties, such as Joint Consumer Advocates and ODEC, raise 
confidentiality concerns with the registry.  ODEC seeks clarification from PJM as to 
whether LSEs will be required to provide Large Load Registry information, and is 
concerned that PJM’s proposal will require LSEs to provide information that they may 
not be able to obtain.80  Joint Consumer Advocates claim that PJM’s proposal 
unreasonably restricts state consumer advocates’ access to the Large Load Registry, 
 
74 Joint Consumer Advocates Protest at 32-33. 
75 SMECO Protest at 11-13. 
76 Equinix Protest at 2. 
77 Id. at 12-14. 
78 Industrial Customers Comments at 7-8. 
79 Id. at 4; IECA Protest at 1. 
80 ODEC Comments at 3-6.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
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arguing entities with access are subject to onerous and insurmountable confidentiality 
restrictions.81  Joint Consumer Advocates and Ohio Consumers’ Counsel argue that PJM 
should allow state consumer advocates access to the Large Load Registry because the 
information will play a central role in their advocacy efforts.82  Pennsylvania 
Commission similarly states that it supports PJM’s proposed Large Load Registry, but 
requests that state utility commissions have access, and that the Large Load Registry 
should contain curtailment data.83  OPSI and Ohio Consumers’ Counsel assert that states 
must have meaningful access to the registry so they can determine how curtailment 
should be implemented at the retail level and how resulting costs or responsibilities 
should be allocated consistent with state law and policy.84  Similarly, Representative 
Pallone argues that the Large Load Registry, or as much of it as possible, must be public 
because it would be invaluable for improving forecasts of electricity demand.85 
40. 
The IMM argues that the proposed Large Load Registry, by itself, does not 
establish that PJM will receive real-time telemetry sufficient to monitor the load during 
an IRAS event, or to determine whether the required reduction action actually occurred.86  
The IMM contends that telemetry and performance measurement requirements are 
particularly important if IRAS reductions are to be treated as an operational reliability 
resource rather than merely as a forecasted or administrative load adjustment.   
41. 
In its answer, PJM highlights the importance of timely Commission approval of 
the Large Load Registry.87  PJM states that the Commission has recognized that PJM 
must have visibility into where Large Loads will be located to be prepared for operational 
issues distinctive to Large Loads.88  PJM states that there have been severe incidents of 
large loads tripping offline in PJM, which could have led to significant outages had PJM 
 
81 Joint Consumer Advocates Protest at 33. 
82 Id. at 34; Ohio Consumers’ Counsel Protest at 22. 
83 Pennsylvania Commission Comments at 6. 
84 Ohio Consumers’ Counsel Protest at 9; OPSI Comments at 7. 
85 Representative Pallone Comments at 3. 
86 IMM Protest at 27. 
87 PJM Answer at 6-7. 
88 Id. at 9 (citing PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 193 FERC ¶ 61,217, at P 212 n.444 
(2025) (PJM Co-Location Order)).

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
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not been able to respond in time.89  PJM asserts that such information will also be 
invaluable for states and other planning entities. 
42. 
In response to states and state consumer advocates asserting that they should have 
broader, less-restricted access to the Large Load Registry, PJM asserts that the 
information contained in the Large Load Registry will be available to Authorized 
Commissions, among others, subject to confidentiality requirements.90  PJM states that 
“Authorized Commission” is currently defined to include state public utility 
commissions, as well as organizations thereof.91  PJM clarifies that the proposal does not 
recommend any new restrictions and that PJM plans to adhere to its existing rules for 
disseminating confidential information, as set forth in the Operating Agreement, and 
which the Commission approved many years ago.92  PJM explains that the Large Load 
Registry is expected to collect information that may be confidential or commercially 
sensitive, or that may implicate infrastructure security concerns.  Therefore, PJM asserts, 
it must only permit access to this registry to “as small a universe of entities as possible,” 
while still making sure it is available to those who require access to implement their 
responsibilities, as well as operational and planning needs.93   
43. 
In response to ODEC, PJM clarifies that it is the LSE serving a Large Load that is 
obligated to provide PJM with the information for the Large Load Registry, but 
acknowledges that there may be instances where an LSE may not have all the information 
 
89 Id. (citing James Downing, Data Centers’ Reliability Impacts Examined at 
FERC Meeting, RTO Insider (Apr. 17, 2025), https://www.rtoinsider.com/103130-ferc-
gets-update-data-center-reliability/ (discussing 1,500 MW drop from Louden County data 
center tripping offline)). 
90 Id. at 10. 
91 Id. (citing PJM, Intra-PJM Tariffs, Operating Agreement, Definitions (A – B) 
(9.2.2) (“‘Authorized Commission’ shall mean (i) a State public utility commission that 
regulates the distribution or supply of electricity to retail customers and is legally charged 
with monitoring the operation of wholesale or retail markets serving retail suppliers or 
customers within its State or (ii) an association or organization comprised exclusively of 
State public utility commissions described in the immediately preceding clause (i).”)). 
92 Id. at 12 (citing PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 107 FERC ¶ 61,322 (2004)). 
93 Id. at 11.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
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required readily available, which is why the RAA language contemplates that the Electric 
Distributor may provide such information.94   
44. 
In response to Industrial Customers and IECA’s arguments that the Large Load 
Registry should not include existing Large Loads, PJM states that, regardless of IRAS, 
PJM must have visibility into the full spectrum of all Large Loads in its footprint to 
properly manage its system and ensure reliability.95 
45. 
In their answers, Constellation and Google argue that the Commission should 
reject PJM’s proposal, other than the proposal to create the Large Load Registry.96 
46. 
FirstEnergy argues that PJM’s assertion that it does not presently perceive a 
connection between the Large Load Registry and the forthcoming pro forma transmission 
service agreement does not demonstrate that finalizing the Large Load Registry now will 
avoid overlapping, inconsistent, or duplicative requirements.97 
47. 
SMECO requests that the Commission direct PJM to conform proposed Tariff, 
Attachment DD-4, section III(b) to PJM’s stated position that the LSE bears the Large 
Load Registry reporting obligation, and to clarify that an Electric Distributor that relays, 
in good faith, information originating with an LSE or Large Load is not responsible for 
the accuracy of that information.98 
iii. 
Determination 
48. 
We find that PJM’s proposed Large Load Registry is just and reasonable and not 
unduly discriminatory or preferential because it will require LSEs to provide information 
about the Large Loads that they serve to PJM, which in turn will provide PJM with the 
information necessary to address the operational impacts of Large Loads on the PJM 
transmission system.  We agree with PJM that its proposed Large Load Registry will 
enable PJM to better forecast load growth and to plan and manage its transmission 
system.99  We further find that the Large Load Registry will provide valuable information 
 
94 Id. at 13. 
95 Id. at 13-14. 
96 Constellation Answer at 21; Google Answer at 6. 
97 FirstEnergy Answer at 5. 
98 SMECO Answer at 7.  
99 Transmittal at 28-29.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 21 - 
concerning—and visibility into—all Large Loads connecting to the PJM transmission 
system, separate and apart from implementation of PJM’s proposed IRAS framework.100  
Therefore, we sever PJM’s proposed Large Load Registry from the remainder of PJM’s 
proposal and accept it.101  We direct PJM to submit a compliance filing, within 30 days of 
the date of this order, with the OATT and RAA provisions for the Large Load Registry, 
removing the language regarding the proposed IRAS and BYONC frameworks. 
49. 
We also find just and reasonable PJM’s proposal to make information in the Large 
Load Registry available to Authorized Commissions, Transmission Owners, Electric 
Distributors, LSEs, the IMM, the Commission, and other entities, subject to appropriate 
confidentiality and data protection safeguards.  Some protesters express concern 
regarding the Large Load Registry information being subject to confidentiality 
restrictions.  We disagree with these parties and find that PJM’s proposal includes 
reasonable safeguards for confidential information.  PJM explains that the Large Load 
Registry will be available only to entities that already have access to this sort of 
information and consistent with existing confidentiality rules, i.e., PJM proposes to 
follow its existing, Commission-approved rules, rules that currently do not allow state 
consumer advocates or similar entities to have access to this type of information.  PJM 
further states that it will post only aggregated data on the PJM website, consistent with its 
existing confidentiality protections.  We find that PJM’s existing confidentiality rules and 
commitment to make only aggregate data publicly available will adequately safeguard 
confidential information submitted and maintained as part of the Large Load Registry, 
while balancing the need for broader transparency concerning Large Loads in the 
aggregate in PJM. 
50. 
We disagree with protesters’ arguments that it is not reasonable for Electric 
Distributors to be responsible for the accuracy of the information in the Large Load 
Registry.  As PJM clarifies in its answer, the LSE serving a Large Load is obligated to 
provide PJM with the information for the Large Load Registry, and the Electric 
Distributor may provide information when the LSE does not have all the information 
required readily available.102  With respect to SMECO’s concern that there is no 
 
100 We note that the proposed Large Load definition accepted above includes all 
Large Loads regardless of the in-service date.   
101 Specifically, we find that PJM’s proposed Large Load Registry as described in 
proposed OATT, Attachment DD-4, § II(a), III(b), and proposed RAA Schedule 11 
revisions in sections (B)(1), B(2)(a), and B(2)(b), is just and reasonable and not unduly 
discriminatory or preferential.  However, consistent with our findings regarding PJM’s 
proposed IRAS framework below, we reject proposed OATT, attach. DD-4, § II and        
§ III, as well as proposed RAA, Schedule 11.   
102 Transmittal at 13.  The proposed RAA states that, “each [entity bound by the

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
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mechanism for Electric Distributors to recover the costs of compliance, SMECO has not 
explained what costs it will incur, whether these are costs related to a wholesale service, 
or what information included in the Large Load Registry it would not otherwise already 
possess.  Also, given our findings elsewhere in this order, we expect that PJM will update 
the information that must be provided for inclusion in the registry to remove the 
previously identified items that are part of the IRAS package (such as the amount of 
BYONC brought by a particular Large Load).  Additionally, because we are rejecting 
PJM’s IRAS proposal, industrial customers will only be included in the Large Load 
Registry for informational purposes.  Similar to our finding concerning PJM’s proposed 
definition of Large Load in section III.B.1.a.iii above, we agree with PJM that it must 
have visibility into all Large Loads in the PJM Region to manage its system and ensure 
reliability.103  Finally, as to commenters suggesting improvements to the Large Load 
Registry, we note that the Commission evaluates whether the proposal in the filing is just 
and reasonable, and not whether alternative proposals are more or less reasonable than 
the filing party’s proposal.104 
51. 
Given that, as discussed below, we are rejecting PJM’s proposed IRAS 
framework, we find that it is unnecessary to address protests arguing that the Large Load 
Registry is unjust and unreasonable because of how it is proposed to interact with IRAS.  
For the same reason, we decline to address protests regarding telemetry or how the 
accuracy of the information in the Large Load Registry affects Eligible New Large 
Loads’ IRAS obligations.  We similarly find that it is unnecessary to address protests that 
states must have access to the Large Load Registry to determine curtailment and cost 
allocation given that, as discussed below, we are rejecting PJM’s proposed IRAS 
framework. 
2. 
Interim Resource Adequacy Service Package 
52. 
Although PJM asserts that its proposal can be viewed as containing discrete 
elements, we decline to sever the remaining aspects of the proposal because they appear 
to be an integrated package.  Below, we find that elements of the package are outside of 
 
Operating Agreement] shall submit, or cause to be submitted, to [PJM] the following 
information, as may be further described in the PJM Manuals, related to each Large Load 
served by [the entity bound by the Operating Agreement].”  Proposed RAA, Schedule 11, 
§ B(1)(a).    
103 Transmittal at 13-14. 
104 See Cities of Bethany v. FERC, 727 F.2d 1131, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding 
that, when determining whether a rate was just and reasonable, the Commission properly 
did not consider “whether a proposed rate schedule is more or less reasonable than 
alternative rate designs”).

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
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the Commission’s jurisdiction or that PJM has not demonstrated that certain elements of 
the package are just and reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or preferential, 
including the proposed IRAS and BYONC frameworks.  As discussed below, we reject 
the entirety of the package.   
a. 
PJM’s Proposal 
53. 
PJM proposes that, during years when the PJM Region experiences a resource 
adequacy shortfall, it may issue an IRAS Action105 directing Electric Distributors to 
reduce load attributable to Eligible New Large Loads106 in the Electric Distributor’s 
zone/area, unless the New Large Load is offset by new capacity through Reliability 
Backstop Procurement Unforced Capacity (UCAP) MW or BYONC arrangements.107  
PJM states that it may issue an IRAS Action when reserves or Interconnection Reliability 
Operating Limits cannot be maintained, and it “generally” would do so before Pre-
Emergency Load Management Reductions but after the deployment of available 
generation and economic demand resources, and curtailment of non-firm interchange and 
applicable non-firm transmission service.108  Specifically, in the affidavit, Mr. Pilong 
explains that IRAS Actions would occur after PJM dispatchers have issued a NERC 
Energy Emergency Alert Level 1 (EEA1).109  PJM states that IRAS would be suspended 
 
105 PJM explains that an IRAS Action is an “Operating Instruction, as defined by 
NERC.”  Transmittal at 75 (citing Proposed OATT, Definitions – Interim Resource 
Adequacy Service Action).   
106 PJM proposes to define Eligible New Large Loads as “a New Large Load 
eligible to provide Interim Resource Adequacy Service in accordance with Tariff, 
Attachment DD-4, section V.”  Proposed OATT, Definitions – Eligible New Large 
Loads. 
107 Transmittal at 82-83, 97-98. 
108 Id. at 82.  PJM explains that details as to how and when PJM may call an IRAS 
Action will be set forth by PJM Manual 13, along with its other Emergency Procedures.  
Id. at 75-76. 
109 Id., attach. C (Affidavit of Mr. Christopher Pilong) ¶¶ 38-40 (Pilong Aff.).    
Mr. Pilong explains that there are three levels of NERC Energy Emergency Alert Levels 
(EEA1 through EEA3), with an EEA3 being the highest alert level.  EEA1 signals that 
PJM foresees or is experiencing conditions where all available resources are scheduled to 
meet firm load, firm transactions, and reserve commitments, and is concerned about 
sustaining its required Contingency Reserves.  An EEA3 is issued when PJM is unable to 
meet minimum Contingency Reserve Requirements.  Pilong Aff. ¶ 11 (citing PJM 
Manual 13, §§ 2.3.1, 2.3.2).

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 24 - 
after three consecutive Delivery Years of PJM meeting its Reliability Requirements.110  
PJM proposes to set a maximum wholesale compensation rate for IRAS that is equal to 
50% of the capacity performance Non-Performance Charge Rate, but the proposed Tariff 
states that the rate could be reduced if the Eligible New Large Load accepts in its retail 
rate a sum less than 50% of the Non-Performance Charge Rate or waives receipt of any 
compensation in its retail rate.111  
54. 
Underpinning IRAS, PJM proposes a new obligation on LSEs that seek to procure 
NITS to support New Large Loads by designating new capacity resources in an amount at 
least equal to the load’s peak demand or such New Large Loads may be subject to 
curtailment under IRAS.112  PJM also proposes to establish a new category of capacity 
resources, BYONC, that may be designated to address the needs of New Large Loads.113  
PJM states that BYONC would include new UCAP and eligible generation, storage, and 
eligible demand-side resources that satisfy gating criteria demonstrating their newness to 
the capacity market and PJM system, with UCAP fixed when the resource first clears.114  
PJM states that BYONC resources would remain subject to applicable capacity market 
obligations, including deficiency charges, performance penalties, plus a 10-year        
must-offer requirement and $0/MW-day price-taker requirement, annual performance 
demonstrations for demand response and distributed energy resources, and a prohibition 
on external sales.115   
55. 
Finally, beginning with the 2029/2030 Delivery Year, PJM proposes to exclude 
from the VRR curve New Large Load MW that has neither entered into BYONC 
arrangements nor received allocated Reliability Backstop Procurement UCAP MW, 
regardless of whether an IRAS-triggering shortfall exists.116 
 
110 Transmittal at 72. 
111 Id. at 102; proposed OATT, attach. DD-4, § X(a). 
112 Transmittal at 21. 
113 Id. at 23. 
114 Id. at 49-57, 64-65. 
115 Id. at 55-58.  
116 Id. at 109-10.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
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b. 
Jurisdiction 
i. 
PJM’s Filing 
56. 
PJM argues that the proposed IRAS framework falls within the Commission’s 
established transmission jurisdiction and wholesale electricity jurisdiction.117  PJM 
maintains that IRAS respects existing bright-line divisions between retail and wholesale 
jurisdiction over transmission and distribution.  According to PJM, IRAS represents a 
federal regime encouraging, but not mandating, states to re-evaluate load reduction plans, 
providing PJM the necessary tools to address situations where regional resource 
adequacy shortfalls would jeopardize reliability.118  Moreover, PJM argues that it is 
preserving state authority by leaving retail load reduction and retail cost allocation to 
state-level entities, while offering non-mandatory options under the federal tariff to aid 
collection and settlement of compensation for IRAS. 
57. 
PJM asserts that its proposal to direct the Electric Distributor, rather than a 
specific end-use customer, to reduce a quantity of load is in keeping with PJM’s 
longstanding practice and reflects the allocation of jurisdiction between the federal and 
state levels.119  PJM states that it will not direct specific LSEs and/or specific customers 
of LSEs, including specific Large Loads, to reduce their load and/or switch to on-site 
back up resources; rather, those decisions would be worked out through state retail 
tariffs.120  PJM asserts that this division of responsibility between PJM and the states 
and/or the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority (RERRA) is supported by 
precedent.121  PJM asserts that states have exclusive jurisdiction to ensure the appropriate 
retail customers are reduced when IRAS Actions are called.122  PJM argues that it may 
issue directives to Electric Distributors to reduce load by a certain MW quantity during 
certain, limited emergency conditions.123  PJM states that while the amount attributable to 
 
117 Id. at 2-3. 
118 Id. at 3. 
119 Id. at 86 (citing New PJM Cos., 107 FERC ¶ 61,272, at P 21 (2004)). 
120 Id. at 86-87. 
121 Id. at 89-90.  The Operating Agreement defines a RERRA as “an entity that has 
jurisdiction over and establishes prices and policies for competition for providers of retail 
electric service to end-customers, such as the city council for a municipal utility, the 
governing board of a cooperative utility, the state public utility commission or any other 
such entity.”  PJM, Intra-PJM Tariffs, Operating Agreement, Definitions, Q - R (13.1.0). 
122 Transmittal at 90-91.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 26 - 
each Electric Distributor zone/area will be guided by the Large Load Registry, PJM will 
leave it to Electric Distributors (in coordination with the states, LSEs, and LSE 
customers) to determine which loads should ultimately reduce subject to IRAS.  PJM 
argues the IRAS framework divides authority between PJM and the states in a manner 
consistent with the FPA’s basic division of authority. 
58. 
PJM also argues that this is not an improper delegation of federal authority to the 
states because the division of responsibility reflected in the Tariff would be on file and 
remain subject to the Commission’s authority.124  PJM asserts that its resource adequacy 
framework recognizes the traditional role of state and local entities, and that the 
Commission has found that the appropriate course of action has been to defer to state and 
local entities’ decisions when possible while not shirking its responsibility under the 
FPA.125 
59. 
PJM likewise argues that its compensation framework respects and reflects the 
federal and state division of authority.126  PJM asserts that the IRAS rate is compensation 
for a wholesale load reduction service.127  However, PJM also asserts that the rate is 
intended to be conjoined with retail rates and that the entities to be paid the rate and the 
loads to be charged to support such compensation must be determined at the state level.128  
PJM argues that the net result is a reduced capacity charge for the Eligible New Large 
Load, and thus is a practice that directly affects wholesale capacity rates assessed.129  
PJM states that, while it enlists or invites state action through their jurisdictional retail 
process, it does not mandate any state-specific action, nor does it require any specific 
terms and conditions on retail service.130  Rather, PJM asserts that its proposed filed rate 
facilitates and respects the handoff of responsibilities between federal wholesale rate 
development and state retail rate development.  PJM states that, like demand response 
 
123 Id. at 92. 
124 Id. at 92-93. 
125 Id. at 93-94 (citing PJM Interconnection L.L.C., 119 FERC ¶ 61,318, at P 40 
(2007)). 
126 Id. at 101. 
127 Id. at 105. 
128 Id. at 104. 
129 Id. (citing EPSA, 577 U.S., 261, 265). 
130 Id. at 107.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 27 - 
rules, this framework respects state law choices about whether and how to facilitate 
implementation of a wholesale paradigm.131 
ii. 
Pleadings 
60. 
Many protesters argue that PJM’s proposal impermissibly intrudes on state 
authority by directly regulating retail customers, contrary to section 201(b) of the FPA.  
They argue that decisions regarding retail service, rates, and curtailment priorities are 
reserved for states and local regulators.132  Protesters assert that the customers proposed 
to be curtailed are retail customers and the compensation will be collected from and paid 
to retail customers.133  Protesters assert that PJM’s proposal contains several triggers that 
“target” specific retail customers by conditioning curtailment on retail characteristics, 
such as size, vintage, and whether the retail customer brings offsetting new capacity.134  
Protesters also assert that the proposal does not directly affect wholesale rates.135   
61. 
Protesters contend that PJM’s assertion that it is only imposing curtailment 
obligations on Electric Distributors does not alleviate the jurisdictional intrusion.  
Further, some protesters argue that the operative Tariff language places obligations 
directly on New Large Loads.136  Protesters assert that assigning curtailment to Electric 
Distributors merely makes them conduits for PJM’s retail-focused directives, leaving 
states powerless. Protesters assert that PJM’s use of Electric Distributors demonstrates 
 
131 Id. at 108 (citing Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Elec. 
Mrkts., Order No. 719, 125 FERC ¶ 61,071, at P 154 (2008); Order No. 719-B,            
129 FERC ¶ 61,252 at P 5). 
132 CEBA Protest at 6-7; Constellation Protest at 13-18; Data Center Coalition 
Protest at 8; EPSA Protest at 3 n.7; Equinix Protest at 6-10; Google Protest at 8-11 (citing 
EPSA, 577 U.S. at 279); P3 Protest at 41-44; PPL Protest at 17 (citing EPSA, 577 U.S. at 
288); Virginia Commission Comments at 3-4; West Virginia Commission Comments at 
1-4. 
133 Constellation Protest at 13; Virginia Commission Comments at 3; Vistra 
Protest at 5-10.  
134 CEBA Protest at 5-7; Constellation Protest at 13; Data Center Coalition Protest 
at 10-13 (citing Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373, 385 (2015) (Oneok)); Google 
Protest at 8; Vistra Protest at 2-3, 6. 
135 CEBA Protest at 7; Constellation Protest at 26-27 (citing EPSA, 577 U.S. at 
277-79). 
136 Pennsylvania Commission Comments at 2-4; PPL Protest at 10-11.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 28 - 
that PJM is doing indirectly what it cannot do directly.137  Protesters also assert that 
demand response participation rules and Midcontinent Independent System Operator, 
Inc.’s Expedited Resource Addition Study are not analogous to IRAS because those 
programs addressed only wholesale market compensation for voluntary participation, 
where states permit such participation.138  
62. 
Protesters also assert that PJM’s proposal impermissibly compels states to 
implement a federal program.  Specifically, they argue that PJM is pressuring states to 
conform by deferring key curtailment and compensation decisions to state and local 
authorities, requiring the creation of new programs or retail tariff changes, and imposing 
obligations on Electric Distributors without clear state oversight.139 
63. 
Protesters also argue that the IRAS compensation framework establishes a retail 
rate.140  For example, Constellation asserts that PJM sets compensation and requires 
Electric Distributors to pay that amount by assessing charges against retail customers in 
their zone/area to pay other retail customers.141  West Virginia Commission warns that 
West Virginia’s tools for setting retail rates for uncovered New Large Load could be 
challenged if the Commission approved PJM’s wholesale compensation for those New 
Large Loads that do not voluntarily turn down compensation.142   
64. 
Several protesters also argue that the proposal impermissibly delegates authority to 
set the Commission-jurisdictional wholesale rate to states.  They contend that PJM’s 
proposal leaves compensation and curtailment decisions to state-regulated entities, 
 
137 Data Center Coalition Protest at 11; P3 Protest at 43. 
138 EKPC Protest at 29-30; FirstEnergy Protest at 3-4; P3 Protest at 25; PPL 
Protest at 14-15. 
139 AEU Comments at 10; Constellation Protest at 19-21; Data Center Coalition 
Protest at 12-13; FirstEnergy Protest at 3-5; Google Protest at 11; IMM Protest at 6; Ohio 
Consumers’ Counsel Protest at 26-27; P3 Protest at 33-35; PPL Protest at 3; Talen Protest 
at 13-15; Vistra Protest at 8-9. 
140 AEU Comments at 2-3, 10; FirstEnergy Protest at 3-5; Pennsylvania 
Commission Comments at 2-3. 
141 Constellation Protest at 14. 
142 West Virginia Commission Comments at 4.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 29 - 
making the wholesale rate unclear and effectively set by the states rather than the 
Commission.143 
65. 
On the other hand, certain commenters assert that the proposal generally respects 
the division of state and federal authority under the FPA.144  They argue that the proposal 
falls squarely within PJM’s authority to maintain resource adequacy at the wholesale 
level.  PIOs note that the FPA does not prohibit rules that indirectly affect retail customer 
behavior.145  PIOs explain that PJM has a specific and limited role with no direct control 
over retail end-use customers and that IRAS Actions will be implemented through 
Electric Distributors at the wholesale level.  PIOs assert that PJM will rely on aggregate 
MW quantities of load and supply to implement IRAS and that, while it will track retail 
customers, it will act at the macro level using aggregate quantities by zone.  Appalachian 
Voices likewise asserts that PJM’s proposal operates within the Commission’s 
jurisdiction over transmission service and bulk power system reliability, and that tying 
the MW quantity to be shed to New Large Loads is a matter of reliability and cost 
causation.146  The IMM argues that PJM’s proposal does not go far enough; it asserts that 
PJM has authority to curtail individual Large Loads and should not abdicate the 
responsibility to set and implement the terms and conditions of curtailment to the Electric 
Distributor and/or states.147 
66. 
Governor Shapiro argues that IRAS is a supplemental wholesale capacity product 
designed to ensure the reliability of the bulk power system, which is within PJM’s 
jurisdiction.148  Governor Shapiro states that the Operating Agreement already grants 
PJM the ability to coordinate curtailment of load where PJM determines the aggregate 
amount of MW load reduction required to be curtailed and the Transmission Owner or 
Electric Distributor determines which end-use entities are curtailed.149  Governor Shapiro 
 
143 CEBA Protest at 6-7; Constellation Protest at 20-23; Data Center Coalition 
Protest at 9-14; OPSI Comments at 7-8; P3 Protest at 42-45; Pennsylvania Commission 
Comments at 5-6. 
144 Appalachian Voices Comments at 7-9; NJBPU Comments at 3; PIOs Protest at 
18-19. 
145 PIOs Protest at 18. 
146 Appalachian Voices Comments at 8. 
147 IMM Protest at 8. 
148 Governor Shapiro Answer at 7. 
149 Id. at 7-8 (citing PJM, Intra-PJM Tariffs, Operating Agreement, Schedule 1,     
§ 1.6 (Office of the Interconnection) (3.1.0), § 1.6.2 (v) and (vii) (“The Office of the

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 30 - 
argues that IRAS differs from this pre-existing authority in two ways, neither of which 
impact jurisdiction:  (1) curtailment direction takes place prior to EEA1; and (2) the 
means by which PJM determines the aggregate MW of load to be curtailed in a zone or 
area.150  Governor Shapiro states that implementing IRAS Actions prior to EEA1 will 
avoid escalating emergency procedures that would impose financial and reliability costs 
caused by Large Loads on all customers.  Governor Shapiro states that, while PJM 
determines aggregate MW reductions within a zone based on that zone’s share of New 
Large Loads, PJM does not direct the curtailment of loads, and that it remains up to the 
retail authority to implement the retail end-user priority.  Governor Shapiro argues that it 
is appropriate for PJM to focus on non-capacity backed New Large Loads when 
determining aggregate MW reduction targets, as it is those entities that are causing the 
reliability emergency, and is consistent with requirements in the Operating Agreement 
that PJM not order a load shed in one zone to address deficiencies in another zone.151  
Governor Shapiro argues that protesters acknowledge that PJM’s proposal does not target 
specific retail customers.152 
67. 
Governor Shapiro argues that there is no merit to the position that PJM is legally 
barred from acting on information about characteristics of load growth in a zone when 
that information is directly relevant to the operation of the bulk power system.153  
Governor Shapiro states that case law has never imposed such strict boundaries, that the 
characteristics of retail loads and generation are highly relevant to informing a wholesale 
rate, and that taking this information into account when setting wholesale rates does not 
constitute regulation of those matters.154  Governor Shapiro states that, if this position 
were to be adopted, both the Commission and PJM would be barred from considering 
information about generating facilities when setting wholesale rates, because neither the 
Commission nor PJM may directly regulate generation.  Governor Shapiro argues that 
this jurisdictional position would be unworkable if applied to generation and is equally so 
if applied to retail loads. 
 
Interconnection shall . . . Determine and declare that an Emergency is expected to exist . . 
. Coordinate the curtailment of shedding of load . . . .”)). 
150 Id. at 8-9. 
151 Id. at 9 (citing PJM, Intra-PJM Tariffs, Operating Agreement, Schedule 1 § 1.7 
(General) (21.1.0), § 1.7.11). 
152 Id. (citing Data Center Coalition Protest at 11; Constellation Protest at 20). 
153 Id. at 10. 
154 Id. at 11 (citing EPSA, 577 U.S. at 281-82; Oneok, 575 U.S. at 387-88).

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 31 - 
68. 
As to the compensation framework, Governor Shapiro asserts that, although PJM 
“confusingly” appears to speak about compensation that would be provided to individual 
retail customers, because PJM will only direct a MW quantity to be curtailed, wholesale 
compensation will therefore accrue as a credit on a wholesale bill to the wholesale 
customers based on that total MW quantity of load curtailment.155  Governor Shapiro 
acknowledges that PJM could clean up the proposed Tariff provisions related to IRAS 
compensation to (1) remove all references to “Eligible New Large Loads” to clarify that 
it is setting a wholesale rate; and (2) clarify that the particular level of compensation 
depends on certain conditions, which inform the implementation of and are an input into 
the wholesale rate.  
69. 
In its answer, PJM asserts that IRAS is targeted at improving the wholesale market 
by supporting resource adequacy and reliability, which directly affects Commission 
jurisdictional rates.156  PJM argues that IRAS operates within PJM’s authority to require 
load reduction under real-time conditions that may give rise to system instability or 
capacity shortfalls.157  PJM argues that IRAS may ultimately affect retail customers but 
does not present an impermissible intrusion on retail rate regulation because the proposal 
places the terms and conditions on LSEs, not end-use retail customers.158  PJM reiterates 
that it will only determine the quantity of load to be curtailed by Electric Distributors, 
that it will leave to the states to determine which resources will be called upon to reduce 
load, and that it will not determine whether any specific retail customer is called upon to 
reduce load or whether any load may say no to such a directive.159  PJM contends that 
protesters make contradictory claims that IRAS imposes mandatory rules on end-use 
retail customers, but also that IRAS leaves too much discretion to states to determine 
which entities are curtailed.  
70. 
PJM likewise argues that its compensation mechanism targets wholesale rates for 
wholesale customers and is not an attempt to create a retail compensation scheme for 
curtailed large loads or an impermissible delegation to states of its wholesale ratemaking 
authority.160  PJM explains that IRAS compensation neither mandates state-specific 
action nor imposes specific terms and conditions on retail rates.161  Instead, PJM asserts 
 
155 Id. at 14-15. 
156 PJM Answer at 19-21. 
157 Id. at 23 
158 Id. at 26 (citing Tri-State, 196 FERC ¶ 61,127 at P 68). 
159 Id. at 28-29. 
160 Id. at 54.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 32 - 
that it is using its authority to set rates for operational actions to reduce energy 
consumption as part of the Commission’s wholesale jurisdiction, with all other aspects of 
ratemaking, including application of that rate to different retail customer classes, left to 
the states.  PJM states that, just like wholesale demand response participation depends on 
state permission, wholesale compensation for IRAS at a reduced level depends on 
RERRA action specifying an alternative compensation below the maximum rate.  
Furthermore, PJM states that the Tariff contemplates that entities to be paid the rate and 
the loads to be charged to support such compensation are determined at the state level. 
71. 
In its answer, Google asserts that when it comes to determining whether a rate is 
jurisdictionally permissible under the FPA, the dispositive question is how it works in 
practice, not the relevant public utility’s transmittal letter.162  Constellation and Data 
Center Coalition argue that the express language of the proposed Tariff unlawfully targets 
and requires curtailment of a specific category of retail customers, i.e., Eligible New 
Large Loads, thereby regulating the terms of retail service and intruding on state 
jurisdiction.163  Specifically, Constellation and Data Center Coalition cite the proposed 
Tariff, which states that “Electric Distributors” shall “execute the [PJM] Office of the 
Interconnection’s directives to implement Interim Resource Adequacy Service Actions 
among the Eligible New Large Loads in the Electric Distributor’s zone/area.”164  
Constellation asserts that the proposed Tariff language leaves no doubt that Electric 
Distributors would actually violate the PJM Tariff if they bypassed curtailment of 
Eligible New Large Loads and chose to curtail other retail customers instead.   
72. 
Constellation, Data Center Coalition, FirstEnergy, Google, and Vistra further 
argue that the Tri-State order does not support PJM’s proposal because, unlike the 
accepted Tri-State tariff, PJM’s proposed Tariff leaves Electric Distributors no discretion 
to determine whether and how retail customers will be affected.165 
 
161 Id. at 56-57. 
162 Google Answer at 13. 
163 Constellation Answer at 4; Data Center Coalition Answer at 10. 
164 Constellation Answer at 4-5 (citing proposed OATT, attach. DD-4, §§ II(e), 
III(a) (emphasis added); id. (stating that the PJM “shall . . . request Electric Distributors 
to direct that a quantity of Eligible New Large Load Amounts . . . be reduced in 
accordance with an [IRAS] Action”); id. § IV(a) (“All Eligible New Large Loads shall be 
available to be requested to provide [IRAS] by the [PJM] Office of the 
Interconnection.”)); Data Center Coalition Answer at 10 (citing proposed OATT, attach. 
DD-4 § III(a)). 
165 Constellation Answer at 7-8; Data Center Coalition Answer at 7-8; FirstEnergy

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 33 - 
73. 
Constellation also argues that the answers fail to explain how the proposal’s 
compensation provisions target wholesale rates when they effectively set retail 
compensation for interrupted service, making them jurisdictionally improper.166  
Constellation contends that, even if the compensation is wholesale, the proposal 
impermissibly gives states direct authority to set or vary wholesale compensation, unlike 
Order No. 719’s permissible deference to state preferences.167 
74. 
Constellation argues, in response to answers’ claims that IRAS is no different 
from PJM’s existing curtailment authority and falls within the Commission’s and states’ 
resource adequacy powers, that the proposal instead creates a novel curtailment regime 
based on retail customer characteristics and rates that requires jurisdictionally proper 
action.168 
75. 
PPL argues that it is not clear in PJM’s proposal and Tariff language that state 
regulatory authorities have the power to opt-out individual Eligible New Large Loads 
from the requirement to provide IRAS.169  Specifically, PPL argues that it is unclear 
under what legal authority state regulatory authorities in the PJM Region would be able 
to compel end-use retail customers (Eligible New Large Loads) to provide a 
Commission-jurisdictional wholesale service to PJM.170  PPL asserts that states lack 
authority to compel end-use retail customers to provide Commission-jurisdictional 
wholesale services to PJM, and that doing so would be an unprecedented and 
constitutionally problematic intrusion into the Commission’s plenary jurisdiction under 
the FPA.  PPL suggests that PJM either (1) have the Tariff language stop at the issuance 
of the Operating Instruction to Electric Distributors to curtail load, and leave the rates, 
terms, and conditions of that load curtailment service to state and local regulatory 
 
Answer at 5; Google Answer at 19; Vistra Answer at 10-11. 
166 Constellation Answer at 8. 
167 Id. at 9-10. 
168 Id. at 11-12. 
169 PPL Answer at 1-2 (citing PJM Answer at 29 (“Third, the IRAS framework 
does not determine whether any specific retail customers can say no.  Just as the identity 
of the retail customers who are ultimately implicated by PJM’s directives to reduce a 
MW quantity of load is not decided by PJM, under the IRAS framework, it is also not up 
to PJM to determine whether, as PPL puts it, retail customers can say no.  That—and the 
regulation of the terms and conditions of retail rates, and the regulation of retail 
customers—remains within the exclusive jurisdiction of the states.”)). 
170 Id. at 6.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 34 - 
authorities; or (2) make IRAS a voluntary Commission-jurisdictional service, whereby 
Electric Distributors and/or Large Load customers themselves can choose whether to 
participate like any other wholesale market service provider in PJM.171 
76. 
The IMM argues that, although the IRAS proposal is within the Commission’s 
jurisdiction, PJM’s proposal fails to establish consistent regional curtailment rules and 
relies on states to complete the proposal.172  The IMM argues that Data Center Coalition’s 
assertion that data centers’ status as retail customers prevents PJM from imposing 
wholesale-market capacity and curtailment requirements is inconsistent with the 
Commission’s recognized jurisdiction over retail customers’ participation in wholesale 
markets and with the RAA’s existing requirements for LSEs to procure qualifying 
capacity.173   
iii. 
Determination 
77. 
We find that certain aspects of PJM’s proposal appear to present an impermissible 
intrusion on retail rate regulation and are not subject to the Commission’s authority 
pursuant to section 205 of the FPA.174  We find that several provisions of the proposed 
Tariff appear to place obligations directly on Eligible New Large Loads, which are, for 
the most part,175 retail customers; that certain other provisions appear to dictate which 
retail customers taking retail service will be curtailed; and that the proposed 
compensation framework appears to establish a retail rate.176  Therefore, we reject PJM’s 
proposed IRAS framework. 
 
171 Id. at 7-8. 
172 IMM Answer at 6-7. 
173 Id. at 7-9. 
174 16 U.S.C. §§ 824(b), 824e(a). 
175 For example, an Eligible New Large Load could take unbundled retail 
transmission service from PJM if authorized to do so under state law and therefore 
become an Eligible Customer that falls within the Commission’s jurisdiction.  However, 
the rates for energy sales to such a customer would still be subject to state regulation.     
16 U.S.C. §§ 824(b), 824e(d). 
176 The proposed OATT states that any Eligible New Large Load can elect to “(i) 
accept in its retail rates a sum less than 50% of the Non-Performance Charge Rates as 
compensation for the provision of wholesale [IRAS], or (ii) waive receipt in its retail 
rates any compensation for provision of wholesale [IRAS].”  Proposed OATT, attach. 
DD-4, § X(a).

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 35 - 
78. 
The FPA authorizes the Commission to regulate “rates, terms, and conditions” and 
any “rule, regulation, practice, or contract” directly “affecting” such transmission or 
wholesale rates.177  But the law places beyond the Commission’s jurisdiction, and leaves 
to the states alone, the regulation of “any other sale”—most notably, any retail sale—of 
electricity.178  Section 201 of the FPA further limits the Commission’s jurisdiction to 
“those matters which are not subject to regulation by the states.”179  
79. 
In EPSA, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that although “the wholesale and retail 
markets in electricity are inextricably linked,”180 the Commission “may not regulate . . . 
retail sales of electricity.”181  The Court further stated that “no matter how direct, or 
dramatic” a proposal’s impact on wholesale rates, the Commission may not regulate retail 
electricity sales.182  The Court also clarified that the FPA limits the Commission’s 
jurisdiction to wholesale sales, reserving regulatory authority over retail sales to the states 
alone, and that any regulation that “specifies terms of sale at retail” exceeds the 
Commission’s authority under the FPA.183   
80. 
In the instant proceeding, protesters argue that PJM is proposing, via a 
Commission-jurisdictional tariff, terms of retail service for Eligible New Large Loads.  
These protesters contend that PJM is doing so by placing obligations on Eligible New 
Large Loads, which are, for the most part, retail customers taking retail service; by 
dictating which retail customers an Electric Distributor must curtail; and by establishing 
the compensation for Eligible New Large Loads.184  PJM’s proposed construct appears to 
regulate the terms and conditions of a retail customer’s service in ways that are beyond 
the Commission’s authority.   
 
177 EPSA, 577 U.S. at 264-65 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 824(b), 824e(a)). 
178 Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)). 
179 16 U.S.C. § 824(a). 
180 EPSA, 577 U.S. at 265. 
181 Id. at 264-65 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 824(b), 824e(a)). 
182 Id. at 279-80.  This statement presents a limit on the Court’s finding that the 
Commission has authority under the FPA to ensure that practices directly affecting 
wholesale rates are just and reasonable.  Id. at 277-78. 
183 Id. at 279-80. 
184 See Constellation Protest at 9-23; FirstEnergy Protest at 3-5; Google Protest at 
8-11; PPL Protest at 5-16; Virginia Commission Comments at 3-5; Vistra Protest at 5-11.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 36 - 
81. 
First, the proposed Tariff appears to direct specific retail customers to provide 
IRAS for wholesale service and, therefore, to curtail.  For example, IRAS is defined as “a 
load reduction service through which New Large Loads reduce load as directed by the 
applicable Electric Distributor in response to an [IRAS] Action requested by [PJM].”185  
The IRAS Tariff provisions also state that the Electric Distributor “shall” implement the 
curtailment among “Eligible New Large Loads” and therefore specifies the class of retail 
customers that should be curtailed.186  Further, the proposed Tariff states that when IRAS 
is suspended, “[PJM] does not need any Eligible New Large Loads to be available to 
provide [IRAS] for that Delivery Year.”187  Eligible New Large Loads are, for the most 
part, retail customers taking retail service.  PJM’s transmittal seems to recognize this, 
proposing that IRAS MWs be assigned to Electric Distributors, with the state/RERRAs 
responsible for identifying which loads will be obligated to curtail under IRAS.  As such, 
PJM’s transmittal states that its proposed Tariff imposes obligations only on the Electric 
Distributor by assigning curtailment obligations to Electric Distributors, who can then, at 
the direction of retail regulators, determine which retail customers are curtailed.188  While 
the proposal described in PJM’s transmittal may be within the Commission’s jurisdiction, 
we find that the plain language of the Tariff, as proposed, appears to place obligations 
directly on the Eligible New Large Loads and requires Electric Distributors to curtail the 
Eligible New Large Loads.  We note that PJM’s answer fails to engage with the concern 
that its proposal, as described in its transmittal, is inconsistent with the proposed Tariff’s 
plain language that imposes obligations directly on Eligible New Large Loads and 
requires Electric Distributors to curtail Eligible New Large Loads.   
82. 
Second, the proposed Tariff appears to be setting a retail rate because it establishes 
a compensation rate for IRAS payable to the Eligible New Large Load.189  The proposed 
Tariff directs compensation at Eligible New Large Loads, which are, for the most part, 
 
185 Proposed OATT, Definitions – Interim Resource Adequacy Service (emphasis 
added).  Similarly, the proposed OATT Introduction to IRAS states that “[IRAS] is a load 
reduction service, effective starting with the 2027/2028 Delivery Year, through which 
Eligible New Large Loads may be compensated for providing load reductions requested 
by [PJM].”  Id. attach. DD-4, § I(a) (emphasis added). 
186 Id. attach. DD-4, § II(e).  The proposed Tariff further requires that the Electric 
Distributor must implement the instructions “among the Eligible New Large Loads in the 
Electric Distributor’s zone/area” and that “[a]ll Eligible New Large Loads shall be 
available to be requested to provide [IRAS] by [PJM].”  Id. attach DD-4, §§ III(a), IV(a).  
187 Id. attach. DD-4, § IV(b)(iii). 
188 Transmittal at 99. 
189 Proposed OATT, attach. DD-4, § X.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 37 - 
retail customers taking retail service.  The proposed Tariff also appears to specify that 
retail customers will be charged to fund such compensation.190  The proposed Tariff 
language thus appears to establish a framework whereby retail customers will be paid by 
other retail customers for what PJM describes as a wholesale capacity service.  Although 
Governor Shapiro asserts that the wholesale customer would receive a credit,191 and PJM 
asserts in its answer that the LSE would be compensated for load reduction,192 this is not 
specified anywhere in the proposed Tariff language.  The proposed Tariff does not 
specify what wholesale customer would be paid for IRAS or how; it only mentions 
payment to the Electric Distributor’s customers, who are retail customers.193  Nor is 
payment guaranteed under PJM’s proposal, as PJM only proposes a default rate that 
appears subject to further change and beyond the reach of the Tariff.  Furthermore, while 
PJM’s transmittal recognizes that the retail entities to be paid the rate and the loads 
charged for the rate must be set by state regulators, protesters like the Virginia 
Commission highlight that the proposed Tariff does not include any language stating that 
retail regulators may establish the rate.194  Instead, the proposed Tariff indicates that the 
New Large Load may elect to reduce or waive its compensation for IRAS.195  
Accordingly, we find that the proposed Tariff appears to impermissibly set a retail rate.     
83. 
Finally, the proposed Tariff also appears to allow the Electric Distributor, which 
PJM’s transmittal explains would occur in consultation with the RERRA, to determine 
which customers will pay the compensation to the entities providing IRAS pursuant to 
the PJM Tariff and the level of compensation, which we interpret as allowing a retail 
regulator to set a wholesale rate.196  
 
190 Id. § X(b)(i).  We note that other provisions of the Tariff appear to suggest that 
wholesale customers could be charged or paid; however, the proposed Tariff does not 
explain how such charges or payments will be allocated.  See id. § X(b)(ii). 
191 Governor Shapiro Answer at 14. 
192 PJM Answer at 56. 
193 See proposed OATT, attach. DD-4, §§ X, X(b)(i). 
194 Virginia Commission Comments at 4-5. 
195 Proposed OATT, attach. DD-4, § X(a). 
196 Proposed OATT, attach. DD-4, § X(b); Transmittal at 110-13.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 38 - 
c. 
Undue Discrimination – IRAS Curtailment 
i. 
PJM’s Filing 
84. 
PJM asserts that its proposal is not unduly discriminatory or preferential because 
the IRAS framework recognizes that New Large Loads are not similarly situated to other 
loads.197  To support this conclusion, PJM states that members of Congress have 
expressed to PJM that “[i]t is not unduly discriminatory to identify and manage demand 
from new data centers given their incomparably large energy demands, how quickly data 
centers can come online, and their unique potential to impact the reliability of the electric 
grid as a collective class and to increase rates for all customers.”198  Further, PJM states 
that New Large Loads constitute a separate, new class of load, and are therefore 
appropriately subject to different treatment.199  PJM asserts that New Large Loads are not 
similarly situated to other loads in the PJM Region because, according to the 
Commission, large loads constitute “a separate category of load.”200  Additionally, PJM 
states that the Commission has highlighted the uniqueness of large loads, noting 
specifically that their integration “poses specific challenges to transmission system 
operation given their size, operational behavior, and unique potential to impact the 
transmission system.”201   
85. 
Similarly, PJM points to the Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (SPP) Conditional High 
Impact Large Load Service (CHILLS) order, where the Commission found that the 
proposal for new large loads was just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or 
preferential.  PJM states that the Commission observed that “SPP has shown that 
unprecedented growth in large loads in the SPP region presents significant and unique 
 
197 Transmittal at 94. 
198 Id. at 94-95 (quoting Letter from the Members of Congress to David E. Mills, 
PJM Board Chair, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 4 (Nov. 5, 2025), https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/about-pjm/who-we-are/public-disclosures/2025/20251106-
congressional-letter-re-cifp-lla.pdf. 
199 Id. at 95. 
200 Id. at 96 (quoting PJM Large Load Show Cause Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,211 at   
P 50). 
201 Id. (citing PJM Large Load Show Cause Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,211 at P 58; 
Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,212, at P 58 (2026); Sw. Power 
Pool, 195 FERC ¶ 61,213 at P 15 & n.54 (2026); Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.,       
195 FERC ¶ 61,214, at P 57 (2026); ISO New Eng. Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,215, at P 56 
(2026); N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,216, at P 64 (2026)).

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 39 - 
operational and planning challenges.”202  PJM states that in the last two Delivery Years, 
since the influx of new large loads consisting primarily of data centers, PJM has cleared 
short of its PJM Region Reliability Requirement in the face of exponential load growth. 
ii. 
Pleadings 
86. 
Protesters generally argue that IRAS is unduly discriminatory because it treats 
Large Loads, and/or the LSE or Electric Distributor serving them, differently on the basis 
of the retail customer’s size, vintage, or capacity procurement.203  This disparate 
treatment, they contend, is not justified by the actual impact these customers have on 
system reliability, nor does PJM demonstrate material differences relevant to reliability or 
resource adequacy.  Specifically, protesters assert that PJM has not demonstrated that the 
size or in-service date is relevant to the load’s impact on reliability or capacity because 
the capacity of the system is burdened in the same way by a new or existing large load, 
and by a single new large load or many new smaller loads.204  Some protesters also assert 
that these characteristics are not material because existing or smaller new loads can also 
procure capacity and provide the same curtailment.205 
87. 
Some protesters argue that PJM’s proposal unduly discriminates against LSEs 
taking NITS on behalf of New Large Loads, as compared to LSEs taking NITS on behalf 
of other new loads.  Constellation and the Data Center Coalition argue that PJM’s 
proposal unfairly creates a subclass of NITS customers—those serving Eligible New 
Large Loads—who pay the same transmission and capacity rates as other NITS 
customers but receive inferior service and are subject to involuntary curtailment ahead of 
other firm customers.206  The Data Center Coalition further argues that PJM’s proposal 
undermines traditional curtailment priority of NITS customers, effectively turning them 
into second-class customers by depriving them of equal protection from service 
interruptions and equal curtailment treatment.207  Protesters contend that PJM’s rationale 
 
202 Id. at 97 (quoting Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 195 FERC ¶ 61,196 at P 84). 
203 Constellation Protest at 31-37; Data Center Coalition Protest at 27-30; Google 
Protest at 11-13; Microsoft Comments at 4; P3 Protest at 28; Vistra Protest at 11-12,    
13-14. 
204 Constellation Protest at 31-35; Data Center Coalition Protest at 28-29; EPSA 
Protest at 4; Google Protest at 12-13; P3 Protest at 28; Vistra Protest at 13-14. 
205 Talen Protest at 6-10. 
206 Constellation Protest at 36; Data Center Coalition Protest at 5. 
207 Data Center Coalition Protest at 26.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 40 - 
for disparate treatment based on Large Loads is arbitrary and unsupported, and that 
similarly situated NITS customers should receive comparable service and rates, rather 
than being subject to unduly discriminatory and preferential treatment.208   
88. 
Some protesters also argue that PJM’s proposal unduly discriminates against 
Electric Distributors with LSEs serving Eligible New Large Loads in their zone/area as 
compared to Electric Distributors that do not have LSEs serving Eligible New Large 
Loads in their zone/area.  They further contend that retail customer characteristics are not 
a relevant distinction for resource adequacy challenges.  Vistra argues that the 
consideration relevant to resource adequacy is instead whether an Electric Distributor is 
generation deficient.209  Google likewise asserts that the relevant factor that causes the 
resource adequacy challenge is aggregate load growth in a zone/area, not the load growth 
of only a subset of customers.210 
89. 
Other commenters assert that differential treatment is not undue because the size 
and operational characteristics of New Large Loads create unique concerns for resource 
adequacy, reliability, and affordability, and so New Large Loads, and the entities that 
serve them, are not similarly situated.211  PIOs assert that New Large Loads are different 
from traditional residential and commercial load because they grow rapidly and 
unpredictably with concentrated impacts on the electricity system, and develop 
significantly faster than construction of new supply.212  PIOs argue that as such, New 
Large Loads pose distinct challenges for reliability and affordability.  PIOs argue that 
New Large Loads are having an outsized impact on future resource adequacy and on   
real-time reliability, which warrants placing unique requirements on them through LSEs 
and Electric Distributors.  Appalachian Voices likewise argues that the distinction is 
based on legitimate operational constraints caused by the sudden and unexpected influx 
of New Large Load demand, which has significantly higher demand requirements and 
higher load factors.213 
90. 
In its answer, PJM reiterates that IRAS is not unduly discriminatory because of the 
unique characteristics of Large Loads that are relevant to ensuring just and reasonable 
 
208 Constellation Protest at 36; Data Center Coalition Protest at 30. 
209 Vistra Protest at 12. 
210 Google Protest at 12. 
211 Appalachian Voices Comments at 1, 10-12; PIOs Protest at 13-18. 
212 PIOs Protest at 13-18. 
213 Appalachian Voices Comments at 10-12.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 41 - 
rates and the reliable operation of the bulk power system.214  PJM further asserts that 
IRAS is narrowly tailored to address capacity shortfalls caused by New Large Loads that 
lack sufficient capacity and applies only during specifically defined emergency 
situations.215  PJM also argues that distinguishing between existing Large Loads and New 
Large Loads based on vintage is justified because new, rather than existing, load causes 
the capacity shortfall that necessitates IRAS.  
91. 
In their answers, Constellation, Data Center Coalition, and Vistra argue that 
parties do not explain why New Large Loads are solely or disproportionately responsible 
for the region’s resource adequacy shortfall.216  They assert that both new and existing 
Large Loads contribute to the resource adequacy shortfall because every transmission 
system user is economically marginal.217  Data Center Coalition and Vistra also argue 
that PJM misread the SPP CHILLS precedent, which they argue supports offering 
different services to differently situated loads but not reducing NITS for Electric 
Distributors serving materially identical loads.218 
92. 
Constellation further argues that Governor Shapiro’s justification for 
discriminating against new large computational loads highlights, rather than resolves, the 
proposal’s unlawfulness because it fails to explain why those loads differ in their capacity 
needs or resource adequacy burdens, and conflicts with PJM’s rejection of distinctions 
between computational and other large loads.219 
 
214 PJM Answer at 59-60.  
215 Id. at 60-61.  
216 Constellation Answer at 12-13; Data Center Coalition Answer at 16-18; Google 
Answer at 20; Vistra Answer at 16. 
217 Constellation Answer at 13 (citing BNP Paribas Energy Trading v. FERC, 743 
F.3d 264, 269 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that “imputing an exclusive or even primary 
causal role to the . . . demand” of the newest market entrants is not equitable)); Se. Mich. 
Gas v. FERC, 133 F.3d 34, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“every shipper is economically marginal, 
the costs of increased demand may equitably be attributed to every user.”)); Google 
Answer at 22 (citing BNP Paribas Energy Trading GP v. FERC, 743 F.3d at 268-69); 
Vistra Answer at 16 (citing BNP Paribas Energy Trading GP v. FERC, 743 F.3d at    
268-69). 
218 Data Center Coalition Answer at 18-19; Vistra Answer at 17. 
219 Constellation Answer at 14.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 42 - 
93. 
The IMM disagrees with Data Center Coalition that IRAS is unduly 
discriminatory because the IMM argues that data centers uniquely drive PJM’s reliability 
challenges through their rapid, large-scale interconnection requests and reliance on 
curtailments before the necessary infrastructure is available, making data center specific 
rules consistent with cost-causation principles.220 
iii. 
Determination 
94. 
We find that PJM has not currently offered sufficiently detailed evidence 
concerning how its treatment of Electric Distributors and LSEs taking NITS differently in 
the resource adequacy context based on the characteristics of their retail customers is not 
unduly discriminatory.221  PJM’s proposal imposes capacity procurement and curtailment 
obligations on Electric Distributors and LSEs taking NITS to serve certain loads based on 
retail customer characteristics, yet PJM has not at this time produced evidence sufficient 
to demonstrate how such characteristics are material to the resource adequacy challenges 
its proposal seeks to address.  Historically, PJM’s capacity market has treated all load 
taking NITS comparably, procuring capacity on its behalf regardless of retail customer 
class or whether the load is new or existing.  While PJM now proposes to distinguish 
between different loads taking NITS on these bases for purposes of both procuring 
capacity through its Reliability Pricing Model (RPM) and curtailing NITS, it fails to 
provide sufficiently detailed evidence to support why Electric Distributors and LSEs 
using NITS to serve New Large Loads should not be treated comparably to Electric 
Distributors and LSEs using NITS to serve equivalent quantities of load growth.  We note 
PJM’s explanation that New Large Loads have unique characteristics compared to 
traditional load growth and are the primary cause for the resource adequacy shortfall, 
assertions with which some commenters agree,222 but we find that PJM’s generic 
references to these retail customer characteristics without more detail are insufficient 
evidence to counter the current resource adequacy construct in PJM, i.e., that PJM will 
procure sufficient capacity to serve all NITS load in the PJM Region.  Therefore, we find 
that, in its current filing, PJM did not adequately support its proposal to treat Electric 
Distributors and LSEs differently based on the characteristics of their retail customers. 
 
220 IMM Answer at 5-6. 
221 It is a well-established principle that all similarly situated entities should be 
charged consistent and congruent rates.  Tenaska Clear Creek Wind, LLC v. FERC,     
108 F.4th 858, 868 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (“And undue discrimination occurs when similarly 
situated entities are charged different rates for no good reason.” (quoting Consol. Edison 
Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. FERC, 45 F.4th 265, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2022)). 
222 See supra P 84.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 43 - 
95. 
Should PJM choose to refile a modified version of its proposed IRAS framework, 
we encourage PJM to either provide further justification regarding its proposed treatment 
of Electric Distributors or LSEs using NITS to serve New Large Loads or revise its 
proposal to not expressly single out LSEs using NITS to serve New Large Loads, or 
Electric Distributors on the basis of the amount of New Large Loads in its zones/areas.  
As we have previously stated, we recognize that the rapid emergence of large loads 
presents a shared regulatory challenge that implicates both federal and state authority.223  
States have a crucial role to play in this challenge by designating which retail customers 
must be curtailed when the system is stressed, and we strongly encourage states to 
continue their important work on this issue. 
d. 
BYONC Accreditation 
i. 
PJM’s Filing 
96. 
PJM proposes that New Large Loads can avoid curtailment under IRAS by 
bringing new capacity to offset their capacity needs.224  PJM states that BYONC 
resources will be subject to all of the requirements for capacity resources associated with 
their resource type, including deficiency charges and capacity performance penalties.225  
PJM proposes that:  (1) a BYONC resource’s UCAP level be determined in the first 
auction it clears; and (2) BYONC resources are subject to a 10-year must-offer and 
$0/MW-Day offer requirement in PJM’s capacity market, including resource types 
usually exempt from the must-offer requirement, such as demand response resources.226  
Demand response and distributed energy resources will be required to demonstrate their 
performance each year of the 10-year period consistent with those resource classes’ 
treatment in the capacity market.227   
97. 
PJM explains that the timing of the BYONC arrangement is central to the 
determination of the BYONC’s Accredited UCAP value because the ICAP equivalent of 
 
223 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 196 FERC ¶ 61,245, at P 161 (2026). 
224 Transmittal at 49. 
225 Id. at 55 (citing Proposed OATT, attach. DD-4, § VIII(c)). 
226 Id. at 55-56, 65-66.  Only BYONC supported by a demand resource or 
distributed energy resource Capacity Aggregation Resource may be replaced during the 
10-year commitment period, and it must be replaced by another eligible resource willing 
to fulfill the rest of the 10-year requirement.  Id. at 56-57. 
227 Id. at 64-65.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 44 - 
the Accredited UCAP value is used to reduce a New Large Load’s potential IRAS 
availability.228 
ii. 
Pleadings 
98. 
AMP requests that the Commission direct PJM to modify its proposal to set the 
level of BYONC for a generation or storage resource at the resource’s accredited capacity 
in the first year it is in arrangement with a New Large Load.229  AMP argues PJM expects 
the Effective Load Carrying Capability (ELCC) of some resource classes, especially 
storage, to decline over the BYONC commitment term, and using a fixed ELCC value for 
BYONC would therefore over-credit New Large Loads for BYONC.230  AMP argues that 
the portion of the New Large Load that exceeds the ELCC-measured UCAP of the 
supporting BYONC resource is effectively the same as Eligible New Large Load but 
without the IRAS obligation. 
99. 
Further, AMP argues that PJM has not explained how BYONC will be accredited 
for the purposes of the RPM.  AMP states that, if the fixed Accredited UCAP is used, and 
exceeds the UCAP that would have resulted from applying updated ELCC values to the 
underlying resources, PJM would be counting and clearing MW of Accredited UCAP 
that may not exist.231  However, AMP continues, if the Accredited UCAP of BYONC 
resources is updated for the RPM, the BYONC MW in the RPM could be less than the 
MW of New Large Loads, potentially shifting costs to other customers.232   
100. EPSA and FirstEnergy assert that the proposal to lock in the BYONC resource’s 
accreditation grants BYONC resources unduly preferential treatment under ELCC 
accreditation.233  EPSA similarly argues that the lock-in mechanism may result in a 
BYONC’s capacity contribution being overstated in RPM Auctions, which will further 
erode the fidelity of the RPM BRA or incremental auction price signal.234  The IMM 
argues that it is unjust and unreasonable to protect new generation from ELCC risk.235  
 
228 Id. at 65-66. 
229 AMP Protest at 4. 
230 Id. at 4-6. 
231 Id. at 7. 
232 Id. at 8. 
233 EPSA Protest at 10-11. 
234 Id. at 11; FirstEnergy Protest at 5.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 45 - 
The IMM explains that, regardless of the technology, fixing the accredited UCAP at a 
single value over the period will misrepresent the actual UCAP.236  AEU supports the 
lock-in mechanism, asserting that this prevents resources from being exposed to 
unhedgeable ELCC risk.237 
101. In its answer, PJM argues that IRAS is intended to incent New Large Loads to 
bring new capacity to meet their resource adequacy needs, and asserts that the lock-in 
mechanism avoids introducing uncertainty to the BYONC arrangement and undermining 
the BYONC incentive.238  PJM asserts that “the risk of changes to ELCC values (both 
increases and decreases) remains just as it is today—on individual generators in the first 
instance and all customers in the event that PJM has to purchase more capacity due to an 
aggregate ELCC decline.”239  
102. The IMM argues that disregarding changes in actual ELCC values does not 
eliminate uncertainty; it shifts the risks of any capacity shortfall, and the cost of 
procuring additional capacity, to other PJM customers.240 
iii. 
Determination 
103. We find that PJM has not sufficiently justified its proposal to lock in the 
accreditation of BYONC resources over the lifetime of the BYONC arrangement to be 
just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.  Generation resources 
vary considerably in their operating characteristics, including various fuel types, 
dispatchability, and maximum run times.  UCAP accreditation, as implemented through 
PJM’s ELCC, is designed to create a single tradeable capacity product from a field of 
diverse and distinct generation resources.241  We find that PJM has failed to provide 
 
235 IMM Protest at 20. 
236 Id. at 22. 
237 AEU Comments at 9. 
238 PJM Answer at 45. 
239 Id. 
240 IMM Answer at 13-14. 
241 See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 186 FERC ¶ 61,080, at P 42 & n.85 (2024) 
(finding that PJM’s marginal ELCC framework provides a reliability-neutral basis for 
comparison between different resource types for PJM’s capacity market because marginal 
accreditation establishes a framework where capacity resources are interchangeable or 
substitutable as they offer equivalent reliability contributions per accredited unit of

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 46 - 
sufficient record evidence to substantiate its rationale for allowing BYONC resources to 
provide capacity when that capacity is not equivalent to the single tradable capacity 
product that PJM procures through its RPM because its accreditation value is fixed over 
the term of the BYONC arrangement.  This lack of substantiation is heightened by the 
fact that PJM’s proposed Tariff language and its description of the lock-in arrangement 
are inconsistent. 
104. Specifically, PJM states that the lock-in period acts as a “shield” to BYONC 
resources from changes in their capacity accreditation (as determined through PJM’s 
ELCC capacity accreditation method) by locking in their accreditation for the period of 
the BYONC arrangement.  While, in its answer, PJM contends that locking in a BYONC 
resource’s capacity accreditation will provide certainty to a New Large Load contracting 
with a BYONC resource and incentivize parties to enter into BYONC arrangements,242 
PJM also asserts that “the risk of changes to ELCC values (both increases and decreases) 
remains just as it is today—on individual generators in the first instance and all customers 
in the event that PJM has to purchase more capacity due to an aggregate ELCC 
decline.”243  Yet, despite PJM’s assertion in its answer, PJM’s proposed Tariff provides 
that the “Accredited UCAP of any BYONC shall be the Accredited UCAP for the RPM 
Auction in which the BYONC cleared for the initial Delivery Year . . . .”244  We find that 
PJM has not sufficiently demonstrated that the potential benefits of locking in BYONC 
resources’ capacity accreditation outweigh PJM’s obligation to ensure that the PJM 
Region’s resource adequacy needs are met.   
105. With respect to the arguments PJM has offered, we are concerned with whether 
PJM’s lock-in Tariff language proposal may worsen the problems it is attempting to 
solve.  Specifically, PJM’s proposal to lock in the accreditation value of BYONC 
resources may also risk the capacity market procuring too little or too much capacity 
should the BYONC resource’s actual ELCC accreditation fall or rise over time.245  While 
PJM contends that the risk of the ELCC accreditation decreasing will still lie with 
individual capacity resources in the first instance, that statement does not appear to hold 
with respect to BYONC resources, whose accreditation value will be locked in for the 
 
capacity).  
242 PJM Answer at 45. 
243 Id.  
244 Proposed OATT, attach. DD-4, § VIII(i). 
245 We note that PJM’s long-term ELCC forecast projects lower ELCC ratings for 
all resource types over time.  See PJM, Preliminary ELCC Class Ratings for 2028/29 to 
2042/43, preliminary-elcc-class-ratings-for-period-dy28-dy42-elcc.pdf.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 47 - 
term of the BYONC arrangement per the proposed Tariff language.246  We agree with 
PJM that whenever ELCC accreditation declines, it will affect all load because PJM will 
have to procure additional capacity.  However, the risk that a BYONC resource’s    
locked-in accreditation value be higher than the capacity that it can actually provide has 
the potential to create a new resource adequacy risk for the entire PJM Region, 
particularly given the potential magnitude of BYONC MW that will be offered into and 
clear the capacity market.  We note PJM’s explanation that the lock-in mechanism would 
avoid introducing uncertainty to the BYONC arrangement that would undermine the 
incentive for Large Loads to contract with new capacity.  However, PJM has not 
sufficiently substantiated in the current record—especially with the conflicting Tariff 
language and explanation—that those considerations outweigh the potential downsides of 
introducing new resource adequacy risks and therefore merit a different approach to 
ELCC accreditation for BYONC resources.  For these reasons, we find that PJM has not 
sufficiently substantiated that its proposal to lock in the value of BYONC UCAP 
accreditation is just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.  
e. 
Other Issues 
106. Because we are rejecting PJM’s proposed IRAS framework, which as noted above 
appears to be an integrated package, we need not address other issues raised in this 
proceeding regarding the merits of other aspects of IRAS.  However, we note that several 
elements of PJM’s proposed IRAS framework (including but not limited to those 
discussed below) may require additional justification to demonstrate that they are just and 
reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.  Should PJM choose to refile a 
modified version of its proposed IRAS framework that does not infringe on retail rate 
regulation, we encourage PJM to address the concerns discussed below. 
107. First, we are concerned that, as designed, PJM’s proposal may not be consistent 
with mandatory Reliability Standards.  Reliability Standard EOP-011-4 only permits firm 
loads to be curtailed following initiation by the reliability coordinator of an EEA3, which 
is when “[t]he energy deficient Balancing Authority is unable to meet minimum 
Contingency Reserve requirements.”247  In contrast, PJM’s proposal would direct Electric 
 
246 PJM has not sufficiently explained in this record how factors specific to the 
instant proposal could mitigate the concerns the Commission expressed when it 
previously rejected a proposal from PJM to establish a 13-year ELCC accreditation floor 
for new capacity resources, finding that PJM failed to justify why the benefits of reducing 
ELCC volatility for certain resources outweigh the risks of establishing potentially 
inaccurate ELCC accreditation values.  PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 175 FERC              
¶ 61,084, at P 105 (2021). 
247 N. Am. Elec. Reliability Corp., Reliability Standard EOP-011-4 — Emergency

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 48 - 
Distributors to curtail certain load, which comprise a portion of a Transmission 
Customer’s firm NITS load under PJM’s proposal, earlier in the emergency process, at 
EEA1, when all generation is committed and non-firm wholesale energy sales have been 
curtailed.  Although firm loads willing to receive a lower curtailment priority, such as 
demand response resources, may be voluntarily curtailed before EEA3 under the 
mandatory Reliability Standards, PJM’s proposal would shed firm load on an involuntary 
basis.  Several parties argue that it is not just and reasonable to curtail IRAS MW before 
demand response resources.248  Others argue that curtailing New Large Loads prior to 
calling on Pre-Emergency Load Management is just and reasonable.249  Nevertheless, 
PJM has crafted curtailment rules that do not appear internally consistent with its Tariff 
(i.e., curtailing certain transmission customers on a pro rata basis).  It appears that PJM’s 
proposal ignores the plain language of mandatory Reliability Standard EOP-011-4 
regarding the curtailment priority of loads for whom an Eligible Customer is taking and 
paying for firm transmission service, which would result in PJM dispatch actions that 
conflict with the mandatory Reliability Standards.   
108. Second, the current record suggests that the LSE using NITS to serve an Eligible 
New Large Load would be required to pay the same capacity charges and transmission 
charges as LSEs using NITS to serve other types of load that are not subject to 
curtailment under IRAS and on whose behalf PJM procures capacity.250  Protesters argue 
that LSEs should not be allocated capacity charges based on the MW of Eligible New 
Large Loads when PJM has excluded such loads from the VRR curve, and is therefore 
not procuring capacity for said loads, or when these loads will be curtailed before 
capacity resources that are demand response resources are deployed.251  It appears that 
PJM has not sufficiently justified why it is just and reasonable and not unduly 
discriminatory or preferential for LSEs using NITS to serve Eligible New Large Loads to 
be charged for capacity based on the quantity of Eligible New Large Load MW when 
PJM does not procure capacity on behalf of that load.  The Commission has previously 
found that Eligible Customers taking non-firm transmission service on behalf of co-
located load should not be charged for capacity because PJM does not procure capacity 
on their behalf.252  We are concerned that PJM has not adequately explained why it is just 
 
Operations, Requirement, attach. 1, § B(3) (approved Feb. 15, 2024).  
248 Constellation Protest at 42; IMM Protest at 17. 
249 See, e.g., Governor Shapiro Answer at 24-25. 
250 See, e.g., Data Center Coalition Protest at 5, 23-24. 
251 Data Center Coalition Protest at 19-22; Google Protest at 15; Microsoft 
Comments at 4; Vistra Protest at 16-17.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 49 - 
and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential to diverge from this 
principle.   
109. Third, we are concerned that PJM’s proposal does not take into account locational 
or deliverability considerations for BYONC resources.  We note that under PJM’s 
existing Tariff, PJM identifies LDA Reliability Requirements, which require sufficient 
capacity to be inside or deliverable to the LDA based on transmission constraints.  Under 
PJM’s proposal, the New Large Load would not be subject to IRAS, and its load would 
not be counted towards the Eligible New Large Load amount for its EDC zone/area, 
regardless of transmission constraints between the New Large Load and the BYONC 
resource, which could exacerbate the resource adequacy shortfall in the New Large 
Load’s zone.  If PJM chooses to file a new proposal, PJM may consider if it is 
appropriate to condition IRAS consideration of BYONC arrangements on PJM finding 
that the BYONC resources are deliverable to the LDAs where the New Large Loads with 
which they are in agreements are located. 
110. Fourth, the record suggests that PJM’s designation of New Large Loads to provide 
IRAS obligations may disrupt existing commercial arrangements, including binding 
agreements between large loads that will ramp up after June 1, 2027 and existing 
generation.253  Should PJM choose to refile, PJM should consider how to account for or 
acknowledge these concerns, to the extent they persist given our other findings and 
guidance in this order.  It also appears that PJM has not adequately explained why a 
threshold only on the overall size of the Large Load, and not on the incremental increase 
of an existing Large Load, is just and reasonable.  The proposed Tariff appears to treat 
existing NITS customers differently even on the basis of small MW increases, such that a 
49 MW existing load that increased its consumption by 1 MW would become a 50 MW 
New Large Load and impose new requirements on the existing NITS customer for the 
entire 50 MW.  Should PJM choose to file a new proposal, we encourage PJM to clarify 
exactly how the definition of New Large Load and any IRAS or IRAS-like framework 
would apply to such existing commercial arrangements.  The proposed Tariff also does 
not appear to account for existing Behind the Meter Generation rules, although the 
Commission has found that NITS customers may net up to 50 MW of load at a particular 
electrical location using Behind the Meter Generation.254   
111. We also note that the new non-firm transmission services proposed in the order to 
show cause proceeding on co-located load—specifically Non-Firm Contract Demand 
 
252 PJM Co-Location Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at PP 200-201, 214-215. 
253 CyrusOne Comments at 6-8; Equinix Protest at 2, 8-14; FirstEnergy Protest at 
9; Microsoft Comments at 6; Talen Protest at 12. 
254 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,209, at P 207 (2026).

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 50 - 
transmission service—demonstrate a concept that PJM could consider as another possible 
avenue to achieve some of the aims of PJM’s proposed IRAS framework.  In the PJM 
Large Load Show Cause Order, the Commission preliminarily found that PJM’s Tariff 
appears to be unjust and unreasonable because it does not include transmission services 
that reflect Eligible Customers taking transmission service on behalf of flexible large 
loads that are willing and able to limit their use of the transmission system under certain 
conditions.255  The Commission directed PJM to explain whether its Tariff remains just 
and reasonable without Non-Firm Contract Demand Service for flexible large loads.256  It 
appears that a non-firm transmission service similar to Non-Firm Contract Demand 
transmission service, with appropriate adjustments, might be considered as a potential 
avenue to achieve some of the aims of PJM’s proposed IRAS framework.  However, we 
note that Non-Firm Contract Demand transmission service is affirmatively a voluntary 
option, while the product or service here is not.  Should PJM choose to refile its IRAS 
proposal, we encourage PJM to clearly identify the product or service IRAS is intended 
to provide and ensure its proposed Tariff revisions consistently reflect that 
characterization.  We also encourage PJM to consider providing a description of how it 
will transition from any proposed types of service back to its traditional market structures 
and how it will avoid a long-term bifurcation of loads in the PJM market.  Although we 
are rejecting PJM’s proposal, PJM may consider refiling an alternative proposal under 
FPA section 205 that considers the guidance provided herein. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Commission orders: 
 
(A) 
PJM’s proposal is hereby accepted in part, effective October 12, 2026, as 
requested, and rejected in part, as discussed in the body of the order. 
(B) 
PJM is hereby directed to submit a compliance filing within 30 days of the 
date of this order, as discussed in the body of this order.  
By the Commission.  Commissioner Rosner is concurring with a separate statement 
 
 
 
  attached. 
 
255 PJM Large Load Show Cause Order, 195 FERC ¶ 61,211 at P 86. 
256 Id. at P 87.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 51 - 
 
( S E A L ) 
 
 
Debbie-Anne A. Reese, 
Secretary.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 52 - 
Appendix 
List of Intervenors and Commenters 
* Filed comments or protests 
+ Filed comments or protests without a motion for intervention  
# Motions to intervene out-of-time 
^ Out-of-time comments/protest 
 
 
Advanced Energy United (AEU)* 
American Clean Power Association  
American Council on Renewable Energy* 
American Electric Power Service Corporation (AEP)* 
American Municipal Power, Inc. (AMP)* 
America’s Power* 
Anthropic, PBC 
Appalachian Voices* 
Avangrid Networks, Inc. and Avangrid Power, LLC257 
Base Power, Inc. 
Brookfield Renewable Trading and Marketing LP 
Buckeye Power, Inc. (Buckeye)* 
Calibrant Energy* 
Chief Energy Officer for the Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia + 
Citizens’ Electric Company of Lewisburg, PA and Wellsboro Electric Company 
Constellation Energy Generation, LLC (Constellation)* 
Corporate Energy Buyers Association (CEBA)* 
CPV Power Holdings, L.P. 
CyrusOne LP (CyrusOne) #^ 
Data Center Coalition* 
Delaware Division of the Public Advocate* 
District of Columbia Office of People’s Counsel + 
Dominion Energy Services, Inc.258* 
Duke Energy Corporation259 
 
257 Avangrid Networks, Inc. and Avangrid Power, LLC on behalf of their 
respective subsidiaries.  
258 Dominion Energy Service on behalf of Virginia Electric Power Company. 
259 Duke Energy Corporation on behalf of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.; Duke Energy 
Kentucky, Inc.; Duke Energy Indiana, LLC; Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC; and Duke 
Energy Progress, LLC.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 53 - 
Duquesne Light Company 
East Kentucky Power Cooperative, Inc. (EKPC)* 
EDF Power Solutions, Inc. 
Edison Electric Institute  
Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA)* 
Enchanted Rock, LLC 
Enel North America, Inc. 
ENGIE North America Inc. 
Environmental Law & Policy Center 
Equinix Inc. (Equinix)^ 
Exelon Corporation 
FirstEnergy Service Company (FirstEnergy)260* 
Google LLC (Google)* 
Governor Josh Shapiro, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Governor Shapiro) # 
Hans Royal + 
Illinois Citizens Utility Board* 
Illinois Commerce Commission 
Illinois Municipal Electric Agency 
Industrial Energy Consumers of America (IECA) #^ 
Invenergy261 
J-POWER USA Development Co., Ltd. 
Kentucky Attorney General  
LS Power Development, LLC 
Maryland Office of People’s Counsel* 
Maryland Public Service Commission 
Michigan Public Service Commission 
Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft)* 
MN8 Energy LLC 
Monitoring Analytics, LLC, acting in its capacity as the Independent Market Monitor for  
PJM (IMM)* 
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners 
National Grid Plc262 
 
260 FirstEnergy on behalf of Ohio Edison Company, The Cleveland Electric 
Illuminating Company, The Toledo Edison Company, FirstEnergy Pennsylvania Electric 
Company, Jersey Central Power & Light Company, Monongahela Power Company, and 
The Potomac Edison. 
261 Invenergy includes Invenergy Wind Development North America LLC, 
Invenergy Solar Development North America LLC, and Invenergy Thermal Development 
Holdings LLC.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 54 - 
Natural Resources Defense Council* 
New Jersey Board of Public Utilities (NJBPU)* 
New Jersey Division of Rate Counsel* 
Nicholas Max Neal and David Neal* 
North Carolina Electric Membership Corporation* 
Northern Virginia Electric Cooperative, Inc. 
NRG Business Marketing LLC (NRG)263* 
Nucor and Stell Dynamics, Inc. 
Office of the Illinois Attorney General*  
Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel (Ohio Consumers’ Counsel)* 
Ohio Energy Leadership Council (Ohio ELC)* 
Old Dominion Electric Cooperative (ODEC)* 
Organization of PJM States, Inc. (OPSI)^ 
Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate  
 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (Pennsylvania Commission)* 
Persistence Analytics Group LLC (PAG)* 
PJM Industrial Customer Coalition (Industrial Customers)* 
PJM Power Providers Group (P3)* 
PPL Electric Utilities Companies (PPL)* 
PSEG Companies264 
Public Citizen, Inc. 
Public Service Commission of West Virginia (West Virgina Commission)* 
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio’s Office of Federal Energy Advocate* 
Retail Energy Supply Association* 
Rockland Electric Company 
Sierra Club* 
Solar Energy Industries Association* 
Southern Maryland Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SMECO)* 
Sunrun Inc.* 
 
262 National Grid Plc on behalf of National Grid Ventures. 
263 NRG on behalf of Aspen Gen Funding, LLC; Direct Energy Business, LLC; 
Doswell, LLC; Energy Plus Holding LLC; Green Mountain Energy Company; Helix 
Ironwood, LLC; Enerwise Global Technologies, LLC; Independent Energy Group LLC; 
LSP University Park, LLC; Midwest Generation LLC; Reliant Energy Northeast LLC; 
Riverside Generating Company, LLC; Stream Energy Pennsylvania, LLC; University 
Park Energy, LLC; XOOM Energy, LLC; NRG Energy, Inc.; and NRG Curtailment 
Solutions, Inc. 
264 PSEG Companies include PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC, PSEG 
Service Electric and Gas Company, and PSEG Power LLC.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
- 55 - 
Talen Energy Corporation (Talen)* 
Tesla, Inc.+ 
The Center for Progressive Reform* 
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce Ranking Member 
Frank Pallone, Jr. (Representative Pallone) ^ 
Verrus LLC 
VC Renewables LLC and Vitol Inc. 
Virginia State Corporation Commission (Virginia Commission) ^ 
Vistra Corp. (Vistra)* 
Voltus, Inc. (Voltus) ^

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 
 
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. 
Docket No. ER26-3515-000 
 
 
(Issued October 9, 2026) 
 
ROSNER, Commissioner, concurring:  
 
1. 
I agree with the decision to reject the bulk of PJM’s filing for the reasons 
articulated in today’s order.  I write separately to emphasize that, if PJM chooses to refile 
its proposal, it must justify its proposal to curtail IRAS load on a mandatory basis before 
load that has voluntarily enrolled in a demand response program.  I also urge PJM to 
carefully consider the consequences any refiled proposal might have on its capacity 
market. 
2. 
Customers in a demand response program allow a utility to reduce their demand 
without resorting to the extreme measure of manually pulling breakers on the utility’s 
distribution network.  Demand response customers also receive payments in exchange for 
volunteering to reduce their usage when the grid is stressed.  This structure is designed to 
protect consumers and their equipment from the draconian measure of being involuntarily 
forced off the system, as well as to send efficient market signals based on actual system 
conditions. 
3. 
PJM’s filing flips this paradigm, proposing to force IRAS load off the system in 
the earliest stages of emergency conditions,1 before PJM deploys demand response.2   
4. 
Moreover, PJM’s proposal would force IRAS load off the system in lieu of 
sending capacity price signals that are needed to get new infrastructure built.  Because 
PJM would forcibly curtail IRAS load before other firm load, PJM excludes IRAS load 
from its capacity market demand curve.  The result could be a capacity market signaling 
that PJM has more than enough capacity while the region sheds thousands of megawatts 
of demand on an involuntary basis.  That’s not only economically inefficient, but also 
likely to prevent supply and demand from coming back into balance.   
 
1 That is, during a NERC EEA 1 event. 
2 PJM cleared 7,017 MW of demand response in its most recent capacity auction.  
See PJM, 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction Report, at 15 (Jul. 14, 2026), 
https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2028-
2029/2028-2029-bra-results-report.pdf.

Docket No. ER26-3515-000  
- 2 - 
 
5. 
To be clear, in an emergency, data centers not serving critical functions should be 
shut off before ordinary customers (Hint: homes, hospitals, and schools should never be 
curtailed before data centers).  We need state regulators to establish clear rules for which 
customers should be curtailed first when circumstances require it.  And we need PJM to 
be ready to adjust their operations to this evolving paradigm.  But such measures should 
only be taken when necessary to keep the system reliable, after voluntary demand 
response resources have been exhausted.   
 
For these reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
________________________ 
David Rosner 
Commissioner