{"document":{"slug":"pjm-september-iras-answer","filename":"pjm-september-iras-answer.pdf","title":"PJM answers comments and protests about interim resource adequacy service","url":"https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/documents/ferc/filings/2026/20260923-er26-3515-000.pdf","issued":"2026-09-23","group":"PJM filings","docket":"ER26-3515-000","filer":"PJM","provenance":"Signed original published by the filer; eLibrary accession not verified.","file":"sources/originals/pjm-september-iras-answer.pdf","kind":"stakeholder document","sha256":"ac097dfe57a0906d43ff19ba74b8c1f958bccb47028dfd178968f797ac070b4d","pages":71,"tokens":24667,"emptyPages":[]},"pages":[{"page":1,"startToken":0,"endToken":403,"text":"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nBEFORE THE \nFEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \n \n) \nPJM Interconnection, L.L.C.                      ) \nDocket No. ER26-3515-000 \n) \n \nMOTION FOR LEAVE TO ANSWER AND ANSWER OF  \nPJM INTERCONNECTION, L.L.C. \nThe Base Residual Auction for the 2027/2028 Delivery Year procured insufficient \ncapacity to meet the PJM Region Reliability Requirement.1  Thus, it is unclear whether, as \nof June 1, 2027, the PJM Region will have enough capacity to meet the longstanding \nreliability metric of one event in 10 years loss of load expectation.2   \nThe realities of the operational emergencies caused by the influx of New Large \nLoads endemic to PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“PJM”) demand a region-wide response \nat the wholesale level that simultaneously respects the jurisdictions of the 13 PJM states \nand the District of Columbia (together, “PJM states”) at the retail level.  PJM’s proposed \nInterim Resource Adequacy Service (“IRAS”) and Large Load Registry provide the needed \ntools to mitigate such operational emergencies in PJM, a footprint that includes the largest \n \n1 See 2027/2028 Base Residual Auction Report, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (Dec. 17, 2025), \nhttps://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2027-2028/2027-2028-bra-\nreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/TA3Y-95AX] (“2027/2028 BRA Report”).  Capitalized terms not otherwise \ndefined herein have the meaning as defined in the August 13 Filing, PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff, \nReliability Assurance Agreement Among the Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region (“RAA”), and \nAmended and Restated Operating Agreement of PJM (“Operating Agreement”).  In the context of revisions \nproposed in this proceeding, the Tariff will be referred to as “proposed Tariff,” and the RAA will be referred \nto as “proposed RAA.”  PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Proposal of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. to Establish \nInterim Resource Adequacy Service and a Large Load Registry to Address System Reliability, Docket \nNo. ER26-3515-000 (Aug. 13, 2026) (“August 13 Filing”). \n2 See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 194 FERC ¶ 61,049, at P 20 (“PJM states that . . . the proposed [Variable \nResource Requirement (“VRR”)] Curve meets PJM’s Reliability Requirement, which targets a 1-in-10-year \nLoss of Load Expectation [(“LOLE”)] on a long-term average basis.”), order on reh’g, 196 FERC ¶ 61,007 \n(2026).  PJM is still developing the 2027 Load Forecast and has yet to conduct the Third Incremental Auction \nfor the 2027/2028 Delivery Year.  Thus, it is still unknown whether the PJM Region will be short of capacity \nheading into the Delivery Year."},{"page":2,"startToken":403,"endToken":831,"text":"2 \nconcentration of data centers in the world sharing the grid with over 67 million people.  \nIRAS provides the tools to address essential reliability and resource adequacy issues in \nPJM while simultaneously permitting large loads to interconnect to the system, providing \na broad framework under which states can exercise their own regulatory authority and \nprotecting existing customers from capacity price increases resulting from the effects of \nNew Large Loads, consistent with the Statement of Principles Regarding PJM issued on \nJanuary 16, 2026, by the National Energy Dominance Council (“NEDC”) and the 13 \ngovernors of the PJM states,3 and the Ratepayer Protection Pledge, to which many \nintervenors in this proceeding are signatories.4   \n \n \n \n3 Statement of Principles Regarding PJM, National Energy Dominance Council, 1 (Jan. 16, 2026), \nhttps://www.energy.gov/documents/statement-principles-regarding-pjm \n[https://perma.cc/35HJ-W56E] \n(“NEDC/PJM Governors’ Principles”).  The 13 state signatories are the governors of Delaware, Illinois, \nIndiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, \nVirginia, and West Virginia.  Except for in reference to the “NEDC/PJM Governors’ Principles,” reference \nherein to the PJM states shall include the 13 state signatories and the District of Columbia. \n4 Ratepayer Protection Pledge, The White House (Mar. 4, 2026), https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/ \n2026/03/ratepayer-protection-pledge/ [https://perma.cc/N8PH-K82T] (“Ratepayer Protection Pledge”).  The \nRatepayer Protection Pledge requires, inter alia, that New Large Loads “will voluntarily negotiate new, \nseparate rate structures with their utilities and relevant State governments wherever they build data centers,” \ncommit to “build, bring, or buy the new generation resources and electricity needed to satisfy their new \nenergy demands,” and “add more capacity that serves the broader public by increasing supply” in order to \nprotect “Americans from higher prices” and commit to “[c]ontribut[e] to [e]lectric and [c]ommunity \n[r]esilience” by “coordinat[ing] with grid operators to contribute to a more reliable grid.”  IRAS reflects such \ncoordination at a just and reasonable rate.  See also President Trump’s Ratepayer Protection Pledge Secures \nAmerican \nAI \nDominance, \nProtects \nConsumers, \nThe \nWhite \nHouse \n(July \n23, \n2026), \nhttps://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/07/president-trumps-ratepayer-protection-pledge-secures-\namerican-ai-dominance-protects-consumers/ [https://perma.cc/9VDB-B4EH] (“Ratepayer Protection Pledge \nAnnouncement”); Data centers pay their way. Ratepayers pay theirs., The White House, \nhttps://www.whitehouse.gov/ratepayer-protection-pledge/ [https://perma.cc/TC2X-AN5T] (last visited on \nSep. 21, 2026) (“July 2026 Ratepayer Protection Pledge Update”) (identifying over 300 organizations that \ninclude over 250 utilities, cooperatives, and transmission cooperatives to municipal utilities and state \nassociations, 44 data center developers, 7 Artificial Intelligence companies, and 23 governors that joined the \nRatepayer Protection Pledge)."},{"page":3,"startToken":831,"endToken":1184,"text":"3 \nThe IRAS proposal is a response to the following basic realities:  \n• A region-wide response must guide and provide a framework for the \nPJM states’ various disparate approaches;   \n• To maintain reliability and resource adequacy, PJM, as well as the \nstates, must have key information about the location and \ncharacteristics of New Large Loads entering the region; and  \n• Load Serving Entities (“LSEs”) serving New Large Loads, or the New \nLarge Loads, must arrange for new capacity to meet their resource \nadequacy needs.  Absent such new capacity, New Large Loads must \nbe flexible and, pursuant to PJM’s operational needs, reduce their \nenergy demands when called upon during system emergencies.   \nPJM stands behind the IRAS proposal as a just and reasonable and not unduly \ndiscriminatory or preferential response.  Protests calling for IRAS to be simply rejected \noutright ignore or fail to recognize the realities of the myriad risks that doing nothing \npresents.  Moreover, entities that seek rejection of the IRAS proposal on jurisdictional \ngrounds conveniently overlook the fact that integrating large loads in a manner that \n(1) ensures reliability; (2) allows for these loads to interconnect to the system; and \n(3) protects existing ratepayers, is a responsibility shared between the states and PJM.  The \nPennsylvania Governor’s office and other state intervenors acknowledge as much,5 while \nsome opponents of the IRAS proposal would point to the division of authority between \nPJM and the states as grounds for eliminating the IRAS proposal altogether.6   \n \n 5 PA Governor Answer at 2 (“First, protestors are wrong that PJM has veered beyond its jurisdiction.  PJM \nis squarely in its lane to operate the bulk power system in order to maintain system reliability . . . .”); see also \nNJ BPU Comments and Limited Protest at 3 (expressing that the “IRAS plan strikes an appropriate balance \nbetween state and federal jurisdictional divisions”); PIOs Limited Protest at 20 (The IRAS framework’s \n“design elements ensure that the IRAS Framework respects jurisdictional roles and is a just and reasonable \napproach to maintaining resource adequacy and protecting other customers.”). \n6 See, e.g., DCC Protest at 8-14; Google Protest at 8-11; IMM Protest at 3; Dominion Protest at 4."},{"page":4,"startToken":1184,"endToken":1766,"text":"4 \nThe time to act is now.7  Indeed, the comments and protests in this proceeding show \ngeneral conceptual support for IRAS from a wide range of interests—including states and \ntheir public utility and consumer advocacy groups,8 transmission owners,9 capacity \n \n7 Pursuant to Rules 212 and 213 of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“Commission” or “FERC”) \nRules of Practice and Procedure, 18 C.F.R. §§ 385.212, 385.213, PJM submits this Motion for Leave to \nAnswer and Answer to comments and protests filed in response to PJM’s August 13 Filing.  Although \nCommission Rule 213(a)(2) does not generally permit answers to protests, the Commission permits answers \nfor good cause shown, such as when an answer contributes to a more accurate and complete record or \nprovides useful information that assists the Commission’s deliberative process.  PJM respectfully moves for \nleave to file this answer, as it will aid the Commission’s decision-making process by providing responses to \nthe various comments and protests filed in response to PJM’s filings in this docket.  PJM therefore asks that \nthe Commission accept this answer.  See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 182 FERC ¶ 61,073, at P 13 \n(2023) (“We accept the answers . . . because they have provided information that assisted us in our decision-\nmaking process.”). \n8 OPSI Comments and Request for Clarification or to Sever at 1 (“OPSI is supportive of both identifying \n[New Large Loads] that have not brought capacity to meet their needs in an  [New Large Load] registry and \nthe need to send a wholesale curtailment signal, equivalent to the  [New Large Load] quantity that does not \nhave associated capacity, prior to entering into pre-emergency procedures.”); Ohio FEA Comments at 9 \n(“PJM’s IRAS is a timely effort to confront reliability concerns caused by significant data center load growth \nin the region.  The proposed BYONC construct, the Large Load Registry, and the curtailment prioritization \nof certain loads when necessary to ensure reliability during emergency conditions will all require massive \nnew coordination effort by PJM, states, EDUs, and LSEs.”); NJ BPU Comments and Limited Protest at 3 \n(“The Board thinks PJM’s Proposal presents thoughtful consideration of the various stakeholder proposals \nand perspectives and thinks its final IRAS plan strikes an appropriate balance between state and federal \njurisdictional divisions in the [FPA].  While there are certain elements of the Proposal that the Board does \nnot support, these elements are not consequential to the foundational principles or procedures of IRAS and \ncould be modified, or severed and rejected, without undermining the overall package reforms.  In some \ninstances, the Board is simply asking for additional clarification from PJM.”); PA Governor Answer at 2 \n(“IRAS is a critical measure to protect the region’s reliability and its ratepayers, consistent with the \n[NEDC/PJM Governors’ Principles] and the Ratepayers Protection Pledge.”), 5 (“PJM’s proposal of IRAS \nis necessary and appropriate in response to the severe challenges facing the region.”),  & 6 (“Governor \nShapiro therefore urges the Commission to approve IRAS without delay, as timely implementation is critical \nto have IRAS in effect in time to avoid disruption of service for existing customers and to ensure its rate \nprotective effects are in place before the next Base Residual Auction in December.”). \n9 Dominion Comments at 3 (“Dominion Energy Virginia generally supports the proposed framework for \nIRAS.  However, PJM’s approach for implementation as presented in the transmittal letter and the Tariff \namendments raises concerns that it will not accommodate all business models and state regulatory \nframeworks within the PJM Region.”)."},{"page":5,"startToken":1766,"endToken":2419,"text":"5 \nproviders,10 large loads,11 LSEs,12 public interest organizations,13 and others.14  Although \nmost who support IRAS also advocate for tweaks or other changes to the proposed \nframework, this should not be interpreted as dissatisfaction with IRAS as a whole.  Rather, \nrequests for tweaks or elimination of certain elements reflect the fact that PJM has not \n \n10 Voltus Comments at 4 (“Voltus approves the IRAS proposal as a whole and supports PJM’s reintroduction \nof the RTO-wide CAM/IRAS incentive framework.”); NRG Comments and Limited Protest at 1-2 (“In \ngeneral, [NRG Companies (“NRG”)] supports PJM’s efforts to provide certainty and clarity to market \nparticipants and New Large Loads that do not bring new supply into the PJM market.  NRG also supports \nPJM’s efforts to articulate rules pertaining to the curtailment of New Large Loads that do not bring new \nsupply where such customers are curtailed before existing pre-emergency and emergency customers.”); SEIA \nComments at 8 (“The IRAS proposal is another necessary response to PJM’s growing resource adequacy \nissues.”). \n11 ACORE Comments at 1 (“ACORE . . . supports the requirement for a new large load to contract for new \ncapacity under BYONC to avoid being subject to potential curtailments under IRAS.  Such a requirement \nwill strongly incent longer-term (at least 10 year) contracting with BYONC capacity by the large loads \navailing themselves of the IRAS BYONC provision.”); Sunrun Comments at 2-3 (“Sunrun respectfully \nrequests that the Commission accept PJM’s filing subject to a discrete clarification or compliance filing \nconfirming that verified PSA values reduce IRAS obligations, with appropriate measurement, verification, \nperformance scoring, reconciliation, and no-double-counting safeguards, or, in the alternative, reject the \nfiling without prejudice.”). \n12 AMP Limited Protest at 3 (“During [the IRAS CIFP] process, AMP endorsed – and continues to endorse \n– many of the core features of PJM’s IRAS proposal, including the Large Load Registry, offsetting IRAS \nobligations with BYONC, preserving retail regulatory authority over the determination of the end use loads \nultimately subject to IRAS, and the exclusion of unhedged New Large Loads from the Variable Resource \nRequirement Curve.  In general, the PJM [IRAS] Filing proposes a reasonable framework to ‘connect and \nmanage’ new large loads in the PJM region.”). \n13 PIOs Limited Protest at 1 (“[T]he IRAS Filing is an essential mechanism to protect customers in PJM from \nskyrocketing costs and degrading reliability caused by the forecasted rapid influx of large loads. PIOs believe \nthe IRAS Filing could, if modified as described below, permanently resolve emerging resource adequacy \nshortfalls while respecting jurisdictional boundaries.”).  The Public Interest Organizations (“PIOs”) consist \nof Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council, Environmental Law and Policy Center, Appalachian \nVoices, and the Center for Progressive Reform.  See also Appalachian Voices Comments at 1 (“PJM’s IRAS \nProposal is an ambitious, yet narrowly tailored solution to address the primary issue facing the region: the \noutsized and unprecedent [sic] development of large loads and the unsustainable bill impacts they have \ncreated for residential ratepayers. . . . By applying only to Load Serving Entities serving New Large Loads, \nwhose size and operational attributes create unique concerns for the bulk transmission system and resource \nadequacy, PJM’s IRAS Proposal does not unduly discriminate.  Nor does it inappropriately cross \njurisdictional lines, but will instead complement efforts already underway to address large load integration \nin Virginia.”). \n14 Persistence Analytics Comments at 4 (“PAG supports PJM’s effort to establish a Large Load Registry and \nan interim framework that better aligns large-load integration with resource adequacy and ratepayer \nprotection.  The proposal correctly recognizes that reliable implementation depends on more than collecting \na headline [megawatt (“MW”)] value.”); Hans Royal Comments at 1 (“I support approval of the Interim \nResource Adequacy Service (IRAS), the Large Load Registry, and the Bring Your Own New Capacity \n(BYONC) provisions.  The July 27 Board framework followed a substantial stakeholder process and places \nthe reliability obligation where it belongs: on new load that enters without bringing new supply, not on \ncustomers already served by the system.”)."},{"page":6,"startToken":2419,"endToken":2858,"text":"6 \nproposed IRAS as an inseverable “package,” but instead—in the interest of administrative \nefficiency and acknowledging the urgency with which PJM must act15—affirmatively \nstated that each element is modifiable and severable so long as consistent with PJM’s \noverarching objectives.16  Although PJM is amenable to a certain degree of severability of \nthe component parts of IRAS so as to provide the Commission with a degree of flexibility, \nthis does not mean, however, that PJM is waiving its Federal Power Act (“FPA”) \nsection 205 rights, 16 U.S.C. § 824d, to a timely response from the Commission with \nrespect to this proposal, consistent with section 205 of the FPA.  Moreover, the question \nbefore the Commission, as in all section 205 proceedings, is not whether the proposal is \nthe sole means of achieving its stated ends but whether it is a just and reasonable proposal, \namong the many that could be offered in protests, to address the critical reliability issue \nthat PJM has detailed in the August 13 Filing.17   \nGiven PJM’s declaration that it is not proposing a package to be accepted or \nrejected as a whole, elements of the August 13 Filing can stand on their own and should be \ntimely approved as just and reasonable.  Most significantly, PJM highlights the importance \nof timely Commission approval of the following discrete elements:  the Large Load \nRegistry,18 the definition of Large Load,19 and the general obligation in proposed RAA, \n \n15 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 9. \n16 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 9-11, 121-125. \n17 See, e.g., Cities of Bethany, 727 F.2d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“FERC has interpreted its authority to review \nrates under [the FPA] as limited to an inquiry into whether the rates proposed by a utility are reasonable—\nand not to extend to determining whether a proposed rate schedule is more or less reasonable than alternative \nrate designs.” (citing In re Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., Inc., 1976 F.P.C. LEXIS 1334 (Mar. 10, 11976)); Midwest \nIndep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 127 FERC ¶ 61,109, at P 20 (2009) (“It is well established that there \ncan be more than one just and reasonable rate . . . .” (citing Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp. v. Midwest Indep. \nTransmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 122 FERC ¶ 61,083, at P 88, order on reh’g, 125 FERC ¶ 61,342 (2008))).   \n18 Proposed Tariff, Attachment DD-4, section VII. \n19 Proposed RAA, Article 1, Definitions – Large Load (“‘Large Load’ shall mean end-use customer(s) load \nthat has a cumulative peak load of 50 [MW] or greater at a single electrical site behind one or more points of"},{"page":7,"startToken":2858,"endToken":3325,"text":"7 \nsection 7.8 that LSEs bring new capacity in an amount that equals or exceeds its New Large \nLoads’ peak load.20  Each of these elements are foundational to PJM’s ability to put in \nplace an effective response to the rapidly increasing large load demand in a manner that \ndoes not harm overall region-wide reliability.  \nThe PJM Region and other regions have already experienced some of the \nchallenging operational issues emblematic of the high volume of new large loads the PJM \nRegion is facing today.21  Without IRAS, the reliability concerns may soon become even \nmore acute.  Therefore, to ensure PJM has the tools to manage the region-wide reliability \nissues presented by the influx of large loads, the key operational tools noted above must be \nin place by June 1, 2027.   \nAt bottom, IRAS is a just and reasonable means of managing the influx of New \nLarge Loads into the PJM Region while maintaining resource adequacy, reliability, and \naffordability in a manner that respects the divide between state and federal authorities, \nprovides a framework that accommodates and in fact welcomes further state action, and \n \ninterconnection, where for configurations involving multiple affiliated load facilities or multiple points of \ninterconnection with affiliated load facilities behind them, all affiliated load facilities within a one-mile radius \nwill be considered a single electrical site as further described in the PJM Manuals.”).  \n20 The revisions to the RAA clarify an LSE’s obligation to bring new capacity in an amount that equals or \nexceeds its New Large Loads’ peak load or be subject to load reduction requests during Emergencies prior \nto Pre-Emergency Load Management Response (“Pre-Emergency Load Management”).  Proposed RAA, \nsection 7.8. \n21 Recently, for example, “a July 22 event saw nearly 4,000 MW of data center load trip offline unexpectedly \nin Virginia.  It was the largest such event in PJM history.”  PJM interconnection, L.L.C., PJM, Dominion \nReview Large Load Transfer Event, PJM Inside Lines (Aug. 11, 2026), https://insidelines.pjm.com/pjm-\ndominion-review-large-load-transfer-event/ [https://perma.cc/55S2-LEWB].   Also, in recent months, PJM \nhas repeatedly requested FPA 202(c) orders from the Department of Energy to obtain permission to dispatch \nbackup generation, often those of data centers, in excess of environmental restrictions to manage emergency \nconditions due to hot weather conditions and the threats that extended heat poses to the reliability of the \ninterstate bulk power system.  As PJM informed the Department of Energy, on July 2, 2026, during the \nevening peak, “PJM was close to having to trigger the backup generator emergency action, if certain system \ncontingencies were to have arisen.”  Request for Extension of Existing Emergency Order No. 202-26-33 \nIssued Pursuant to Federal Power Act, Section 202(c), PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (July 3, 2026), \nhttps://www.energy.gov/documents/pjms-202c-extension-application-202-26-33a [https://perma.cc/RS4E-\nF8EK]."},{"page":8,"startToken":3325,"endToken":3619,"text":"8 \navoids disrupting existing commercial arrangements.  As discussed below, none of the \nprotests or comments submitted in this matter22 undermine the fact that the proposals set \nforth in PJM’s August 13 Filing are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or \npreferential revisions.23  Given the importance of having tools to manage the reliability \nissues presented by the new large loads that have not yet brought new capacity by June 1, \n2027, PJM respectfully requests that, to the extent the Commission rejects any element of \nthis filing, the Commission either direct prescriptive changes to be implemented on \ncompliance or provide guidance to aid PJM and stakeholders to develop a just and \nreasonable approach.  The issues outlined herein are simply too important, and the timing \ntoo critical, for PJM and its stakeholders to have to guess in such a case as to what the \nCommission would find acceptable.   \nFor the reasons set forth below and in PJM’s August 13 Filing, the proposed Tariff \nand RAA changes should be accepted, and made effective, no later than October 12, 2026, \nas requested.  A timely Commission order will allow PJM to proceed with the removal of \nEligible New Large Loads from the VRR Curve used in the Base Residual Auction \nassociated with the 2029/2030 Delivery Year scheduled to commence this December. \nI. \nANSWER \nA. \nThere Is Overwhelming Support for PJM’s Proposed Large Load \nRegistry. \nThe proposed Large Load Registry received overwhelming support from PJM \nstakeholders and commenters in this proceeding.  In particular, stakeholders supported the \n \n22 See Appendix A, Protests, Comments, Requests for Clarification, and Answers Filed to Date attached \nhereto.  \n23 While PJM’s answer does not address every argument raised by intervenors, silence on any argument \nshould not be deemed as acceptance of the arguments raised."},{"page":9,"startToken":3619,"endToken":4016,"text":"9 \nfact that it is needed to ensure appropriate cost allocation, and that it would provide the \ntransparency necessary to identify large loads.24  The Large Load Registry is designed to \nprovide PJM with critical information affecting operations, transmission planning, and \nmarkets.  For example, and as recognized by the Commission, PJM must have visibility \ninto where Large Loads will be located so as to be prepared for operational issues \ndistinctive to Large Loads that may arise, including protecting the transmission system \nfrom large loads unexpectedly dropping off or coming on to the grid.25  There have been \nsevere incidents of large loads tripping offline in PJM, which could have led to significant \noutages had PJM not been able to respond in time.26  Such information will also be \ninvaluable for states and other planning entities.  The Commission should accept the Large \nLoad Registry as just and reasonable, based on the obvious value it provides in supporting \nthe transparent development of large loads independent of whether it is part of IRAS as a \nwhole. \nNotably, none of the comments received regarding the Large Load Registry \noutright oppose it.  Rather, as discussed below, many commenters state that they support \nthe Large Load Registry and offer comments that do not undermine the concept as a whole, \nbut rather seek to modify limited aspects of it.27 \n \n24 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 30-31; see e.g., id. at 30 (“[I]n response to a poll of stakeholders \nposted on July 16, 2026, 82% of the 66 stakeholder respondents agreed that a Large Load registration \nrequirement is necessary to ‘ensur[e] that costs of new capacity required to serve new large load should be \nallocated to data centers.’”). \n25 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 193 FERC ¶ 61,217, at P 212 n.444 (2025) (“December 2025 Show Cause \nOrder”) (citing PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Answer of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket \nNos. EL25-49-000, et al., at 44 (Mar. 24, 2025)). \n26 See James Downing, Data Centers’ Reliability Impacts Examined at FERC Meeting, RTO Insider (Apr. 17, \n2025), \nhttps://www.rtoinsider.com/103130-ferc-gets-update-data-center-reliability/ \n[https://perma.cc/DU3R-PR9B] (discussing 1,500 MW drop from Louden County data center tripping \noffline). \n27 East Kentucky Power Cooperative (“EKPC”) complains that PJM “overstated” the support it received from \nstakeholders because, as PJM understands the concern, the support for a registry was somehow contingent"},{"page":10,"startToken":4016,"endToken":4501,"text":"10 \nSeveral parties, for example, assert that states and state consumer advocates should \nhave broader, less-restricted access to the Large Load Registry.  The Pennsylvania Public \nUtility Commission (“PA PUC”) and the Organization of PJM States, Inc. (“OPSI”), for \nexample, each ask the Commission to ensure that states have information sufficient to \ndetermine how curtailment should be implemented and how costs should be calculated and \nallocated.28  As discussed in the transmittal letter, PJM proposed to follow its existing rules \nfor disseminating confidential information—as set forth in the Operating Agreement, and \naccordingly, the information contained in the Large Load Registry will be available to \nAuthorized Commissions, among others, subject to confidentiality requirements.29  \n“Authorized Commission,” in turn, is currently defined to include state public utility \ncommissions, as well as organizations thereof.30 It is therefore entitled to have the same \naccess as others permitted to do so under PJM’s proposal.  The Public Utilities Commission \nof Ohio’s Office of the Federal Energy Advocate (“Ohio FEA”), in fact, supports the Large \nLoad Registry, recognizes that states will have access to it, and asserts that there should be \n \nupon the IRAS obligations being borne by LSEs, whereas now the Electric Distributor must “interpret the \nregistry and or seek guidance from a [Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority (“RERRA”)] to \ndetermine which loads it must curtail.”  See EKPC Limited Protest at 5-6 & n.22.  While it is unclear what \nthe exact concern is, the obligation to provide information to PJM for the Large Load Registry is borne by \nthe LSE, not the Electric Distributor directly, although PJM would welcome information provided by an \nElectric Distributor.  See proposed RAA, Schedule 11, section B.1(b) (“The Parties [i.e., LSEs] acknowledge \nthat information related to the development and maintenance of the Large Load Registry may be obtained by \nthe Office of the Interconnection from Electric Distributors in accordance with the provisions of the \nOperating Agreement and the Tariff.”).  Regardless, PJM disputes EKPC’s characterization as there was \nindeed broad support for a registry as evidenced in the August 13 Filing. \n28 PA PUC Comments at 7; OPSI Comments and Request for Clarification or to Sever at 7. \n29 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 28 (citing proposed RAA, Schedule 11, section B.1(d) \n(“Information maintained in the Large Load registry may be available to Authorized Commissions, \nTransmission Owners, Electric Distributors, LSEs, the Market Monitoring Unit, and FERC subject to \nappropriate data protection safeguards required by Operating Agreement, section 18.17.”)). \n30 See PJM Operating Agreement, section 1, Definitions A-B (“‘Authorized Commission’ shall mean (i) a \nState public utility commission that regulates the distribution or supply of electricity to retail customers and \nis legally charged with monitoring the operation of wholesale or retail markets serving retail suppliers or \ncustomers within its State or (ii) an association or organization comprised exclusively of State public utility \ncommissions described in the immediately preceding clause (i).”)."},{"page":11,"startToken":4501,"endToken":4987,"text":"11 \nno concerns with confidentiality standards as state commissions access this information.31  \nTo the extent that information submitted to the Large Load Registry is designated as \nconfidential, the Authorized Commission may be required to adhere to the process \nnecessary to access this information pursuant to Operating Agreement, section 18.17.4, \nwhich is a pre-existing section.32  This proposal does not recommend any new restrictions, \nnor are any necessary, as this matter was resolved by the Commission some years ago when \nit approved the sharing of information with Authorized Commissions.33   \nJCA and the Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel (“OCC”) both argue that state \nconsumer advocates are wrongfully excluded from the list of entities that have access to \nthe Large Load Registry.34  The Large Load Registry is expected to collect information \nwhich may be confidential, commercially sensitive, or may implicate infrastructure \nsecurity concerns.  PJM must therefore only permit access to this registry to as small a \nuniverse of entities as possible, while still making sure it is available to those who require \naccess to implement their responsibilities, as well as operational and planning needs.35  \n \n31 Ohio FEA Comments at 5-6. \n32 Operating Agreement, section 18.17.4 (setting forth conditions under which PJM will disclose confidential \ninformation to an Authorized Commission). \n33 See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 107 FERC ¶ 61,322 (2004).  Joint Consumer Advocates (“JCA”) \nsimilarly argue more broadly that the proposed confidentiality provisions, which point to existing Operating \nAgreement, section 18.17.4, may prove too onerous, thereby preventing states from accessing Large Load \nRegistry information in a timely manner.  JCA Protest and Comments at 35-37.  However, they also concede \nthat “changes to the Tariff process for handling confidential information is beyond the scope of this \nproceeding.”  JCA Protest and Comments at 37.  Further, while OPSI and PA PUC express concerns \nregarding access to the Large Load Registry, they support it and did not express any specific concerns \nregarding PJM’s current process for managing access to confidential information. \n34 JCA Protest and Comments at 33-35; OCC Protest at 9, 20-23.  OCC further argues that it is unduly \ndiscriminatory to exclude state consumer advocates from the list.  OCC Protest at 23.  There is no undue \ndiscrimination here because, among other things, state consumer advocates are not similarly situated to any \nof the other entities who require access to the Large Load Registry to meet their legal obligations to regulate \nretail or wholesale rates.  See N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,124, at P 10 (2018) (“To say \nthat entities are similarly situated does not mean that there are no differences between them; rather, it means \nthat there are no differences that are material to the inquiry at hand.”). \n35 This is consistent with the Commission’s findings when it accepted PJM’s definition of “Authorized \nCommission.”  In response to comments that confidential information should also be provided to consumer"},{"page":12,"startToken":4987,"endToken":5445,"text":"12 \nNevertheless, PJM reiterates its commitment to publicly post aggregated data regarding, \namong other things, areas in PJM with the greatest concentrations of large loads.36  This \nlevel of detail is appropriate for public use, including by state consumer advocate offices, \nin aiding transparency into the growth of large loads in the PJM footprint.   \nJCA asserts that PJM’s proposed Tariff language should affirmatively state that \nPJM will validate the information provided for the Large Load Registry.37  PJM fully \nintends to review the information, and when read in context, proposed RAA, Schedule 11, \nsection B.1(c) conveys that PJM will coordinate with the “applicable Transmission Owner \nand Electric Distributor as needed.”38  \nOld Dominion Electric Cooperative (“ODEC”) asks PJM to clarify which entity is \nobligated to provide information to PJM for the Large Load Registry.39  Assuming the \nobligated entity is the LSE, ODEC next asserts that there is certain information identified \nin proposed RAA, Schedule 11, section B.1(a) that LSEs may not have available to them, \n \nadvocates’ offices and joint action agencies, the Commission rejected these concerns, stating that “[t]he \noriginal purpose of establishing these provisions was to provide access to confidential information to state \ncommissions who have the regulatory and legal authority to monitor retail electric markets within the state.  \nThe change proposed by these commenters would open up the possibility of many other state agencies being \nable to receive confidential information, which is not the purpose of the Commission's directive to PJM.”  \nPJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 107 FERC ¶ 61,322, at P 22. \n36 See August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 42-43, 48; see also id. at 42-43 (“[T]o aid transparency to the \npublic, PJM will post aggregated data from the Large Load Registry, which will be aggregated by Electric \nDistributor zone/area, where possible and in a manner consistent with existing confidentiality protections.  \nAggregating the data by zone/area supports transparency by putting stakeholders on notice of the zones/areas \nthat have been assigned IRAS in a given Delivery Year, that may be potentially required to reduce load under \ncertain emergency conditions pursuant to IRAS, while maintaining the confidentiality of the data.”). \n37 See JCA Comments and Protest at 31-33 (citing proposed RAA, Schedule 11, section B.1(c) (“The Office \nof the Interconnection may review information and coordinate with the applicable Transmission Owner and \nElectric Distributor as needed, regarding the validity of the information provided . . . .”) (emphasis added)). \n38 JCA Protest and Comments at 31-33 (citing proposed RAA, Schedule 11, section B.1(c) (“The Office of \nthe Interconnection may review information and coordinate with the applicable Transmission Owner and \nElectric Distributor as needed, regarding the validity of the information provided . . . .” (emphasis added)). \n39 ODEC Comments at 3-4."},{"page":13,"startToken":5445,"endToken":5875,"text":"13 \nand that failure to provide that information may subject them to enforcement action.40  \nFirst, PJM clarifies that it is indeed the LSE serving a Large Load that is obligated to \nprovide PJM with the information for the Large Load Registry.41  Second, PJM agrees there \nmay be instances where an LSE may not have all of the information required for the Large \nLoad Registry readily available.  That is why the proposed RAA language contemplates \nthat Electric Distributors may provide the information for the Large Load Registry on \nbehalf of their relevant LSEs, and that PJM will have the ability to reach out to Electric \nDistributors and large loads as necessary to supplement information provided by LSEs.42     \nThe PJM Industrial Customer Coalition (“PJMICC”) and the Industrial Energy \nConsumers of America (“IECA”) both argue that the Large Load Registry should not \ninclude existing Large Loads, that they must be clearly exempted from all IRAS obligations \nif they are included, and that any data submitted must be protected.43  PJM discussed this \nissue in great detail in its transmittal letter for its IRAS proposal.44  There, PJM explained \nthat, in fact, including existing Large Loads in the Large Load Registry will help ensure \nthat PJM is able to clearly identify which Large Loads, i.e., New Large Loads, are subject \nto IRAS requirements.  In particular, the in-service date is a critical piece of information, \n \n40 ODEC Comments at 4-6. \n41 See proposed RAA, Schedule 11, section B.1(a) states that “[e]ach Party shall submit, or cause to be \nsubmitted, to the Office of the Interconnection the following information, as may be further described in the \nPJM Manuals, related to each Large Load served by the Party,” and a Party to the RAA is an LSE, as stated \nin the Preamble to the RAA (“WHEREAS, each Party to this Agreement is a Load Serving Entity within the \nPJM Region”) and the RAA itself is titled “Reliability Assurance Agreement Among Load Serving Entities \nIn The PJM Region” (emphasis added).  The RAA includes a definition of “Party” that is broader than just \nLSEs and PJM will continue to evaluate this.   \n42 See proposed RAA, Schedule 11, section B.1(b) (“The Parties [i.e., LSEs] acknowledge that information \nrelated to the development and maintenance of the Large Load Registry may be obtained by the Office of the \nInterconnection from Electric Distributors in accordance with the provisions of the Operating Agreement and \nthe Tariff.”). \n43 PJMICC Comments at 4, 5-8; IECA Comments at 1-2. \n44 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 38-40."},{"page":14,"startToken":5875,"endToken":6258,"text":"14 \nbecause IRAS only applies to New Large Load which, pursuant to the proposed definition, \ngo into service after June 1, 2027 (including incremental load).45  Regardless, the \ninformation to be gathered through the Large Load Registry has benefit and usefulness \noutside of the IRAS context.  Indeed, as PJM explained in the August 13 Filing, PJM must \nhave visibility into the full spectrum of all Large Loads in its footprint in order to properly \nmanage its system and ensure reliability.46  Further, the security and confidentiality \nsafeguards are sufficiently robust, and indeed are consistent with existing confidentiality \nrequirements currently contained in the Operating Agreement, as discussed above.47   \nB. \nPJM’s Proposed Definition of Large Load Is Consistent with Commission \nGuidance and Is Just and Reasonable. \nPJM’s proposed definition of Large Load, as discussed extensively in its proposal, \nis just and reasonable and aligned with Commission guidance as set forth in the Show \nCause proceeding, which in turn was based on the record in the Department of Energy’s \nAdvance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“DOE ANOPR”) proceeding.48 \nDespite this alignment with the Commission’s guidance, several parties argue that \nthe 50 MW threshold is unsupported or should be changed.49  The Independent Market \nMonitor (“IMM”) adds that the 50 MW threshold will exclude data centers with peak loads \n \n45 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 38-39 (citing proposed definition of New Large Load). \n46 See August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 41-42. \n47 Operating Agreement, section 18.17.  FirstEnergy Service Company (“FirstEnergy”) asserts that the list of \ninformation to be provided to PJM by LSEs should not be finalized until the pro forma transmission service \nagreement contemplated in the broader Show Cause proceeding is finalized.  FirstEnergy Limited Protest and \nComments at 11-12 (citing PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 196 FERC ¶ 61,129 (2026)).  PJM is unclear about \nthe connection between the two issues as framed by FirstEnergy, since any transmissions service agreement \ndoes not appear to have any bearing on the information that will be contained in the proposed Large Load \nRegistry.  To the extent that any connection arises, PJM can address any need to revisit the list of information \nat that time. \n48 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 31-32. \n49 See PJMICC Comments at 4; IECA Comments at 2; Talen Protest at 9-10."},{"page":15,"startToken":6258,"endToken":6695,"text":"15 \nless than that amount.50  PJMICC and IECA further argue that the “baseline” MW level for \nexisting Large Loads should be established, such that only the net 50 MW above that \nbaseline would trigger IRAS requirements.51  As mentioned, PJM discussed the support for \nthe 50 MW threshold, specifically finding that 50 MW was entirely in keeping with what \nwas contemplated by the Commission, as discussed in the DOE ANOPR proceeding.52  No \ninformation presented by any of these parties renders PJM’s proposed threshold unjust and \nunreasonable.  Further, PJM disagrees that there should be any “baseline” established \nabove which only the net MW would be considered for IRAS purposes.  Since PJM has \nproposed that 50 MW is the appropriate threshold necessary for purposes of tracking Large \nLoads and ensuring that PJM has visibility into them in order to ensure reliability, it would \nbe entirely contradictory to simply ignore any MW that may have existed at a Large Load \nbefore an additional 50 MW were added.  Given the reliability and operational purposes of \nthe Large Load Registry, PJM must have visibility into all Large Loads for registry \npurposes to ensure reliability and facilitate proper planning for the region, and existing \nLarge Loads should be treated no differently. \n \n50 IMM Comments at 29-31. \n51 PJMICC Comments at 10-11; IECA Comments at 2. \n52 See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,211, at P 58 (2026) (“June 2026 Order to Show Cause”) \n(citing Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission System, Motion to Intervene and \nComments of DTE Electric Company,  Docket No. RM26-4-000, at 3, 17-19 (Nov. 21, 2025) (recommending \na threshold of an amount between 50 MW to 100 MW); Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate \nTransmission System, Comments of the People of the State of Illinois by the Office of the Illinois Attorney \nGeneral, Docket No. RM26-4-000, at 7 (Nov. 21, 2025) (supporting a 20 MW or 50 MW threshold and \nconsideration of other factors, such as voltage level); Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate \nTransmission System, Comments of ITC, Docket No. RM26-4-000, at 3 (Nov. 21, 2025) (recommending a \nthreshold of between 50 MW to 100 MW); Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission \nSystem, Comments of the Nebraska Power Board in Response to the Invitation to Submit Comments in the \nAdvance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Docket No. RM26-4-000, at 4 (Nov. 21, 2025) (proposing a \n50 MW threshold); Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission System, Initial Comments \nof the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission, Docket No. RM26-4-000, at 5 (Nov. 21, 2025) \n(proposing a 50 MW threshold))."},{"page":16,"startToken":6695,"endToken":6996,"text":"16 \nEKPC, Ohio Energy Leadership Council (“Ohio ELC”), and FirstEnergy contend \nthat PJM should differentiate between data center Large Loads/computational Large Loads \nand other types of Large Loads, such as manufacturing or industrial loads.53  PJM \nimplemented the approach the Commission set forth in the June 2026 Show Cause Order, \nand as described in the August 13 Filing, adjusted the definition consistent with regional \npractices.54  These entities have shown no basis for deviating from the Commission’s \napproach of treating data center or computational, manufacturing, industrial, or other types \nof Large Load the same.55   \nC. \nThere Is Widespread Support to Establish a Policy that New Large Loads \nMust Bring New Capacity. \nBased on the filings in this proceeding, there is widespread support for the notion \nthat all LSEs in PJM serving New Large Loads via Network Integration Transmission \nService (“NITS”) must bring new capacity to satisfy the resource adequacy needs of such \nNew Large Load.56  Adoption of this policy was a key element of the August 13 Filing.57  \nSpecifically, PJM proposed to include as the first sentence of proposed RAA, section 7.8: \n \n53 EKPC Limited Protest at 25-27; Ohio ELC Comments and Limited Protests at 3-8; FirstEnergy Limited \nProtest and Comments at 10-11. \n54 See August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 31-36. \n55 PJMICC and IECA both assert that PJM should clarify that its measurement of “peak load” aligns with \nretail behind-the-meter generation rules approved by the Commission. PJMICC Comments at 14; IECA \nComments at 3.  This issue is outside the scope of this proceeding, and in any event, would be ultimately \ndecided in conjunction with state retail authorities. \n56 Buckeye Limited Comments at 2; OPSI Comments and Request for Clarification or to Sever at 6. \n57 See August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 3-4, 21-22."},{"page":17,"startToken":6996,"endToken":7472,"text":"17 \nEffective June 1, 2027, each LSE that desires to provide Network \nTransmission Service to support New Large Loads must designate \none or more Generation Capacity Resources or Capacity Storage \nResources that had not cleared an RPM Auction as Network \nResource(s) in a cumulative amount that equals or exceeds the \nLSE’s New Large Load’s peak load (in MW) as reported in the \nLarge Load Registry pursuant to RAA, Schedule 11 or such New \nLarge Load may be subject to load reduction requests during \nEmergencies prior to Pre-Emergency Load Management Response. \nPJM proposed to include this policy in the RAA, i.e., the “Reliability Assurance \nAgreement Among Load Serving Entities in the PJM Region.”  As its title makes clear, the \nRAA establishes the policy and methods for addressing resource adequacy.  All LSEs in \nPJM must sign the RAA and are bound by its terms and conditions.  By including this \nsentence in RAA, Article 7, PJM intends to establish the policy that New Large Loads must \nbring new capacity or PJM may request that they reduce their energy consumption to \nalleviate emergency conditions.58   \nAs PJM explained,59 this policy is consistent with the Ratepayer Protection Pledge \nintroduced in March 202660 and recently expanded in July 2026,61 which assures that New \n \n58 To be clear, this is designed as a condition of New Large Loads interconnecting and taking Network \nTransmission Service.  To the extent the New Large Load takes one of the alternative transmission services \nbeing addressed through other proceedings, this policy would not immediately apply.  In fact, as Mr. \nChristopher Pilong explained, this policy inherently would not apply to New Large Loads being served via \nnon-firm transmission services, as they would have been curtailed prior to this stage of addressing emergency \nconditions.  See August 13 Filing, Affidavit of Christopher Pilong on Behalf of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. \n(Attachment C) ¶ 12 (“Pilong Aff.”). \n59 See August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 4-5. \n60 Ratepayer Protection Pledge.  \n61 See Ratepayer Protection Pledge Announcement; July 2026 Ratepayer Protection Pledge Update \n(identifying over 300 organizations that include over 250 utilities, cooperatives, and transmission \ncooperatives to municipal utilities and state associations, 44 data center developers, 7 Artificial Intelligence \ncompanies,  and 23 governors that joined the Ratepayer Protection Pledge.  The 38 data center developers \ninclude: Aligned Data Centers, LLC; Amazon.com, Inc.; Applied Digital Corporation; Beale Infrastructure \nGroup, LLC; Bitdeer Technologies Group; CleanSpark LLC; Cloud HQ LLC; Cologix, Inc.; Compass \nDatacenters, LLC; Core Scientific, Inc.; CoreWeave, Inc.; Corscale, LLC; Crusoe Technologies LLC; \nCyrusOne, Inc.; DataBank Holdings, Ltd.; Digital Realty Trust, Inc.; Diode Ventures, LLC, a Black & Veatch \ncompany; EdgeConnex Inc.; EdgeCore Digital Infrastructure (d/b/a EdgeCore Internet Real Estate, LLC); \nEquinix, Inc.; Google LLC (“Google”) (d/b/a Alphabet Inc.); Iron Mountain Incorporated; Meta Platforms, \nInc.; Keel Infrastructure Corp.; Lambda; Microsoft Corporation; Nebius Group N.V.; NTT Global Data"},{"page":18,"startToken":7472,"endToken":7833,"text":"18 \nLarge Loads will, at a minimum, “build, bring, or buy the new generation resources and \nelectricity needed to satisfy their new energy demands, paying the full cost of those \nresources whether by building, or buying from, new or otherwise additive power plants” \nbecause it “advances self-sufficiency and protects Americans from higher prices.”62  \nIndeed, this policy furthers the federal policy stated in the Ratepayer Protection Pledge by \nrequiring action consistent with the pledge, and incentivizes New Large Loads to invest in \nnew Capacity Resources to meet their needs and—importantly—protect native loads from \nthe cost increases driven by New Large Loads.  Commission rejection of this statement of \npolicy in the RAA would effectively bring into question, if not displace, the commitments \nthat large loads and LSEs have already made by signing the Ratepayer Protection Pledge.  \nD. \nIRAS Divides Authority over Responses to an Interim Resource Adequacy \nEvent in a Manner Consistent with Commission Jurisdiction. \nThe IRAS framework is deliberately designed with the relevant Commission \nprecedent on how “issues” related to large load additions “require the involvement of both \nfederal and state actors”63 in mind.  Ultimately, “[s]tripped of embellishment, the facts are \nstraightforward,” as the Pennsylvania Governor’s Office explains:  \n[U]nder IRAS, PJM can only direct “a MW quantity of load \nreduction to the relevant Electric Distributer zone(s)/area(s)”—it \nneither targets nor directs specific retail customers to be subject to \ncurtailment, nor compels or restricts the authority of the retail \nauthority to prioritize among the retail customers that must be \n \nCenters (d/b/a NTT DATA, Inc.); OpenAI, L.L.C.; Oracle Corporation; Oppidan Connect Data Centers (d/b/a \nOppidan Investment Company); Prologis, Inc.; Quality Technology Services, LLC; Rowan Digital \nInfrastructure Pty. Ltd.; Skybox Datacenters, LLC; Skylar Opportunities LLC; STACK Infrastructure, Inc.; \nStarwood Digital Ventures (d/b/a Starwood Capital Operations, LLC); Stream Data Centers, L.P.; Switch, \nInc.; T5Data Centers, LLC; TA Realty LLC; Vantage Data Centers Management Company, LLC; and x.AI \nLLC). \n62 Ratepayer Protection Pledge. \n63 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 190 FERC ¶ 61,115, at P 66, order directing compliance, December 2025 \nShow Cause Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217."},{"page":19,"startToken":7833,"endToken":8139,"text":"19 \ncurtailed in order to meet the required MW quantity of bulk load \nreduction and safeguard the reliability of the grid.64 \nLikewise, the PIOs comment that IRAS “relies on a clear division of labor between PJM, \nElectric Distributors, LSEs, state authorities, and end-use customers.  PJM proposes new \nrules that directly affect wholesale market prices and grid reliability.  Even if those federal \nrules affect retail customer behavior, they are legally sound.”65  The New Jersey Board of \nPublic Utilities (“NJ BPU”) similarly states that IRAS “strikes an appropriate balance \nbetween state and federal jurisdictional divisions in the Federal Power Act” and that it \n“falls squarely within PJM’s authority in maintaining resource adequacy at the wholesale \nlevel.”66  \n1. \nIRAS is targeted expressly at improving PJM’s wholesale market by \nsupporting resource adequacy and the reliability of the PJM Region.  \nSome protestors allege that the IRAS framework exceeds the Commission’s \njurisdictional boundary between wholesale and retail capacity markets, “because it targets \nparticular retail customers[,]” i.e., large loads.67  Protestors’ claims are supported by neither \nfact nor law.  Indeed, a clear-eyed review of what it actually means to “target” retail \ncustomers makes this abundantly clear.   \nAs the Supreme Court of the United States has held, to the extent a rule may affect \nboth federally regulated wholesale rates and non-federally regulated retail rates, it is \nimportant to consider “the target at which” the rule aims.68  Whether such a rule “targets” \n \n64 PA Governor Answer at 10 (citation omitted).  \n65 PIOs Limited Protest at 18. \n66 NJ BPU Comments and Limited Protest at 3-4. \n67 Google Protest at 8, 10; Vistra Protest at 2. \n68 ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373, 385 (2015) (“Accordingly, where (as here) a state law can be \napplied to nonjurisdictional as well as jurisdictional sales, we must proceed cautiously, finding pre-emption"},{"page":20,"startToken":8139,"endToken":8424,"text":"20 \nretail or wholesale customers turns on the justification for the rule, not on whether or the \nextent to which the rule affects or even compels action of retail or wholesale customers.69   \nIn EPSA, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commission’s regulation of \ndemand response targets wholesale sales,70 because the Commission’s “justifications for \nregulating demand response are all about, and only about, improving the wholesale \nmarket.”71  The details here are important.  In EPSA, the Court found that the Commission’s \njustifications for the Rules are focused on the impacts of demand response participation on \nwholesale rates—namely:  \n• “help[ing to]create a ‘well-functioning competitive wholesale electric energy \nmarket’ with ‘reduce[d] wholesale power prices;’”  \n• “‘enhanc[ing] reliability;’”  \n• “‘help[ing to] improve the functioning and competitiveness of [wholesale \nenergy] markets’ by replacing high-priced, inefficient generation;” and  \n• “exerting ‘downward pressure’ on ‘generator bidding strategies’ and \n‘support[ing] system reliability.’”72   \nThus, the Court held:  “The retail market figures no more in the Rule’s goals than in the \nmechanism through which the Rule operates.”73  In other words, because the justifications \nprovided by the Commission were “about, and only about, improving the wholesale \nmarket,” the Court concluded that the proposed demand response rules targeted wholesale \nrates, and thus fell within the Commission’s jurisdictional authority. \n \nonly where detailed examination convinces us that a matter falls within the pre-empted field as defined by \nour precedents.”). \n69 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 264 (2016) (“EPSA”). \n70 EPSA, 577 U.S. at 282 (citing ONEOK, 575 U.S. at 385). \n71 EPSA, 577 U.S. at 282. \n72 EPSA, 577 U.S. at 282-83 (some alterations in original). \n73 EPSA, 577 U.S. at 283."},{"page":21,"startToken":8424,"endToken":8784,"text":"21 \nLikewise, the justifications that PJM has provided for IRAS demonstrate that the \ntarget or aim of IRAS is targeted to PJM’s wholesale market and enhancing the reliable \noperation of the bulk electric power system.  Specifically, the reasons for IRAS that PJM \nhas enumerated are as follows: \n• “support[ing] system reliability in the PJM Region,” where “the unprecedented \naddition of large loads, most notably data centers, have given rise to resource \nadequacy shortfalls—and associated real-time operational issues that IRAS is \nintended to address;”74   \n• providing a new tool in “situations where PJM determines that the available \neconomic real-time supply may be insufficient to maintain reserves to meet \napplicable Reserve Requirements and/or Interconnection Reliability Operating \nLimits (“IROL”) within prescribed limits and prevent cascading outages;”75 and \n• providing “tools to address situations where regional resource adequacy \nshortfalls would jeopardize reliability.”76 \nIndeed, the Commission has long held that “maintaining adequate resources within PJM \nhas a significant and direct effect on jurisdictional rates and services, and therefore falls \nwithin the Commission’s jurisdiction. . . . If insufficient resources are made available, \nsystem reliability throughout the PJM grid may be compromised.  In addition, where \nresource demand exceeds the supply, the price for capacity may increase.  These are direct \neffects on Commission-jurisdictional rates.”77  IRAS addresses system reliability and \nresource \nadequacy \nof \nthe \nPJM \nRegion, \nwhich \nhave \ndirect \neffects \non \nCommission-jurisdictional rates.  PPL Electric Company (“PPL”) puts it this way: \n[T]he intended objective of IRAS is clear and unequivocal—”to \nmaintain system reliability for the purpose of supporting the \n \n74 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 6. \n75 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 2. \n76 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 3. \n77 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 119 FERC ¶ 61,318, at P 48 (2007), aff’d sub nom., Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas \nCo. v. FERC, 324 F.App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009); id. PP 46-47 & nn.68-70 (The “other cases” to which the order \nrefers are Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 116 FERC ¶ 61,274, at PP 1113-1114 (2006); Cal. Indep. Sys. \nOperator Corp., 115 FERC ¶ 61,172, at P 36 (2006); Gainesville Utils. Dep’t v. Fla. Power Corp., 402 U.S."},{"page":22,"startToken":8784,"endToken":9065,"text":"22 \nintegration of New Large Loads to the PJM Region that are not in \narrangements with new capacity additions to the PJM Region.”  In \nother words, IRAS serves a fundamentally PJM-specific regional \nand FERC-centric purpose, and is not intended to fulfill any smaller \nstate or local jurisdictional legal function under FPA section 201.78   \n“PJM’s proposal is,” as the PA Governor Answer states, “manifestly aimed at provision of \na wholesale product or service, and at ensuring reliable operation of the bulk power system; \neach is clearly within its jurisdiction.”79  Conversely, the retail market does not figure at \nall in the justifications for IRAS.80  \nOther elements of PJM’s August 13 Filing are unquestionably within the \nCommission’s jurisdiction.  Specifically, the Large Load Registry, defining Large Load, \nestablishing the policy New Large Loads must bring new capacity, and the treatment of \nlarge loads in the demand curve used to clear RPM Auctions.   \n2. \nIRAS appropriately reflects the division of authority over wholesale \nand retail rates.  \n \nSeveral protestors take issue with the IRAS framework’s division between federal \nand state responsibilities.  PPL argues that New Large Loads are “the entities actually \n‘providing’ IRAS as a wholesale, Commission-jurisdictional rate service to PJM[,]”81 and \ntherefore IRAS represents an improper incursion on retail customers.  Constellation Energy \nGeneration, LLC (“Constellation”) alleges that IRAS “takes a federal reliability \n \n515, 529 (1971) (Commission has the “responsibility to the public to assure reliable efficient electric \nservice”); ISO New Eng., Inc., 118 FERC ¶ 61,157, at P 19 (2007)). \n78 PPL Protest and Request for Clarification at 6. \n79 PA Governor Answer at 7. \n80 See EPSA, 577 U.S. at 283. \n81 PPL Protest and Request for Clarification at 8."},{"page":23,"startToken":9065,"endToken":9418,"text":"23 \nfunction . . . and transforms it into a federal regulatory regime governing which categories \nof retail customers must procure generation” or accept potential load reductions.82   \nBut, as the PIOs note, “[t]hroughout every element of the proposed IRAS \nFramework, PJM has a specific and limited role with no direct control over retail end-use \ncustomers.”83  First, as to resource adequacy issues generally, the Commission has long \n“recognize[d] the traditional role of state and local entities in regulating resource \nadequacy” while also remaining “aware of [the Commission’s] responsibilities under the \nFPA to ensure that adequate service is provided, and that wholesale rates are just and \nreasonable.”84  The Commission “defer[s] to state and local entities’ decisions when \npossible on resource adequacy matters, but in doing so . . . must not shirk our \ncongressionally-mandated responsibilities.”85  The Michigan v. Department of Energy \ndecision, issued in September 2026 by the United States Court of Appeals for the District \nof Columbia, expressly held that “the complexity of state planning processes helps to \nexplain why the Federal Power Act leaves resource adequacy to be managed by states, \nutilities, and their RTOs.”86   \nSecond, “the mechanism through which [IRAS] operates”87 falls squarely within \nthe realm of PJM’s authority to require load reduction under real-time conditions that may \ngive rise to system instability or a capacity shortfall.88 \n \n82 Constellation Protest and Comments at 13. \n83 PIOs Limited Protest at 18 (citing EPSA, 577 U.S. at 281).  \n84 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 119 FERC ¶ 61,318 at P 40 (requiring PJM to “allocate costs to data centers” \nin a manner similar to that as urged in the NEDC/PJM Governors’ Principles at 1). \n85 PJM Interconnection, 119 FERC ¶ 61,318 at P 40. \n86 Mich. v. Dep’t of Energy, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 27898, at *44 (D.C. Cir. Sep. 11, 2026) (emphasis added). \n87 EPSA, 577 U.S. at 283. \n88 PA Governor Answer at 9 (“In short, PJM is asserting no new novel authority in proposing IRAS, but \nrather is enhancing its deployment of existing tools to better ensure bulk system reliability (directing load"},{"page":24,"startToken":9418,"endToken":9728,"text":"24 \nThird, the Commission has, by its own accounts, accepted proposed tariffs and \nagreements “related to large loads connecting to the transmission system . . . while rejecting \nthose that exceed the Commission’s jurisdiction” in recent years.89  The Commission has, \nin recent years, reiterated that it “has exclusive authority over the rates, terms, and \nconditions for the sales from generating resources used to serve [generation co-located with \nlarge loads], as well as the practices directly affecting such sales, provided that they are \nsales for resale in interstate commerce.”90  In other words, the jurisdictional boundaries \nwith respect to large load issues are not built on a tabula rasa.  Commission precedent \nprovides valuable guidance. \nMuch of that guidance was addressed in the August 13 Filing and PJM does not \nrepeat itself here.91  As PJM noted in its August 13 Filing, under the IRAS framework, \nPJM “may issue directives to Electric Distributors to reduce load by a certain MW quantity \nduring certain, limited emergency conditions.  The Eligible New Large Load Amount \nattributable to each Electric Distributor zone/area will be guided by the Large Load \nRegistry. . . . PJM will not direct reductions to specific New Large Loads pursuant to \nIRAS.”92 \nHowever, it is worth noting that, following PJM’s August 13 Filing, the \nCommission, in Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc. (“Tri-State”), \n \nshed to areas with concentrations of non-capacity backed new large loads) and equitable wholesale market \nrates (more fairly allocating the risk of curtailment to zones or areas of the grid that have most contributed to \nthe problem.”). \n89 Interconnection of Large Loads to the Interstate Transmission System, 195 FERC ¶ 61,045, at P 2 (2026). \n90 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 190 FERC ¶ 61,115 at P 71; see August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter \nat 89-92.   \n91 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 89-94.   \n92 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 92."},{"page":25,"startToken":9728,"endToken":10031,"text":"25 \nheld that, in its revised form, Tri-State Generation and Transmission Association, Inc.’s \n(“Tri-State”) proposed, amended tariff provisions addressing “concerns regarding the rapid \ngrowth of large loads,” do not constitute “an impermissible intrusion upon retail rate \nregulation.”93  \nSpecifically, Tri-State proposed a High Impact Load Tariff and pro forma High \nImpact Load Agreement (together, “HIL Program”) which, inter alia, defines a large load, \ni.e., HIL, in Tri-State,94 and imposes requirements on Tri-State Utility Members with large \nloads such as:  a biennial study cycle that begins with a “meeting with Utility Members \nand their potential HIL Customers[;]” payment of a “non-refundable HIL Evaluation Fee;” \nagreement “to a HIL Agreement to be executed by the Utility Member and Tri-State to \nfacilitate the responsibility for serving the HIL project[;] and “security in the amount of \n$1.869 million/MW.”95  Despite all these mandates on Utility Members, however, the \nCommission found that the HIL Tariff is also appropriately limited, as it “imposes \nobligations only on Tri-State’s Utility Members and leaves those same Utility Members \nfull discretion as to whether they will flow those terms through to their non-jurisdictional \n[retail customer contracts].”96 \nThe Commission reasoned that, although Tri-State’s HIL Program addresses \n“concerns regarding the rapid growth of large loads,”97 even where certain “requirements \ncould affect [retail customers,] . . . the United States Supreme Court has explained that the \n \n93 Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n., 196 FERC ¶ 61,127, at P 68 (2026). \n94 Tri-State, 196 FERC ¶ 61,127 at P 11 (“Tri-State proposes to define a HIL as load exceeding or forecasted \nto exceed 45 MW within four years and being served from a single Tri-State delivery point.”). \n95 Tri-State, 196 FERC ¶ 61,127 at PP 11-14. \n96 Tri-State, 196 FERC ¶ 61,127 at P 25. \n97 Tri-State, 196 FERC ¶ 61,127 at P 68."},{"page":26,"startToken":10031,"endToken":10378,"text":"26 \nspheres of federal and state authority over electricity are not ‘hermetically sealed’ from one \nanother[.]”98  Thus, in Tri-State, the Commission concluded that, even if the HIL Program \ndoes affect the quantity or terms of retail sales, “Tri-State’s proposal does not present an \nimpermissible intrusion on retail rate regulation.”99   \nLikewise, while the IRAS framework may ultimately affect retail customers, it \ncannot be said to “present an impermissible intrusion upon retail rate regulation.”100  The \nIRAS proposal places terms and conditions on LSEs, not end-use retail customers. The \nLSEs in turn resell capacity and energy to their customers. The IRAS falls clearly within \nFERC’s authority over regulating the terms and conditions of sales for resale.   \nBy way of example, as several intervenors observe, the IRAS framework directs a \nwholesale response during an Interim Resource Adequacy Event.101  During such an event, \nPJM would determine the quantity of MW that load in a zone/area would need to be \nreduced by to maintain system reliability in the PJM Region and provides a directive to \nElectric Distributors accordingly, but would leave it to the states to “determine—under \ntheir own laws, policies, and definition of what constitutes ‘large load’—which resources \nwill actually be called on at the retail level to reduce load.”102  In implementing IRAS, PJM \nwill be issuing broad load reduction directives to Electric Distributors.  PJM “will not direct \nspecific LSEs and/or specific customers of LSEs—including specific Large Loads—to \nreduce their load and/or switch to on-site backup resources.  Those decisions would be \n \n98  Tri-State, 196 FERC ¶ 61,127 at P 68 (quoting EPSA, 577 U.S. at 281). \n99 Tri-State, 196 FERC ¶ 61,127 at P 66. \n100 Tri-State, 196 FERC ¶ 61,127 at P 66. \n101 PIOs Limited Protest at 19 (“PJM will respect jurisdictional boundaries by directing IRAS Actions at the \nwholesale level.”); PPL Protest and Request for Clarification at 6 (“IRAS is a new wholesale rate service, \nwith rates, terms, and conditions established under the jurisdictional authority of the Commission.”). \n102 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 87."},{"page":27,"startToken":10378,"endToken":10731,"text":"27 \naddressed in revised state retail tariffs,” which already provide rules for load reduction \namong various retail customer classes.103  Electric Distributors, in coordination “with the \nrelevant state(s) or RERRA(s), individual Load Serving Entities, and customers served by \nthe Load Serving Entities in its zone/area”104 will retain full discretion as to how PJM’s \ninstructions to reduce MW in a zone/area to maintain system reliability in the PJM Region \nwill ultimately be carried out just as they do today.   \nIndeed, states are stepping up to the challenge.  For example, the PA PUC, on \nSeptember 10, 2026, passed a Motion of Vice Chair Kimberly Barrow that directed staff \nto draft a “Tentative Order outlining proposed amendments and modifications that electric \ndistribution companies must make to their tariffs to incorporate a pre-emergency provision \nthat implements curtailment protocols” and to “outline proposed amendments and \nmodifications that electric distribution companies must make to their emergency load \ncontrol procedures for emergency events, unless the large load customer has secured \nincremental electric capacity for the entirety of its demand as proposed by PJM[.]”105 \nIn keeping with the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decision, \nNew Jersey Board of Public Utilities v. FERC, IRAS permits states to retain authority over \nretail customers and retail rates while also “prevent[ing] the state’s choices from adversely \naffecting wholesale capacity rates.  Such action falls squarely within FERC’s \njurisdiction.”106  The Commission’s recent findings on the jurisdictional divide on large \n \n103 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 86-87. \n104 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 87 (quoting proposed Tariff, Attachment DD-4, section III(c)). \n105 Vice Chair Kimberly Barrow, Directing Staff to Issue Tentative Order Pursuant to the Public Utility \nCommission’s Provisions at 52 Pa. Code Section 57.52 (Emergency load control and energy conservation \nby electric utilities) and Establish a Technical Conference On Large Computational Load Cost Allocation, \nPennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 2 (Sep. 10, 2026), https://www.puc.pa.gov/pcdocs/1949305.pdf \n[https://perma.cc/7UFL-ZX6D]. \n106 N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74, 98 (3d Cir. 2014)."},{"page":28,"startToken":10731,"endToken":11022,"text":"28 \nload issues is clear:  “[S]tates retain exclusive jurisdiction over the terms of retail sales” \nincluding “how the costs of the wholesale sale and transmission of electricity assigned to \na wholesale customer are allocated among that wholesale customer’s retail customers.”107  \nLikewise, states will retain authority over how IRAS responsibility is allocated among their \nretail customers.  \n3. \nIntervenors make contradictory claims that IRAS imposes \nmandatory and involuntary rules on end-use retail customers and \nIRAS improperly foists responsibility on the states.  Neither are true. \nSeveral intervenors characterize IRAS as imposing mandatory and involuntary load \nreduction requirements directly on end-use retail customers, and thus improperly \nregulating retail rates.108  Simultaneously, protestors also assert that PJM’s proposal has \n“foisted onto the states the responsibility for implementing IRAS without consulting with \nthem on the program’s design.”109  Moreover, the Data Center Coalition (“DCC”) argues \nfor rejection of IRAS on one hand in favor of state jurisdiction but then bemoans that if \nstates take different positions on curtailment, it will not be clear that IRAS will deliver its \nintended reliability benefits.110 But, as the Pennsylvania Governor’s Office observes, \n“protestors cannot logically claim both that PJM’s proposal unlawfully ‘targets retail \ncustomers’ and that PJM’s proposal is fatally flawed because it cannot guarantee which \nindividual retail customers are curtailed. Both cannot be true.”111 \nPPL argues, to no avail, that “[t]he issue is not about which entity gets to identify \nthe specific individual Eligible New Large Loads that must provide IRAS when PJM calls \n \n107 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 190 FERC ¶ 61,115 at P 68. \n108 See, e.g., PPL Protest and Request for Clarification at 10. \n109 Google Protest at 11. \n110 DCC Protest at 5. \n111 PA Governor Answer at 9-10."},{"page":29,"startToken":11022,"endToken":11356,"text":"29 \nfor it.  The issue is that, when called upon to provide IRAS under that process, the Eligible \nNew Large Load cannot say no.”112  First, the issue of jurisdiction is about which entity \ngets to identify the retail customers who ultimately respond to PJM’s directives to reduce \nload.  PJM’s answer is straightforward—the states and/or RERRAs, in coordination with \nElectric Distributors and their LSEs and retail customers served by those LSEs ultimately \nidentify those retail customers.  Second, PJM has, in fact, been continuously consulting \nand communicating with states and other stakeholders on the design of IRAS for over a \nyear.113  Third, the IRAS framework does not determine whether any specific retail \ncustomers can say no.  Just as the identity of the retail customers who are ultimately \nimplicated by PJM’s directives to reduce a MW quantity of load is not decided by PJM, \nunder the IRAS framework, it is also not up to PJM to determine whether, as PPL puts it,114 \nretail customers can say no.  That—and the regulation of the terms and conditions of retail \nrates, and the regulation of retail customers—remains within the exclusive jurisdiction of \nthe states.  As noted previously, PJM’s load reduction directives will be informed by the \ndegree to which load in a certain zone/area’s IRAS responsibility has been reduced through \nMW of BYONC or Allocated RBP UCAP MW.  However, PJM will direct load reduction \ndirectives to Electric Distributors, while states/RERRAs may determine which retail \ncustomers will implement the load reduction directives.  \nThe division of labor between PJM and the states is firmly supported by \nCommission precedent.  In Tri-State, the Commission upheld an analogous division of \n \n112 PPL Protest and Request for Clarification at 10. \n113 NJ BPU Comments and Limited Protest at 3 (“PJM’s Proposal at the Federal Energy Regulatory \nCommission (“FERC”) reflects almost a year of deliberation and stakeholder engagement surrounding the \nfeasibility and potential implications of implementing such a program.”). \n114 PPL Protest and Request for Clarification at 10."},{"page":30,"startToken":11356,"endToken":11585,"text":"30 \nresponsibilities and ultimately found that Tri-State’s HIL Program “imposes obligations \nonly on Tri-State’s Utility Members and leaves those same Utility Members full discretion \nas to whether they will flow those terms through to their non-jurisdictional [retail customer \ncontracts].”115  The Commission was not persuaded by arguments, similar to those made \nin this proceeding, that “Tri-State’s proposal exceeds the Commission’s jurisdiction \nbecause Tri-State’s ‘encouragement’ that members include [Member Contract High Impact \nLoad] provisions that are consistent with HIL requirements functionally dictates they do \nso.”116  Indeed, the Commission explains that this is not enough to “convert permissible \nCommission-jurisdictional \nrequirements \ninto \nimpermissible \nretail \nterms \nand \nconditions.”117     \nSimilarly, the contention that PJM has “compelled states”118 to conform to IRAS is \nunavailing.  Under IRAS, PJM directs Electric Distributors to reduce MW quantities of \nload in a zone/area when PJM has determined that “the available economic real-time supply \nmay be insufficient to maintain reserves to meet applicable Reserve Requirements and/or \n[IROL] within prescribed limits and prevent cascading outages.”119  PJM expressly \ndeclines to dictate which retail loads must be reduced.120      \n \n115 Tri-State, 196 FERC ¶ 61,127 at P 25. \n116 Tri-State, 196 FERC ¶ 61,127 at P 68. \n117 Tri-State, 196 FERC ¶ 61,127 at P 68. \n118 DCC Protest at 3. \n119 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 2. \n120 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 82."},{"page":31,"startToken":11585,"endToken":11869,"text":"31 \nE. \nCalling for IRAS Load Reductions Before Pre-Emergency Load \nManagement Properly Reflects the Resource Adequacy Risk of New \nLarge Loads that Have Not Brought New Capacity and Protects Native \nLoads from the Cost and Reliability Impacts of Such New Large Loads. \nInterim Resource Adequacy Service will be an operational tool available for PJM’s \noperators to maintain system reliability when the system has exhausted all available \neconomic resources (i.e., all available generation, storage, and Economic Load Response \nParticipant resources), and before PJM calls upon Pre-Emergency Load Management.  “In \nother words, [as] the region is approaching a capacity event[,] . . . PJM [will] direct Electric \nDistributors to reduce those New Large Loads that have failed to cover their capacity \nobligations before relying on Demand Resources, through Pre-Emergency Load \nManagement Reductions Actions, to maintain reliability.”121  This sequence is just and \nreasonable.  The Eligible New Large Loads available to provide IRAS have not satisfied \ntheir respective capacity needs through BYONC, and therefore, should not obtain the \ncapacity benefit of Demand Resources.   \n1. \nThe states broadly recognize the benefits and purpose of calling \nIRAS before Pre-Emergency Load Management. \nOPSI, NJ BPU, the Pennsylvania Governor’s Office, Ohio FEA, and Ohio ELC \neach express strong support for PJM’s proposed placement of IRAS within the sequence \nof PJM’s operational tools for addressing emergency conditions.122  These entities \nrecognize that PJM’s proposal:  \n• “appropriately places the initial operational consequences of a capacity \nshortfall on the amount of demand associated with NLLs that entered \nthe system without sufficient new capacity, with an eye towards \n \n121 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 79. \n122 For more discussion of how and when PJM would utilize IRAS to address emergencies, please see August \n13 Filing, Pilong Aff."},{"page":32,"startToken":11869,"endToken":12233,"text":"32 \nprotecting existing customers and preserving demand response \nresources;”123 \n• “reduces the likelihood that NLL-driven resource adequacy shortfalls \nwill unnecessarily trigger scarcity conditions, which inflated escalates \nenergy prices that all loads must pay;”124 \n• “creates a strong incentive for New Large Loads to engage in bilateral \nagreements, which is the best way to protect ratepayers from the costs \nand risks associated with load growth from these customers while also \nresulting in new MW of supply to the system;”125 \n• “will help maintain the participation of certain load management \nreduction resources, like [Demand Resources], by minimizing ‘fatigue’ \nthat can occur from being over-called on during stress events;”126  \n• “will avoid escalating emergency procedures that include but are not \nlimited to shortage pricing and public calls for conservation, which \nwould represent socialization of costs, both financial and reliability \nrelated, being imposed by non-capacity backed new large loads upon all \ncustomers;”127 and \n• “places curtailment responsibility where the associated resource \nadequacy risk originates.”128 \nThey also recognize that conversely: \n• calling on IRAS later “would impose significant financial impact and \nshift reliability risk to other customers”129 by “shift[ing] the \nconsequences of that shortfall onto customers and resources that did not \ncause it;”130 and  \n• “if PJM were to call IRAS Actions after Demand Response Resources \nhave been exhausted, this would eliminate the incentive of NLL to \ncontract for new capacity because they would be insulated from \ncurtailment by Demand Response.”131 \n \n123 OPSI Comments and Request for Clarification or to Sever at 4; see also Ohio FEA Comments at 7 (“[I]t \nis reasonable for large loads that do not play a role in remedying the supply and demand imbalance to be \ncurtailed prior to other load.”). \n124 OPSI Comments and Request for Clarification or to Sever at 4. \n125 NJ BPU Comments and Limited Protest at 5. \n126 NJ BPU Comments and Limited Protest at 5. \n127 PA Governor Answer at 8. \n128 OPSI Comments and Request for Clarification or to Sever at 5. \n129Ohio FEA Comments at 7. \n130 OPSI Comments and Request for Clarification or to Sever at 5. \n131 Ohio FEA Comments at 7; Ohio ELC Comments and Limited Protests at 9."},{"page":33,"startToken":12233,"endToken":12590,"text":"33 \nAccordingly,  \n• “prioritizing IRAS Actions is a necessary step to comply with the \nStatement of Principles Regarding PJM, as signed by the National \nEnergy Dominance Council and the 13 PJM governors, and the \nRatepayer Protection Pledge.”132  \nAs is evident, the states recognize the benefits and purpose of calling for IRAS prior to \nPre-Emergency Load Management. \nIn contrast, the DCC, Constellation, and the IMM argue against PJM being able to \ncall on IRAS before Pre-Emergency Load Management.  Their arguments can be boiled \ndown to the proposal (1) is not supported;133 (2) is contrary to cost causation principles;134 \nand (3) will increase costs to load.135  None of these has merit, as demonstrated in turn \nbelow. \n2. \nContrary to the DCC and IMM, the record clearly supports \nauthorizing PJM to be able to manage emergency conditions by \nissuing an IRAS Action before Pre-Emergency Load Management. \nThe DCC and IMM allege that “PJM has not provided a supportable reason to \njustify giving IRAS priority over existing compensated Demand Resources.”136  The \nallegation is belied by the record, which provides a number of reasons why such sequencing \nof operator actions is just and reasonable.137  In addition to the reasons stated above by \n \n132 Ohio FEA Comments at 7. \n133 DCC Protest at 16-19; IMM Protest at 17. \n134 DCC Protest at 19-22. \n135 IMM Protest at 16-18; Constellation Protest and Comments at 42-45. \n136 IMM Protest at 17; see also DCC Protest at 17 (“PJM has not demonstrated that it is just and reasonable \nto direct the curtailment of retail customers prior to deploying Demand Resources that have been committed \nprecisely to avoid such service disruptions.”). \n137 See Pilong Aff. ¶ 15 (“while there is a sequence of escalating emergency action steps set forth in PJM \nManual 13, the rapidness of system events influences the timing and order of actions necessary to maintain \nsystem reliability. Therefore, PJM Dispatchers “have the flexibility to implement emergency procedures in \nwhatever order is required to ensure system reliability. Likewise, they have the flexibility to exit emergency \nprocedures in a different order than they were implemented.” (citing PJM Manual 13, section 2.3))."},{"page":34,"startToken":12590,"endToken":12857,"text":"34 \nsupporting commenters, the August 13 Filing explained that allowing PJM to issue an \nIRAS Action before calling on Pre-Emergency DR is justifiable and appropriate because \nthese Eligible New Large Loads “failed to cover their capacity obligations.”138  PJM also \nexplained that calling IRAS reductions after Pre-Emergency DR “would reduce the \nincentive for New Large Loads to bring new capacity to the system, as they would be \ninsulated by the Demand Resource capacity products.”139  Neither the DCC nor the IMM \nrefuted these arguments.   \nFurther, issuing IRAS Alerts after economic dispatch of all available resources \nthrough the Day-ahead and Real-time Energy Markets and before Pre-Emergency Load \nManagement is consistent with PJM’s current processes to recall/curtail non-firm \ntransmission service after economic generation and before Pre-Emergency Load \nManagement.140  In both instances, these entities transact in the PJM Energy Market \nwithout having secured any capacity.  Therefore, it is reasonable to support these products, \nto the extent the owning entity wishes to schedule them, when the energy is available.  \nWhen there is not sufficient energy, PJM takes action to ensure that capacity-backed loads \nare prioritized.  \n3. \nContrary to Constellation, IRAS load reductions will protect native \nloads from cost impacts of Eligible New Large Loads. \nConstellation contends that calling an IRAS Action, and having Eligible New Large \nLoads reduce their energy demand, would somehow increase costs to the rest of the \ncustomers.  Specifically, Constellation argues that calling on IRAS reductions before \n \n138 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 79. \n139 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 80. \n140 See August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 78; Pilong Aff. ¶¶ 12, 39-40."},{"page":35,"startToken":12857,"endToken":13157,"text":"35 \nPre-Emergency Load Management “violates the core least-cost dispatch principle because \ncurtailment of IRAS load is likely to be significantly more costly than Demand \nResponse.”141  While initially intriguing, this argument quickly falls apart under scrutiny.  \nConstellation then goes on to argue that this is least-cost from the perspective of the \nPre-Emergency Load Management because they have already made the calculus that the \ncost of the capacity payment outweighs the opportunity cost associated with reduced \nenergy consumption, but the “[l]oads subject to IRAS may include customers that have not \nelected Demand Response precisely because their own interruption costs are too high or \ntheir operating characteristics prevent them from meeting the notice and response time \nrequired to provide Demand Response.”142   \nThus, in Constellation’s view, calling on IRAS first is problematic because the cost \nto the large loads that provide IRAS would be greater than the cost to loads that provide \nPre-Emergency Load Management.  This is irrelevant here where the objective is to protect \nnative loads from the costs and reliability issues posed by New Large Loads that failed to \nbring new capacity.  The Ratepayer Protection Pledge signed by a significant number of \nlarge load entities makes clear that protection of cost shifts to other ratepayers is the \nprimary goal as opposed to Constellation’s concern about hypothetical higher costs that \nlarge loads might incur under certain ill-defined and unlikely circumstances.  Calling on \nIRAS before Pre-Emergency Load Management is consistent with the Ratepayer \nProtection Pledge, as it places the reliability and cost burden of New Large Loads’ failure \nto bring new capacity on those New Large Loads, while protecting native loads. \n \n141 Constellation Protest and Comments at 43. \n142 Constellation Protest and Comments at 44 (citing Affidavit of Aaron T. Patterson on Behalf of \nConstellation Energy Generations, LLC (Appendix A) ¶ 17)."},{"page":36,"startToken":13157,"endToken":13448,"text":"36 \n4. \nCalling IRAS before Pre-Emergency Load Management will avoid \nthe detrimental resource adequacy effects of Demand Resource \n“fatigue.” \nIn addition, Constellation’s argument that calling on IRAS before Emergency Load \nManagement is a more costly option frames the issue as the cost to the large load and not \nthe cost to the system and ignores the opportunity cost inherent in calling on Emergency \nLoad Management more often.  The issue of potential Demand Resource fatigue is real, as \nrecognized by the NJ BPU.143  That is, while Demand Resources are paid the same daily \nrate as other Capacity Resources, the underlying resource is not the same as a generation \nor storage resource.  Inherently, a generation or storage resource is purpose built to \nparticipate in PJM’s markets; they are designed to provide energy and capacity.   \nIn contrast, the underlying resource of Demand Resources are energy users, and the \nprovision of demand response is a secondary purpose.  As Constellation recognizes, \nDemand Resources only commit to provide load reductions when the payment exceeds the \nopportunity cost.  However, the opportunity cost calculation changes each time the \nunderlying resources are directed to reduce energy consumption.  The more often a load \ncenter is asked to reduce consumption the more disruptive the provision of demand \nresponse and the greater the opportunity cost.  The result is load centers become less willing \nto provide demand response and support Demand Resources.  This is what is meant by \nDemand Resource “fatigue.”   \nWere such Demand Resource fatigue to manifest, there would be a significant \nadverse effect on the reliability and resource adequacy for the PJM Region.  For the \n2027/2028 Delivery Year, the region is relying on 7,641 MW of Demand Resources to \n \n143 See NJ BPU Comments and Limited Protest at 5."},{"page":37,"startToken":13448,"endToken":13889,"text":"37 \nprovide capacity.144  For a region that is already over 6,800 MW short of capacity, the loss \nof any MW of Demand Resource would be impactful; a sizeable loss would be \nconsiderable.  Accordingly, in addition to the legal and equitable reasons for sequencing \nIRAS Actions before Pre-Emergency Load Management, policy and reliability reasons \ndictate a similar result. \nF. \nPJM’s BYONC Rules Appropriately Incent the Development of New \nCapacity to Meet Long-Term Resource Adequacy Needs of New Large \nLoads.  \nMost commenters and protestors support the concept that New Large Loads should \nbring new capacity to the PJM system to meet their resource adequacy needs.145  However, \nas discussed below, they generally quibble with various aspects of the BYONC rules.  For \ntheir part, commenters and protestors representing the interests of existing generation \nresources argue that the requirement that BYONC is “new” is unduly discriminatory.146   \n \n144 2027/2028 BRA Report at 11, Table 6. \n145 See, e.g., Google Protest at 1 (“Specifically, Google agrees that New Large Loads that do not bring \nsufficient new capacity to offset their expected demand should be subject to curtailment prior to other firm \nwholesale customers during tight system conditions, ensuring service to residential and other commercial \ncustomers remains reliable.”); Va. Governor Chief Energy Officer Comments at 2 (“Virginia supports PJM’s \nrecognition that large loads can contribute to reliability by bringing new capacity, reducing peak demand, or \ndeploying distributed and demand-side solutions.”); Ohio FEA Comments at 5 (“The Ohio FEA supports a \nBYONC framework and PJM’s proposal to incent LSEs to bring new capacity resources to bear \ncommensurate with the addition of NLL, which PJM defines to mean new or incremental large loads that go \ninto service after June 1, 2027.  We agree that bringing new capacity to match new large load is the optimal \nsolution to address resource adequacy concerns and is strongly preferred to IRAS.  However, given the \nchallenges of bringing new capacity resources online to meet new demand in the near term, we find PJM’s \nBYONC proposal to be reasonable.”); ACORE Comments at 1 (“ACORE therefore supports the requirement \nfor a new large load to contract for new capacity under BYONC to avoid being subject to potential \ncurtailments under IRAS.  Such a requirement will strongly incent longer-term (at least 10 year) contracting \nwith BYONC capacity by the large loads availing themselves of the IRAS BYONC provision.”); NRG \nComments and Limited Protest at 5 (supporting PJM’s IRAS filing “in general” including proposal for LSEs \nto bring new capacity and that the BYONC capacity requirement be “new” generation). \n146 See, e.g., EPSA Protest at 2-10; Talen Protest at 5-7; Vistra Protest at 12-13."},{"page":38,"startToken":13889,"endToken":14183,"text":"38 \n1. \nPJM’s BYONC rules offer sufficient flexibility for vertically \nintegrated LSEs. \nDominion Energy Services, Inc. (“Dominion”) and EKPC each argue that the \nBYONC rules do not provide enough flexibility to vertically integrated entities with a \nportfolio of resources.147  Specifically, they contend that the BYONC requirement \nimproperly “pushes Large Loads and their LSEs toward tagging specific resources to \nspecific end consumer loads rather than utilizing portfolio planning,”148 and that the \nBYONC non-transferability requirement runs counter to “the flexibility [an LSE] needs to \nadjust its portfolio to cover its aggregate load obligation.”149  These arguments \nmisunderstand PJM’s proposal.  As PJM explained, BYONC are simply MW of Unforced \nCapacity (“UCAP”).150  A New Large Load with a resource adequacy need of 75 MW \nshould contract with 75 MW of BYONC.  Starting with the first year that the BYONC \nprovides capacity to the PJM Region, the New Large Load is deemed to have satisfied its \nobligation to bring new capacity.151  There is no hint of a requirement that the BYONC \nmust physically serve the New Large Load.  The issue is that the PJM Region is short of \ncapacity.  Because as part of the transmission planning and interconnection processes all \nnew capacity must ultimately be deliverable to the entire PJM Region (subject to \ntransmission constraints), there does not need to be any locational requirement for \nBYONC.  These processes may result in new upgrades to ensure the new capacity is \ndeliverable.  Requiring BYONC generation to continuously match specific large loads is \n \n147 EKPC Limited Protest at 21; Dominion Comments at 3. \n148 EKPC Limited Protest at 20. \n149 EKPC Limited Protest at 24. \n150 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 51. \n151 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 69; proposed Tariff, Attachment DD-4, section V(b)."},{"page":39,"startToken":14183,"endToken":14457,"text":"39 \nsimply not consistent with today’s generation interconnection requirements and would \nintroduce a great deal of new uncertainty and lack of finality to the interconnection process.   \nAs for transferability, once an arrangement between a New Large Load and a \nBYONC is reported, the two are paired, unless the New Large Load goes out of business.152  \nAllowing BYONC to be transferable runs counter to the notion that the New Large Load \nis bringing new capacity to the PJM system.  The requested liquidity in BYONC is not \nnecessary for the scheme to be just and reasonable.  As proposed, for each MW of BYONC \nassociated with a New Large Load, that New Large Load’s exposure to IRAS is \npermanently reduced.  This is clear and easy to understand and administer.  And, \nimportantly, it makes the incentives clear for New Large Loads—they need to bring new \ncapacity.  If none is available, then they need to work with suppliers to develop additional \ncapacity.  \nConversely, allowing for a liquid market for already associated BYONC simply \ncreate a secondary market for existing BYONC, contrary to the root purpose of BYONC \nwhich is designed for New Large Loads to bring new capacity, not existing capacity that \nhas already been deemed to offset the resource adequacy needs of a different New Large \nLoad.  Further, as explained in the August 13 Filing, it would also create unnecessary \ncomplexity in ensuring the correct matching of New Large Load to BYONC and present \nopportunities for fraud where a MW of BYONC could be reported more than once.153   \n \n152 See proposed Tariff, Attachment DD-4, section VII(e). \n153 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 65."},{"page":40,"startToken":14457,"endToken":14774,"text":"40 \n2. \nMeasuring whether BYONC is new as of the 2027/2028 Delivery \nYear is just and reasonable. \nIMM, NJ BPU, and JCAs argue that whether BYONC is new should be measured \nat the time of the BYONC arrangement with the New Large Load and not, as PJM \nproposed, measured against the capacity on the PJM system today prior to the 2027/2028 \nDelivery Year.154  While there may be some merit to an approach that further circumscribes \nBYONC consistent with commenters’ approach, they have not demonstrated that PJM’s \napproach is not just and reasonable.155  As discussed, PJM designed its proposal under FPA \nsection 205, in part, to address the immediate resource adequacy issue facing the PJM \nRegion starting with the 2027/2028 Delivery Year.  An advantage of PJM’s approach is \nthat Capacity Resources ready to participate in RPM and commit to provide capacity are \nnot disincentivized to do so while they wait for the BYONC marketplace to develop.  The \nBYONC rules should not impede or hinder new Capacity Resources from committing to \nprovide capacity.  The reality is that the PJM Region needs new capacity right now.  This \ndesign to spur quicker participation of new Capacity Resources is just and reasonable in \nthis context. \n3. \nThe BYONC price taker requirement is just and reasonable in the \ncontext of IRAS, as the BYONC arrangement is akin to Self-Supply \nCapacity Resources. \nSeveral protestors allege that requiring BYONC to participate as a price taker (i.e., \nsubmit $0/MW-day Sell Offers) would “interfere” with RPM Auction price signals by \n“artificially lower[ing] the clearing price for capacity, depressing market prices for existing \nresources and further suppressing the ability of the RPM to send the proper price signals to \n \n154 IMM Protest at 19-20; JCA Protest and Comments at 29-31; NJ BPU Comments and Limited Protest at \n6-9. \n155 See, e.g., Cities of Bethany, 727 F.2d at 1136."},{"page":41,"startToken":14774,"endToken":15131,"text":"41 \nincentivize new capacity and retain existing capacity.”156  This allegation is incorrect and \nmyopically ignores both the purpose of the price taker requirement and the context of the \nBYONC rules. \nWith respect to the impact on the market, protestors are mistaken that the price \ntaker requirement would affect the clearing price.  Given that, under PJM’s proposal, New \nLarge Loads would be excluded from the demand curve until they contract for BYONC, \nthe one-for-one addition of new MW of load and new MW of supply would have offsetting \neffects on the clearing price.  In other words, as PJM explained in the August 13 Filing, the \nprice taker treatment would “result[] in . . . effectively [a] price-neutral outcome.”157   \nIn any event, regardless of whether the Commission accepts PJM’s proposal to \nexclude New Large Loads from the VRR Curve until they bring new supply, the price taker \nrequirement does not unlawfully interfere with RPM Auction price signals.  While true that \nall else held equal, adding a MW of supply at $0 will tend to reduce clearing prices \n(depending on the offered price of the next marginal MW), as noted below, the capacity \nmarket is not a vacuum, and whether the price taker treatment is not just and reasonable \nmust be considered in context.  The Commission has found price taker treatment just and \nreasonable in multiple contexts. \nFirst, the simple fact is new demand is bringing new supply, and forcing that new \nsupply to clear the capacity market.  This is no different from the Capacity Resources load \nentities have been able to offer as “Self-Supply” since the advent of RPM.158  Longstanding \n \n156 Constellation Protest and Comments at 52; see P3 Protest at 22.   \n157 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 58. \n158 See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61,331, at P 13 (2006) (“To meet the capacity needs of \nLoad Serving Entities that failed to procure enough capacity through self-supply or bilateral contracts, PJM \nproposed to hold an auction each year, in which PJM would procure the remainder of the capacity \nrequirement.”); id. at P 29 (“The Settlement preserves provisions of the August 31 filing that support"},{"page":42,"startToken":15131,"endToken":15550,"text":"42 \ncapacity market rules have allowed load to submit Sell Offers for Capacity Resources \n“deemed Self-Supply and . . . indicate whether it is committing the resource regardless of \nclearing price or with a price bid.”159  There is no question that this is just and reasonable.  \nThe analogous price taker treatment for BYONC caused to be committed as capacity by \nNew Large Loads is similarly just and reasonable, as becoming BYONC is also the product \nof a voluntary choice by the resource seller; if the seller does not want price taker treatment \nfor its resource it does not have to enter into a BYONC arrangement with a New Large \nLoad. \nSecond, BYONC resources will be able to contract for a revenue stream, that is the \nproduct of an arm’s length negotiation between a willing buyer and a willing seller, to \nincent a resource seller to undertake the BYONC requirements.  The Commission has \npreviously found just and reasonable price taker treatment for resources considered in \ncapacity markets where their going forward costs were adequately covered by \nout-of-market revenue streams, notably cost of service agreements to retain resources for \ntransmission reliability or fuel security reasons.160  In this case, as part of being a BYONC \n \nself-supply and bilateral contracts through various means . . . “); Tariff, Attachment DD, section 1(b) (RPM \nprovides:  “a competitive auction mechanism to secure the forward commitment of additional Capacity \nResources and Qualifying Transmission Upgrades as necessary to satisfy the portion of LSEs’ Unforced \nCapacity Obligations not satisfied through Self-Supply, in order to ensure the reliability of the PJM Region \nfor future Delivery Years.”); id. at Attachment DD, section 5.2 (rules for nominating Self-Supply into RPM \nAuctions). \n159 Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.2. \n160 See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 190 FERC ¶ 61,088, at P 50, order addressing arguments raised \non reh’g, 192 FERC ¶ 61,135, at PP 31-34 (2025); Indep. Power Producers of N.Y. v. N.Y. Indep. Sys. \nOperator, Inc., 150 FERC ¶ 61,214 (2015), order granting in part & denying in part clarification & reh’g, \n170 FERC ¶ 61,118 (2020); N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 150 FERC ¶ 61,116 (2015), order on reh'g & \ncompliance, 155 FERC ¶ 61,076 (2016), order on reh'g & compliance, 161 FERC ¶ 61,189 (2017), order on \nclarification & reh’g, 163 FERC ¶ 61,047 (2018); see also ISO New Eng. Inc., 165 FERC ¶ 61,202, at PP \n82-88 (2018) (approving price taker treatment for resource retained for fuel security purposes), order \naddressing arguments raised on reh’g, 173 FERC ¶ 61,204 (2020)."},{"page":43,"startToken":15550,"endToken":15944,"text":"43 \nresource there will be an agreement between the New Large Load and the Capacity \nResource that will address compensation, among other issues.  \nWithin the context of IRAS, for the New Large Loads to get the benefit of the \nBYONC reducing its exposure to IRAS and ultimately exempting New Large Loads from \nIRAS, it is imperative that the BYONC secure capacity commitments for 10 consecutive \nDelivery Years.161  In the August 13 Filing, PJM explained that the 10-year capacity market \nparticipation requirement ensured that the BYONC was “real and lasting,”162 i.e., that the \nresource adequacy needs of the New Large Load would be addressed through the BYONC \nand the region could count on such BYONC to do so.  The price taker treatment is the best \nway to ensure that the BYONC clears the capacity market for each Delivery Year.  To \ncontract for BYONC, New Large Loads must offer out-of-market revenues sufficient for \nthe new supply to acquiesce to price taker treatment for 10 years.  The new supply would \nevaluate the revenue stream and revenue certainty available through the BYONC contract \nagainst unencumbered market participation.  New supply that elects to become BYONC is \nmaking an economic choice to do so.  Sellers of such supply can ensure their BYONC \narrangements with New Large Loads sufficiently cover their going forward costs such that \nthey are indifferent to the outcomes of the PJM capacity auctions.  The BYONC voluntarily \nagreeing to price taker treatment in this context is just and reasonable. \n \n161 Proposed Tariff, Attachment DD-4, section VIII(e).  FirstEnergy challenges the 10-year RPM \nparticipation requirement for BYONC resources, arguing that PJM provided “no basis” for this requirement.  \nSee FirstEnergy Limited Protest and Comments at 5-6, 15.  To the contrary, PJM explained that this \nrequirement is “designed to ensure that this BYONC is real and lasting.”  August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter \nat 56.  That is, because the New Large Load will continue to be served by the PJM system throughout those \n10 years, the BYONC resource should likewise serve to provide capacity during that period too.  If the New \nLarge Load ceases to exist during that 10-year period, the BYONC resource is relieved of its obligations.  \nSee proposed Tariff, Attachment DD-4, section VIII(a) (Capacity participation requirements only apply to \nBYONC “in an arrangement with a New Large Load”). \n162 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 56."},{"page":44,"startToken":15944,"endToken":16265,"text":"44 \n4. \nGiven the present resource adequacy shortfall, requiring New Large \nLoads to bring new capacity is not unduly discriminatory with \nrespect to existing generation resources. \nElectric Power Supply Association (“EPSA”) and others representing the interests \nof existing generators contend that the rule that New Large Loads must contract with new \ncapacity to address their resource adequacy needs is unduly discriminatory against existing \nCapacity Resources.163  In other words, it appears that their argument is that existing \nCapacity Resources are unlawfully being denied the opportunity to meet the resource \nadequacy needs of New Large Loads.  This argument lacks merit.  Discrimination is only \nundue if it lacks justification.  Here, the criterion that BYONC be “new” is easily \njustifiable.  The PJM Region needs new capacity.  This is not in dispute.  The immediate \nprimary cause for the need for new capacity is the significant amount of New Large Load \ninterconnecting without capacity.  Thus, PJM is proposing a requirement that the New \nLarge Loads contract to bring new capacity to become exempt from being eligible to \nprovide IRAS.  Allowing existing Capacity Resources to contract with New Large Loads \nwould not solve the problem that the BYONC scheme is designed to address.   \n5. \nBYONC’s ELCC risk is shared by New Large Loads. \nSeveral entities complain that PJM’s proposal to use the Accredited UCAP of the \nBYONC determined for the “RPM Auction in which the BYONC cleared for the initial \nDelivery Year the BYONC is in an arrangement with the New Large Load”164 as the \npermanent UCAP MW offset for determining the eligibility of a New Large Load to \nprovide IRAS improperly shifts the BYONC resource’s ELCC risk to ratepayers.165  PJM’s \n \n163 See EPSA Protest at 3; Vistra Protest at 12-13; Constellation Protest and Comments at 37-40; America’s \nPower Protest at 5-11. \n164 Proposed Tariff, Attachment DD-4, sections VII(i)(i)-(ii). \n165 See, e.g., AMP Limited Protest at 4-6; IMM Protest at 20."},{"page":45,"startToken":16265,"endToken":16517,"text":"45 \nproposal is just and reasonable.  The impetus for IRAS is to incent New Large Loads to \nbring new capacity to meet their resource adequacy needs.  PJM’s proposal achieves that \nobjective by allowing New Large Loads to reduce or zero-out their IRAS eligibility by \neach UCAP MW of BYONC they contract with.  Introducing uncertainty to that \narrangement by re-evaluating the BYONC’s ELCC and degree to which it addresses the \nNew Large Load’s resource adequacy needs for each Delivery Year would undermine the \nBYONC incentive.   \nIn the first instance, the risk is borne by the BYONC generator as its capacity value \nwill be reduced in future years should its ELCC value decline.  Moreover, although \npotentially more capacity would need to be procured if the ELCC value in the aggregate of \nall resources declines, the associated New Large Load would share in the cost of procuring \nthe additional capacity to make up the difference.  Conversely, the ELCC value of the \nBYONC generator may increase after the initial year and result in lower costs because less \ncapacity would need to be procured.   \nAccordingly, the risk of changes to ELCC values (both increases and decreases) \nremains just as it is today—on individual generators in the first instance and all customers \nin the event that PJM has to purchase more capacity due to an aggregate ELCC decline.  \nEngrafting into ELCC administration a one-off IRAS exception to that paradigm is not \njustified, as there is no change to the status quo risk allocation associated with ELCC \nchanges."},{"page":46,"startToken":16517,"endToken":16833,"text":"46 \n6. \nMW that do not meet BYONC gating criteria and requirements or \nprovide Allocated RBP UCAP MW should not reduce potential IRAS \nexposure. \nSeveral intervenors assert that additional categories of MW should reduce IRAS \nexposure.166  Those intervenors miss the mark, as the purpose behind reducing IRAS \nexposure to account for BYONC is “to incent New Large Loads to facilitate the \ndevelopment of new capacity so that the PJM Region has sufficient capacity to maintain \nreliability without entering into a capacity shortage and/or having to shed existing native \nload customers.”167  PJM proposed, in its August 13 Filing, to permit Large Loads to \nexclude themselves, in whole or in part, from the MW eligible for IRAS by bringing new \ncapacity to PJM.  Importantly, exclusion from IRAS is intended to incentivize Large Loads \nto address the capacity shortfall caused by their rapid growth in the PJM Region through \nBYONC arrangements.  To that end, PJM proposed specific gating criteria and categories \nof qualifying BYONC.  As PJM explained in its initial filing, a meaningful contribution to \nthe capacity shortfall must not be ephemeral or dissipate quickly and, furthermore, must \nmeet gating criteria designed to stimulate development of new capacity.168  For BYONC \nto address the capacity needs of New Large Loads, and thus appropriately reduce IRAS \nexposure, BYONC must be Capacity Resources, with all attendant rights and obligations, \nand obtain capacity commitments.  Thus, for example, BYONC would be subject to the \n“capacity must-offer requirements and exceptions set forth in Tariff, Attachment DD, \nsections 6.6 and 6.6A,” and that the BYONC would be prohibited from “seek[ing] an \n \n166 See, e.g., Va. Governor Chief Energy Officer Comments at 2-4; CEBA Protest at 2-3; Equinix Protest, \nRequest for Clarification and Comments at 14-17; NRG Comments and Limited Protest at 7-13.  \n167 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 59. \n168 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 50."},{"page":47,"startToken":16833,"endToken":17171,"text":"47 \nexception to the capacity must-offer requirement to provide an external sale” during this \n10-year period.169  \na. \nPeak Shaving Adjustment MW are not comparable to \nBYONC and should not reduce IRAS exposure. \nSome intervenors challenge PJM’s omission of Peak Shaving Adjustment MW \nfrom BYONC arrangements that may reduce a Large Load’s exposure to IRAS.170  But, as \nthe name implies, Peak Shaving Adjustments are adjustments to PJM’s load forecasts, not \nresources that may participate in RPM Auctions.171   \nIn the RBP proceeding, for example, PJM permitted Peak Shaving Adjustment MW \nthat qualify for an opt-out to potentially reduce the identified 2027/2028 Delivery Year \ncapacity shortfall for which the RBP will procure, but did not contemplate that Peak \nShaving Adjustment MW might serve as either Qualifying RBP Offset UCAP MW or \neligible RBP Resources.172  As intervenors recognize, PJM has proposed that Peak Shaving \nAdjustments be reported in the proposed Large Load Registry, which provides PJM with \nsituational awareness of relevant metrics concerning Large Loads in the PJM Region, but \nPJM is not permitting Peak Shaving Adjustments to reduce IRAS exposure in the same \nway as BYONC. \n \n169 Proposed Tariff, Attachment DD-4, section VIII(b). \n170 See, e.g., Voltus Comments at 23-24; Equinix Protest, Request for Clarification and Comments at 14-17; \nSunrun Comments at 5; Tesla Comments at 2; AEU Comments at 3; CEBA Protest at 8. \n171 Resource Adequacy Planning, PJM Manual 19: Load Forecasting and Analysis, PJM Interconnection, \nL.L.C., section 3.2, Development of the Forecast (rev. 39, June 30, 2026), https://www.pjm.com/-\n/media/DotCom/documents/manuals/m19 [https://perma.cc/2JBC-BBDC] (“PJM Manual 19”). \n172 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Reliability Backstop Procurement to Address Resource Adequacy Concerns \nStemming from Large Loads, Docket No. ER26-3380-000, Transmittal Letter at 36, 46-52 (July 31, 2026); \nid. at 51 (“RBP is designed to attract new supplies of capacity (i.e., new [Installed Capacity]), not merely \nincremental resource efficiencies, to address the current capacity shortfall and provide a stable, long-term \nsource of capacity.”)."},{"page":48,"startToken":17171,"endToken":17452,"text":"48 \nBYONC is, at bottom, new supplies of capacity needed to address the current \nshortfall and provide a stable, long-term source of capacity.  Peak Shaving Adjustments \nMW are not, by comparison, a real-time dispatchable product.  Depending on the Peak \nShaving Adjustment plan, a program requires peak shaving on days in which a trigger is \nmet or exceeded based on the actual maximum daily temperature-humidity index for the \nrelevant PJM zone, scored over a rolling three-year period.173  Peak Shaving Adjustments \nare entirely dependent on the specific plan’s temperature-humidity index and are captured \nthrough forecast adjustment MW values.  Peak Shaving Adjustments are, at bottom, not a \nproduct that PJM can dispatch in real-time to provide reliable operations.  Thus, Peak \nShaving Adjustments cannot and should not qualify as BYONC MW capable of reducing \nIRAS exposure. \nb. \nDemand Resources and DER Capacity Aggregation \nResources that fail to meet the BYONC qualifications and \ngating requirements should not reduce IRAS exposure. \nWith exception to the clarifications discussed in Part I.K below, offered in response \nto issues related to locations eligible to support BYONC based on Demand Resources \nand/or DER Capacity Aggregation Resources, intervenors’ arguments174 for expanding the \ncategories of Demand Resources and DER Capacity Aggregation Resources that should \nqualify as BYONC, and thus reduce IRAS exposure, are unavailing.  Intervenors propose \nexpansion of these categories as a means of “unlock[ing] new, and readily available, \ncapacity quickly.”175  Again, intervenors’ positions fail to recognize the underlying purpose \nof BYONC, and the reason BYONC may reduce IRAS exposure—is to incentivize new \n \n173 PJM Manual 19, section 3.2. \n174 NRG Comments and Limited Protest at 7-13; AEU Comments at 5-6. \n175 SEIA Comments at 7."},{"page":49,"startToken":17452,"endToken":17832,"text":"49 \nand lasting capacity contributions to the capacity shortfall, with all attendant rights and \nobligations, and obtain capacity commitments.176  \nIRAS is an operational tool designed to address the shortfall created by the absence \nof new Capacity Resources that offer lasting solutions to the capacity shortfall.  \nFurthermore, as such, Demand Resources and DER Capacity Aggregation Resources that \ncannot demonstrate the Accredited UCAP requirement each year of the 10-year BYONC \nperiod is not a lasting solution.177  Some intervenors assert that Demand Resources and \nAggregated DER Resources are improperly held to standards not imposed on other \nresources participating in a BYONC.178  But, the difference in the gating criteria for \ngeneration/storage resources and Demand Resources/DER is by design.  It is the outgrowth \nof PJM’s recognition that generation/storage resources are tied to physical assets.  For such \nresources, once there is “steel in the ground,” it becomes costly for such assets to exit the \nmarket early.  By contrast, Demand Resources and Aggregated DER Resources are, by \nnature, contracts or agreements.  Demand Resource and Aggregated DER Resource \ncontracts and agreements are not inherently tied to one dedicated asset.  In addition, there \nare near-zero sunk costs associated with exiting the market or re-entering it, year-to-year.  \nIn other words, by design, that Demand Resources and Aggregated DER Resources may \nenter and exit the market year-to-year based on economic and other business decisions.  \n \n176 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 50. \n177 In response to Calibrant Energy’s (“Calibrant”) request, PJM clarifies that this 10-year requirement is for \nparticipation in the capacity market, see August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 55-57, and is not a \nrequirement that any BYONC resource “must remain in service for the life of the New Large Load that it \nserves.”  Calibrant Comments at 8.  PJM further clarifies that BYONC once paired with a New Large Load \ncannot be paired with a different New Large Load unless the initial New Large Load goes out of business.  \nSee August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 64.  The permanence of this arrangement relates to accounting \nfor the BYONC resource’s capacity attributes with the New Large Load, and does not mean that the BYONC \nresource must remain in service permanently as long as the New Large Load is in service. \n178 SEIA Comments at 7."},{"page":50,"startToken":17832,"endToken":18231,"text":"50 \nIndeed, the ability for that Demand Resources and Aggregated DER Resources to easily \nenter and exit the market is one reason why, as NRG notes, Demand Resources and \nAggregated DER Resources may serve as a “bridge to power.”179   \nFinally, Advanced Energy United’s (“AEU”) recommendation that “PJM \nseparately develop additional [Demand Response] product options, calibrated to a capped \nnumber of event hours per year” to allow New Large Loads to self-provide a meaningful \nshare of its BYONC obligation is beyond the scope of this proceeding180 and, in any event, \nsuggests that untested types of capacity contributions be credited for BYONC.    \nG. \nExcluding New Large Loads from the VRR Curve Until They Bring New \nCapacity Properly Gives Effect to the Ratepayer Protection Pledge and \nSends Appropriate Price Signals. \nSeveral entities challenge PJM’s proposal to remove New Large Loads (to the \nextent they have not brought capacity to offset their resource adequacy needs) from the \nVRR Curve used to clear RPM Auctions.  These entities each overlook that, pursuant to \nthe Ratepayer Protection Pledge, the New Large Loads have committed to “build, bring, or \nbuy the new generation resources and electricity needed to satisfy their new energy \ndemands” and “add more capacity that serves the broader public by increasing supply” in \norder to “advance[] self-sufficiency and protect[] Americans from higher prices.”181  \n \n179 NRG Comments and Limited Protest at 4. \n180 AEU Comments at 8. \n181 Ratepayer Protection Pledge; Ratepayer Protection Pledge Announcement; July 2026 Ratepayer \nProtection Pledge Update (identifying over 300 organizations that include over 250 utilities, cooperatives, \nand transmission cooperatives to municipal utilities and state associations, 44 data center developers, 7 \nArtificial Intelligence companies, and 23 governors that joined the Ratepayer Protection Pledge.  The 44 data \ncenter developers include:  Aligned Data Centers, LLC; Amazon.com, Inc.; Applied Digital Corporation; \nBeale Infrastructure Group, LLC; Bitdeer Technologies Group; CleanSpark LLC; Cloud HQ LLC; Cologix, \nInc.; Compass Datacenters, LLC; Core Scientific, Inc.; CoreWeave, Inc.; Corscale, LLC; Crusoe \nTechnologies LLC; CyrusOne, Inc.; DataBank Holdings, Ltd.; Digital Realty Trust, Inc.; Diode Ventures, \nLLC, a Black & Veatch company; EdgeConnex Inc.; EdgeCore Digital Infrastructure (d/b/a EdgeCore \nInternet Real Estate, LLC); Equinix, Inc.; Google (d/b/a Alphabet Inc.); Iron Mountain Incorporated; Keel \nInfrastructure Corp.; Lambda; Meta Platforms, Inc.; Microsoft Corporation; Nebius Group N.V.; NTT Global \nData Centers (d/b/a NTT DATA, Inc.); OpenAI, L.L.C.; Oracle Corporation; Oppidan Connect Data Centers"},{"page":51,"startToken":18231,"endToken":18572,"text":"51 \nExcluding New Large Loads that have not yet brought new capacity from the VRR Curve \nrecognizes and gives meaning to this commitment.   \nThe DCC claims that PJM “cannot expect new supply resources to appear if the \nprice signals sent by the market do not reflect—as will be the case under PJM’s IRAS \nproposal--the actual load that must be served in the region.”182  The DCC completely \nignores that the New Large Loads (many of which may be brought by members of the \nDCC) have committed, under the Ratepayer Protection Pledge, to “build, bring, or buy the \nnew generation resources” need to meet their demand.  PJM expects new supply resources \nto appear to match the demand represented in the VRR Curve; the demand outside the VRR \nCurve—the New Large Loads—have committed to procure new capacity “build, buy, or \nbring” new capacity,183 actions which generally would occur outside the capacity market.  \nPJM’s proposal merely effectuates the expectation that New Large Loads will follow \nthrough on their commitment, and if they do not, they will address their resource adequacy \nneeds through the provision of IRAS.   \nSimilar to the DCC, EPSA contends that “existing resources ‘will presumably face \nlower prices and will never get the benefit of price formation that will price in new entry \nin the market as it is needed.’”184  But, this claim fails for the same reason—it presumes \nthat New Large Loads should be served through the capacity market.  EPSA and the DCC \n \n(d/b/a Oppidan Investment Company); Prologis, Inc.; Quality Technology Services, LLC; Rowan Digital \nInfrastructure Pty. Ltd.; Skybox Datacenters, LLC; Skylar Opportunities LLC; STACK Infrastructure, Inc.; \nStarwood Digital Ventures (d/b/a Starwood Capital Operations, LLC); Stream Data Centers, L.P.; Switch, \nInc.; T5Data Centers, LLC; TA Realty LLC; Vantage Data Centers Management Company, LLC; and x.AI \nLLC). \n182 DCC Protest at 25. \n183 Ratepayer Protection Pledge. \n184 EPSA Protest at 7 (quoting Affidavit of Paul M. Sotkiewicz, Ph.D. on Behalf of Electric Power Supply \nAssociation (Attachment A) ¶ 80)."},{"page":52,"startToken":18572,"endToken":18990,"text":"52 \nwould have everyone forget about or otherwise discount the commitments in the Ratepayer \nProtection Pledge and maintain the status quo so as to allow New Large Loads to continue \nto drive cost increases to ratepayers.185  Moreover, PJM’s capacity market was never \ndesigned to be the sole mechanism by which loads procure capacity.  Rather, it was always \ndesigned as producing a forward price signal that load and generation can contract around \nthrough bilateral arrangements.186  Adopting EPSA’s position would put the Commission \nin the anomalous position of ignoring the desire for long-term bilateral arrangements \ninformed by the capacity price signal and instead exalting the capacity market as the \nexclusive means for setting capacity prices, terms, and conditions.  \nGoogle echoes these arguments, asserting that removing certain New Large Loads \nfrom the VRR Curve would “mut[e] the demand signal and forc[e] capacity prices to a \nlevel that is lower than what is needed to attract investment in new generation.”  To put a \nfiner point on it—the price signal that will result from the auction will reflect the loads the \nauction is designed to procure.  As such, contrary to Vistra Corp.’s (“Vistra”) claim \notherwise, PJM’s proposal will not “disincentivize the entry [of new supply] needed to \nclose any reliability gap remaining after the backstop auction.”187  Rather, the auction will \ncontinue to produce a price signal that incents supply to meet the needs of the \n \n185 See, e.g., Independent Market Monitor for PJM, State of the Market Report for PJM (May 14, 2026) \nhttps://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/2026/2026q1-som-pjm.pdf \n[perma https://perma.cc/4DSL-2SCK] (“Based on actual auction clearing prices and quantities and uplift \nMW, inclusion of existing and forecast data center load growth resulted in a combined total increase in \ncapacity market revenues for the 2025/2026 [Base Residual Auction], the 2026/2027 [Base Residual \nAuction], and the 2027/2028 [Base Residual Auction]of $23,100,955,341.  This total will continue to grow \nuntil the issues associated with the addition of large data center loads are addressed.”). \n186 See Tariff, Attachment DD, sections 1(b), 4.6, 5.2; PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 119 FERC ¶ 61,318, at \nP 91 (2007) (“PJM adds that likely benefits of forward commitment include long-term contracting, incentives \nfor investment, and a stable forward price signal that encourages long-term forward contracting, which in \nturn provides greater forward certainty for both capacity price and capacity adequacy.”). \n187 Vistra Protest at 20."},{"page":53,"startToken":18990,"endToken":19373,"text":"53 \ncapacity-backed loads that are included in the demand curve, and the New Large Loads \nthat have not entered into BYONC arrangements are appropriately excluded from the \ndemand curve until such loads procure their own new supply.  Those entities that fail to \narrange for BYONC will still be paying for capacity but may be eligible to provide IRAS \nand reduce consumption at a much earlier stage than their New Large Load counterparts \nwho did arrange to bring new capacity to the market.  \nAnother complaint is that excluding the New Large Loads that have not entered \ninto BYONC arrangements from the VRR Curve is “breaking supply and demand \nfundamentals.”188  This is incorrect.  The exclusion of New Large Loads from the demand \ncurve is akin to the exclusion of energy-only resources from the supply curve in the \ncapacity market.  That is, the purpose of the RPM Auction is to procure resources that are \ncapable of providing capacity for loads that seek to receive capacity service.  New Large \nLoads that do not BYONC are effectively electing not to receive capacity service (at \n1-in-10 LOLE) so such loads are appropriately excluded from the demand curve because \nthey are not electing to receive the capacity-backed service that RPM is designed to \nprocure.  This is the same concept as why PJM excludes energy-only resources from the \nsupply curve since those resources do not provide capacity to the system. In both cases, it \nis proper to exclude non-capacity backed loads and energy-only resources from the demand \nand supply curves, respectively, since the RPM Auction is designed to procure Capacity \nResources to meet the needs of capacity-backed loads.189 \n \n188 Google Protest at 14. \n189 The IMM also challenges PJM’s proposal but on the grounds that it does not go far enough.  The IMM \nadvocates for permanently removing all data center loads from the capacity market, regardless of whether \nthey have brought new capacity.  See IMM Protest at 11-12.  The IMM’s arguments are made in an effort to \nfurther its preferred approach of pulling all data centers out of PJM’s markets and procuring capacity for \nthem in a separate process.  See id. at 37-40 & Attachment A.  The Commission has already rejected the \nIMM’s approach of allowing data centers to connect to the PJM system “only when they can be served"},{"page":54,"startToken":19373,"endToken":19733,"text":"54 \nH. \nThe IRAS Compensation Mechanism Benefits Ratepayers, Adheres to \nCost Causation Principles, and Reflects a Division of Labor that Respects \nStates’ Jurisdictional Authority over Retail Customers and Rates. \nThe IRAS compensation mechanism adheres to cost causation principles by \ncompensating LSEs, which are NITS customers who were requested to, and did in fact, \nreduce load in response to an IRAS Action.  The mechanism recognizes that, to the extent \nthat LSEs serving Eligible New Large Loads are required to reduce consumption before \nPre-Emergency Load Management in response to an IRAS Action, those LSEs are called \non to reduce consumption before other NITS customers.  The mechanism targets wholesale \nrates for wholesale customers and, thus, falls squarely within the scope of PJM’s \nauthority.190 \nNevertheless, several intervenors request that PJM clarify the IRAS rate and \ncompensation mechanism,191 allege that the IRAS compensation mechanism is an \nimproper attempt to create a retail compensation scheme for curtailed large loads,192 or \nassert that PJM has impermissibly delegated its authority to establish wholesale rates for \nwholesale service pursuant to the FPA.193  DCC asserts that, in spite of the IRAS \ncompensation mechanism, requiring some NITS customers to reduce load prior to others \nwould violate cost causation.194  None of these arguments pass muster.  The IRAS \n \nreliably as defined both by transmission and capacity adequacy.”  Indep. Market Monitor for PJM v. PJM \nInterconnection, L.L.C., 194 FERC ¶ 61,227, at P 1 (2026).  Leaving aside that PJM’s proposal is just and \nreasonable, consistent with both the applicable FPA section 205 standard and the Commission’s past rejection \nof this proposal from the IMM, the Commission likewise can easily dismiss the IMM’s proffered approach. \n190 EPSA, 577 U.S. at 264; see also PA Governors Answer at 12 (“PJM’s provision of wholesale \ncompensation for a wholesale service . . . envisions making that wholesale compensation level subject to \nchange by the relevant retail authority.”). \n191 See, e.g., OPSI Comments and Request for Clarification or to Sever at 7-8; Microsoft Comments at 4; PA \nGovernor Answer at 14-15. \n192 FirstEnergy Limited Protest and Comments at 4.  \n193 PPL Protest and Request for Clarification at 16. \n194 DCC Protest at 5."},{"page":55,"startToken":19733,"endToken":20011,"text":"55 \ncompensation mechanism is, in fact, a balanced approach that is beneficial to ratepayers, \nadheres to cost causation principles, and respects the division of authority over wholesale \nand retail rates. \n1. \nThe proposed compensation mechanism recognizes that LSEs \nsubject to an IRAS Action that have been called on before \nPre-Emergency Load Management should be compensated, in \nkeeping with cost causation principles. \nThe IRAS compensation mechanism recognizes that LSEs serving Eligible New \nLarge Load customers are NITS customers.  Like other NITS customers, these LSEs would \nhave their transmission service curtailed after non-firm customers.195  And, like other NITS \ncustomers, these LSEs would be allocated capacity charges based on their peak load.   \nIndisputably, however, under IRAS, some LSEs serving Eligible New Large Loads \nmay not receive all of the benefits of NITS customers despite having paid for capacity \ncharges like other NITS customers.  Specifically, if LSEs serving New Large Loads are, \npursuant to IRAS, called on to reduce their consumption before PJM calls on \nPre-Emergency Load Management, such LSEs cannot be said to have received the benefit \nof the Pre-Emergency Load Management in the same way that other NITS customers \nwould.   \nDCC alleges that, under IRAS, calling on LSEs serving Eligible New Large Loads \nbefore Pre-Emergency Load Management would violate cost causation principles because \nEligible New Large Loads will “pay the costs of capacity that only will be deployed after” \nthey have been asked to reduce energy consumption.196   \n \n195 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 94. \n196 DCC Protest at 20; see also Google Protest at 13 (arguing that being removed from the VRR Curve and \nassessed capacity charges “is not just and reasonable or consistent with cost causation”)."},{"page":56,"startToken":20011,"endToken":20292,"text":"56 \nTo be clear, while DCC is correct that “NITS customers serving Eligible New Large \nLoads still would be required to pay charges reflecting the cost of capacity committed \nthrough PJM’s capacity market,”197 DCC incorrectly alleges that the IRAS framework \n“forces . . . NITS customers to bear the costs of capacity that would not be available to \nmeet their needs.”198   \nThe IRAS compensation mechanism addresses DCC’s concern by compensating \nLSEs serving Eligible New Large Loads under the limited circumstance in which an LSE \nhas paid for but, unlike other NITS customers, not received the full benefit of, \nPre-Emergency Load Management.  In the event the loads of those LSEs are, unlike other \nNITS customers, reduced under IRAS before Pre-Emergency Load Management, they \nwould be compensated for such load reduction, in part, to account for the fact that these \nLSEs are, in the context of an IRAS Action, not treated as capacity-backed loads.  That is, \nin developing IRAS, PJM recognized that Eligible New Large Loads would not be able to \nobtain the full benefit, and therefore, consistent with cost causation principles, PJM \nproposed to compensate them for the load reduction service—both for the load reduction \nservice provided and in exchange for the avoided capacity service not provided.  Thus, \nwhen viewed globally, PJM’s proposal is just and reasonable \n2. \nThe IRAS compensation rate establishes a default, maximum rate, \nbut provides states with the flexibility to establish lower \ncompensation rates.  \nAs PJM notes in its initial filing, the proposed IRAS compensation rate neither \nmandates state-specific action nor imposes specific terms and conditions on retail rates.199  \n \n197 DCC Protest at 5. \n198 DCC Protest at 5. \n199 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 104-08."},{"page":57,"startToken":20292,"endToken":20673,"text":"57 \nPJM has proposed a default IRAS compensation rate set at the Commission-accepted \nmaximum rate of 50% of the Non-Performance Charge Rate.200  However, the IRAS \ncompensation rate may be reduced, even to 0%, by the states and/or appropriate RERRAs \nat the retail level.  In short, PJM is using its authority to set the rates, terms and conditions \nassociated with operational actions to reduce energy consumption as part of the \nCommission’s “sales for resale” jurisdiction.  As with all other aspects of ratemaking, the \napplication of that rate to different retail customer classes is left to state jurisdictions.201  \nThe absence of state action will result in the application of a default rate of 50% of \nthe Non-Performance Charge Rate.  As PJM’s initial filing furthermore notes,202 and the \nPennsylvania Governor’s Office likewise explains, consistent with the Commission’s \nrespect of state law choices in the demand response context, “provision of particular levels \nof compensation depend on certain conditions at retail.  In other words, just as eligibility \nto participate as wholesale demand response depends on permission under the relevant state \nlaws and regulations, wholesale compensation for IRAS at a reduced level depends on \nRERRA action specifying such an alternate compensation level within the acceptable, just \nand reasonable range.”203   \n \n200 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 102. \n201 See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 195 FERC ¶ 61,211 at P 70 (“We expect that the additional cost \ntransparency measures proposed in the following section will give state public utility commissions and other \nstate regulators the information necessary to allow them to understand which transmission costs are caused \nby which transmission customers, so that they can sub-allocate these costs to the appropriate retail customers. \nIndeed, the Commission's objective in this proceeding is to respect the cooperative federalism approach \nestablished under the FPA. Specifically, one of the benefits of providing transparency on the costs of Network \nUpgrades necessary to provide transmission service to Eligible Customers on behalf of large loads is so that \nstate regulators can use that information to protect residential and small commercial customers by \nincorporating those costs into the retail rates as they see fit given their authority to set rates for different \nclasses of retail customers.”). \n202 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 102. \n203 PA Governor Answer at 15."},{"page":58,"startToken":20673,"endToken":21021,"text":"58 \nLest there be any ambiguity, proposed Tariff, Attachement DD-4, Section X \ncontemplates that the entities to be paid the rate and the loads to be charged to support such \ncompensation are determined at the state level, in collaboration with relevant retail \ncustomers, and consistent with the Electric Distributor’s state-approved load reduction \nplans and other state-approved programs, rates, and rules.204   \n \nThe appropriate states and/or RERRAs, conferring with Electric Distributors, \nLSEs, and the relevant New Large Loads, may—but are not required to under PJM’s \nproposed Tariff provisions—reduce that rate and to even decide when and whether the \nIRAS rate should be reduced to zero.  PJM has, as the Pennsylvania Governor’s Office \nobserves, “appropriately provided solicitude to the states by granting retail authorities a \ndirect role in determining whether to provide wholesale compensation based on the \ncurtailments directed under IRAS and, if so, how much compensation up to the cap \nproposed by PJM.”205 \nI. \nIRAS Does Not Unduly Discriminate Against New Large Loads. \nSeveral protests assert that the IRAS framework unduly discriminates against New \nLarge Loads based on vintage, size, or type.206  For reasons that PJM explained at length \nin its August 13 Filing, those arguments are unavailing, particularly when considered in \nthe context of longstanding precedent. \n \n204 To the extent the Commission finds ambiguity, PJM consents to clarifying the proposed Tariff, \nAttachement DD-4, section X on compliance, consistent with the description of the provision in this section, \nif the Commission so directs.  Given the need to have the rules in place in a timely manner, PJM respectfully \nrequests that the Commission prescribe the compliance requirement in as much detail as possible.   \n205 PA Governor Answer at 3. \n206 See, e.g., Constellation Protest and Comments at 29.  Other intervenors argue that BYONC discriminates \nagainst Capacity Resources based on vintage and type (see, e.g., Vistra Protest at 3; Constellation Protest and \nComments at 37; EPSA Protest at 2; America’s Power Protest at 8-10; NRG Comments and Limited Protest \nat 9).  Those arguments are addressed in this answer, above, in Part I.F.4."},{"page":59,"startToken":21021,"endToken":21414,"text":"59 \nAccording to well-settled precedent, “[w]hether a rate or practice is unduly \ndiscriminatory depends on whether it provides different treatment to different classes of \nentities and turns on whether those classes of entities are similarly situated.”207  When \ndifferences in treatment “can be explained by some factor deemed acceptable by the \nregulators (and the courts)”208 or “are predicated upon factual differences between \ncustomers,”209 they are justified and therefore not unduly discriminatory nor preferential.   \nFirst, for reasons PJM has already explained at length in its initial filing and which \nPJM declines to repeat here,210 and as the PIOs state in their limited protest, “Large load \ncustomers are differently situated than traditional residential and commercial customers \nand warrant new rules and obligations.”211   \nSecond, as explained in PJM’s initial filing, the Commission has found that large \nloads constitute “a separate category of load[,]”212 and repeatedly highlighted the \nuniqueness of large loads.213  Far from being “legally irrelevant differences,” as Google \nalleges,214 these distinctions have repeatedly served as the foundation for the Commission’s \n \n207 Calpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 171 FERC ¶ 61,035, at P 318, order on compliance, \ngranting waiver request, addressing arguments raised on reh’g & setting aside prior order, in part, 173 \nFERC ¶ 61,061 (2020), order on compliance & clarification, 174 FERC ¶ 61,036, order setting aside prior \norder, in part, 174 FERC ¶ 61,109 (2021). \n208 Town of Norwood v. FERC, 202 F.3d 392, 402 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[D]ifferential treatment does not \nnecessarily amount to undue preference where the difference in treatment can be explained by some factor \ndeemed acceptable by the regulators (and the courts).”). \n209 Cities of Newark v. FERC, 763 F.2d 533, 546 (3d Cir. 1985) (“[D]ifferences in rates are justified where \nthey are predicated upon factual differences between customers.”). \n210 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 95-97. \n211 PIOs Limited Protest at 13.  \n212 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 96 & n.257 (citing June 2026 Order to Show Cause, 195 FERC \n¶ 61,211 at P 50; FPA section 215, 16 U.S.C. § 824o). \n213 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 96-97 & nn.259, 261-62 (citing 2026 Order to Show Cause, 195 \nFERC ¶ 61,211 at P 58; Sw. Power Pool, 195 FERC ¶ 61,196, at PP 84-85, 87 (2026)). \n214 Google Protest at 12."},{"page":60,"startToken":21414,"endToken":21705,"text":"60 \nfinding that unique characteristics of large loads have given rise to unique, \nCommission-jurisdictional challenges.  Most recently, and indeed, as the Pennsylvania \nGovernor’s Office notes, the IRAS proposal “focuses on distinctions among customers that \nare relevant to ensuring just and reasonable rates and reliable operation of the bulk power \nsystem.  Large load customers that today drive completely novel degrees of load growth \npose unique operational challenges to the transmission system.”215 \nThird, the applicability of IRAS is limited and narrowly tailored to address the \nspecific situation where PJM may require that Electric Distributors reduce consumption by \na MW quantity of load during certain, specifically defined emergency situations in years \nwhen a capacity shortfall triggers IRAS due to the influx of large loads.  IRAS is applicable \nonly when New Large Loads that have not brought their own capacity and have not been \nallocated sufficient RBP UCAP MW cause a PJM Region Reliability Requirement \nshortfall.  Where the Commission has found that the treatment of large loads is “tailored to \nthe specific and unique nature of” of such loads, the Commission has found that treatment \njust and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.216  IRAS was developed \nto address the specific and unique issues caused by New Large Loads in the PJM Region, \nwhile also enabling New Large Loads to nevertheless be served by PJM.   \nFourth, the contention that IRAS unduly discriminates against large loads based on \nvintage—i.e., by distinguishing existing Large Loads from New Large Loads—fails to \nrecognize that the relevant law on undue discrimination turns on whether the different \ntreatment is justified.  Here, that different treatment has been fully justified. \n \n215 PA Governor Answer at 18.   \n216 Sw. Power Pool, 195 FERC ¶ 61,196 at PP 85, 87."},{"page":61,"startToken":21705,"endToken":22125,"text":"61 \nAs PJM explains in the August 13 Filing, only New Large Load may be eligible to \nprovide IRAS.  At the beginning of IRAS, New Large Loads will consist of loads in-service \nafter June 1, 2027.  In subsequent years, if the need for IRAS re-emerges, New Large Load \nwill be designated as Large Load entering service after June 1 of the first Delivery Year \nthat the PJM Region is short capacity.  The reasoning is straightforward.  IRAS applies in \nDelivery Years when the amount of Capacity Resources committed falls short of the PJM \nRegion Reliability Requirement, because new load has come onto the PJM system without \nbringing their own capacity.217  New, not existing load, is the reason for the shortfall, which \ndrives the need for IRAS.  Failing to make a distinction between New Large Loads and \nLarge Loads for purposes of applying IRAS would fail to account for causation.  \nFurthermore, as the Pennsylvania Governor’s Office correctly notes, the Commission \nregularly accepts new rules that apply only to new entrants.218 \nJ. \nPJM’s Proposal to Require FRR Entities to Bring New Capacity to Meet \nthe Needs of New Large Loads Regardless of Need for IRAS in a Given \nDelivery Year Is Just and Reasonable and Treats All LSEs in PJM \nEqually. \nAmerican Electric Power Service Corporation (“AEP”) seeks several clarifications \nregarding the proposed rules applicable to Fixed Resource Requirement (“FRR”) Entities.  \nAEP’s proposed clarifications can be boiled down to this:  When the IRAS is not needed \nbecause the capacity market has secured sufficient capacity to meet the applicable \n \n217 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 39. \n218 PA Governor Answer at 18 & n.42 (citing Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 150 FERC ¶ 61,180, \nat P 21 (2015) (rejecting arguments that differing treatment between interconnection customers constitutes \nundue preference, where that difference is due to the fact that certain interconnection customers are subject \nto generator interconnection procedures and agreements that pre-date new reforms); ISO New Eng. Inc., 162 \nFERC ¶ 61,205, at P 47 (2018) (rejecting protestors’ arguments that ISO New England Inc.’s inclusion of a \ncut-off date in the definition of resource types to which a particular capacity market rule would apply \nconstitutes undue discrimination); December 2025 Show Cause Order, 193 FERC ¶ 61,217 at P 224 (“To the \nextent an entity is a party to an existing contract for such a purpose, we find that it is appropriate to grandfather \nsuch entity so that it may continue using BTMG for the current term remaining under the existing contract.”)."},{"page":62,"startToken":22125,"endToken":22461,"text":"62 \nreliability requirement, PJM should relax the proposed rule prohibiting an FRR Entity from \nrelying on Existing Generation Capacity Resources in its FRR Capacity Plan in excess of \nthose Capacity Resources owned or contracted by the FRR Entity prior to June 1, 2027, as \nNew Large Load.219  Such relaxation would allow an FRR Entity to use existing PJM \nCapacity Resources to meet the resource adequacy needs of its New Large Loads.   \nThe Commission should reject this request, as granting it would undermine the \noverarching policy driving IRAS and the Ratepayer Protection Pledge:  The resource \nadequacy needs of New Large Loads will be met through new capacity.  PJM proposed \nnew RAA, section 7.8 to memorialize this policy as an obligation on all LSEs, including \nthe LSEs within FRR Entities’ service territories.220  As PJM explained in the August 13 \nFiling, “[t]he growth of Large Loads is an issue facing the entire PJM Region, and new \ncapacity should arrive to serve their needs, regardless of whether the New Large Load is \nto be located in an FRR Service Area or the region served by RPM.”221  It is just and \nreasonable that all LSEs in PJM adhere to the same requirement of bringing new capacity \nto meet the needs of New Large Loads.  This is true regardless of whether the LSE meets \nits capacity needs under the capacity market rules or FRR rules.  Thus, an FRR Entity \ncannot utilize existing capacity outside of the FRR Entities’ territory to meet the resource \nadequacy needs of any New Large Load through its FRR Capacity Plan.222 \nFor its part, EKPC alleges that PJM’s exclusion of New Large Loads located in \nFRR Entities’ territories “unduly discriminates against RPM Capacity Market LSEs.”223  \n \n219 AEP Comments and Request for Clarification at 9-17. \n220 See August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 49-50; see supra Part I.C. \n221 August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 74. \n222 See August 13 Filing, Transmittal Letter at 52. \n223 EKPC Limited Protest at 33."},{"page":63,"startToken":22461,"endToken":22826,"text":"63 \nSpecifically, EKPC contends that “[i]t is unduly discriminatory to allow an FRR Entity that \npotentially could have an insufficient FRR Plan to avoid IRAS while load of a Self-Supply \nEntity participating in the RPM Capacity Market would be subject to IRAS.”224  This \nargument is without merit.  It is well established that “a finding of undue discrimination \nrequires a showing that (1) two classes of customers are treated differently; and (2) the two \nclasses of customers are similarly situated.”225  With respect to resource adequacy, FRR \nEntities are not similarly situated to LSEs participating in the capacity market.  By \ndefinition, FRR Entities must bring new capacity for all new loads within their territory.226  \nIf an FRR Entity does not include sufficient capacity in its FRR Capacity Plan, the FRR \nEntity is subject to “an FRR Commitment Insufficiency Charge, in an amount equal to two \ntimes the Cost of New Entry for the relevant location” multiplied by the MW of capacity \nshort.227  In contrast, LSEs participating in RPM have no requirement to bring capacity \nsufficient to meet their needs—which is a primary reason why PJM is trying to incent New \nLarge Loads to bring new capacity for their resource adequacy needs.  \n \n224 EKPC Limited Protest at 33. \n225 TranSource, LLC v. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 168 FERC ¶ 61,119, at P 240 & n.769 (2019) (citing \n“Complex” Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. FERC, 165 F.3d 992, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Advanced Energy \nMgmt. All. v. FERC, 860 F.3d 656, 670-71 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Transmission Agency of N. Cal. v. FERC, 628 \nF.3d 538, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“A rate is not ‘unduly’ preferential or ‘unreasonably’ discriminatory if the \nutility can justify the disparate effect. The court will not find a Commission determination to be unduly \ndiscriminatory if the entity claiming discrimination is not similarly situated to others.”) (internal quotations \nand citations omitted). \n226 See RAA, Article 1 (defining FRR Service Area and stating that “the FRR Entity has or assumes the \nobligation to provide capacity for all load (including load growth) within such area”).   \n227 RAA, Schedule 8.1D, section 7."},{"page":64,"startToken":22826,"endToken":23181,"text":"64 \nK. \nFollowing Review and Stakeholder Feedback, PJM Consents to a Few \nRevisions to the Proposed Tariff Language.  \nIn addition, stakeholders have identified some clarifications to the proposed \nlanguage that PJM agrees with and is willing to make on compliance, if directed by the \nCommission.228   \nIn particular, Calibrant and Voltus identify a clarifying revision to the text in \nproposed Tariff, Attachment DD-4, section VI(b)(ii)(1) related to the composition of \nDemand Resources or DER Capacity Aggregation Resources that may qualify as \nBYONC.229  PJM agrees that the “not” included in this section should be removed, as \nshown below, and provides additional clarifying language.   \n(ii) For Demand Resources or DER Capacity Aggregation \nResources, the resource must qualify as a Planned Demand \nResource or DER Capacity Aggregation Resource, as described in \nthe RAA, Schedule 6 and Schedule 6.2 and: \n(1) be composed of, or reliant on, the incremental amount of \nany location not registered in or prior to the 2026/2027 \nDelivery Year at which an such incremental amount at that \nlocation is the result of the registration of new generation or \nstorage assets at the location. However, to the extent three \nconsecutive Delivery Years meet the requirements of Tariff, \nAttachment DD-4, section IV(b)(iii), then will be composed \nof, or reliant on, the incremental amount of any location \nregistered in the Delivery Year prior to the first Delivery \nYear for which the requirements of Tariff, Attachment \nDD-4, section IV(b)(iii) are not met; and/or \nThis “not” was inadvertently included in the proposed Tariff language.  With this \ncorrection and the additional clarifying language, the provision logically provides that only \n \n228 Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 134 FERC ¶ 61,140, at P 1 (2011); id. PP 13-14, 42-43 (accepting \nchanges to tariff language identified by the California Independent System Operator Corporation (“CAISO”) \nin its answer where CAISO agreed with intervenors that changes to the tariff would be consistent with \nCAISO’s intentions and CAISO indicated that it was willing to correct the error; accepting other tariff \nrevisions correcting typographical and other errors). \n229 See Calibrant Comments at 6-7; Voltus Comments at 7-8."},{"page":65,"startToken":23181,"endToken":23531,"text":"65 \nincremental increases in load reduction capability above that which was previously \nregistered due to the registration of new generation or storage at the underlying location \nwill qualify as BYONC—which was PJM’s intent.230   \nSimilarly, in response to Voltus’s request,231 PJM agrees that “dormant” registered \nlocations should be allowed to be reactivated to support BYONC resources.  Such locations \nare not currently supporting Capacity Resources, and therefore any capacity capability they \ncan provide would be new as compared to the capacity on the system for the 2026/2027 \nDelivery Year.  Accordingly, PJM consents to revising proposed Tariff, Attachment DD-4, \nsection VI(b)(ii)(2) to make clear that registered locations not used in the capacity market \nfor the 2026/2027 Delivery Year are eligible to support a BYONC arrangement. \n(2) be composed of, or reliant on, locations that did were not \npreviously supported a Capacity Resource, a Peak Shaving \nAdjustment, or Price Responsive Demand for or prior to the \n2026/2027 Delivery Year. However, to the extent three \nconsecutive Delivery Years meet the requirements of Tariff, \nAttachment DD-4, section IV(b)(iii), then will be composed \nof, or reliant on, locations that did were not previously \nsupported a Capacity Resource, a Peak Shaving Adjustment, \nor Price Responsive Demand for the Delivery Year prior to \nthe first Delivery Year for which the requirements of Tariff, \nAttachment DD-4, section IV(b)(iii) are not met. \nIn addition, since PJM submitted the August 13 Filing, PJM identified a couple \n“clean-up” type ministerial revisions needed to the proposed Tariff, which are described \nbelow and that PJM is willing to make these clean up changes on compliance, if directed \nby the Commission.  Specifically, PJM identified the following ministerial clean-up \nchanges to proposed Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.10(a)(i): \n \n230 In response to Calibrant’s request, see Calibrant Comments at 7-8, PJM also clarifies that the measurement \nof the “incremental amount” will be a comparison of the location’s prior demand reduction capability against \nthe location’s capability following the registration of new generation or storage assets at that location.   \n231 See Voltus Comments at 10-11."},{"page":66,"startToken":23531,"endToken":23747,"text":"66 \n• For the Variable Resource Requirement curve for the 2029/2030 Delivery Year, \nthe language describing point (1) includes two extraneous end parentheses.  \nSpecifically, the “)” should be deleted after “0.2 times Cost of New Entry” and \nat the end after “multiplied by 99%;” and \n• For the Variable Resource Requirement curve for the 2030/2031 Delivery Year \nand subsequent Delivery Years, the language describing point (1) includes an \nextraneous bracket after “multiplied by 99%” and the language for point \n(3) includes an extraneous bracket after “multiplied by 106.0%.” \nII. \nCONCLUSION \nPJM asks that the Commission consider this answer and accept the Tariff and RAA \nrevisions proposed in this proceeding, effective October 12, 2026, as requested. \nRespectfully submitted, \n \n /s/ Ryan J. Collins \n \nCraig Glazer \nVice President–Federal Government Policy \nPJM Interconnection, L.L.C. \n1200 G Street, NW, Suite 600 \nWashington, DC  20005 \n(202) 423-4743  \ncraig.glazer@pjm.com \n \nRyan J. Collins \nVivian W. Chum \nAnne Marie Hirschberger \nWright & Talisman, P.C. \n1200 G Street, NW, Suite 600 \nWashington, DC  20005 \n(202) 393-1200  \ncollins@wrightlaw.com \nchum@wrightlaw.com \nhirschberger@wrightlaw.com \n \nMark J. Stanisz \nAssociate General Counsel \nPJM Interconnection, L.L.C.  \n2750 Monroe Blvd. \nAudubon, PA  19403 \n(610) 666-8800 \nmark.stanisz@pjm.com  \n \n \nOn Behalf of \nPJM Interconnection, L.L.C. \n \nSeptember 23, 2026"},{"page":67,"startToken":23747,"endToken":23762,"text":"Appendix A \n \nProtests, Comments, Requests for Clarification, and Answers Filed to Date  \nDocket No. ER26-3515-000"},{"page":68,"startToken":23762,"endToken":24016,"text":"Appendix A \nProtests, Comments, Requests for Clarification, and Answers Filed to Date  \nDocket No. ER26-3515-000 \n• ACORE Comments on PJM Interconnection LLC Interim Resource Adequacy \nService Proposal (Sep. 3, 2026) (“ACORE Comments”) \n• Comments of Advanced Energy United (Sep. 3, 2026) (“AEU Comments”) \n• Comments and Request for Clarification of American Electric Power Service \nCorporation (Sep. 3, 2026) (“AEP Comments and Request for Clarification”) \n• Limited Protest of American Municipal Power, Inc. (Sep. 3, 2026) (“AMP Limited \nProtest”) \n• Protest of America’s Power (Sep. 3, 2026) (“America’s Power Protest”) \n• Motion to Intervene and Comments of Appalachian Voices (Sep. 3, 2026) \n(“Appalachian Voices Comments”) \n• Limited Comments of Buckeye Power, Inc. (Sep. 3, 2026) (“Buckeye Limited \nComments”) \n• Motion for Leave to Answer and Answer of Buckeye Power, Inc. (Sept. 18, 2026) \n(“Buckeye Answer”) \n• Comments of Calibrant Energy (Sep. 3, 2026) (“Calibrant Comments”) \n• Comments of the Chief Energy Officer for the Governor of Virginia (Sep. 3, 2026) \n(“Va. Governor Chief Energy Officer Comments”) \n• Protest and Comments of Constellation Energy Generation, LLC (Sep. 3, 2026) \n(“Constellation Protest and Comments”) \n• Motion to Intervene and Protest of Corporate Energy Buyers Association (Sep. 3, \n2026) (“CEBA Protest”) \n• Motion for Leave to File Comments Out-of-Time and Comments of CyrusOne, LP \n(Sep. 11, 2026) (“CyrusOne Comments”) \n• Motion to Intervene and Protest of the Data Center Coalition (Sep. 3, 2026) (“DCC \nProtest”) \n• Comments of Dominion Energy Services, Inc. (Sep. 3, 2026) (“Dominion \nComments”) \n• Limited Protest of East Kentucky Power Cooperative, Inc. (Sep. 3, 2026) (“EKPC \nLimited Protest”) \n• Protest of the Electric Power Supply Association (Sep. 2, 2026) (“EPSA Protest”)"},{"page":69,"startToken":24016,"endToken":24324,"text":"ii \n• Protest, Request for Clarification and Comments of Equinix Inc. on the Proposal of \nPJM Interconnection, L.L.C. to Establish Interim Resource Adequacy Service and \na Large Load Registry to Address System Reliability (Sep. 4, 2026) (“Equinix \nProtest, Request for Clarification and Comments”) \n• Limited Protest and Comments of FirstEnergy Service Company (Sep. 3, 2026) \n(“FirstEnergy Limited Protest and Comments”) \n• Protest of Google LLC (Sep. 3, 2026) (“Google Protest”) \n• Answer of Google LLC (Aug. 31, 2026) (“Google Answer”) \n• Comments of Hans Royal (Sep. 3, 2026) (“Hans Royal Comments”)  \n• Protest of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM (Sep. 3, 2026) (“IMM Protest”) \n• Comments of Industrial Energy Consumers of America (Sep. 15, 2026) (“IECA \nComments”) \n• Protest and Comments of Joint Consumer Advocates (Sep. 3, 2026) (“JCA Protest \nand Comments”) \n• Comments of Microsoft Corporation (Sep. 3, 2026) (“Microsoft Comments”) \n• Motion to Intervene and Protest of Nicholas Max Neal and David Neal, Delaware \nStandard Offer Service Ratepayers (Sep. 3, 2026) (“Nicholas Max Neal and David \nNeal Protest”)  \n• Supportive Comments and Limited Protest of the New Jersey Board of Public \nUtilities (Sep. 3, 2026) (“NJ BPU Comments and Limited Protest”) \n• Motion for Leave to Answer and Answer of the New Jersey Board of Public \nUtilities (Sept. 18, 2026) (“NJ BPU Answer”) \n• Limited Comments of North Carolina Electric Membership Corporation (Sep. 3, \n2026) (“NCEMC Limited Comments”) \n• Comments and Limited Protest of the NRG Companies (Sep. 3, 2026) (“NRG \nComments and Limited Protest”) \n• Protest by Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel (Sep. 3, 2026) (“OCC Protest”) \n• Comments and Limited Protests of Ohio Energy Leadership Council (Sep. 3, 2026) \n(“Ohio ELC Comments and Limited Protests”) \n• Comments of Old Dominion Electric Cooperative (Sep. 3, 2026) (“ODEC \nComments”) \n• Comments, Request for Clarification, and, in the Alternative, Request to Sever of \nthe Organization of PJM States, Inc. (Sep. 4, 2026) (“OPSI Comments and Request \nfor Clarification or to Sever”)"},{"page":70,"startToken":24324,"endToken":24593,"text":"iii \n• Motion for Leave to Answer and Answer of Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro \n(“PA Governor Answer”) \n \n• Comments of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (Sep. 3, 2026) (“PA \nPUC Comments”) \n• Comments of Persistence Analytics Group LLC (Aug. 14, 2026) (“Persistence \nAnalytics Comments”) \n• Supplemental Comments of Persistence Analytics Group LLS Regarding IRAS \nPerformance Verification and Compensation (Sep. 2, 2026) (“Persistence Analytics \nSupplemental Comments”) \n• Comments of the PJM Industrial Customer Coalition (Sep. 3, 2026) (“PJMICC \nComments”) \n• Protest of PJM Power Providers Group (Sep. 3, 2026) (“P3 Protest”) \n• Motion to Intervene, Protest, and Request for Clarification of PPL Electric \nCorporation (Sep. 3, 2026) (“PPL Protest and Request for Clarification”) \n• Limited Protest of Public Interest Organizations (Sep. 3, 2026) (“PIOs Limited \nProtest”) \n• Comments of the Public Service Commission of West Virginia (Sep. 3, 2026) \n(“PSCWV Comments”) \n• Comments of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio’s Office of the Federal \nEnergy Advocate (Sep. 3, 2026) (“Ohio FEA Comments”) \n• Motion to Intervene and Comments of the Retail Energy Supply Association (Sep. \n3, 2026) (“RESA Comments”) \n• Comments of the Solar Energy Industries Association (Sep. 3, 2026) (“SEIA \nComments”) \n• Comments and Limited Protest of Southern Maryland Electric Cooperative, Inc. \n(Sep. 3, 2026) (“SMECO Comments and Limited Protest”) \n• Motion to Intervene and Comments of Sunrun Inc. (Sep. 3, 2026) (“Sunrun \nComments”) \n• Motion to Intervene and Protest of Talen Energy Corporation (Sep. 3, 2026) \n(“Talen Protest”) \n• Comments of Tesla, Inc. (Sep. 3, 2026) (“Tesla Comments”) \n• Motion for Acceptance of Late-Filed Comments and Comments of the Virginia \nState Corporation Commission (Sep. 8, 2026) (“VSCC Comments”) \n• Protest of Vistra Corp. (Sep. 3, 2026) (“Vistra Protest”) \n• Comments of Voltus (Sep. 4, 2026) (“Voltus Comments”)"},{"page":71,"startToken":24593,"endToken":24667,"text":"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \n \nI hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing document upon each \nperson designated on the official service list compiled by the Secretary in this proceeding. \n \nDated at Washington, D.C., this 23rd day of September 2026. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n /s/ Ryan J. Collins \n  \nRyan J. Collins \nWright & Talisman, P.C. \n1200 G Street, NW, Suite 600 \nWashington, DC  20005 \ncollins@wrightlaw.com \n(202) 393-1200 \n \n \nAttorney for \nPJM Interconnection, L.L.C."}],"sections":[{"p":1,"at":0,"title":"Opening text","method":"opening text","endPage":8,"endAt":1351,"startToken":0,"endToken":3543},{"p":8,"at":1351,"title":"I. ANSWER","method":"printed heading","endPage":8,"endAt":1363,"startToken":3543,"endToken":3545},{"p":8,"at":1363,"title":"A. There Is Overwhelming Support for PJM’s Proposed Large Load","method":"printed heading","endPage":14,"endAt":719,"startToken":3545,"endToken":5983},{"p":14,"at":719,"title":"B. PJM’s Proposed Definition of Large Load Is Consistent with Commission","method":"printed heading","endPage":16,"endAt":639,"startToken":5983,"endToken":6791},{"p":16,"at":639,"title":"C. There Is Widespread Support to Establish a Policy that New Large Loads","method":"printed heading","endPage":18,"endAt":896,"startToken":6791,"endToken":7609},{"p":18,"at":896,"title":"D. IRAS Divides Authority over Responses to an Interim Resource Adequacy","method":"printed heading","endPage":31,"endAt":4,"startToken":7609,"endToken":11586},{"p":31,"at":4,"title":"E. Calling for IRAS Load Reductions Before Pre-Emergency Load","method":"printed heading","endPage":37,"endAt":374,"startToken":11586,"endToken":13507},{"p":37,"at":374,"title":"F. PJM’s BYONC Rules Appropriately Incent the Development of New","method":"printed heading","endPage":50,"endAt":654,"startToken":13507,"endToken":17933},{"p":50,"at":654,"title":"G. Excluding New Large Loads from the VRR Curve Until They Bring New","method":"printed heading","endPage":54,"endAt":4,"startToken":17933,"endToken":19374},{"p":54,"at":4,"title":"H. The IRAS Compensation Mechanism Benefits Ratepayers, Adheres to","method":"printed heading","endPage":58,"endAt":1028,"startToken":19374,"endToken":20829},{"p":58,"at":1028,"title":"I. IRAS Does Not Unduly Discriminate Against New Large Loads.","method":"printed heading","endPage":66,"endAt":581,"startToken":20829,"endToken":23620},{"p":66,"at":581,"title":"II. CONCLUSION","method":"printed heading","endPage":66,"endAt":586,"startToken":23620,"endToken":23621},{"p":66,"at":586,"title":"CONCLUSION","method":"printed heading","endPage":71,"endAt":0,"startToken":23621,"endToken":24593},{"p":71,"at":0,"title":"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE","method":"printed heading","endPage":71,"endAt":482,"startToken":24593,"endToken":24667}]}