ER26-3380-001 · 2026-10-29 · Constellation Energy Generation

Request for Rehearing and Clarification of Constellation Energy Generation, LLC

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
BEFORE THE 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 
 
 
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. 
Docket Nos. 
ER26-3380-000 
EL26-108-000 
 
 
REQUEST FOR REHEARING AND CLARIFICATION  
OF CONSTELLATION ENERGY GENERATION, LLC 
 
Pursuant to Section 313 of the Federal Power Act (“FPA”)1 and Rule 713 of the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (“Commission”) Rules of Practice and Procedure,2 Constellation 
Energy Generation, LLC (“Constellation”) respectfully requests that the Commission grant 
rehearing and clarification of its September 29, 2026, Order Accepting Reliability Backstop 
Procurement and Establishing Further Procedures.3 
 
BACKGROUND 
On July 31, 2026, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“PJM”) submitted revisions to the PJM 
Open Access Transmission Tariff (“Tariff”) and the Reliability Assurance Agreement Among 
Load Serving Entities (“RAA”) to establish the Reliability Backstop Procurement (“RBP”).4  
Numerous parties filed comments and protests addressing the proposal, including Constellation.5 
 
1 16 U.S.C. § 825l. 
2 18 C.F.R. § 385.713. 
3 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 196 FERC ¶ 61,245 (2026) (“Order”).  
4 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Reliability Backstop Procurement to Address Resource Adequacy Concerns Stemming 
from Large Loads, Docket No. ER26-3380-000 (filed July 31, 2026) (“RBP Proposal”).  Capitalized terms used but 
not otherwise defined herein have the meaning as defined in the Tariff, the RAA, or the PJM Proposal, as applicable.  
5 See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Limited Protest of Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Docket No. ER26-
3380-000 (filed Aug. 21, 2026) (“Limited Protest”); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Motion for Leave to Answer and 
Answer of Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Docket No. ER26-3380-000 (filed Sept. 8, 2026) (“Constellation

2 
The Order accepted the RBP tariff records for filing, suspended them for five months, 
instituted a parallel proceeding under section 206 of the FPA, and established paper-hearing 
procedures concerning cost allocation, Transmission Owner exit rules, and LSE collateral 
requirements. The Commission otherwise found the RBP Proposal just and reasonable.6 
Constellation seeks rehearing of two final determinations in the Order. First, paragraph 51 
rejected—without reasoned analysis—Constellation’s request to permit energy-only resources 
obtaining new capacity rights, like Constellation’s Eddystone Units 3 & 4 (“Eddystone”), to 
qualify as RBP Resources after obtaining new Capacity Interconnection Rights (“CIRs”). The 
Order also recited, but did not decide, Constellation’s separate request that such resources be 
eligible to provide Qualifying RBP Offset UCAP MW.7 
Second, paragraph 53 accepted PJM’s proposed mandatory price-taker treatment for 
committed RBP Sell Offers, despite such requirement resulting in distorted Reliability Pricing 
Model (“RPM”) price signals,8 without (i) addressing Constellation’s annual isolation mechanism 
supported by Dr. Shanker’s expert affidavit,9 or (ii) engaging in a reasoned balancing analysis, 
instead pointing to certain reliability-must-run resource arrangements to justify imposing zero-
 
Answer”); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Motion for Leave to Answer and Answer of Constellation Energy Generation, 
LLC, Docket No. ER26-3380-000 (filed Sept. 21, 2026) (“Constellation Answer to PJM”). 
6 Order at PP 23–24.  
7 Limited Protest at 13–14; Constellation Answer at 2–3; Constellation Answer to PJM at 2–4. 
8 Limited Protest at 5–10 (“A mandatory $0/MW-day offer is not the reasonable or just way to address that risk 
because such mandate does more harm than good by signaling excess supply if anticipated load is delayed or does 
not show up, thereby encouraging departure of existing generation—recreating the very reliability problems that 
spurred the RBP in the first place”); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Limited Protest of the NRG Companies, Docket 
No. ER26-3380-000 at 10–11 (filed Aug. 21, 2026) (“[T]he proposed requirement that resources with RBP 
commitments offer as price-takers into RPM Auctions for the associated Delivery Years ‘is antithetical to creating a 
normal capacity market,’” and “‘send[s] the wrong signals [to] potential investors of PJM generation capacity.’”). 
9 Limited Protest at 10–13.

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price RPM participation on a region-wide procurement for terms lasting up to fifteen years, and 
ignoring other Commission precedent rejecting zero priced out of market supply due to its price 
suppressive effect.10 
In an abundance of caution, Constellation also requests clarification that the paper-hearing 
procedures leave fully open the collateral, Transmission Owner exit-charge, and cost-allocation 
issues identified below. To the extent the Order excludes or prejudges any of those matters, 
Constellation alternatively seeks rehearing. 
 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS 
Pursuant to Rule 713(c),11 Constellation provides the following statement of issues and 
specification of errors: 
1. Eddystone’s eligibility as an RBP Resource. The Commission acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously, misapprehended the record, and failed to engage in reasoned 
decision-making when it rejected Constellation’s request that Eddystone and 
similarly situated Energy Resources be eligible as RBP Resources, where such 
resources have no current CIRs or capacity commitment, must undertake a new 
interconnection process and obtain new CIRs, fund any required Network 
Upgrades, and satisfy the same deliverability, accreditation, commercial-
operation, and performance requirements applicable to greenfield resources. 
Order at PP 46, 48, 51; PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC v. FERC, 665 F.3d 
203, 208-210 (D.C. Cir. 2011); ANR Storage Co. v. FERC, 904 F.3d 1020, 1024-
 
10 Order at P 53. 
11 18 C.F.R. § 385.713(c).

4 
1029 (D.C. Cir. 2018); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
2. Eddystone’s eligibility to provide Qualifying RBP Offset UCAP MW. The 
Commission erred by failing to decide Constellation’s separately and expressly 
presented request that Energy Resources obtaining new CIRs through a new 
interconnection process be eligible to provide Qualifying RBP Offset UCAP MW. 
Order at P 141; PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC v. FERC, 665 F.3d at 208-
210; ANR Storage Co. v. FERC, 904 F.3d at 1024-1029; Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. at 43. 
3. Failure to address Constellation’s annual isolation remedy. The Commission 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously and failed to support its determination under 
section 205 of the FPA when it accepted mandatory price-taker treatment as 
necessary to avoid duplicate capacity procurement without adequately considering 
the market impacts of such approach or addressing Constellation’s annual, 
auction-specific isolation mechanism and matched demand adjustment, which 
prevents duplicate procurement for the matched quantity by adjusting both supply 
and demand. Order at P 53; PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC v. FERC, 665 
F.3d at 208; ANR Storage Co. v. FERC, 904 F.3d at 1024; Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. at 43. 
4.  Failure to engage meaningfully with ISO-NE and Reliability Must Run 
precedent. The Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to 
engage in a meaningful balancing analysis to justify the RBP Proposal’s price-
taker requirement, and by relying on the Commission’s Reliability Must Run

5 
(“RMR”) precedent as justification and treating long-term, forecast-driven, 
region-wide RBP commitments as equivalent to localized, short-term RMR 
arrangements without addressing the material differences in purpose, scale, 
duration, and associated-load certainty—particularly when the Commission’s 
precedent in its ISO New England, Inc. (“ISO-NE”) self-supply proceedings 
rejected zero priced out of market supply due to its price suppressive effect.  
Order at PP 44, 53; PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 192 FERC ¶ 61,135, at P 31 
(2025); ISO New England, Inc., 138 FERC ¶ 61,027 at PP 71–72, 75 (2012); 
PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC v. FERC, 665 F.3d at 208; ANR Storage 
Co. v. FERC, 904 F.3d at 1024; Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. at 43. 
5. Scope of the LSE collateral paper hearing. In an abundance of caution, the 
Commission should clarify that the paper hearing concerning appropriate 
collateral requirements for RBP buyers encompasses Constellation’s arguments 
concerning the size and methodology of the RBP Credit Rate, gross contractual 
value versus net payment exposure, overlapping collateralization, recognition of 
existing credit support, direct customer or affiliate posting for the responsible 
LSE’s account, and objective recalculation and release standards. To the extent 
the Order intended to exclude or reject those matters, such an exclusion is 
arbitrary and capricious and rehearing is warranted. Order at PP 190, 194, 204–
206; PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 186 FERC ¶ 61,055 at P 29 (2024); PSEG 
Energy Resources & Trade LLC v. FERC, 665 F.3d at 208.

6 
6. Transmission Owner exit charges. In an abundance of caution, the Commission 
should clarify that paragraphs 181–182 of the Order neither establish a 
presumption that LSEs in an exiting Transmission Owner’s zone must bear RBP 
exit charges nor predetermine the allocation of such charges. To the extent the 
Order intended otherwise, the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously and 
rehearing is warranted. Order at PP 177–182; Duquesne Light Co., 122 FERC ¶ 
61,039 at PP 83, 89–94 (2008); PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC v. FERC, 
665 F.3d at 208; K N Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 968 F.2d 1295, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 
1992); Illinois Commerce Commission v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 477 (7th Cir. 
2009). 
7. Cost allocation based on accurate and up-to-date load forecasts. In an 
abundance of caution, the Commission should clarify that paragraphs 153–160 of 
the Order leave fully open whether a just and reasonable RBP allocation must use 
PJM’s most current official load forecast after application of PJM’s ordinary 
forecasting and vetting procedures; must reasonably capture all forecast large-
load growth, including load already embedded in the base forecast; and must use 
consistent or reconciled data to establish the procurement target and allocate its 
costs. To the extent the Order intended otherwise, the Commission acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously and rehearing is warranted. Order at PP 153–160; K N 
Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 968 F.2d at 1300; Illinois Commerce Commission v. FERC, 
576 F.3d at 477; Old Dominion Electric Cooperative v. FERC, 898 F.3d 1254, 
1260 (D.C. Cir. 2018); Emera Maine v. FERC, 854 F.3d 9, 24–27 (D.C. Cir. 
2017).

7 
 
REQUEST FOR REHEARING AND CLARIFICATION 
A. 
The Commission Erred in Rejecting Constellation’s Proposed Eligibility 
Revisions for RBP Resources and Resources Eligible to Supply Qualifying 
RBP Offset UCAP MW 
Constellation requested12 that the Commission require PJM to modify the criteria set forth 
in the RBP Proposal so that resources like Eddystone could qualify as RBP Resources or as 
resources eligible to provide Qualifying RBP Offset UCAP MW. Specifically, Constellation 
recommended that PJM modify the criteria listed in Sections 18.2 and 18.5 of the proposed Tariff 
to clarify that Energy Resources (i.e., energy-only resources with no capacity rights) seeking new 
CIRs through an Interconnection Request would be eligible to supply Qualifying RBP Offset 
UCAP MW and qualify as an RBP Resource.13 
As currently drafted, Section 18.5 of the proposed Tariff requires a generation or Energy 
Storage Resource offered as an RBP Resource to meet certain criteria, including that such RBP 
Resources be: 
(i) 
Composed of new Installed Capacity and new Maximum Facility 
Output; 
(ii) 
Supported by new Capacity Interconnection Rights (if located in the 
PJM Region) or Capacity Interconnection Rights transferred from a 
deactivated resource or a resource that announced deactivation as of April 
10, 2026; and 
(iii) 
Consist of (1) new build; (2) incremental capacity created by an 
uprate of an existing Generation Capacity Resource’s or Energy Storage 
Resource’s installed capacity and associated level of Capacity 
Interconnection Rights; or (3) repowering of a generation resource that had 
deactivated, or announced deactivation, on or before April 10, 2026.14 
 
12 Limited Protest at 13–14; Constellation Answer at 2–3; Constellation Answer to PJM at 2–4. 
13 Limited Protest at 13–14; Constellation Answer at 2–3. 
14 See RBP Proposal, attach. A § 18.5(b).

8 
Those provisions exclude an existing Energy Resource that presently has no CIRs but seeks 
to become a Capacity Resource by submitting a new Interconnection Request, obtaining new CIRs, 
funding any required Network Upgrades, and satisfying the RBP’s deliverability, accreditation, 
commercial-operation, and performance requirements. 
Similarly, as currently drafted, proposed Tariff Section 18.2(b) arguably would exclude 
Energy Resources like Eddystone because Eddystone does not fit squarely within the list of 
enumerated criteria, e.g., that resources be “new builds,” a “repowering” of a deactivated resource, 
or be composed of new incremental capacity created by an uprate of existing Generation Capacity 
Resources. 
In its Order, the Commission found as a general matter that PJM had “demonstrated that 
its proposed eligibility requirements for RBP Resources are just and reasonable,”15 and rejected 
Constellation’s request.16  With respect to Constellation’s argument regarding the criteria for 
Qualifying RBP Offset UCAP MW, the Commission provided no response. 
Eddystone’s circumstances demonstrate why its exclusion and the exclusion of similarly-
situated resources is unreasonable. Eddystone is now an Energy Resource with no capacity 
rights.17 To return as a Capacity Resource, Eddystone must reenter the interconnection queue, 
obtain new CIRs, and bear any required Network Upgrade costs. The facility is already constructed 
 
15 Order at P 48.  
16 Id. at P 51.  
17 Eddystone, which had been slated to retire, was directed by the Secretary of Energy to remain online and available 
pursuant to the Secretary’s FPA section 202(c) authority.  Dep’t of Energy, Order No. 202-26-40 (Aug. 21, 2026); 
Dep’t of Energy, Order No. 202-26-24 (May 21, 2026); Dep’t of Energy, Order No. 202-26-17 (Feb. 23, 2026) 
(“Feb. 2026 Eddystone Order”); Dep’t of Energy, Order No. 202-25-10 (Nov. 25, 2025); Dep’t of Energy, Order 
No. 202-25-8 (Aug. 28, 2025); Dep’t of Energy, Order No. 202-25-4 (May 30, 2025).  The Secretary directed that 
Eddystone may not participate as a capacity resource in PJM while retained under section 202(c).  See e.g., Referral 
to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Docket No. AD25-15-000 (filed June 17, 2025); Feb. 2026 
Eddystone Order at 10, Ordering Para. G (emphasis added).  Accordingly, earlier in 2026 Constellation removed 
Eddystone from capacity resource status and transferred the Eddystone capacity rights.

9 
and permitted, with fuel supply in place, and therefore may be capable of providing new 
deliverable capacity more quickly and efficiently than a greenfield project or even a traditional 
“repowering.”18  The Commission has signaled that it is increasingly concerned that resource 
adequacy in PJM is insufficient to meet growing demand.19  As a policy matter, including Energy 
Resources obtaining new CIRs among the resources that qualify as RBP Resources or are eligible 
to provide Qualifying RBP Offset UCAP MW would provide an incentive for those resources to 
add badly needed new capacity to the system. 
Paragraph 51 framed Constellation’s request as involving a resource that could provide 
new CIRs but “no new installed capacity.” That framing does not address the substance of 
Constellation’s request.20 Eddystone has no current CIRs (or “installed capacity,” as that term is 
defined)21 and cannot provide capacity unless it undertakes a new interconnection process, obtains 
new CIRs, funds any required Network Upgrades, and satisfies the RBP’s applicable deliverability, 
accreditation, commercial-operation, and performance requirements. The relevant resource-
 
18 Limited Protest at 14; Constellation Answer to PJM at 3–4.  
19  See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.,  195 FERC ¶ 61,211, P 103 (2026) (“While we are encouraged by the 
implementation of such processes to ensure resource adequacy and faster interconnection and ongoing stakeholder 
discussions, we remain concerned that these efforts may fall short in light of generator retirements and tightening 
supply conditions.”). 
20 Constellation’s requested relief is not limited to deletion of the phrase “new Maximum Facility Output” from the 
proposed eligibility criteria. Constellation asks the Commission to direct whatever conforming revisions to sections 
18.5(b)(i) and 18.5(b)(iii) are necessary to permit an existing Energy Resource with no current CIRs to qualify after 
obtaining new CIRs through a new Interconnection Request and satisfying all other applicable RBP requirements.   
21 The “Installed Capacity” or “ICAP” of a generating resource may not exceed the resource’s CIRs.  Accordingly, a 
generating resource with no CIRs also has no “Installed Capacity.”  See PJM Manual 21B, Section 6.  An energy-
only resource that acquires new CIRs through the interconnection process would therefore also obtain new Installed 
Capacity.

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adequacy increment is new deliverable capacity available to PJM—not whether the underlying 
generating equipment was newly constructed.22 
The Commission’s error with respect to Constellation’s request for offset capacity 
eligibility is even more clear. The Order expressly recited Constellation’s request that Energy 
Resources obtaining new CIRs be eligible to provide Qualifying RBP Offset UCAP MW, but never 
decided it.23 For the same reasons discussed above regarding RBP Seller eligibility, the 
Commission should grant rehearing and make such resources eligible to provide Qualifying RBP 
Offset UCAP MW. 
The Commission failed to engage in reasoned decision-making when it accepted PJM’s 
RBP Proposal without modification and rejected Constellation’s recommendation to modify the 
criteria for RBP Resources, and failed to articulate its reasoning entirely with respect to 
Constellation’s recommendations related to the criteria for Qualifying RBP Offset UCAP MW. 
To comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the Commission must “examine the 
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action.”24  Accordingly, the 
Commission’s “failure to respond meaningfully” to Constellation’s objections “renders its 
decision arbitrary and capricious.”25 
 
22 Order at P 48. 
23 Id. at P 141. 
24 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (emphasis 
added). 
25 PSEG Energy Res. & Trade LLC v. FERC, 665 F.3d 203, 208 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

11 
B. 
The Commission Did Not Justify Mandatory Price-Taker Treatment 
1. 
The Commission Failed to Engage in a Reasoned Balancing Analysis 
In its Order, the Commission rejected the arguments of Constellation and other commenters 
objecting to the RBP Proposal’s price taker requirement, stating that “the Commission has 
consistently found that Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators 
can reasonably require resources that are compensated outside of the capacity market because they 
are needed to maintain reliability to offer as price-takers in capacity auctions to avoid double 
procurement, even at the risk of price suppression.”26   
Notably, as support for its finding, the Commission cited to its RMR precedent, without 
providing any additional analysis. The Order’s reliance on RMR precedent does not supply the 
missing analysis.27  Unlike in the RMR proceedings, in the Order the Commission failed to engage 
in a reasoned balancing analysis to determine whether it is just and reasonable in these 
circumstances to require out-of-market resources to offer as price takers.  Any such meaningful 
analysis would find that on balance the facts presented here, unlike in the RMR proceedings, weigh 
in favor of finding that the RBP Proposal’s price taker requirement is unjust and unreasonable 
given the material and potentially long-lived effect it may have on RPM price formation for years 
to come. 
 
26 Order at P 53. 
27 Id. (citing PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 196 FERC ¶ 61,098, at P 21 (2026) (finding that PJM’s proposal to 
include reliability-must-run units in the RPM supply stack as price-takers is just and reasonable and consistent with 
Commission precedent regarding the treatment of reliability-must-run resources in other regions) (citing PJM 
Interconnection, L.L.C., 193 FERC ¶ 61,234, at P 10 (2025) (citing PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 190 FERC 
¶ 61,088, at P 50 (2025) (citing Indep. Power Producers of N.Y., Inc. v. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 150 FERC 
¶ 61,214 (2015); N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 150 FERC ¶ 61,116 (2015), order on reh’g & compliance, 155 
FERC ¶ 61,076 (2016), order on reh’g & compliance, 161 FERC ¶ 61,189 (2017); ISO New Eng. Inc., 165 FERC 
¶ 61,202 (2018))))).

12 
RMR arrangements generally retain existing units for limited periods to address identified 
transmission-reliability violations affecting existing load.28 The RBP instead may place 6,831.3 
MW of forecast-driven, separately compensated capacity into repeated RPM Auctions as price-
taker supply for as long as fifteen years, even though the associated load may energize later than 
forecast (or not at all). 
Those distinctions concern the very factors the Commission has considered when balancing 
the reliability rationale for out-of-market support against its effect on market price formation and 
the potential impacts on resource adequacy in the long-term: purpose, magnitude, duration, and 
certainty of need. Yet paragraph 53 simply concluded that the RBP is “likewise” entitled to price-
taker treatment because both RBP and RMR resources are procured outside RPM for reliability 
purposes. Characterizing the arrangements at that level of generality does not explain why their 
material differences are irrelevant, or why, in this instance, the price-taker requirement is just and 
reasonable. 
Further emphasizing the Commission’s failure to engage in any meaningful and reasoned 
balancing analysis here is the Commission’s precedent in ISO New England, in which the 
Commission engaged in an extensive analysis weighing the potential effects of out-of-market 
resources.29  There, the Commission found that self-supplied resources participating in the 
capacity auction as price-takers could have a price suppressing effect on the market.  The 
Commission explained that “just and reasonable market rules must achieve” the objective of 
“preventing [out-of-market] resources from distorting the market clearing price.”30  Ultimately, 
 
28 Constellation Answer to PJM at 4-8.  
29 ISO New England Inc., 138 FERC ¶ 61,027 at PP 71–72, 75. 
30 Id. at P 75.

13 
and after “weighing all the interests and evidence before it,” the Commission found that “the 
appropriate course of action, which result in just and reasonable rates, is to prevent new resources 
from lowering the price of capacity significantly below competitive levels” by, in that case, 
imposing a mandated offer floor mitigation measure.31 
In ISO New England, the Commission was so concerned with the price suppressive effect 
from price-taker bidding in the capacity auction and the potential to “inhibit competitive 
investment” that it mandated offer floor mitigation.32  Here, the Order performs no comparable 
balancing analysis of the RBP’s scale, duration, timing mismatch, or effect on entry and retention 
signals.  
2. 
The Order Did Not Address the Matched Isolation Mechanism, 
Which Was Supported by Expert Testimony 
PJM justified mandatory price-taker treatment as necessary to prevent RPM from procuring 
capacity already secured through the RBP. Paragraph 53 accepted that rationale without adequately 
considering the countervailing market and long-term resource adequacy impacts of such approach 
or addressing the mechanism Constellation proposed. 
PJM suggested that RBP resources must be offered into RPM as a price-taker to ensure 
load does not “double pay” for capacity. But as Constellation explained in previous filings, the 
price-taker requirement will undermine RPM as a credible price-forming market and resource 
adequacy will be hindered. A mandatory $0/MW-day offer is not just or reasonable, and does more 
harm than good, because it will signal excess supply if anticipated load is delayed or does not show 
 
31 Id.  
32 Id. at P 70.

14 
up.33  The resulting signal can reduce retention and entry incentives, accelerate resource exit, and 
defer new investment in the region. Such a result recreates the very resource adequacy problems 
that spurred the RBP in the first place. 
As Constellation explained in its Limited Protest, these results can be avoided, and load 
can still be protected from the double payment, if instead PJM isolates the RBP supply and 
corresponding RBP-related demand from the RPM. By utilizing the isolation method instead of a 
price-taker requirement, the market will not result in distorted RPM prices that signal excess 
supply and encourage retirement of the existing fleet if anticipated load is delayed.34 
Constellation did not propose removing RBP supply while leaving the full associated 
demand requirement in RPM. For each applicable auction, Constellation’s proposed mechanism 
would exclude Available RBP UCAP from the price-forming supply stack and reduce the 
applicable reliability requirement by the lesser of Available RBP UCAP and RBP-Related Load 
reflected in that auction’s Planning Parameters. The mechanism therefore prevents duplicate 
procurement for the matched quantity by adjusting both supply and demand, while avoiding the 
one-sided price-forming effect of mandatory zero offers. 
Paragraph 53 of the Order claimed that the price-taker requirement was necessary, despite 
“the risk of price suppression,” in order to avoid double procurement.35  But the Order ignored Dr. 
Shanker’s supporting analysis and Constellation’s recommended proposal to isolate RBP supply 
and corresponding load from RPM price formation, which would have the effect of avoiding both 
the risk of double procurement and the risk of distorting RPM prices and the resource adequacy 
 
33 Limited Protest at 5-10.  
34 Id. at 10-13.  
35 Order at P 53.

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consequences that could bring.36  The Commission therefore acted arbitrarily and capriciously 
because it failed to explain why the price taker proposal is just and reasonable in order to avoid 
double procurement when the isolation methodology supported by Constellation’s expert witness 
will similarly avoid double procurement while also preserving the RPM’s effectiveness for price 
formation in support of long-term resource adequacy.37 
Finally, the Commission recently directed PJM to explain how it would transition back to 
“traditional market structures” and avoid “a long-term bifurcation of loads in the PJM market.”38  
Although the IRAS Order addressed load treatment, the same concern counsels against embedding 
a separate, fifteen-year class of zero-priced RBP supply in RPM. Constellation’s isolation 
mechanism would limit, rather than institutionalize, that bifurcation.  The Commission’s stated 
desire to return to traditional market structures, as noted in the IRAS Order, is at odds with its 
acceptance of an RBP proposal that will embed out-of-market distortions in RPM auctions for the 
next 15 years.39    
Given the foregoing, the Commission should grant rehearing and condition acceptance on 
the annual isolation mechanism. At minimum, it should reconsider the issue under the correct 
record and provide a reasoned response to the matched supply-and-demand adjustment, the ISO-
NE precedent, and the material distinctions between RBP and RMR arrangements. The 
 
36 Limited Protest at 6. 
37 Id. at 10-13. 
38 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 197 FERC ¶ 61,019, at P 111 (2026). The Commission issued the IRAS Order on 
October 9, 2026, after issuance of the September 29, 2026 RBP Order. Constellation identifies the IRAS Order 
pursuant to Rule 713(c)(3) as intervening Commission precedent that was unavailable when the RBP Order issued. 
39 See MISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, 45 F.4th 248 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (vacating a FERC decision when the 
Commission failed to provide a reasoned explanation for its contradictory positions).

16 
Commission “did not engage in the reasoned decision-making required by the [APA]”40 to justify 
the RBP Proposal’s price-taker requirement.  The Order failed to explain why it departed in a 
manner that was “internally inconsistent”41 with its past ISO-NE precedent, and why it relied on 
RMR precedent to support the price-taker requirement despite its impacts on the RPM, while 
ignoring the isolation methodology solution entirely.42  Such a “failure to respond meaningfully” 
to Constellation’s objections and proposed isolation methodology “renders its decision arbitrary 
and capricious.”43 
C.
In an Abundance of Caution, the Commission Should Clarify the Scope of
the Paper Hearings
Constellation understands the Order to leave the following matters open for development 
in the paper-hearing procedures and does not seek to short-circuit those proceedings. Because 
paragraphs 159, 181, and 206 identify potential replacement approaches without finally adopting 
them, Constellation requests clarification that the full scope of the issues described below remains 
open. To the extent the Order holds otherwise, Constellation seeks rehearing. 
1.
Scope of the LSE Collateral Paper Hearing
In its Order, the Commission found that the proposed RBP collateral requirements for LSEs 
may be unjust and unreasonable, and set the issue for paper hearing.44 Constellation requests 
clarification that the paper-hearing inquiry into “appropriate collateral requirements for RBP 
buyers” encompasses: (1) the size and methodology of the RBP Credit Rate; (2) gross contractual 
40 New England Power Generators Ass’n v. FERC, 881 F.3d 202, 210-11 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
41 ANR Storage Co. v. FERC, 904 F.3d 1020, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
42 PSEG Energy Res. & Trade LLC v. FERC, 665 F.3d 203, 208 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
43 Id.  
44 Order at PP 190, 194, 196, 204–206.

17 
value versus reasonably foreseeable net payment exposure; (3) recognition of existing collateral, 
guarantees, and other credit support to prevent overlapping collateralization of the same exposure; 
(4) direct customer or affiliate posting for the responsible LSE’s account; (5) LSE and guarantor
credit quality; (6) objective recalculation, reduction, and release standards; and (7) the time 
afforded to arrange collateral. To the extent the Order intended to exclude or reject any of those 
matters, rehearing is warranted.45 
2.
Scope of the Transmission Owner Exit Rules Paper Hearing
In its Order, the Commission found that the proposed RBP Transmission Owner exit rules 
may be unjust and unreasonable, and set the issue for paper hearing.  Constellation seeks 
clarification that the Order neither established a presumption that LSEs in an exiting Transmission 
Owner’s zone must bear RBP exit charges nor predetermined the allocation of such charges. To 
the extent the Order intended otherwise, the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously and 
rehearing is warranted. 
The fact that an LSE may have benefited from the original RBP procurement does not 
establish that it caused every incremental cost arising from a Transmission Owner’s later 
withdrawal. The Transmission Owner controls the withdrawal decision; the affected LSEs 
generally cannot prevent, predict, or hedge that event. An exiting Transmission Owner should bear 
its appropriate cost burden of generation and load investments made under the assumption that the 
Transmission Owner would remain in PJM.46 At minimum, costs attributable to the withdrawal 
decision should not be shifted automatically to LSEs merely because those LSEs benefited from 
45  PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 186 FERC ¶ 61,055 at P 29 (2024). 
46 K N Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 968 F.2d 1295, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Illinois Commerce Commission v. FERC, 576 
F.3d 470, 477 (7th Cir. 2009).

18 
the original RBP procurement. Shifting all exit-related consequences to LSEs could reduce the 
withdrawing entity’s incentive to internalize the costs caused by its decision and impose a 
contingent liability lasting through 2042/2043 on entities that did not control the triggering event. 
In addition, the paper hearing should distinguish ordinary RBP Charges attributable to load that 
departs PJM from incremental costs created by the Transmission Owner’s withdrawal, including 
pseudo-tie, accelerated-payment, contract-preservation, and stranded-obligation costs. 
In its Order, the Commission noted that it has previously found that it is just and reasonable 
to impose generation capacity costs on LSEs located within an exiting Transmission Owner’s zone, 
citing to Duquesne. 47   However, Duquesne does not resolve the problem here. It addressed a 
withdrawing entity’s capacity obligations in its role as an LSE for capacity PJM had procured on 
its behalf.48 It did not hold that non-withdrawing LSEs must bear incremental costs caused by a 
separate Transmission Owner’s exit. Constellation therefore requests clarification that the paper 
hearing remains open to all allocation approaches and that any replacement rate must separately 
identify the relevant cost, cause, and beneficiary. To the extent paragraph 181 intended to prejudge 
LSE responsibility, rehearing is warranted. 
3.
Scope of Cost Allocation Paper Hearing
The Order correctly found that reliance on PJM’s Load Adjustment process may fail to 
capture actual or forecast large-load growth and therefore may produce allocations not roughly 
commensurate with benefits.49 It then suggested that PJM could use actual 2026/2027 load and the 
47 Duquesne Light Co., 122 FERC ¶ 61,039 (2008). 
48 Id. at PP 83, 89–94. 
49 Order at PP 153–155.

19 
most recent 2028/2029 forecast.50  The Commission should clarify that Paragraphs 159–160 of the 
Order identify a possible approach; they do not establish a lawful replacement rate.51 
Any replacement methodology must use current, project-specific, PJM-validated and 
auditable information; identify and eliminate double counting associated with duplicate or 
alternative-site requests; reasonably validate energization dates and ramp assumptions; account for 
withdrawals, delays, and reductions; and identify load already embedded in the base forecast. The 
forecast used to establish the procurement target and the data used to allocate costs must be 
consistent or expressly reconciled. 
If PJM submits a new section 205 filing, it bears the burden of demonstrating that its 
proposed allocation is just and reasonable. If the Commission establishes a replacement rate under 
section 206, it must support both its determination that the filed methodology is unlawful and its 
selection of the replacement.  
 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Commission should: 
1. 
Grant rehearing of paragraph 51 and direct PJM to revise the Tariff to permit an existing 
Energy Resource with no current CIRs or capacity commitment to qualify as an RBP Resource 
and be eligible to provide Qualifying RBP Offset UCAP MW if it obtains new CIRs through an 
Interconnection Request, provides new deliverable capacity not previously available to PJM, and 
satisfies the applicable interconnection, deliverability, accreditation, commercial-operation, and 
performance requirements; 
2. 
Grant rehearing of paragraph 53 as discussed above and condition acceptance of PJM’s 
proposal on Constellation’s annual isolation mechanism; 
 
50 Id. at P 159. 
51 Emera Maine, 854 F.3d 9, 24–27 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

20 
3. 
Clarify that the collateral paper hearing encompasses all issues identified in Section III.C.1; 
4. 
Clarify that paragraphs 181–182 establish no presumption that LSEs must bear 
Transmission Owner exit charges and that incremental exit-caused costs require a separate cost-
causation analysis; and 
5. 
Clarify that paragraphs 153–160 do not prejudge the replacement cost-allocation 
methodology and that any replacement methodology must use accurate, up-to-date load forecast 
information and satisfy the applicable FPA sections 205 and 206 burdens. 
To the extent the Order intended to exclude or decide any of the matters addressed in paragraphs 
3 through 5 above, the Commission should grant rehearing. 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
Dated: October 29, 2026 
 
/s/ 
Carrie Hill Allen 
Sr. Vice President & Deputy General Counsel 
John M. White 
Assistant General Counsel 
Constellation Energy Generation, LLC 
250 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Suite 760 
Washington, D.C. 20001 
carrie.allen@constellation.com 
john.white@constellation.com 
 
Christopher A. Wilson 
Vice President, Federal Regulatory Affairs 
Constellation Energy Generation, LLC 
250 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Suite 760 
Washington, D.C. 20001 
202-347-7500 
FERCe-filings1@constellation.com 
Kenneth W. Irvin 
Alexandra K. Calabro 
Sidley Austin LLP 
1501 K Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20005 
Phone: (202) 736-8256 
kirvin@sidley.com 
alexandra.calabro@sidley.com 
 
Terence T. Healey 
Sidley Austin LLP 
60 State Street, 37th Floor 
Boston, MA 02109 
Phone: (617) 223-0306 
thealey@sidley.com 
 
Counsel for Constellation Energy Generation, LLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing document upon each person 
designated on the official service list compiled by the Secretary in this proceeding. 
Dated at Washington, D.C. this 29 day of October 2026. 
/s/ 
Alexandra K. Calabro  
Sidley Austin LLP 
1501 K Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20005