ER26-3380-001 · 2026-10-29 · FirstEnergy Service Company

Request for Rehearing of FirstEnergy Service Company

1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
) 
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. 
) 
Docket Nos. ER26-3380-000 
) 
                     EL26-108-000 
) 
REQUEST FOR REHEARING OF
FIRSTENERGY SERVICE COMPANY
Pursuant to Section 313 of the Federal Power Act ("FPA"), 16 U.S.C. § 825l(a), and Rule 
713 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
("Commission" or "FERC"), 18 C.F.R. § 385.713 (2025), FirstEnergy Service Company 
("FirstEnergy"),1 respectfully submits this Request for Rehearing of the Commission's order issued 
on September 29, 2026 in the above-captioned proceedings, which accepted and suspended the 
Reliability Backstop Procurement ("RBP") proposal of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. ("PJM"), 
established a paper hearing, and instituted a proceeding under FPA Section 206.2  This request is 
timely because it is filed within thirty days of issuance of the September 29 Order. 
Rehearing is necessary because the September 29 Order, while correctly identifying several 
of the defects in PJM's filing, does not fully reject PJM's proposal on the bases FirstEnergy raised 
1
FirstEnergy intervened in this proceeding as agent for its franchised public utility and transmission-
owning public utility affiliates Ohio Edison Company; The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company; The 
Toledo Edison Company; FirstEnergy Pennsylvania Electric Company; and the FirstEnergy Transmission 
Owners (collectively, Jersey Central Power & Light Company; Monongahela Power Company; The 
Potomac Edison Company; American Transmission Systems, Incorporated; Keystone Appalachian 
Transmission Company; Mid-Atlantic Interstate Transmission, LLC; and Trans-Allegheny Interstate Line 
Company). PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 196 FERC ¶ 61,245, at App. B n.344 (2026) ("September 29 
Order").
2
September 29 Order at P 1 & Ordering Paras. (A)-(C).

2
in its Comments and Protest ("FirstEnergy Protest").3  Instead, the September 29 Order accepts the 
filing, declares that every aspect of the RBP other than three discrete topics set for paper hearing 
is just and reasonable,4 and then either summarily dismisses, or never addresses, the arguments 
FirstEnergy raised on those very aspects. FPA Section 205 places the burden of proof on PJM, and 
the Commission may accept PJM's proposal only if the record shows that PJM carried that burden.5
The Commission's obligation to engage in reasoned decision-making likewise requires that it 
respond meaningfully to the objections raised before it.6  The September 29 Order falls short of 
both requirements with respect to several of the issues raised in the FirstEnergy Protest. 
Specifically, the September 29 Order: (1) accepts PJM's levelized, MW-weighted average-
price framework without responding at all to FirstEnergy's showing that it permits sellers to "front 
load" contract prices onto customers, a plainly unacceptable outcome when affordability concerns 
are already at the forefront; (2) rejects FirstEnergy's protest that the procurement should prioritize 
the resources that most effectively address reliability without engaging with the record evidence 
FirstEnergy submitted; (3) finds PJM's supplier shortfall charges and seller collateral requirements 
just and reasonable without addressing FirstEnergy's showing that customers are unprotected 
against supplier underperformance after commercial operation; and (4) accepts PJM's demand 
response gating criteria without resolving the ambiguity FirstEnergy identified as to whether 
3
Comments and Protest of FirstEnergy Service Company, Docket No. ER26-3380-000 (filed Aug. 
21, 2026) ("FirstEnergy Protest").
4
September 29 Order at P 23 ("Aside from the three issues discussed directly below, we find that 
the other aspects of PJM's RBP proposal are just and reasonable, as discussed in this order.").
5
16 U.S.C. § 824d(a)-(b); Constellation Mystic Power, LLC v. FERC, 45 F.4th 1028, 1035 (D.C. 
Cir. 2022); NorthWestern Corp. v. FERC, 884 F.3d 1176, 1182-84 (D.C. Cir. 2018); City of Winnfield v. 
FERC, 744 F.2d 871, 876-77 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See FirstEnergy Protest at 1-2.
6
See FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 592 U.S. 414, 423 (2021); Me. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. FERC, 
520 F.3d 464, 471 (D.C. Cir. 2008), rev'd on other grounds, 558 U.S. 165 (2010). See FirstEnergy Protest 
at 2 n.6.

3
eligible demand response must be supported by binding contractual commitments.  Each of these 
determinations is arbitrary and capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, and contrary to 
law, and thus rehearing should be granted.  Although FirstEnergy understands that PJM is planning 
to submit a new filing pursuant to FPA Section 205, consistent with the Commission’s invitation 
to do so, rehearing is still warranted to ensure these issues are preserved and appropriately decided 
in the context of any new filing made by PJM. 
I. 
BACKGROUND
Because the September 29 Order is the culmination of an expedited process that unfolded 
over approximately nine months, several major events are relevant to this request.  On January 16, 
2026, the National Energy Dominance Council and the governors of all thirteen PJM states issued 
the Statement of Principles, urging PJM to "[p]rovide 15-year price certainty for new capacity 
resources" through a reliability backstop auction and to allocate the costs of new capacity to LSEs 
with data centers that have not self-procured new capacity or agreed to be curtailable.  Shortly 
thereafter the PJM Board announced its decision in the Critical Issue Fast Path ("CIFP") process 
addressing large load additions, which included accelerating a backstop capacity procurement.  In 
April the PJM Board initiated a targeted CIFP process to develop the RBP. On June 30, 2026, the 
PJM Members Committee voted on thirteen RBP proposals. Only one—sponsored by a coalition 
of Electric Distributors and the Data Center Coalition ("Joint Proposal")—received the two-thirds 
sector-weighted support needed for endorsement.  PJM's own proposal did not.  Then on July 14, 
2026, PJM announced that the 2028/2029 Base Residual Auction ("BRA") cleared short of the 
PJM Region's reliability requirement.  In response, on July 27, 2026, the PJM Board adopted PJM's 
proposal, with three "targeted changes," rather than the Joint Proposal.  PJM filed its RBP proposal

4
("July 31 RBP Proposal" or "Transmittal"), as supplemented, on August 14, 2026.  The foregoing 
events are more thoroughly described in the September 29 Order and the FirstEnergy Protest.7
PJM describes the RBP as a one-time procurement of new capacity to address resource 
adequacy challenges primarily driven by an influx of large loads.8  Under PJM's proposal, 
PJMSettlement, Inc. would act as counterparty on behalf of LSEs to procure commitments from 
new "RBP Resources" for fixed terms of up to fifteen years, starting no earlier than the 2028/2029 
delivery year and ending no later than the 2042/2043 delivery year.9  PJM proposed to procure 
capacity equal to the 6,831 MW shortfall in the 2028/2029 BRA (the "Initial RBP Target"), 
adjusted downward for qualifying offset capacity and for load that qualifying Electric Distributors 
elect to opt out of the RBP.10 PJM proposed to select offers on a pay-as-bid basis, subject to a 
maximum willingness to pay $555/MW-day calculated as a MW-weighted average of the levelized 
cost of all selected offers over all delivery years.11  PJM proposed to allocate the costs to Electric 
Distributor zone/areas based on each zone/area's pro rata share of the difference between 
forecasted Load Adjustments for the 2026/2027 and 2028/2029 delivery years, fixed for the 
fifteen-year term, with further allocation to LSEs left to states and Relevant Electric Retail 
Regulatory Authorities ("RERRAs").12  And PJM proposed to require LSEs to post collateral equal 
to $1.5 million per committed RBP MW.13
7
September 29 Order at PP 1, 6-7, 9, 12-14; FirstEnergy Protest at 1, 2 n.8, 3-4.
8
September 29 Order at PP 1, 15.
9
Id. at PP 15-16.
10
Id. at P 16.
11
Id. at PP 55-57, 60.
12
Id. at PP 99, 110.
13
Id. at P 183.

5
FirstEnergy agreed that new generation is needed, but demonstrated that fundamental 
elements of PJM's proposal could not be approved consistent with FPA Section 205.14  FirstEnergy 
showed, among other things, that: (1) PJM's levelized contract framework permits suppliers to 
"front load" contract prices and creates unnecessary affordability risks; (2) the RBP should be 
limited to the resources (namely, dispatchable resources) that most effectively address reliability 
needs; (3) the Commission should direct PJM to strengthen supplier performance and credit 
requirements; and (4) the Commission should direct PJM to clarify that its gating criteria require 
binding contractual commitments for eligible demand response resources.15  FirstEnergy asked the 
Commission to reject PJM's filing, institute an FPA Section 206 proceeding, and establish 
settlement procedures, following the model the Commission used when PJM first proposed the 
Reliability Pricing Model ("RPM").16
The September 29 Order did not reject the filing.  It accepted PJM's proposed tariff 
revisions and Reliability Assurance Agreement ("RAA") revisions for filing, suspended them for 
five months to become effective February 28, 2027, subject to refund, and established paper 
hearing procedures limited to three topics: cost allocation, Transmission Owner exit rules, and 
LSE collateral requirements.17  The September 29 Order found that "the other aspects of PJM's 
RBP proposal are just and reasonable,"18 instituted a proceeding in Docket No. EL26-108-000 on 
the preliminary finding that PJM's existing Tariff may be unjust and unreasonable,19 anticipated 
14
FirstEnergy Protest at 1.
15
Id. at 2.
16
Id. at 6-7, 22 (citing PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61,331 (2006)).
17
September 29 Order at PP 1, 23-24 & Ordering Paras. (A)-(B).
18
Id. at P 23.
19
Id. at PP 27, 29-31, 214 & Ordering Para. (C).

6
that it may impose a replacement rate under Western Resources, Inc. v. FERC following the paper 
hearing,20 and repeatedly encouraged PJM to submit a new FPA Section 205 filing "without delay," 
noting that the Commission would likely hold the paper hearing in abeyance if PJM did so within 
thirty days.21  On October 13, 2026, PJM filed a motion to hold the paper hearing in abeyance 
pending resolution of PJM’s forthcoming Section 205 filing.22  The Commission granted that 
motion extending the deadline for initial briefs in the paper hearing Docket No. EL26-108-000 
from November 13, 2026 to January 11, 2027, and the deadline for reply briefs from December 3, 
2026 to January 26, 2027.23
II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND SPECIFICATIONS OF ERROR
The following Statement of Issues and Specifications of Error is provided pursuant to Rule 
713(c)(1) and Rule 713(c)(2), 18 C.F.R. § 385.713(c)(1)-(2). 
A. 
The September 29 Order is arbitrary and capricious, fails to engage in reasoned 
decision-making, and is unsupported by substantial evidence because it accepts 
PJM's levelized, MW-weighted average maximum willingness to pay $555/MW-
day without responding to FirstEnergy's showing that the framework permits sellers 
to front-load contract prices into the initial delivery years, exposing customers to 
unnecessary affordability risk. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a); FCC v. Prometheus Radio 
Project, 592 U.S. 414 (2021); Me. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. FERC, 520 F.3d 464 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008); NorthWestern Corp. v. FERC, 884 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
B. 
The September 29 Order is arbitrary and capricious, fails to engage in reasoned 
decision-making, and is unsupported by substantial evidence because it finds PJM's 
resource eligibility and selection rules just and reasonable without considering the 
record evidence FirstEnergy presented that firm, dispatchable resources provide the 
essential reliability services needed to address the reliability shortfall that is the 
20
Id. at PP 25-26 (citing W. Res., Inc. v. FERC, 9 F.3d 1568, 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("Western 
Resources")).
21
Id. at PP 3, 24, 28, 158, 160.
22
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Motion for Abeyance of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket Nos. 
ER26-3380-000, et al. (filed Oct. 13, 2026)[submitted Oct. 12, a holiday, so not filed until Oct. 13-DK]. 
23
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Notice Addressing Motion to Hold Proceeding in Abeyance, Docket 
Nos. ER26-3380-000 et al. (Oct. 23, 2026).

7
stated purpose of the RBP. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a); FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 
592 U.S. 414 (2021); NorthWestern Corp. v. FERC, 884 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 
2018). 
C. 
The September 29 Order is arbitrary and capricious, fails to engage in reasoned 
decision-making, and is unsupported by substantial evidence because it finds PJM's 
RBP UCAP MW shortfall charges and seller collateral requirements just and 
reasonable without addressing FirstEnergy's showing that those provisions protect 
customers only against construction and development risk, and not against supplier 
underperformance during the balance of the fifteen-year commitment term, and 
without explaining the asymmetry between the protections afforded suppliers and 
those afforded customers. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a)-(b); FCC v. Prometheus Radio 
Project, 592 U.S. 414 (2021); NorthWestern Corp. v. FERC, 884 F.3d 1176 (D.C. 
Cir. 2018); Ala. Elec. Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 684 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
D. 
The September 29 Order is arbitrary and capricious and fails to engage in reasoned 
decision-making because it finds PJM's gating criteria for Demand Resources and 
DER Capacity Aggregation Resources just and reasonable without resolving the 
ambiguity FirstEnergy identified—that the criteria may be satisfied by a mere 
"plan" for enabling infrastructure rather than a binding commitment to provide the 
MWs sold into the RBP—and without addressing FirstEnergy's request that PJM 
clarify that eligible demand response resources must be supported by binding 
contractual commitments. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a); FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 
592 U.S. 414 (2021); NorthWestern Corp. v. FERC, 884 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 
2018). 
III. 
ARGUMENT
A. 
The Commission Erred in Accepting PJM's Levelized Average-Price 
Framework Without Responding to FirstEnergy's Showing That It Permits 
Front-Loaded Contract Prices.
PJM proposes that the levelized procurement cost of all selected RBP Sell Offers not 
exceed $555/MW-day on a MW-weighted average basis over all delivery years of the RBP.24  PJM 
characterizes this as a "budget approach" that "allows for potentially fluctuating offers across the 
15 delivery years of the RBP term," and contends that prices above $555/MW-day "in some 
24
September 29 Order at P 55; FirstEnergy Protest at 10 n.28 (citing July 31 RBP Proposal at 61-64; 
Proposed Tariff, Attachment DD, § 18.5(f)).

8
delivery years may nevertheless be appropriate."25  Levelized cost is calculated using a discount 
rate equal to a 9.5% after-tax weighted average cost of capital.26
FirstEnergy explained that the predictable consequence of this flexibility is that sellers will 
front-load their costs into the initial years of their contracts.  A seller could, for example, offer 
$1,000/MW-day for the first several years of the contract and balance that out with sub-market 
prices in the later years, forcing customers to bear extremely large increases in capacity costs in 
the initial delivery years—during a period of acute concern, including among members of this 
Commission, about affordability.27  FirstEnergy further demonstrated that a levelized structure that 
authorizes the front loading of payments is not needed: the Statement of Principles calls for fifteen-
year price certainty; significant new generation is being built by vertically integrated utilities with 
straight-line, fixed-value cost recovery; and experience under PURPA shows that non-incumbent 
investors are generally willing to build new generation on a straight-line, fixed-value basis.28
The September 29 Order does not respond to this argument.  The Commission instead finds 
that a maximum willingness to pay "set at the MW-weighted average of the levelized procurement 
cost over the RBP commitment term reasonably balances the need to expeditiously procure 
capacity . . . with ensuring that the average procurement price does not exceed load's maximum 
willingness to pay," and that $555/MW-day is a reasonable proxy for load's maximum willingness 
to pay.29  Those findings address the average level of the cap, but not the temporal distribution of 
payments that the averaging methodology permits.  That temporal distribution—and the resulting 
25
September 29 Order at PP 55-56.
26
Id. at P 60.
27
FirstEnergy Protest at 10-11.
28
Id. at 11.
29
September 29 Order at P 74.

9
near-term affordability risk—was the basis of FirstEnergy's objection.  The September 29 Order 
also accepts PJM's pay-as-bid structure while acknowledging that sellers in a pay-as-bid auction 
are "less likely to offer near their marginal costs."30  The combination of pay-as-bid pricing and an 
average-only constraint is precisely what invites strategic front-loading, yet the September 29 
Order does not consider that interaction. 
The risk is compounded by other features of the proposal the September 29 Order accepted. 
Under PJM's proposal, a resource that does not reach commercial operation and provide any RBP 
UCAP MW for three consecutive delivery years has its commitment rescinded for the remainder 
of the term.31  A resource that collects front-loaded payments and then ceases performance before 
the later, lower-priced years leaves customers having paid a premium without receiving the 
offsetting discount.  Intervenors identified this very risk, noting that ratepayers could pay more 
than $555/MW-day if any resource fails to materialize or ceases operation prior to the end of the 
RBP term.32  The September 29 Order does not address it.  Because the Commission accepted the 
levelized framework without responding to FirstEnergy's showing, its determination is arbitrary 
and capricious.  The Commission should grant rehearing and reject the levelized framework or, in 
the alternative, require that RBP offers be priced on a straight-line, fixed-value basis or subject to 
an annual price cap. 
30
Id. at P 75.
31
Id. at P 79.
32
Id. at P 64.

10
B. 
The Commission Erred in Finding PJM's Resource Eligibility and Selection 
Rules Just and Reasonable Without Considering FirstEnergy's Evidence 
Regarding the Reliability Value of Dispatchable Resources.
PJM justifies the RBP as an extraordinary measure necessary to address the approximately 
6,831 MW capacity shortfall identified in the 2028/2029 BRA and to preserve resource adequacy 
in the PJM Region.33  FirstEnergy demonstrated that, because the stated purpose of the 
procurement is to address a reliability need, the Commission should ensure that it prioritizes 
resources that provide firm and dependable capacity.34  FirstEnergy supported that showing with 
record evidence from the North American Electric Reliability Corporation ("NERC"), which has 
identified that conventional generators provide much of the essential reliability services that 
support reliable operation of the grid; that wind and solar resources lack the spinning mass and 
traditional excitation systems that provide voltage control and stability; and that dispatchable 
generators provide system inertia, dynamic reactive support, and frequency response for stable 
grid operation.35  FirstEnergy further showed that PJM's selection process is designed to select the 
"least-cost set of resources" without sufficient consideration of the relative reliability value of 
different resource types.36
The September 29 Order finds PJM's eligibility requirements and selection process just and 
reasonable.37  It disposes of the argument that the selection process should value dispatchable 
generation's reliability attributes in a single sentence, stating that the Commission does "not find 
such additional valuation metrics to be necessary for PJM's proposal to be just and reasonable" 
33
FirstEnergy Protest at 15 (citing July 31 RBP Proposal at 31, 68).
34
Id.
35
Id. at 15-16 (citing NERC, 2024 Long-Term Reliability Assessment, at 22, 29-30).
36
Id. at 16 (citing July 31 RBP Proposal at 78).
37
September 29 Order at PP 48-51, 74, 77.

11
because PJM's Effective Load Carrying Capability ("ELCC") accreditation already captures such 
attributes.38  The September 29 Order acknowledges FirstEnergy's position in a footnote and does 
not discuss the NERC evidence on which that position rests.39  Nor does the September 29 Order 
explain how ELCC accreditation—a measure of a resource's contribution to resource adequacy—
accounts for the inertia, dynamic reactive support, frequency response, and voltage control that 
NERC identified as needed for reliability.  The September 29 Order similarly dismisses the 
concern that four-hour storage and stand-alone solar resources are poorly matched to around-the-
clock data center demand on grounds that the same energy must-offer requirements apply to RBP 
Resources as to other resources of their type,40 which does not answer whether a fifteen-year, 
customer-funded procurement justified on reliability grounds should prioritize resources that 
provide the greatest reliability value.  The September 29 Order’s conclusory statement ignores the 
record evidence and thus is not reasoned decision-making.   
The Commission should grant rehearing and require PJM to demonstrate that the RBP 
framework appropriately prioritizes firm and dependable capacity resources.41  In this era of acute 
affordability concerns, no better exemplified than by the inflated capacity costs that ratepayers in 
PJM are already forced to shoulder even before implementation of an RBP, it is inappropriate to 
require customers to pay even more for resources that are unable to provide the dispatchability and 
other operational characteristics that are essential to meeting the needs of the moment.  Data center 
and other large load customers overwhelmingly need and desire on-demand service.  The resources 
38
Id. at P 77.
39
Id. at P 66 n.96 (citing FirstEnergy Protest at 15-17).
40
Id. at PP 36, 49.
41
See FirstEnergy Protest at 16-17.

12
procured, and paid for by ratepayers, must meet these needs.  To do otherwise would be to impose 
manifestly unjust and unreasonable costs on ratepayers. 
C. 
The Commission Erred in Finding PJM's Supplier Performance and Credit 
Provisions Just and Reasonable Without Addressing the Risk of Post-
Commercial Operation Underperformance.
FirstEnergy demonstrated that the Commission should ensure that customers are 
adequately protected against supplier non-performance over the full fifteen-year commitment 
term.42  PJM's proposed protections are directed primarily toward construction risk and the risk 
that a resource fails to come online in the first instance: PJM proposes an RBP UCAP MW shortfall 
charge when a committed resource fails to achieve commercial operation, and rescission of the 
commitment if the resource fails to provide any committed RBP UCAP MW after three 
consecutive delivery years.43  As FirstEnergy showed, those provisions do not protect customers 
against the possibility that a resource satisfies its initial commercial operation obligations and then 
underperforms during the balance of its commitment term—even though LSEs, and ultimately 
retail customers, remain responsible for funding the commitment throughout that term.44
FirstEnergy further showed that the asymmetry is particularly striking because PJM proposes 
substantial, and unnecessary, collateral requirements to protect suppliers against the risk of 
customer non-payment, and asked the Commission to require enhanced performance assurance 
requirements, ongoing credit support, or other mechanisms ensuring that resources receiving long-
term RBP commitments remain accountable to customers throughout the commitment period.45
42
FirstEnergy Protest at 20.
43
Id. (citing July 31 RBP Proposal at 60-61, 80-81, 116-118).
44
Id. at 20-21 (citing July 31 RBP Proposal at 61-64, 76-78).
45
Id. at 21.

13
The September 29 Order does not address FirstEnergy’s argument.  The Commission 
instead finds PJM's shortfall charges just and reasonable because they "will deter speculative 
resources from seeking to participate in the RBP auction without creating an undue barrier to 
entry," and because those penalties, together with the pay-as-bid approach and up to fifteen years 
of revenue certainty, "will incentivize developers of RBP Resources to deliver their RBP UCAP 
MW."46  That reasoning confirms FirstEnergy's point rather than answering it: the shortfall charge, 
by PJM's design, applies only when a committed RBP Resource "has not reached commercial 
operation," and "[o]nce an RBP Resource has achieved commercial operation, . . . RBP UCAP 
MW shortfall charges will end."47  Likewise, seller collateral reflects only three years of shortfall 
charges and is returned once the resource no longer gives rise to credit exposure.48  The September 
29 Order finds that seller collateral requirement just and reasonable because it reduces risks 
"associated with non-payment of RBP Shortfall Charges,"49 but offers no explanation of what 
protects customers after commercial operation, when shortfall charges no longer apply. 
The September 29 Order's observation that LSEs pay RBP Charges "for only the RBP 
UCAP MW delivered"50 is not responsive to FirstEnergy's showing.  The Commission 
acknowledges that, under that structure, "the risk for customers is that they end up paying for less 
RBP capacity than they anticipated," and that PJM's 120% offer quantity cap means PJM may 
procure "20% more capacity on paper than what eventually materializes."51  In other words, the 
46
September 29 Order at P 84.
47
Id. at PP 79, 84.
48
Id. at P 183.
49
Id. at P 203.
50
Id. at P 85; see also id. at PP 17, 35.
51
Id. at PP 52, 85.

14
September 29 Order accepts that customers bear the reliability and replacement-cost consequences 
of supplier underperformance, and relies on the incentives of the shortfall charge—which ends at 
commercial operation—to mitigate that risk.52  The Independent Market Monitor similarly showed 
that PJM's proposal shifts accreditation and performance risk from generators to load and that 
PJM's shortfall charges are far narrower than the RPM's deficiency charges, which apply to a 
failure to satisfy a commitment "for any reason."53  The September 29 Order dismisses those 
comparisons on the ground that the RBP is a stopgap measure,54 but a fifteen-year, customer-
funded commitment is not a stopgap from the perspective of the customers who must pay for it. 
The September 29 Order also does not address the asymmetry in PJM’s proposal that 
FirstEnergy identified.  Customers are asked to post collateral of $1.5 million per committed RBP 
MW to protect suppliers for up to fifteen years,55 while suppliers post collateral covering only 
three years of development-period shortfall charges.56 Parties showed that the LSE requirement is 
many times larger than the seller requirement even though sellers have the most control over 
development and non-performance risk.57  Treating suppliers' long-term performance obligations 
so differently from customers' long-term payment obligations, without explanation, is not reasoned 
decision-making.  The Commission should grant rehearing and direct PJM to strengthen supplier 
52
Id. at P 85.
53
Id. at PP 80-81.
54
Id. at P 86.
55
Id. at P 183; FirstEnergy Protest at 7.
56
September 29 Order at P 183.
57
Id. at P 188 & n.308.

15
performance assurance and credit requirements so that they extend through the full RBP 
commitment term.58
D. 
The Commission Erred in Accepting PJM's Demand Response Gating 
Criteria Without Resolving Whether Eligible Demand Response Must Be 
Supported by Binding Contractual Commitments.
FirstEnergy demonstrated that PJM's proposed gating criteria for demand response 
resources appear to require only a contract or agreement evidencing a "plan or evidence of 
deployed enabling infrastructure," not a contract or agreement demonstrating a clear and binding 
commitment to provide the MWs sold into the RBP.59  If demand response resources may satisfy 
the gating criteria based merely on a "plan," rather than a binding commitment for the underlying 
demand response capability, the proposal risks treating speculative resources as equivalent to 
committed resources—a result that would defeat the purpose of the RBP and require data centers 
to pay for capacity that has not genuinely been procured.60  FirstEnergy therefore asked the 
Commission to require PJM to clarify that eligible demand response resources must be supported 
by binding contractual commitments.61
The September 29 Order summarizes FirstEnergy's argument,62 but does not resolve it.  
The Commission finds PJM's gating criteria just and reasonable because they purportedly "will 
help to deter speculative resources from bidding into the RBP auction and ensure that the selected 
RBP Resources are those most likely to go into service."63  The September 29 Order's analysis of 
58
See FirstEnergy Protest at 21.
59
FirstEnergy Protest at 21 (citing July 31 RBP Proposal at 74-75).
60
Id. at 21-22.
61
Id. at 22.
62
September 29 Order at P 67 & n.99 (citing FirstEnergy Protest at 21).
63
Id. at P 76.

16
the demand response criteria, however, addresses only the requirement that Demand Resources 
and DER Capacity Aggregation Resources provide evidence of executed customer agreements or 
binding commitments with identified locations and customer names.64  It does not address the 
separate requirement that the seller show it can effectuate the offered load reduction through an 
"[e]quipment procurement plan or evidence of deployed enabling infrastructure such as metering, 
telemetry, load control, [Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition]/dispatch systems, or DER 
major equipment as applicable"65—the very language FirstEnergy challenged.  The record reflects 
that the ambiguity is real: while FirstEnergy asked PJM to clarify that binding commitments are 
required, another intervenor asked PJM to "confirm . . . that a procurement plan, rather than 
infrastructure already installed and operational at the time of the offer, is sufficient."66  The 
September 29 Order does not resolve either request. 
The September 29 Order's rationale underscores why rehearing or clarification is required.  
The Commission accepted the gating criteria precisely because the criteria are intended to deter 
speculative resources and ensure that selected resources are those most likely to go into service.67
A criterion that can be satisfied by a mere plan for the infrastructure necessary to deliver the offered 
load reduction does not serve that purpose, and the September 29 Order does not explain how it 
does.  Because the September 29 Order accepts the criteria without resolving an ambiguity 
squarely raised in the record, it fails to engage in reasoned decision-making.  The Commission 
should grant rehearing or, in the alternative, clarify that Demand Resources and DER Capacity 
Aggregation Resources must be supported by binding contractual commitments to provide the 
64
Id. at PP 76, 59.
65
Id. at P 59 (quoting Proposed Tariff, Attachment DD, § 18.5(f)(i)(11)).
66
Id. at P 67 (quoting AEU Comments at 21).
67
Id. at P 76.

17
MWs sold into the RBP, including the enabling infrastructure necessary to effectuate the offered 
load reduction. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, FirstEnergy respectfully requests that the Commission 
grant rehearing of the September 29 Order on the issues specified above.  Specifically, the 
Commission should reject PJM's RBP filing, proceed under the Section 206 proceeding it has 
instituted in Docket No. EL26-108-000, and establish settlement procedures.  In the alternative, 
and at a minimum, the Commission should: (1) reject PJM's levelized average-price framework; 
(2) direct PJM to strengthen supplier performance assurance and credit requirements for the full 
commitment term and to clarify that eligible demand response resources must be supported by 
binding contractual commitments; (3) reject PJM’s shortfall charge proposal because it fails to 
ensure that customers are adequately protected against supplier non-performance over the full 
fifteen-year commitment term; (4) vacate its preliminary findings that PJM's eligibility 
requirements and selection process are just and reasonable; and (5) expand the scope of the paper 
hearing to encompass the arguments identified herein that the September 29 Order did not address. 
Respectfully submitted, 
/s/ Morgan E. Parke
/s/ Michael Kunselman
Morgan E. Parke 
Michael Kunselman 
Vice President, Associate General Counsel 
Nicholas J. Cicale 
FirstEnergy Service Company 
Davis Wright Tremaine LLP 
341 White Pond Drive 
1301 K Street, NW 
Akron, OH 44320 
Suite 500 East 
Tel: (330) 620-9585 
Washington, DC 20005 
mparke@firstenergycorp.com 
Tel: (202) 973-4295 
michaelkunselman@dwt.com 
nicholascicale@dwt.com 
October 29, 2026                  Counsel for FirstEnergy Service Company

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have caused the foregoing document to be served upon all the parties 
listed on the official service list for the above-referenced proceedings, pursuant to the requirements 
of Rule 2010 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure. 
Dated at Washington, D.C. this 29th day of October, 2026. 
/s/ Nicholas J. Cicale 
Nicholas J. Cicale 
Davis Wright Tremaine LLP 
1301 K Street NW, Suite 500 East 
Washington, D.C. 20005