Request for Rehearing of the Joint Consumer Advocates (DE, DC, IL CUB, IL AG, MD, NJ) of the September 29, 2026 backstop order
Read topic-matched comments in ER26-3380
Topics in the text: Cost allocation · Registry access · Reliability and curtailment
What the document says
PDF p. 2
Pay-as-bid without market power screens lets sellers bid the cap, not cost.
The Order accepts RBP without requiring reasonable market power screens or mitigation PDF p. 2
PDF p. 8
Pay-as-bid without market power screens lets sellers bid the cap, not cost.
unlike a uniform clearing price construct where sellers are expected to offer a marginal cost, sellers are more likely to offer the expected clearing price. PDF p. 8
PDF p. 11
Pay-as-bid without market power screens lets sellers bid the cap, not cost.
The RBP includes none of the BRA’s approved mitigation measures. PDF p. 11
PDF p. 10
FERC abandoned its single-clearing-price precedent for capacity auctions without a reasoned explanation.
A central premise of the design is that capacity sellers are expected to bid their own marginal costs. PDF p. 10
PDF p. 6
The $555/MW-day cap is borrowed from the BRA with no evidence it fits.
The RBP Order fails to provide a reasoned explanation based on the record evidence for accepting an average-weighted $555/MW-day price cap. PDF p. 6
PDF p. 4
15-year terms could add $13 billion when five years would cure the shortfall.
The Order’s acceptance of RBP’s 15-year procurement terms could unjustly and unreasonably saddle captive ratepayers with some $13 billion in excessive and unnecessary RBP costs. PDF p. 4Filed comments: Cost allocation
PDF p. 6
15-year terms could add $13 billion when five years would cure the shortfall.
RBP’s acquisition of 15-year capacity commitments is unjust and unreasonable because it may increase PDF p. 6
PDF p. 4
No locational requirement means RBP capacity may land where the load growth is not.
the RBP Order is arbitrary and capricious because it fails to engage arguments that RBP’s lack of locational constraints renders it unjust and unreasonable. PDF p. 4
PDF p. 7
No locational requirement means RBP capacity may land where the load growth is not.
is likely to result in excessive capacity costs due to the non-deliverability of the resources to areas of need PDF p. 7
Responses and related views
No section-specific public response is linked for this document.
Source sections
Printed headings where available; page ranges otherwise. Excerpts below are selected from the text by keyword.
Opening text
opening text · Topic match: Registry access
The Commission cannot dismiss the concerns of Joint Consumer Advocates (and others) that the RBP’s lack of locational constraints risks burdening ratepayers with additional capacity, transmission and energy costs that could otherwise be avoided based on the unsubstantiated and vague contention that…Read this passage Filed comments: Registry access
I. Statement of Issues and Specification of errors
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS In accordance with Commission Rules of Practice and Procedure 713(c)(1) and (c)(2),18 the Joint Consumer Advocates provide the following enumerated statement of issues and specification of errors, including citations to representative Commission and…Read this passage Filed comments: Cost allocation
II. Request for Rehearing
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REQUEST FOR REHEARINGRead this passage Filed comments: Filing procedure
A. The Commission’s approval of RBP exceeds its authority to rely on competition to set just and reasonable market-based rates because RBP permits and incents the exercise of seller-side market power.
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It must be emphasized that Joint Consumer Advocates do not concede that the Reliability Pricing Model (RPM) is at present competitive or just and reasonable.Read this passage Filed comments: Registry access
B. The Order provides no reasoned explanation for approving PJM’s proposed $555/MW-day price cap.
PDF bookmark · Topic match: Cost allocation
The Order nowhere addresses Joint Consumer Advocates’ argument nor explains why a willingness to pay for a one-year commitment when scarcity is greatest should be commensurate with the willingness to pay for a 15-year commitment that may extend well beyond the end of any supply crisis.Read this passage Filed comments: Cost allocation
C. The Order is arbitrary and capricious in failing to address why it requires 15-year RBP resource commitments when PJM admits that 5-year contracts eliminate the need for RBP procurement.
PDF bookmark · Topic match: Cost allocation
Circuit explained that the “application of [a PJM auction rule] was unjust and unreasonable not just because of how much it increased the wholesale rate, but because it caused that increase for no justifiable purpose” and “without any commensurate [consumer] benefit.”100 That “comfortably fits the…Read this passage Filed comments: Cost allocation
D. The RBP Order errs by failing to require that the RBP incorporate locational constraints.
PDF bookmark · Topic match: Reliability and curtailment
The Order’s refusal to require locational procurement constraints in the RBP is thus an unexplained departure from precedent.117 While the IRAS decision postdates the RBP Order, the Commission on rehearing must explain why it dismissed the concern in the RBP context while crediting it in the IRAS…Read this passage Filed comments: Reliability and curtailment
CONCLUSION
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CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Joint Consumer Advocates respectfully request that the Commission: (1) grant rehearing of the RBP Order; (2) find unjust and unreasonable the four elements of the RBP framework identified herein by Joint Consumer Advocates; and (3) direct PJM to…Read this passage Filed comments: Registry access
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
printed heading
Dated on this 29th day of October, 2026 /s/ Lauren L.Read this passage