{"document":{"slug":"rehearing-er26-3380-ohio-occ","title":"Request for Rehearing to Protect Consumers from Excessive Transmission Rates by Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel","issued":"2026-10-29","accession":"20261029-5263","docket":"ER26-3380-001","group":"Rehearing of FERC's PJM Reliability Backstop Procurement order","filer":"Ohio Consumers' Counsel","kind":"request for rehearing","file":"sources/originals/20261029-5263_FIN Rehearing Request Reliability Backstop Procurement ER26-3380 (002).pdf","url":"https://elibrary.ferc.gov/eLibrary/filelist?accession_number=20261029-5263","sha256":"74d23855cf0dacee481b4778c33b38a6dbeef7de0461b1af74686b0d6e246c5f","pages":26,"tokens":7748,"emptyPages":[]},"pages":[{"page":1,"startToken":0,"endToken":115,"text":"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nBEFORE THE \nFEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \nPJM Interconnection, L.L.C.   \n) \nDocket Nos. ER26-3380-000 and \n)            \n         ER26-3380-001 \nREQUEST FOR REHEARING \nTO PROTECT CONSUMERS FROM EXCESSIVE TRANSMISSION RATES \nBY \nOFFICE OF THE OHIO CONSUMERS’ COUNSEL \nMaureen Willis \nConsumers’ Counsel \nAngela O/Brien \nDeputy Consumers’ Counsel \nOffice of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel \n65 East State Street, Suite 700 \nColumbus, Ohio 43215 \nTelephone: (614) 466-9531 \nangela.obrien@occ.ohio.gov\nDenise C. Goulet, Esq. \nMcCarter & English, LLP \n1301 K Street, N.W., Suite 1000 West \nWashington, D.C. 20005 \n(202) 753-3400 \ndgoulet@mccarter.com\nSpecial Counsel to the Ohio Office of the \nAttorney General for the  \nOffice of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel \nOctober 29, 2026"},{"page":2,"startToken":115,"endToken":342,"text":"Table of Contents\nI.\nINTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. 1\nII.\nBACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 3\nIII.\nSPECIFICATIONS OF ERRORS ON REHEARING .................................................. 4\nIV.\nLIST OF ISSUES ON REHEARING ............................................................................. 5\nV.\nREQUEST FOR REHEARING ...................................................................................... 8\nA.\nFERC’s approval of the $555/MW-day seller offer cap and the \npay-as-bid clearing mechanism design for the RBP auction fails the \ntest for reasoned decision-making because these decisions are not \nsupported by the evidence and do not provide adequate protections \nfor consumers against seller market power. ................................................................... 8\nB.\nFERC’s approval of the pay-as-bid clearing price mechanism \nfor the RBP auction is an unexplained and unreasoned departure \nfrom long-held FERC precedent. .................................................................................. 13\nC.\nFERC’s approval of the 20% shortage penalty for the RBP \nauction fails the test for reasoned decision-making because it is \ndisproportionate to the risk consumers will incur if large load data \ncenters do not materialize, and it is allocated to consumers who did \nnot cause the circumstances leading to the incurrence of the penalty. ...................... 16\nD. \nFERC’s approval of the RBP auction structure violates long-\nheld judicial precedent requiring that costs be allocated to those \ncausing the costs to be incurred or to those benefitting from them.  It \nalso does not protect consumers from the unjust and unreasonable \nresults of RPM auctions held in the past three years that cleared short \nbecause of large data center load demands. ................................................................. 19\nVI.\nCONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF ........................................................... 22"},{"page":3,"startToken":342,"endToken":567,"text":"1 \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nBEFORE THE \nFEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION \nPJM Interconnection, L.L.C.   \n) \nDocket Nos. ER26-3380-000 and \n)            \n         ER26-3380-001  \nREQUEST FOR REHEARING \nTO PROTECT CONSUMERS FROM EXCESSIVE TRANSMISSION RATES \nBY \nOFFICE OF THE OHIO CONSUMERS’ COUNSEL \nI. \nINTRODUCTION \nThe Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC”) September 29, 2026 Orders1 in \nthis case fail to protect consumers in Ohio and elsewhere in PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. \n(“PJM”) from the risks and costs that will result from general acceptance of PJM’s Reliability \nBackstop Procurement (“RBP”) proposal in these dockets. That order allows PJM to implement a \none-time capacity auction, with “billion-dollar implications for consumers,”2 to procure \ngenerating capacity needed to serve forecasted load associated with large data centers and the \nresulting resource adequacy shortfall in the 2028/2029 Delivery Year capacity auction.   \nBut the RBP auction design subjects consumers who are not causing the need for the \nauction to shoulder the significant risk of paying for those costs, especially if the forecasted loads \ndo not materialize. FERC’s acceptance of this proposal is inconsistent with the stated \nunderstandings of several of the commissioners in their concurring opinions.  For example, \nCommissioner David A. LaCerte states in his concurrence that the “Reliability Backstop \n1 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 196 FERC ¶ 61,245 (2026) (“September 29 Order”).  \n2 Id., Chairman Laura V. Swett concurring at P 2."},{"page":4,"startToken":567,"endToken":935,"text":"2 \nProcurement is designed to make sure the costs of the large load at issue here are appropriately \nallocated to that load and not to other consumers”3 Similarly, Commissioner Lindsay S. See \nstated in her concurrence that: \n“customers that drive new costs should bear appropriate responsibility for \nthem. Existing customers should not be left paying costs attributable to new \ndemand. That principle is particularly important here where PJM proposes a \nbackstop procurement specifically to deal with the capacity shortfall that \nrapid load growth largely drove.”4\nThe approved RBP auction design does not comport with these understandings.  Moreover, the \nFERC-accepted auction design does not contain sufficient and critically needed consumer \nprotections against the exercise of market power. Pursuant to Section 313 of the Federal Power \nAct (“FPA”), 16 U.S.C. § 825l, and Rule 713 of the FERC’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 \nC.F.R. § 385.713, the Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel (“OCC”) hereby requests \nrehearing of the September 29 Orders.   \nOCC is the statutory representative of millions of Ohio residential utility consumers, per \nR.C. Chapter 4911. OCC actively advocates for Ohioans in numerous state and federal \nregulatory proceedings, including proceedings before FERC. OCC timely intervened in this case \non August 14, 2026,5 and submitted a Protest of the filing on August 21, 2026.6  Ohio residential \nconsumers are adversely affected by FERC’s September 29 Order in this case because they are at \nrisk of paying the costs for the capacity to be acquired by the auction even though they did not \ncause that capacity to be procured.  They are also at risk of paying an excessive capacity clearing \n3 Id., Commissioner LaCerte concurring at P 1.   \n4 Id., Commissioner See concurring at P 2.  \n5 Doc-less Motion to Intervene in PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket No. ER26-3380-000, filed by Office of the \nOhio Consumers’ Counsel, available on FERC’s e-library website as Accession Document No. 20260814-5066. \n6 Protest and Request for Rejection of Filing, or in the Alternative, for Evidentiary Hearings and/or Settlement \nProceedings by Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel (Aug. 21, 2026), Docket No. ER26-3380-000, available on \nFERC’s e-Library website as Accessions Document No. 20260821-5281 (“OCC Protest”)."},{"page":5,"startToken":935,"endToken":1192,"text":"3 \nprice for that auction because the auction design does not contain crucially needed seller market \npower mitigation measures. \nII. \nBACKGROUND \nFERC generally accepted (subject to refund and paper hearing) PJM’s proposal to \nestablish the RBP, a one-time auction to procure 6,831 MW of new generating capacity and cure \nthe capacity shortage that occurred in the Reliability Pricing Model (“RPM”) capacity base \nresidual auction for the 2028/2029 Delivery Year.7 Although the September 29 Order generally \naccepted the RBP proposal subject to refund and paper hearing, it postponed that auction for five \nmonths, until February 28, 2027.8 This delay appears intended to give PJM time to modify the \nproposal to correct certain deficiencies identified by FERC in the Order.9\nThe overall RBP auction design accepted in the September 29 Order (subject to refund \nand paper hearing) requires all loads in the transmission zones affected by the capacity shortages \nfrom the 2028/2029 Delivery Year RPM auction to participate in the RBP auction.10 FERC’s \nruling accepts (a) the must-offer requirement for capacity sellers;11 (b) the $555/MW-day market \nseller offer cap;12 (c) the pay-as-bid auction clearing mechanism proposal;13 (d) the shortage \npenalty of 20% of the seller’s cleared bid times the shortage amount;14 (e) the lack of a locational \n7 September 29 Order at P 1. \n8 Id.\n9 Id. at PP 2-3.   \n10 Id. at PP 12, 16.   \n11 Id. at P 53.   \n12 Id. at P 74.   \n13 Id. at P 75.   \n14 Id. at P 84."},{"page":6,"startToken":1192,"endToken":1477,"text":"4 \nrequirement for new generation;15 and the opt-out provision for Fixed Resource Requirement \nentities.16\nFERC found that the following elements of the RBP proposal may be unjust and \nunreasonable, and set these issues for further paper hearings and additional comments:  (a) \nallocation of costs to Electric Distributor zones and then among Load Serving Entities (“LSEs”) \nlocated in those zones using a snapshot-in-time approach that does not make adjustments for \nchanges in load over time;17 (b) the proposal to allow municipal and cooperative utilities to opt \nout of allocated shares of the cost of capacity acquired through the RBP auction;18 (c) the \nproposed rules for exit fees associated with a Transmission Owner leaving PJM that would \nallocate the exit fees to Transmission Owners rather than LSEs;19 and (d) the LSE collateral \nrequirements.20 The September 29 Order also establishes a process for the paper hearing, but \nstates that FERC might be willing to delay that paper hearing process if PJM submits a filing \nwithin 30 days of the date of the order to correct the deficiencies identified above.21\nIII. \nSPECIFICATIONS OF ERRORS ON REHEARING \n1. \nFERC erred by acting in an arbitrary and capricious manner in approving the \nexcessive $555/MW-day market seller offer cap and the pay-as-bid clearing mechanism design \nfor the RBP auctions.  There is no evidence in the record to support this offer cap, and there is no \nevidence to support the pay-as-bid clearing mechanism design.  The excessive cap and pay-as-\n15 Id. at P 97.   \n16 Id.at P 151. \n17 Id. at PP 154-156.   \n18 Id. at P 152.   \n19 Id. at PP 178-179.   \n20 Id. at PP 204-205.  \n21 Id. at PP 2-3, 24."},{"page":7,"startToken":1477,"endToken":1814,"text":"5 \nbid design will neither mitigate market power of sellers in the auction nor protect consumers in \nOhio and elsewhere in PJM from paying excessive, unjust and unreasonable capacity prices. \n2. \nFERC erred in approving the pay-as-bid clearing mechanism design in the RBP \nbecause this ruling departs from long-held precedent regarding the need for a single clearing \nprice auction structure in capacity auctions to mitigate seller market power. \n3.  \nFERC erred by acting in an arbitrary and capricious manner in approving the \nproposed insufficient shortage penalty.  That penalty is significantly less stringent than warranted \ngiven the high risk associated with purchasing generating capacity through the RBP auction well \nin advance of the forecasted new large data center loads materializing on the system.  This ruling \nis also inconsistent with FERC precedent establishing more stringent penalties for RPM capacity \nresource non-performance, and inconsistent with judicial precedent requiring FERC to address \nthe critical issues raised before it. \n4. \nFERC erred by acting in an arbitrary and capricious manner in approving an RBP \nauction design that does not allocate the costs of the auction to the large load data centers \ncausing the need for the auction and thus placing residential consumers in Ohio and elsewhere in \nPJM that did not cause these costs to be incurred at risk of paying these costs. \nIV. \nLIST OF ISSUES ON REHEARING \n1. \nWhether FERC’s approval of the $555/MW-day seller offer cap for the RBP \nauctions and the pay-as-bid clearing mechanism design are contrary to the Administrative \nProcedure Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), Sithe/Indep. Power \nPartners, L.P. v. FERC, 165 F.3d 944, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Sithe/Indep. Power Partners”); \nFERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 782 (2016) (“EPSA”) (quoting Motor Vehicle \nMfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)); and Neighborhood TV \nCo. v. FCC, 742 F.2d 629, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Neighborhood TV Co.”) (the court must be"},{"page":8,"startToken":1814,"endToken":2160,"text":"6 \nable to “discern a reasoned path from the facts and considerations before the [agency] to the \ndecision it reached”) because the excessive offer cap in conjunction with the pay-as-bid clearing \nmechanism will not sufficiently constrain market power in the RBP auction?  \n2. \nWhether FERC’s approval of the pay-as-bid clearing mechanism in the RBP \nproposal is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary \nand capricious” standard, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), Sithe/Indep. Power Partners, L.P. v. FERC, 165 \nF.3d 944, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Sithe/Indep. Power Partners”); FERC v. Elec. Power Supply \nAss’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 782 (2016) (“EPSA”) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm \nMut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)); and Neighborhood TV Co. v. FCC, 742 F.2d 629, \n639 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Neighborhood TV Co.”) (the court must be able to “discern a reasoned \npath from the facts and considerations before the [agency] to the decision it reached.”) because \nthat auction clearing mechanism design is an unwarranted and unexplained departure from \nprecedent, contrary to the requirements of Williams Gas Processing-Gulf Coast Co. v. FERC, \n475 F.3d 319, 326 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Williams Gas Processing”) (citing Brusco Tug & Barge \nCo. v. NLRB, 247 F.3d 273, 278 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is ‘axiomatic that [agency action] must \neither be consistent with prior [action] or offer a reasoned basis for its departure from \nprecedent’”)? \n3. \nWhether FERC’s approval of the shortage penalty proposal is arbitrary and \ncapricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard, \n5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), Sithe/Indep. Power Partners, L.P. v. FERC, 165 F.3d 944, 948 (D.C. Cir. \n1999) (“Sithe/Indep. Power Partners”), FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 782 \n(2016) (“EPSA”) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. \n29, 43 (1983)); and Neighborhood TV Co. v. FCC, 742 F.2d 629, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1984)"},{"page":9,"startToken":2160,"endToken":2457,"text":"7 \n(“Neighborhood TV Co.”) (the court must be able to “discern a reasoned path from the facts and \nconsiderations before the [agency] to the decision it reached.”) because the penalty is \ndisproportionate to the risk that residential consumers will bear if the large data center loads do \nnot materialize, is allocated to loads that did not cause the circumstances leading to the \nimposition of the penalty, is inconsistent with judicial precedent requiring FERC to address the \ncritical issues raised before it, and is inconsistent with FERC precedent establishing more \nstringent penalties for RPM capacity resource non-performance, contrary to the requirements of \nWilliams Gas Processing-Gulf Coast Co. v. FERC, 475 F.3d 319, 326 (D.C. Cir. 2006) \n(“Williams Gas Processing”) (citing Brusco Tug & Barge Co. v. NLRB, 247 F.3d 273, 278 (D.C. \nCir. 2001)? \n \n4. \nWhether FERC’s failure to allocate the RBP costs that will be incurred to serve \nlarge data center loads to those loads is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the \nAdministrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), \nSithe/Indep. Power Partners, L.P. v. FERC, 165 F.3d 944, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Sithe/Indep. \nPower Partners”), FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 782 (2016) (“EPSA”) \n(quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)), \nand Neighborhood TV Co. v. FCC, 742 F.2d 629, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Neighborhood TV Co.”) \n(the court must be able to “discern a reasoned path from the facts and considerations before the \n[agency] to the decision it reached.”) because it violates long-held judicial principles that require \nallocation of costs to those causing the costs to be incurred or benefiting from the projects?"},{"page":10,"startToken":2457,"endToken":2779,"text":"8 \nV. \nREQUEST FOR REHEARING \nA. \nFERC’s approval of the $555/MW-day seller offer cap and the pay-as-bid clearing \nmechanism design for the RBP auction fails the test for reasoned decision-making \nbecause these decisions are not supported by the evidence and do not provide \nadequate protections for consumers against seller market power.     \nFERC failed to provide a reasoned explanation for its acceptance of the $555/MW-day \nproposed market seller offer cap and the pay-as-bid clearing mechanism for the RBP auction \ndesign.  This design will not protect consumers in Ohio or elsewhere in PJM from the exercise of \nseller market power.  In his Protest to the filing, the Independent Market Monitor for PJM \n(“IMM”) demonstrates the critical flaw in PJM’s proposal, i.e., that PJM explicitly decided \nnot to use “market power screening or mitigation measures” in the design of the auction \nparameters.22 As the IMM argues, “[i]t should be unacceptable that PJM, at a time of severe \nsupply shortage, would propose to not use the standard market power screening that is used \nin all PJM capacity auctions.”23 This is especially concerning given that the overall market \ndesign is premised on  an excessive seller offer cap and a pay-as-bid clearing mechanism, \nneither of which will constrain seller market power in an auction where scarcity is a known \ncondition.  \nThe September 29 Order’s primary reasoning for the offer cap amount is that the \n$555/MW-day represents the “maximum willingness to pay and process for selecting RBP \nresources in the RBP auction.”24 But the order points to no evidence justifying that $555/MW-\nday is the maximum willingness to pay in the RBP auction. Instead, FERC states that “PJM \n22 Protest of the Independent Market Montior for PJM at 12 (citing RBP Application at 32), Docket No. ER26-3380-\n000, available on the FERC e-library website as Accession Document No. 20260821-5317 (“IMM  Protest”).   \n23 Id.\n24 September 29 Order at P 74."},{"page":11,"startToken":2779,"endToken":3086,"text":"9 \nneeds to expeditiously cure the capacity shortage and a high price cap will encourage new \nentrants.”25\nFERC also notes that “in establishing the value for the maximum willingness to pay in the \nRBP, PJM reasonably relied on the value of the RPM price cap that the Commission accepted in \nJanuary and reaffirmed in July” in the RPM quadrennial review of the RPM auction \nparameters.”26 But that too fails to explain why the $555/MW-day cap is appropriate for an \nauction with known scarcity conditions and no market power mitigation provisions. \n In the RPM quadrennial review proceeding that established $555/MW-day as the upper \nbound for procuring capacity in RPM base residual auctions, there are other established measures \nin place to mitigate seller market power. As the IMM demonstrates in his Protest, those seller \nmarket power mitigation measures will not exist in the RBP auction.  Neither PJM nor FERC \nexplain why they assume load has a maximum willingness to pay $555/MW-day for capacity to be \nprocured in the RBP auction where scarcity is highly likely given that the 2028/2029 auction \ncleared short by over 6,800 MW.  PJM argued in the RBP Application27 that its proposed \n“maximum willingness-to-pay cap” will provide “a direct limit on procurement costs even in \nthe absence of offer mitigation,”28 claiming that “competitive dynamics are expected to \nencourage suppliers to submit competitive offers that more closely reflect their willingness to \nprovide service.”29 But there is no evidence that competitive dynamics are likely to exist in \n25 Id.\n26 Id.\n27 Reliability Backstop Procurement to Address Resource Adequacy Concerns Stemming from Large Loads (Jul. 31, \n2026), filed by PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. in Docket No. ER26-338-000 (“RBP Application”), available on \nFERC’s e-library website at Accession Document No. 20260731-5214.   \n28 RBP Application at 68.   \n29 Id. at 69."},{"page":12,"startToken":3086,"endToken":3438,"text":"10 \nthe RBP auction. FERC acknowledges that the pay-as-bid nature of the RBP auction is a \n“theoretical drawback” to ensuring competitive outcomes, but dismisses this flaw, stating that \nthis “is acceptable in the context of the proposed $555/MW-day average-price cap and the \nCharles River Associates Survey Results indicating strong seller interest in the RBP auction.”30\nIt is mere speculation that new capacity will show up in the RBP auction in sufficient \nquantities to mitigate the known scarcity from the 2028/2029 RPM auction.  \nRegardless of the Study results, neither FERC nor PJM explain how the offer cap \nwill mitigate seller market power when structural market power has long been endemic to \nthe PJM capacity auctions. The IMM has consistently reported that “[s]tructural market power \nis endemic to the capacity market.” 31  In the 2026 State of the Market Report, the IMM states \nthat “[i]n a good market design and a competitive market structure, market participants are \nconstrained to behave competitively,” but that “[i]n a market with endemic structural market \npower like the PJM Capacity Market, effective market power mitigation rules are required in \norder to constrain market participants to behave competitively.”32 Suppliers know they will be \npaid their offer price given the pay-as-bid RBP auction design, but there are no rules to \nmitigate structural seller market power in that auction. \nThe $555/MW-day offer cap FERC accepted in the September 29 Order is more than \n$200/MW-day higher than the current collared price cap applied in the 2028/2029 RPM base \nresidual auction.  And while it may make sense that something higher than the cap in the \n2028/2029 auction is needed to cure the capacity shortage stemming from that auction, there is no \n30 September 29 Order at P 75.   \n31 2026 State of the Markets Report, Section 5 Capacity Market at 382, 390, prepared by the Independent Market \nMonitor for PJM (“2026 State of the Market Report”), available on the internet at \nhttps://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/2026/2026q2-som-pjm-sec5.pdf. \n32 2026 State of the Market Report at 390."},{"page":13,"startToken":3438,"endToken":3751,"text":"11 \njustification for why $555/MW-day is the right price point for preventing seller market power in an \nauction with known endemic market power, a known shortage to be procured, and a known lack of \nmarket power mitigation measures.  The fact that the accepted auction design will pay each seller \nwhose offer clears the auction its offer bid price for a period of up to 15 years only encourages \nrather than discourages offers above competitive levels.  While one might argue that a cap above \nthe clearing price in the last short auction might be needed to encourage new entry, neither PJM \nnor FERC explain why $555/MW-day is the right number. \nThe obvious goal of a seller offer cap is to mitigate seller market power in the RPM \nauctions. FERC has routinely used market seller offer caps in conjunction with an auction \nstructure that encourages new entrants to bid their marginal cost of new supply into the \nauctions.33 FERC found that “a competitive market with a single, market-clearing price creates \nincentives for sellers to minimize their costs, because cost-reductions increase a seller’s \nprofits.”34 FERC further explained that “when many sellers work to minimize their costs, \ncompetition among them keeps prices as low as possible.”35 FERC continued, reasoning that \n“[w]hile an efficient seller may, at times, receive revenues that are above its average total costs, \nthe revenues to an inefficient seller may be below its average total costs and it may be driven out \nof business,” and “[t]his market result benefits customers, because over time it results in an \nindustry with more efficient sellers and lower prices.”36 In Commonwealth Edison Co. FERC \nexplained that “under this model, the generator has the proper incentive to bid the lowest price \n33 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61,331 at P 141 (2006). \n34 Id.\n35 Id.\n36 Id."},{"page":14,"startToken":3751,"endToken":4094,"text":"12 \nthat covers its marginal cost, knowing that if the market produces a higher price it will receive \nthe market price.”37\nPJM argued that a single clearing price is inappropriate for the RBP auction design because \nthat approach would “transfer inframarginal rents to every seller priced below the most expensive \naccepted offer.”38 But that concern simply demonstrates the unjustness and unreasonableness of the \nexcessive offer cap rather than supports a departure from long-held precedent.  It is also \ninconsistent with FERC’s long-held rulings related to the use of a single clearing price auction \nstructure for PJM capacity markets.    \nFERC does not explain why the goal of RPM, which is to encourage bids reflecting \nmarginal costs (which addresses market power concerns), is not also needed for the RBP \nauction.  FERC states only that it recognizes the flaw in pay-as-bid because it does not encourage \nmarginal cost based bids, but shrugs off that flaw with the argument that the excessive offer cap \nand a study indicating strong interest in RBP auction will cure the problem.39  FERC would not \nneed an excessive offer cap if it was not departing from precedent with the pay-as-bid approach.  \nIt appears that FERC’s hope is that new or more sellers will show up for an auction to be run just \na few months after the 2028/2029 Delivery Year RPM auction which cleared short by more than \n6,800 MW.  This hope is mere speculation, poses a significant risk of high clearing prices for \nconsumers, and does not satisfy the judicial  requirement for reasoned decision-making. \nInstead of developing a market design consistent with sound economic and FERC policy, \nthe IMM notes that “PJM’s [RBP] proposals abandon single clearing price logic.”40 As the IMM \n37 Commonwealth Edison Co., 113 FERC ¶ 61,278 at P 43 (2005), citing to New York Independent System Operator, \nInc., order on reh'g, 110 FERC ¶ 61,244 at P 65 n. 76 (2005). \n38 RBP Application at 66. \n39 September 29 Order at P 75. \n40 2026 State of the Market Report at 382."},{"page":15,"startToken":4094,"endToken":4439,"text":"13 \nexplains, “[b]y proposing a pay as bid auction design with no market power screening, RBP \nmarket sellers have a strong incentive to offer above their costs.”41 There is nothing in that \nstructure that will prevent sellers from just bidding at the $555/MW-day offer cap regardless of \nthe sellers’ actual marginal costs. The high offer cap will do nothing to curb seller incentives to \nbid above their marginal costs.     \nThe RBP auction design does not replicate how sellers in competitive markets would bid.  \nFERC should reconsider its approval of the $555/MW-day offer cap and the pay-as-bid clearing \nprice auction design because these components of the RBP are unsupported by the evidence and \nfail to mitigate seller market power. The September 29 Order fails to explain how the excessive \noffer cap in conjunction with a pay-as-bid clearing price design will mitigate seller market power \nin the wake of known structural market power that is endemic to the capacity markets, known \ncapacity shortages in recent auctions, and a lack of market power mitigation measures.  \nB. \nFERC’s approval of the pay-as-bid clearing price mechanism for the RBP auction is \nan unexplained and unreasoned departure from long-held FERC precedent. \nFERC also failed to provide a reasoned explanation for its departure from its long-held \npolicy of requiring a single clearing price auction design for capacity markets. The September 29 \nOrder attempts to distinguish between the RPM capacity auction design and that approved for \nRBP by arguing that pay-as-bid is appropriate when the product to be procured is not uniform.42\nBut the product to be procured in RBP is just as uniform as it is in the RPM auctions.  In the \nthree-year forward RPM auctions, new capacity participating in the auctions can consist of both \nexisting and planned generation, as well as demand response resources.43 Similarly, the RBP \n41 IMM Protest at 12. \n42 September 29 Order at P 75. \n43 Reliability Resource Agreement Among Load Serving Entities in PJM, Article I, Definitions, Capacity Resources; \nsee  also PJM Tariff, Attachment DD, section 5.5A(a)."},{"page":16,"startToken":4439,"endToken":4753,"text":"14 \nauction design approved by FERC allows both existing and planned generating resources and \ndemand response resources to participate, subject to certain limitations.44 RBP sellers’ capacity \nmust never have cleared an RPM auction and must have an expected in service date of June 1, \n2032.45 While that date is a limitation on sellers that can bid into RBP, the three-year ahead RPM \ncapacity auctions have a similar start date limitation in that the planned capacity being bid into \nthe RPM auction must have an in-service date of three years, i.e., by the time the Delivery Year \ncommences.   \nFERC appears to focus on the fact that RBP resources will provide a 15-year \ncommitment to remain in the market.46  RPM resources have no similar commitment. But that \ndifference does not mean that the RBP auction design does not seek to procure a uniform \nproduct. The fact remains that bidders into both the RBP and RPM auctions must be available \nwithin the period defined in the respective rules.  And while RPM sellers do not have to make \nmore than a one-year commitment to the market, they nevertheless must offer their capacity into \nsubsequent auctions unless they satisfy one of four very limited criteria for an exception.47 In \nother words, they too have restrictions mandating their participation in the PJM capacity auctions \nyear-after-year unless they qualify for one of four limited exceptions.  That obligation makes \ntheir resources similar to the resources subject to the 15-year participation commitment in the \nRBP rules.   \nThe September 29 Order provides no clear explanation for how FERC decided that RPM \nprocures a uniform product while RBP does not. FERC describes the uniform product as \n44 PJM RBP Application at 36, 51.   \n45 Id., see also September 29 Order at P 32.  \n46 September 29 Order at 32.   \n47 PJM Tariff, Attachment DD, section 6.6(a) and (g)."},{"page":17,"startToken":4753,"endToken":5042,"text":"15 \ncapacity that “may differ based on commercial operation dates and other factors.”48 But there are \nlimits on commercial operation dates in both the RBP and RPM auctions, as discussed above.  \nThe evidence does not support FERC’s findings.  In neither the RBP nor the RPM auction design \nis the product to be procured “uniform” as FERC describes that word in the September 29 \nOrder.   \nThe approved RBP pay-as-bid auction design dramatically departs from FERC’s prior \npreference for a single auction clearing price structure in order to ensure that market outcomes \nare consistent with competitive market conditions. This is inconsistent with Commissioner \nLaCerte’s guidance in his concurrence, directing that PJM, in preparing a revised filing, should \n“not deviate from the principles of ratepayer protection.”49 Commissioner David Rosner likewise \ndirected that PJM and its stakeholders must return to market fundamentals so that “[l]oad and \nsupply should have strong incentives to hedge, manage their risks, and procure the capacity they \nrely upon.”50\nFERC never reasonably explained its departure from long-held judicial precedent with \nrespect to the preference for single clearing price capacity auctions. That unexplained departure \nfrom precedent violates long-held juridical precedent in Williams Gas Processing-Gulf Coast Co. \nv. FERC, 475 F.3d 319, 326 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Williams Gas Processing”) (citing Brusco Tug & \nBarge Co. v. NLRB, 247 F.3d 273, 278 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is ‘axiomatic that [agency action] \nmust either be consistent with prior [action] or offer a reasoned basis for its departure from \nprecedent’”).  This failure to explain its departure requires rehearing or reconsideration by FERC \nof this ruling. \n48 September 29 Order at P 75.   \n49 Id., LaCerte concurrence at P 6. \n50 Id., Rosner concurrence at P 4."},{"page":18,"startToken":5042,"endToken":5374,"text":"16 \nC. \nFERC’s approval of the 20% shortage penalty for the RBP auction fails the test for \nreasoned decision-making because it is disproportionate to the risk consumers will \nincur if large load data centers do not materialize, and it is allocated to consumers \nwho did not cause the circumstances leading to the incurrence of the penalty.   \nFERC did not explain why the shortage penalty, set at 20% of the price bid by the seller \ntimes the cleared capacity, was appropriate.  PJM proposed that the shortfall charge would “be \nequal to the product of the RBP Resource’s committed . . . MW shortfall and 20% of the RBP \nprice.”51  In approving this proposal, the September 29 Order states only that the proposed \npenalty is appropriate because it will work in conjunction with the high pay-as-bid RBP clearing \nprice and the “promise” of up to 15 years of revenue certainty, which “will incentivize \ndevelopers of RBP Resources to deliver” on their commitment.52  But FERC does not explain \nhow a penalty set at only 20% of the clearing price, without additional restrictions, will \nencourage developers to meet their commitments.   \nUnder existing RPM rules, the non-performance penalty is set at the clearing price plus \n20% of that price.53  Those non-performing resources face additional penalties for not meeting \ncommitments during performance assessment hours. In contrast, FERC accepted a proposal to \nlimit the proposed shortage penalty to only 1/5th of the capacity sell offer, which seriously \nundervalues the reliance load places on resource adequacy.  \nAs the IMM explained in his Protest, “the RBP Filing is inconsistent with the capacity \nmarket approach to penalties for performance” because “[t]he proposed [RBP] Tariff language \nunnecessarily restricts the applicability of charges to a narrow, specific reason, is vague about the \ntiming of the charges, limits the charges to three years, and shifts the risk from resource owners to \n51 September 29 Order at P 79. \n52 Id. at P 84. \n53 PJM Tariff, Attachment DD, sections 7 and 8.2."},{"page":19,"startToken":5374,"endToken":5767,"text":"17 \ncustomers.”54 The IMM demonstrates that “[d]eficiency charges in the current RPM rules are \nassessed due to a failure to satisfy a commitment ‘for any reason,’ such as derates and \nretirements.”55  In contrast, “the proposed RBP Shortfall Charge would only apply for a specific \nreason, “due to not achieving commercial operation.”56 Moreover, the RBP shortfall charges are \nlimited to a three-year period.57 In contrast, the new resources must be available for a 15-year \nperiod.  FERC never addressed the IMM’s concerns that there is nothing to protect consumers \nfrom shortfall in capacity that could occur in years four through fifteen.  FERCs failure to \naddress serious challenges to the insufficiency of the proposed shortage penalty violates judicial \nprecedent requiring that FERC address critical issues raised before it.58\nFERC also ignores that under PJM’s proposal, it is consumers who may pay the shortage \npenalties. PJM states in its RBP Application that “[s]hortfall charges assessed to RBP Resources \nwill be allocated to load.”59 It is unclear what PJM means by this statement, but it appears that \nPJM is proposing that consumers rather than those bidding the resources into the RBP auctions \nwill pay the shortage penalties. Although OCC protested this element of the RBP proposal, \nFERC never addressed that concern. It simply is not just and reasonable to impose these shortage \npenalties on consumers when it is the suppliers that FERC seeks to encourage to comply with \n54 IMM Protest at 15. \n55 Id.\n56 Id. at 15-16, citing proposed Tariff, Attachment DD, section 8.1 \n57 RBP Application at 61; see also IMM Protest at 17.   \n58 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (FERC’s orders are arbitrary \nand capricious if it “relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an \nimportant aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the \nagency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency \nexpertise.”); see also Friends of Buckingham v. State Air Pollution Control Bd., 947 F.3d 68, 80 (4th Cir. 2020); \nAppalachian Voices v. State Water Control Bd., 912 F.3d 746, 753 (4th Cir. 2019). \n59 RBP Application at 61."},{"page":20,"startToken":5767,"endToken":6081,"text":"18 \npromised in-service dates and it is suppliers that have the power to remedy the problem.  FERC’s \nfailure to address this issue also violates judicial precedent.60\nFERC’s ruling accepting the proposal to impose the shortage penalty on loads might have \nbeen just and reasonable if the auction design made the cost causers (large data center loads)  pay  \nthe costs associated with the RBP auctions. But under the RBP auction design accepted by \nFERC, it is all consumers in the Electric Distributor zones that are short that will pay the \nincentive for seller performance.61 This is unjust and unreasonable.  \nIf the RBP capacity developers fail to abide by their commitment to bring capacity to \nPJM by June 2032, consumers will bear the risk of that capacity not materializing through \ncurtailments of energy deliveries.  This is especially true given FERC’s recent rejection of PJM’s \ncompanion filing to the RBP Application, i.e., the Interim Resource Adequacy Service (“IRAS”) \nproposal.62 That proposal would have targeted curtailments to the zones that are short on \ncapacity.63 In the absence of that proposal, PJM curtailments could affect all consumers across \nthe grid. Thus, all consumers grid-wide could be saddled with both energy curtailments and the \nexcessive costs of the unmitigated seller market power stemming from the RBP auction. These \nconsumers should not also bear the shortage penalties incurred by capacity sellers unable or \nunwilling to abide by their commitments.   \nFERC should have found the shortage charge provisions of the RBP proposal unjust and \nunreasonable, and required further briefing or a modified filing to ensure that the shortage \npenalty was sufficiently stringent to incent capacity developer performance. FERC also should \n60 See n.58, supra.   \n61 RBP Application at 61.     \n62 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 197 FERC ¶ 61,019 (2026) (rejecting the curtailment provisions in PJM’s \ncompanion to the RBP filing). \n63 Id. at P 53."},{"page":21,"startToken":6081,"endToken":6453,"text":"19 \nhave made clear that such penalties would be allocated to the developers defaulting on their \ncommitments. The combination of a more stringent shortage penalty with a structure that \nallocated such costs either to the developers or the load causing the costs to be incurred would be \nfair, follow cost causation principles and protect all other consumers in Ohio and elsewhere in \nPJM. \nD.  \nFERC’s approval of the RBP auction structure violates long-held judicial precedent \nrequiring that costs be allocated to those causing the costs to be incurred or to those \nbenefitting from them.  It also does not protect consumers from the unjust and \nunreasonable results of RPM auctions held in the past three years that cleared short \nbecause of large data center load demands.  \nFERC never addressed OCC’s main concern that the RBP auction model is \ninappropriate, unjust and unreasonable because it does not target procurement and allocation of \nthe resulting auction costs to the large data center loads causing the shortage in the 2028/2029 \nand earlier RPM Delivery Years.  PJM and FERC both recognize that the need for the RBP \nauction is the direct result of the sudden addition of more than 6,000 MW of large load data \ncenters to the PJM resource adequacy forecasts.  As FERC recognizes in the September 29 \nOrder, the courts have long required that “Commission-jurisdictional rates and charges must \n‘reflect to some degree the costs actually caused by the customer who must pay for them,’ and \ncosts must be allocated in a manner that is at least roughly commensurate with benefits.”64 FERC \nfurther recognized that “[c]ompliance with this principle is evaluated by ‘comparing the costs \nassessed against a party to the burdens imposed or benefits drawn by that party’.”65\nOCC demonstrated that PJM’s proposal would not ensure allocation of costs associated \nwith the RBP auction to those entities causing those costs to be incurred and benefitting from \n64 September 29 Order at P 150, citing KN Energy Inc. v. FERC, 968 F.2d 1295, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1992);  Ky. Pub. \nServ. Comm’n v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 193 FERC ¶ 61,110 (2025). \n65 Id., citing Ill. Com. Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 477 (7th Cir. 2009)."},{"page":22,"startToken":6453,"endToken":6808,"text":"20 \nthat auction.66 Nowhere in the record is there any evidence that parties other than large load data \ncenters caused the need for the RBP auction.  Indeed, the name of PJM’s Application for the \nRBP framework is “Reliability Backstop Procurement to Address Resource Adequacy Concerns \nStemming from Large Loads” (emphasis added). FERC should have rejected the RBP auction \nproposal and directed PJM to meet again with stakeholders to consider a model that would \nprovide appropriate allocations of costs, while also providing critically needed consumer \nprotections against market power in an auction structure that is likely to face supply scarcity. \nThe IMM also criticized PJM’s RBP proposal for its failure to properly allocate costs to \ncost causers. As OCC explained in its Protest, the IMM stated that “[t]he most important \ncriterion for evaluating proposals to address how to reliably serve new data center load is the \nassignment of the costs and risks associated with LSEs serving data center load.”67 The IMM \nfurther explained that “the failure to exclude new data center load from the BRAs [RPM base \nresidual auctions], as PJM proposes, would by definition impose significant costs on other \ncustomers and therefore violate the basic principle that data center costs should not be imposed \non other customers.”68\nCommissioner LaCerte emphasized the importance of allocating the costs of the RBP \nauction to those causing the costs to be incurred, i.e., the large load data centers.  He stated that  \nThe vital nature of the large load integration issue to all Americans is \nhighlighted by the very existence of the January 2026 Statement of \nPrinciples Regarding PJM in which the White House National Energy \nDominance Council and the governors of all 13 PJM states joined together \nto address these large load issues as well as the March 2026, White House \n66 OCC Protest at 12-15.   \n67 OCC Protest at 16, citing Monitoring Analytics, Critical Issue Fast Path Proposed Reliability Backstop Auction \nProposal at 1 (Jun. 30, 2026), available at \nhttps://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Presentations/2026/IMM%20Backstop%20auction%20design%20pro\nposal%20-%20V6%202026.06.19.pdf (“IMM RBP Proposal”). \n68 Id."},{"page":23,"startToken":6808,"endToken":7138,"text":"21 \nRatepayer Protection Pledge which addressed that new large loads will, at \na minimum, “build, bring, or buy the new generation resources and \nelectricity needed to satisfy their new energy demands, paying the full cost \nof those resources” and which received broad consensus from utilities, \ncooperatives, data center developers, and governors.69\nCommissioner See in her concurrence likewise emphasized the need for PJM to get the \ncost allocation correct in any revised filing.  She stated that “PJM must better ensure that the \ncustomers driving new costs bear appropriate responsibility for them and that existing customers \nare not left paying the bill instead.”70 Commissioner Rosner similarly stated that “[t]he limited \nset of guidance we give PJM to revise its proposal will enable PJM to assign costs to those \nresponsible (i.e. to the zones with data center growth) for the resource adequacy shortfall, \nconsistent with cost causation principles, and it is my hope that PJM will act on this guidance \nswiftly so that needed generation may be procured.”71\nFERC never addressed OCC’s concern related to the overall auction structure design, and \nthe unjust and unreasonable cost allocations stemming therefrom. FERC also never addressed \nOCC’s protest related to the failure of the PJM proposal to address the unjust and unreasonable \ncost allocations resulting from the previous three RPM auctions that all cleared short of PJM’s \nidentified resource adequacy goal.72 OCC demonstrated that data center demand increased \ncapacity costs to other PJM customers by approximately $23.1 billion across the 2025/2026, \n2026/2027, 2027/2028 Base Residual Auctions.73 As OCC explained in its Protest, “[t]he $23.1 \nbillion figure is not a mere historical artifact of load growth. It reflects a structural outcome of a \n69 September 29 Order, Commissioner LaCerte concurrence at P 4 (footnotes omitted).   \n70 Id., Commissioner See concurrence at P 6. \n71 Id., Commissioner Rosner concurrence at P 2, \n72 OCC Protest at 11. \n73 Id., citing Market Monitor Report at 1."},{"page":24,"startToken":7138,"endToken":7430,"text":"22 \ncapacity market in which extraordinary new demand (data centers) can raise clearing prices \nacross a much larger base of existing capacity (other customers including residential customers). \nThe result is a system-wide cost shift that extends far beyond the incremental load that triggered \nit.”74\nJudicial precedent requires that FERC at a minimum address the arguments before it.75\nJust as it did with individual issues set for paper hearing, FERC could have found that both the \nPJM existing rules and the PJM proposal are unjust and unreasonable to achieve a proper \nallocation of costs associated with generating capacity procured in the RBP auction.  It then \ncould have sent the matter back to the PJM stakeholder process or set the matter for hearing and \nsettlement procedures.76 As OCC explained in its protest, the reality is that PJM’s auction \nproposal is not going to cure the shortage in time for the 2028/2029 Delivery Year, thus there is \nno harm in delaying implementation of a remedy.   \nGiven that even PJM’s proposed RBP auction structure would not procure sufficient new \ngenerating capacity in time for the 2028/2029 Delivery Year, FERC should have taken the time \nto direct PJM to get the auction structure right. A more appropriate auction structure along the \nlines of that proposed by the IMM would have better addressed OCC’s cost allocation concerns \nby targeting the costs of the capacity procured in the RBP auction to the loads causing that cost \nincurrence. \nVI. \nCONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF \nWHEREFORE, OCC respectfully requests that FERC reconsider its rulings in the \nSeptember 29 Order, and afford consumers in Ohio and elsewhere in PJM the full protections of \n74 Id.\n75 See n.58 supra.\n76 September 29 Order at P 23."},{"page":25,"startToken":7430,"endToken":7671,"text":"23 \njust, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory and preferential rates by (1) directing PJM to set  \na lower market seller offer cap for the RBP auction consistent with protests filed by OCC and \nothers on this issue; (2) reject the pay-as-bid proposal in favor of the single auction clearing price \nformat used for RPM auctions and direct PJM to adopt a single clearing price design; (3) reject \nthe 20% shortage penalty and the proposal to allocate related costs to load, and direct PJM to \nadopt a more stringent proposal that will actually encourage suppliers to timely reach \ncommercial operation; and (4) direct PJM to work with stakeholders to develop an RBP auction \ndesign that will properly allocate related costs to the cost causers and develop a remedy for the \nallocation of costs associated with the past three RPM auctions that cleared short because of the \naddition of forecasted large data center loads.   \nRespectfully submitted, \nMaureen Willis  \nOhio Consumers’ Counsel \n/s/ Angela O’Brien  \nAngela O’Brien \nDeputy Consumers’ Counsel  \nOffice of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel \n65 East State Street, Suite 700 \nColumbus, Ohio 43215 \nTelephone: (614) 466-9531 \nangela.obrien@occ.ohio.gov\n/s/ Denise C. Goulet \n \nDenise C. Goulet, Esq. \nMcCarter & English, LLP \n1301 K Street, N.W., Suite 1000 West \nWashington, D.C. 20005 \n(202) 753-3400 \ndgoulet@mccarter.com \nSpecial Counsel for The Office of  \nAttorney General of Ohio on Behalf of \nthe Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel \nOctober 29, 2026"},{"page":26,"startToken":7671,"endToken":7748,"text":"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI hereby certify that I have on this date served a copy of the foregoing document via \nelectronic mail upon all parties of record on the Commission’s official service list in this \nproceeding. Dated in Washington, D.C., on this 29th day of October, 2026.  \n/s/ Denise C. Goulet \nDenise C. Goulet, Esq. \nMcCarter & English, LLP \n1301 K Street, N.W., Suite 1000 West \nWashington, D.C. 20005 \n(202) 753-3400 – Telephone \ndgoulet@mccarter.com"}],"sections":[{"p":1,"at":0,"title":"Opening text","method":"opening text","endPage":2,"endAt":0,"startToken":0,"endToken":115},{"p":2,"at":0,"title":"Table of Contents","method":"printed heading","endPage":2,"endAt":596,"startToken":115,"endToken":143},{"p":2,"at":596,"title":"A. FERC’s approval of the $555/MW-day seller offer cap and the","method":"printed heading","endPage":2,"endAt":975,"startToken":143,"endToken":191},{"p":2,"at":975,"title":"B. FERC’s approval of the pay-as-bid clearing price mechanism","method":"printed heading","endPage":2,"endAt":1219,"startToken":191,"endToken":215},{"p":2,"at":1219,"title":"C. FERC’s approval of the 20% shortage penalty for the RBP","method":"printed heading","endPage":2,"endAt":1582,"startToken":215,"endToken":271},{"p":2,"at":1582,"title":"D. FERC’s approval of the RBP auction structure violates long-","method":"printed heading","endPage":3,"endAt":305,"startToken":271,"endToken":380},{"p":3,"at":305,"title":"I. INTRODUCTION","method":"printed heading","endPage":3,"endAt":309,"startToken":380,"endToken":381},{"p":3,"at":309,"title":"INTRODUCTION","method":"printed heading","endPage":5,"endAt":130,"startToken":381,"endToken":954},{"p":5,"at":130,"title":"II. BACKGROUND","method":"printed heading","endPage":5,"endAt":135,"startToken":954,"endToken":955},{"p":5,"at":135,"title":"BACKGROUND","method":"printed heading","endPage":6,"endAt":1121,"startToken":955,"endToken":1375},{"p":6,"at":1121,"title":"III. SPECIFICATIONS OF ERRORS ON REHEARING","method":"printed heading","endPage":7,"endAt":1417,"startToken":1375,"endToken":1695},{"p":7,"at":1417,"title":"IV. LIST OF ISSUES ON REHEARING","method":"printed heading","endPage":10,"endAt":3,"startToken":1695,"endToken":2458},{"p":10,"at":3,"title":"V. REQUEST FOR REHEARING","method":"printed heading","endPage":10,"endAt":30,"startToken":2458,"endToken":2462},{"p":10,"at":30,"title":"A. FERC’s approval of the $555/MW-day seller offer cap and the pay-as-bid clearing","method":"printed heading","endPage":15,"endAt":1084,"startToken":2462,"endToken":4270},{"p":15,"at":1084,"title":"B. FERC’s approval of the pay-as-bid clearing price mechanism for the RBP auction is","method":"printed heading","endPage":18,"endAt":4,"startToken":4270,"endToken":5043},{"p":18,"at":4,"title":"C. FERC’s approval of the 20% shortage penalty for the RBP auction fails the test for","method":"printed heading","endPage":21,"endAt":391,"startToken":5043,"endToken":6144},{"p":21,"at":391,"title":"D. FERC’s approval of the RBP auction structure violates long-held judicial precedent","method":"printed heading","endPage":24,"endAt":1496,"startToken":6144,"endToken":7383},{"p":24,"at":1496,"title":"VI. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF","method":"printed heading","endPage":26,"endAt":0,"startToken":7383,"endToken":7671},{"p":26,"at":0,"title":"CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE","method":"printed heading","endPage":26,"endAt":462,"startToken":7671,"endToken":7748}]}