ER26-3380-000 · 2026-08-19 · Illinois Commerce Commission

Comments of the Illinois Commerce Commission in support of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.’s 07/31/2026 filing

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
BEFORE THE 
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 
 
 
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.  
 
) 
 
 
Docket No. ER26-3380-000 
 
 
ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION 
  COMMENTS 
 
Pursuant to the Notice of Filing issued August 3, 2026, setting August 21st as the 
Comment date in this docket, the Illinois Commerce Commission (“ICC”) respectfully submits 
these comments in support of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.’s (“PJM”) July 31, 2026, filing 
proposing revisions to the Open Access Transmission Tariff (“Tariff”) and the Reliability 
Assurance Agreement Among Load Serving Entities (“RAA”) to establish a Reliability Backstop 
Procurement (“RBP”) addressing resource adequacy and large loads.1  The ICC submitted a 
notice of intervention in this docket on August 5, 2026, and, therefore, it is a party in this docket. 
The ICC generally supports PJM’s proposal to implement a one-time, supplemental 
procurement of new capacity to address the identified resource adequacy shortfall that aligns 
with the National Energy Dominance Council/PJM Governors’ Principles and the Commission’s 
recognition of the need for action.  The proposed one-time actions strengthen regional resource 
adequacy.  While appropriately recognizing that implementation may require complementary 
state action to ensure that RBP costs are allocated to the appropriate retail loads, the ICC does 
 
1 1 PJM Interconnection L.L.C., Reliability Backstop Procurement to Address Resource Adequacy Concerns 
Stemming from Large Loads, Docket No. ER26-3380-000 (July 31, 2026) (“Backstop Filing”).

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have some implementation concerns, particularly for retail access states like Illinois.  The ICC 
recommends that the Commission require sufficient mitigation efforts to protect against cost 
shifts to or any negative impacts on existing ratepayers, impose no new obligations upon the 
states, and require PJM to provide the clarifications, transparency, and access to data as 
discussed herein. 
I. COMMENTS 
A. The Core Elements of PJM’s Reliability Backstop Procurement Proposal are 
Generally a Just and Reasonable Approach to Assigning Costs While Maintaining 
Reliability  
 
Given the time constraints under which PJM is operating, PJM’s RBP proposal is a 
reasonable path forward to secure much needed capacity for the footprint.  As PJM notes in its 
transmittal letter, capacity shortfalls have appeared over the last two capacity auctions.2  PJM’s 
market faces a host of difficulties in meeting its capacity needs, most notably a sudden increase 
in load due to rapid and large data center growth in the footprint in addition to persistent 
interconnection delays for new generation, supply constraints, and permitting and siting delays. 
To address this capacity shortfall, PJM developed a plan to bring more generation online.  
At its core, PJM’s recommendation is a two-phase procurement process.  The first phase 
is bilateral contracting, followed by central procurement.  PJM’s development of a more robust 
bilateral matchmaking phase, with assistance from Charles River Associates, is a particularly 
well-designed method for meeting capacity needs.  Bilateral contracts provide new load with an 
opportunity to purchase capacity and address the shortfall to which they directly contributed. 
Further, bilateral contracting protects ratepayers and assigns costs directly to those most 
 
2 Backstop Filing, at 7, 27.

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responsible for cost increases.  As we understand it, this bilateral matching process has already 
begun and is ongoing. 
The second phase is the proposed RBP to address the capacity shortfall.  PJM is setting 
the procurement target based on the region-wide Unforced Capacity megawatt (“MW”) quantity 
that cleared short of the Reliability Requirement in the July 2026 Base Residual Auction for the 
2028/2029 Delivery Year.  Resource eligibility requirements for the RBP ensure that the 
procurement is more likely to bring on new generation by outlining what resources can 
participate in the procurement.  New resources included those that have not committed their 
capacity previously, uprates with an affiliated increase in Capacity Injection Rights, and 
incremental capacity created by utilizing Supplemental Interconnection Service.  
PJM’s RBP approach has two particularly insightful features. First, PJM’s RBP 
methodology insists on only new generation participating.  This prevents existing generation 
resources from being purchased away from extant load.  Second, PJM’s approach also makes full 
use of the existing transmission system.  This allows new resources to come online more quickly, 
showing PJM’s awareness of the time constraints under which they are operating.  
In addition to these core features, PJM’s RBP solution includes a number of other 
beneficial aspects.  For instance, the ICC appreciates the Large Load Registry, which will 
improve transparency in the backstop procurement processes, which PJM filed separately in 
Docket No. ER26-3515-000 on August 13, 2026.  Additionally, PJM set an appropriate 
definition for New Large Loads as end-use customer load that has a cumulative peak load 
quantity greater than or equal to 50 MW.  The ICC also appreciates PJM’s attempt to mitigate 
gaming by New Large Load customers.  PJM clarified in its definition that if a load increases its 
peak demand after June 1, 2027, including any new incremental load that causes an existing load

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to meet the Large Load definition, the new large load definition applies.  This should discourage 
gaming by New Large Load customers. 
While PJM’s general procurement strategy makes sense, the proposal does not include 
measures to mitigate errors in forecasting and related prices. It is hard to overstate the significant 
increase in load forecast compared to prior years.  After years of nearly flat load growth, PJM 
expects load growth to average 5.3% over the next 10 years and 3.4% over 20 years.  By 2036, 
total PJM energy is forecasted to be over 1.4 million GWh - a nearly 600,00 GWh increase.3 
Historically, PJM tended to over-procure capacity: from the 2018/2019 to the 2022/2023 
planning years, PJM purchased 8,066MW-11,912MW of excess capacity each Planning Year. 
This was excess capacity in the order of 5-8% over PJM’s Installed Reserve Margin (IRM).4 
When forecasts are off, even by a small percentage, the error has a significant impact on both the 
amount of MWs needed and prices for capacity.   
The PJM proposal does not include any mechanism to moderate any potential error, such 
as cost reconciliation.  Even where overall cumulative regional forecasts remain roughly 
accurate, failure to accurately forecast the locations where such growth will materialize may 
significantly mean the wrong zones are shouldering the costs.  Further only offering 15-year 
contracts may compound the impact of forecasting errors.  Longer contracts will likely attract 
new generation.  Such long contracts can lock ratepayers into contracts with high prices that may 
come down over time as supply increases.  The procurement price cap assuages some concerns 
but not all.  PJM should have pursued a way to mitigate forecast error’s impact and a range of 
 
3 PJM, PJM Load Forecast Report, posted January 14, 2026, p. 8, https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/DotCom/library/reports-notices/load-forecast/2026-load-report.pdf 
4 Monitoring Analytics, State of the Market Report for PJM, Volume 2: Detailed Analysis, March 10, 2022, Table 5-
7, p. 313

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contract periods for the central procurement to better balance reliability needs against 
affordability concerns.  
In addition, PJM’s proposed new term and approach, “RBP Obligation” or “RBO,” will 
impose new obligations on the states to assess the state and/or Relevant Electric Retail 
Regulatory Authority (“RERRA”)-determined allocation of RBP UCAP MW to Load Serving 
Entities within each Electric Distributor’s zone/area.  PJM should provide clarification as to how 
it envisions states making those determinations and whether and how PJM plans to assist states 
in that process.  PJM proposes to “empower” states by imposing on them an obligation to 
“submit RBP RBOs, which PJM would then apply to the allocation of RBP Charges” to load 
serving entities (“LSEs”).5  Given the timing and the lack of implementation details, particularly 
for retail access states like Illinois, PJM’s proposal will take time to develop.  
Moreover, it is unclear how states, particularly retail access states like Illinois, would be 
able to assign wholesale capacity costs to retail load in the manner PJM proposes, particularly 
without an appropriate rider or retail tariff sheet to do so through the LSEs.  It is unclear whether 
it may be necessary to conduct a rulemaking proceeding, a legislative change, or create a new 
customer classification for large loads, in order to properly assign these costs at the retail level.  
This will also take time to develop.  While the Virginia proposal to develop model state tariff 
provisions by January 1, 2028,6 may be good starting point, a solution that works for Virginia 
may not work for a retail access state like Illinois.  For Illinois, it will take time to develop its 
own state tariff provisions. 
We appreciate that the Commission acknowledged that it “has a duty to address the risk 
of cost shifting among transmission customers that may result in unjust and unreasonable 
 
5 Backstop Filing at 104.  
6 Id. at 12.

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transmission rates.”7 In the PJM Show Cause Order, the Commission said, “[w]e expect that the 
additional cost transparency measures proposed  . . . will give state public utility commissions 
and other state regulators the information necessary to allow them to understand which 
transmission costs are caused by which transmission customers, so that they can sub-allocate 
these costs to the appropriate retail customers.”8  We continue to have concerns about this 
assumption.  The ICC supports cooperative federalism. In the case of assessing cost causers 
and/or beneficiaries of transmission costs and/or in the case here of assessing cost causers of 
wholesale capacity procurement, however, expecting the states to make such determinations for 
PJM and the Commission may be unreasonable.  PJM would seem to be in a better position and 
have access to the appropriate data to make an assessment of the cost causers and even 
beneficiaries of those transmission costs or wholesale capacity costs at issue here.   
Despite these concerns, however, given the need to rapidly bring on generation, the ICC 
is generally supportive of the filing.  We recommend that the Commission requires sufficient 
mitigation efforts to protect against cost shifts to or any negative impacts on existing ratepayers, 
impose no new obligations upon the states, and require PJM to provide the clarifications 
requested herein as well as state access to any and all RBP related data. 
B.  PJM’s Proposal Requires Active Collaboration Between PJM and States 
 
As PJM recognizes, under its proposal, states will play a central role in ensuring costs are 
paid by cost causers.  It will be critical for PJM to support states in this critical endeavor.  PJM’s 
territory covers vastly different market structures and PJM’s proposals must work for all of them. 
Put simply, flexibility is essential.  The proposal must work for all fourteen jurisdictions across 
the region, and what works for Virginia will not be same solution that Illinois needs.   
 
7 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. et al, 195 FERC ¶ 61,211, P 68 (2026) (“PJM Show Cause Order”).  
8 Id. P 70.

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Also to enable the states, PJM needs to provide data support, analytic insight, and 
transparency to states when necessary to ensure costs are correctly allocated.  The proposed 
Large Load Registry is an admirable first step that will track the size and location of new large 
loads, improving accuracy of load forecasts.  The registry should collect all necessary data on 
load size, location, ramp rate, and other relevant features in an easy-to-use format that states can 
make use when assigning costs.   
Further, it is important that PJM ensure the data collected in the registry is available to all 
states.  States have different rules that can limit their access to confidential data.  Due to state 
laws and limitations, the ICC, for instance, would not be in a position to sign the pro forma non-
disclosure agreements to access confidential data from PJM as it reads at this time.  There should 
be flexibility with the non-disclosure form language if such accommodations to particular states 
like Illinois become necessary.  It is crucial that any large load registry be accessible to ICC staff 
in order to fulfill any state’s cost allocation obligations.  
II. CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, the Illinois Commerce Commission does 
hereby submit these comments for your consideration.  The ICC further requests any and all 
other appropriate relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Christine F. Ericson 
 
     
 
 
 
 
____________________________ 
Christine F. Ericson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illinois Commerce Commission 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Office of General Counsel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
160 N. LaSalle St., Suite C-800 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chicago, IL 60601 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(312) 814-3706

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Christine.Ericson@Illinois.gov 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel on behalf of the 
ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION 
 
 
 
 
Dated: August 19, 2026

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I hereby certify that I caused copies of the foregoing document of the Illinois Commerce 
Commission to be served this day upon each person designated on the official service list compiled 
by the Secretary in this proceeding in accordance with the requirements of Rule 2010 of the 
Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure. 
 
 
          Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 19th day of August, 2026. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Christine F. Ericson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Christine F. Ericson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illinois Commerce Commission 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Office of General Counsel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
160 N. LaSalle St. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suite 800-C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chicago, IL 60601 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(312) 814-3706