TL;DR

IBM's PSIRT bulletin for Langflow OSS (published 2026-10-28, modified 10-29) lists seven CVEs for 1.0.0 through 1.12.8 and one fix, 1.13.0 (PyPI 2026-10-22): CVE-2026-93680 (IBM 9.8) lets a remote attacker bypass authentication, which the bulletin ties to an incomplete fix for the automatic-login control; CVE-2026-110186 (9.8) is unauthenticated code execution through improper control of code generation; CVE-2026-110193 (8.8) lets a low-privileged user steer the Agentic Assistant into generating or submitting component code with patterns the blocklist missed, for OS command execution; CVE-2026-110192 (6.5) exposes credentials to an authenticated user; and three Hono CVEs (CVE-2026-84363, 84364, 84365) come in through the bundled framework. Upgrade to 1.13.0, back up first, and if the instance ran with automatic login, follow the recovery steps the release notes added, because the default superuser now needs a password.

What happened

IBM has owned Langflow's disclosure since the DataStax acquisition, and its bulletin precedes the vendor tab by weeks (the September file records the same pattern). Bulletin ibm17294467 carries the seven ids; the four IBM-assigned CVE records were published at CVE Services on 2026-10-29 and each describes the whole range, "IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.12.8", with the bulletin as its only reference.

CVE CNA CVSS 3.1 (provider, read 2026-10-30) What the record says
CVE-2026-93680 IBM 9.8 (IBM) AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H "could allow a remote attacker to bypass security restrictions due to improper authentication." The bulletin's summary ties it to an incomplete fix for the auto-login control.
CVE-2026-110186 IBM 9.8 (IBM) "could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code due to improper control of code generation."
CVE-2026-110193 IBM 8.8 (IBM) PR:L "could allow a remote attacker with a low-privileged authenticated account to cause the Agentic Assistant to generate or submit component code using these unblocked patterns, resulting in arbitrary operating system command execution on the server."
CVE-2026-110192 IBM 6.5 (IBM) PR:L, C:H "could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to insufficiently protected credentials."
CVE-2026-84363, CVE-2026-84364, CVE-2026-84365 GitHub 5.9, 5.3, 6.5 (GitHub) Hono: query parsing after a literal hash fragment (cache poisoning, filter bypass), parseBody() dot-notation memory exhaustion, and toSSG() path traversal at build time; all fixed in Hono 4.13.5 per the bulletin.

The bulletin says "several other open-source dependencies in the product have known vulnerabilities" without listing them, and offers no workaround.

The release. langflow 1.13.0 reached PyPI on 2026-10-22 at 21:20 UTC, six days before the bulletin. Its release notes do not name a CVE. They do carry the lines the bulletin's summary points at: "fix: disable automatic login by default" (#14993), "fix(auth): keep the default superuser's data when AUTO_LOGIN is turned off" (#15326), "fix: guide recovery after upgrading from an auto-login installation" (#15789), "fix(auth): isolate sessions for runtime URL prefixes" (#15875), "fix: block unsafe module reexports in assistant code scanning" (#15586), "fix: enforce credential egress policy across provider components" (#15587) and "fix(security): bound URL component response size to prevent memory exhaustion" (#15436). This file does not pair release-note lines with CVE ids beyond what the bulletin states, because the records do not.

What this adds to the Langflow record here. The auto-login path is the one behind CVE-2026-9198 (KEV, 2026-08-04) and the exploited-in-the-wild CVE-2026-105740 chain (not in KEV as of the 2026-10-30 release) (the fernet-key and REPL file, the September file); CVE-2026-93680 is IBM saying the earlier fix was incomplete, and 1.13.0 is the release that turns automatic login off by default rather than patching around it. The Agentic Assistant finding is the third code-generation sink in the product this year after /api/v1/validate/code and the Smart Transform lambda.

Severity. critical on two unauthenticated 9.8s from the vendor's CNA; the bulletin, the records and the release are all IBM or Langflow primaries, so status: patched rests on the vendor alone.

Am I affected?

pip show langflow 2>/dev/null | grep -i ^version        # 1.0.0 through 1.12.8 is affected; 1.13.0 is the fix
docker image ls | grep langflowai/langflow               # same lines for the image
grep -rn 'LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN' .env docker-compose*.yml 2>/dev/null   # unset or true on an older release is the 9.8 path
  • Any instance below 1.13.0 that an untrusted network can reach is affected by the two unauthenticated records.
  • Any instance below 1.13.0 with accounts you do not fully trust is affected by the Agentic Assistant and credential records.

If you are affected

  1. Back up the database, the secret key and uploaded files, then upgrade: pip install --upgrade "langflow==1.13.0" or the langflowai/langflow:1.13.0 image.
  2. If the instance ran with automatic login, follow the release's recovery guidance so the default superuser has a password before anyone else reaches the login page.
  3. Treat every credential stored in an exposed instance as readable and rotate it: rotating cloud credentials, if your web app was compromised.

Prevention

Sources

Update 2026-11-02 — a public Metasploit module for CVE-2026-93680 predates the record by six days and names a narrower range; thirty more Langflow CVEs from IBM's 2026-10-19 bulletins now have their own file

The Hacker News (2026-11-02) covered the bulletin and added two facts. Rapid7's Metasploit wrap-up of 2026-10-23 announced an auxiliary module, gather/langflow_auth_bypass_cve_2026_93680 (Richard Howe, pull request 21942), six days before IBM published the CVE record on 2026-10-29. The module's metadata says Langflow "allows unauthenticated connections to the MCP SSE endpoint", that it initialises an MCP session and lists the server's tools without running code, gives a disclosure date of 2026-09-22, and states an affected range of 1.5.0 through 1.11.4. IBM's record says 1.0.0 through 1.12.8. The two ranges come from different authors and this file keeps IBM's; a reader who copies the module's upper bound would conclude a 1.12.x instance is safe when the vendor says it is not. The Hacker News also notes that LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN is enabled by default in 1.12.8, that its code description calls it development-only, and that the bulletin does not say whether instances with automatic login off are affected by CVE-2026-93680.

The same wrap-up lists five more Langflow exploit modules: one for CVE-2026-0768, which has its own file here, and four for CVE-2026-0769, CVE-2026-10134, CVE-2026-7873 and CVE-2026-93674, which have no file in this corpus; their records were not opened this run and the ranges Rapid7 prints for them (1.3.2, 1.0.0 to 1.9.3, 1.0.0 to 1.10.0, 1.5.0 to 1.9.0) are the module authors' statements. Separately, IBM's two bulletins of 2026-10-19 (sixteen CVEs fixed in 1.12.4 and fourteen fixed in 1.12.5, including the unauthenticated 9.8 CVE-2026-104339) published their thirty records on 2026-10-29 alongside the four above, and are now in their own file. None of the ids in either file was in CISA's KEV catalog at its 2026-10-30 release. status and severity unchanged.

Sources for this update: The Hacker News — Critical Langflow Flaws Could Let Unauthenticated Attackers Run Code on Servers (fetched 2026-11-02); Rapid7 — Metasploit Wrap-Up 2026-10-23 (fetched 2026-11-02: the six Langflow modules, authors, ranges and pull requests); metasploit-framework — langflow_auth_bypass_cve_2026_93680.rb (fetched 2026-11-02: metadata only); CISA KEV JSON (fetched 2026-11-02, release 2026-10-30).